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Brunner's theology is one of reaction and reformulation; reaction against
the "objectivism" of Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism, and against the "subjectivism"
of liberal theology, and a reformulation of the basic tenets of the Christian faith
in accordance with the sola gratia perspective of the Reformers. The reformulation
contrasts the competing tendencies in philosophy, psychology and ethics, and relates
these to the basic contradiction of human life, which the Christian faith calls 'sin',
with the aid of Kantian criticism, and particularly Kantian moral theory, the
Kierkegaardian dialectic of time and eternity, and the I-Thou framework developed by
Ebner and Buber. Within this comprehensive formulation, our concern is the question
of sin and human responsibility.
Theologically, the issue is the seriousness of sin, and has been answered
traditionally by contrasting man's creation in the image of God with the loss of that
image through sin. Brunner's contention that Scripture presents two concepts of the
image is most plausible, but his designation of these as a formal and a material
concept of the image seems to set the distinction within man himself, whereas the
Scriptural distinction seems to be between an Old Testament image which is predicated
of man and a New Testament image which is Christ. We must also question his
contention that Irenaeus distinguished between imago and similitudo in a manner
similar to the mediaeval natural-supernatural distinction, but his summation of the
Reformers' predicament, that their equation of the image with the justitia originalis
and corresponding doctrine of total depravity renders their concept of a 'relic' of
the image illegitimate, is essentially plausible. Brunner's solution to this
predicament is not greatly clarified in the controversy with Barth, although Barth's
subsequent charge, that Brunner teaches a neutral freedom, is instructive. Brunner's
insistence on a concept of an analogia entis involving an analogy of proportionality,
likeness in basic unlikeness, is understandable, but his relational interpretation of
this suggests that his distinction between a formal and a material sense of the image
is facilitated by an ambiguity in the term 'responsibility'.
The term 'responsibility' seems to have at least three basic meanings in
Brunner's theology - responsiveness, accountability, and ability to respond. Behind
this is the more basic question of the distinction between moral and religious
responsibility. His enthusiasm for Kant's development of the concept suggests that
he overlooks the basically rational nature of the Kantian Imperative, and his content-
-ion that Kant was torn between autonomy and theonomy suggests that he minimizes the
rational perspective from which Kant viewed Christianity. Kierkegaard's teleological
suspension of the ethical, with its inseparability of command and commanded, reveals
the difficulty in the formal Kantian Imperative which Brunner applauds. Further,
Brunner's contention that Kant's concept of 'radical evil' is rationally discerned,
and his appreciation for Schelling's treatment of evil, cast doubt on the seriousness
of his affirmation of the irrationality of sin, and also illuminate the ambiguity in
the moral and religious uses of the term 'responsibility' in his writings. There seem
to be two strands in Brunner's presentation - a basic allegiance to the Reformers, and
a certain sympathy with moral idealism.
The conflict is climaxed in Brunner's treatment of the Fall and Original Sin.
His rejection of a literal interpretation of Genesis III is understandable, but his
contention that there is no real conflict here with modem science indicates an over¬
simplification of the problem. His rejection of a causal explanation of sin is under-
-standable, but his rejection of every temporal explanation suggests a confusion between
causal and temporal. His late admission that he taught a Platonic doctrine of the Fall
suggests that he never really came to grips with the basic problems of the doctrine.
His concern has been with the fallenness of man, in which he attempts to correct the
one-sidedness of the Augustinian doctrine with an emphasis on responsibility. Here the
conflict between the two strands in Brunner's theology is pronounced. His reversal of
Kierkegaard's formula for the relation between individuals and humanity, whereby the
Use other side if necessary.
special term 'Individual' is subordinated to an individualistic concept of 'each of
us', conflicts with his concern for solidarity and his appreciation for the I-Thou
framework, but agrees with his emphasis on responsibility and his refusal to consider
a temporal origin of sin. Ultimately it is the universality of sin, and not
solidarity in sin, which prevails in Brunner's theology. As this fails to provide
an adequate statement of the totality of sin in terms of the race, so his emphasis on
sin as 'act' fails to give adequate account of the totality of sin in terms of the
individual. The concern to emphasize responsibility for sin suggests that this is a
total responsibility which is predicated of men in general, and thus indicates a
violation of the Reformation perspective.
In his basic allegiance to the Reformation perspective, Brunner's development
of the sola gratia principle involves an opposition to synergism in Orthodoxy, Roman
Catholicism and liberal theology, and to passivism in the Reformers themselves. His
defence of the personal over against the rational, in terms of the I-Thou framework,
raises questions as to the significance of the 'It'dimension of life and the nature
of the relation between I and Thou. The two questions are answered in Brunner's
presentation of the respective roles of the imperative and the indicative in the
relation. The former reveals a basic divergence between Brunner and Luther on 'Law'
in that Brunner divests Luther's Law of all content and reintroduces it as the formal
Imperative, thus indicating that Law is an 'It' which has no integral place in the
I-Thou framework. The indicative of the once-for-all act of God in Christ i3 equally
embarrassing to the I-Thou, although it represents a constant emphasis in Brunner's
theology. Luther's concern for the man who stands between the demand of the Law and
the comfort of the Gospel becomes, in Brunner, the concern to relate this dialectic to
the self-understanding of natural man. He accomplishes this with the relatively
modern word 'responsibility' which can refer both to man as an independent moral agent
and to man's ultimate obligation to God. In so far as man is addressed as a moral
agent, and called to account prior to the proclamation of grace, the Reformation
perspective is violated. It is strange that Brunner has not applied his recognition
of the profound gulf separating modern man from former ages to this relatively modern
concept of 'responsibility'.
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Summary
Brunner's theology is one of reaction and reformulation; reaction
against the "objectivism" of Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism, and against the
"subjectivism" of liberal theology, and a reformulation of the basic tenets
of the Christian faith in accordance with the sola gratia perspective of the
Reformer's. The method which is employed consists in contrasting the competing
tendencies in philosophy, psychology and ethics, and affirming that these
crises of the human predicament are manifestations of the underlying contra-
-dietion which the Christian faith calls sin. This comprehensive reformulat-
-ion is accomplished with the aid of Kantian criticism, and particularly the
Kantian moral theory, the Kierkegaardian dialectic of time and eternity, and
the I-Thou framework developed by Ebner and Buber. Within this comprehensive
formulation, our particular concern is the question of sin and human respons¬
ibility.
The question of sin and human responsibility is essentially the
question of the seriousness of sin. This question was answered traditionally
in theology in terms of a contrast between man's creation in the image of God
and the loss of that image through sin. Brunner's contention that Scripture
presents two concepts of the image is well attested, but his designation of
these as a formal and a material concept of the image seems to set the
distinction within man himself, whereas the Scriptural distinction seems to
be between an Old Testament image which is predicated of man and a New
Testament image which is Christ. We must also question Brunner's contention
that Irenaeus distinguished between imago and similitudo in a manner similar
to the mediaeval natural-supernatural distinction, but his summation of the
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Reformers• predicament, that their equation of the image with the justitia
originalis and corresponding doctrine of total depravity renders their concept
of a 'relic' of the image illegitimate, is essentially credible. Brumier's
solution to this predicament is not greatly clarified in the controversy with
Barth, although Earth's subsequent charge, that Brunner teaches a neutral
freedom, is instructive. Brunner understandably insists on a concept of an
analogia entis involving an analogy of proportionality, likeness in basic
unlikeness, and seems to interpret this analogia entis relationally. The
difficulty in this equation of being and relation suggests a more fundamental
ambiguity in the terra 'responsibility'. For it is in terms of responsibility
that Brunner distinguishes between a formal and a material sense of the imago.
The terra 'responsibility' seems to have at least three basic
meanings in Brunner's theology. First, it is used in a purely formal sense
to designate man's essential nature as being one of responding. Secondly, it
is used in the negative sense of culpability to indicate man's answerability
for his response. Thirdly, it i3 used in the positive sense of ability to
respond. Behind this diversity in meaning, there is a more fundamental
difficulty in the form of a lack of clarity as to the context of responsibility.
The basic difficulty is that responsibility can be both a moral and a religious
term. In Ms enthusiasm for Kant's development of the concept, particularly
in the Critique of Practical Reason where it is given a definite religious
setting, Brunner seems to overlook the basically rational nature of the Kantian
Imperative. His contention that Kant's 0pu3 Posturaum reveals a struggle
between autonomy and theonomy minimizes the basically rational perspective
from which Kant viewed Christianity. Kierkegaard's teleological suspension
of the ethical, with its inseparability of the command and that i/hdch is
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commanded, reveals the difficulty in the Kantian concept of the foreal
Imperative. let it is this formal Imperative which plays the major role
in Brunner'g formulation. This suggest that Brunner's sympathies lie with
moral idealism. His contention that Kant's concept of 'radical evil' is
rationally discerned, and his appreciation of Schelling's treatment of evil,
cast doubt on the seriousness of his affirmation of the irrationality of sin,
and also help to explain the confusion between moral aid religious respons¬
ibility in his writings. In fact, there seem to be two strands running
throughout Brunner's presentation, one which indicates a basic allegiance to
the Reformers, and another which indicates a certain sympathy with moral
idealism.
The two strands in Brunner's presentation come into conflict in
his treatment of the Fall and Original Sin. His rejection of a literal
interpretation of Genesis III is understandable in terms of modem scientific
knowledge, but his confidence in the separability of the fore of the narrative
from the matter which it contains indicates an oversimplification of the
problem. Similarly, his rejection of a causal explanation of sin is under-
-standable in so far as sin must be seen within the context of freedom, but
his apparent assumption that this must also involve the rejection of every
temporal indication of the origin of sin suggests a confusion of the causal
with the temporal. His late admission that he taught a Platonic doctrine of
the Fall suggests that Brunner never really came to grips with the basic
problems of the Fall doctrine. His concern has been the fallenness of man,
rather than the origin of that fallenness. In this question, his dissatisfact¬
ion with the Augustinian doctrine is expressed in an emphasis on responsibility
for sin rather than on the inevitability of sin. While this is an important
1*
emphasis, it also has its dangers. Brunner's reversal of Kierkegaard's
formula for the relation between individuals and humanity, whereby the special
term 'Individual' is subordinated to an individualistic concept of 'each of
us', represents one of the riddles of Bninner's theology. This reversal does
not accord with his concern for solidarity and his appreciation for the I-Thou
framework. Yet it does accord well with his emphasis on responsibility, and
also with his refusal to consider a temporal origin of sin. Ultimately it is
the universality of sin, and not the solidarity in sin, which prevails in
Brunner's theology. This difficulty is equally significant with regard to the
other aspect of the totality of sin, the totality in terms of the individual.
Brunner's emphasis on sin as act creates problems in accounting for the state
of sin, but it also facilitates his emphasis on responsibility. The difficulty
is that this responsibility for sin seems to be predicated of men generally,
and not simply within the Christian revelation, so that the responsibility
involved may even be responsibility for guilt. At this point, we reach a
definite divergence from the Reformation perspective.
Brunner's basic allegiance is to the sola gratia principle of the
Reformers. He seeks to interpret this so as to avoid the errors of synergism
and passivism. In the former, he opposes liberal theology, Orthodoxy and
Roman Catholicism. In the latter, he comes into conflict with the Reformers
themselves, for he charges that they succumbed to a concept of passivity in
describing man's reaction to grace. His reformulation is made in the context
of a polemic against rationalism, whereby he defends the personal over against
the rational. His use of the I-Thou frmaework for this purpose raises the
questions posed by the formulations of its originators, the question of the
'It' dimension of life posed by Buber's treatment, and the question of the
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nature of the I~Thou relation raised by Ebrier's contention that the medium of
the relation is the 'word1. The two questions are intimately related, as an
examination of the two basic types of relation between the I and the Thou, that
which is based on the Imperative and that which is based on the Indicative,
shows. Stunner's development of the relation based on the Imperative reveals
that the similarity between his concept of 'Law' and that of Luther is more
apparent than real in that he divests Luther's material Law of all content
and reintroduces it as the formal Imperative. In the I-Thou framework, Law
is an 'If which does not really belong. This centrality of the .Imperative
creates problems for Brunner in giving an adequate account of the Indicative.
Although the once-for-ali act of God in Christ is central for Brunner, it too
is an 'It', and is much less at heme in the I-Thou framework than the idea of
the present Christ who enters into relations with men. The divergence between
this setting of the I-Thou framework and the Law-Gospel dialectic of Luther is
climaxed in the concept of repentance. Although Brunner claims to be follow*
-ing Luther, his concern, in fact, is very different. .Luther's concern for
the man who stands between the demand of the Law and the comfort of the Gospel
becomes in Brunner the concern to relate this situation to the self-xmderstand-
-ing of natural man. He does this by the use of this relatively modern word
'responsibility'. With this concept he can move from moral obligation to
obligation to God without acknowledging the differences between moral and
religious responsibility. In so far as ha does this, he violates the sola
gratia principle in that man is addressed on his own terms as a moral agent
prior to the knowledge of grace. It is strange that Brunner has not applied
his recognition of the profound gulf which separates modern man from former
ages to this relatively modern concept of 'responsibility'.
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CHAPTER I
ORIGIN, METHOD AND SOURCES OP BRUNNER'S "CRISIS" THEOLOGY
The so-called "Crisis" or "Dialectical" Theology is a theology of
reaction and reformulation. It has its origin in a reaction against the
previous trend in theology to blur the distinction between God and man, against
which it attempts to reformulate the basic affirmations of the Christian faith
in accordance with the sola ,'tratia perspective of the Reformation.
Since Emil Brenner's theology has emerged from the crisis of the
theology in which he was trained, any significant appreciation of his concern
and success as a theologian must begin with an appreciation of his estimation
of that theology, and of his exposition of what he considers to be its
underlying principles. Further, sinee Brunner's complaint against this theology
is that it conformed to the Zeitgeist produced in the last century by rationalism
and German Idealism, an appreciation of his position also involves the wider
orientation of philosophical perspectives. Thus we must seek to appreciate
Brunner's position in the historic context which dictates the forms of reaction
in terms of which his formulation is developed, before we consider that aspect
of Brunner's theology which is of particular concern here, the questions of
sin and responsibility. Not only is this essential for an understanding of
the basic orientation of Brunner's theology, but it is especially significant
for our purpose because his reformulation i3 contrasted with the perspective
from which he seeks to escape precisely by his claim to affirm the Christian
doctrine of sin with a seriousness which he denies of his predecessors'
formulations.
It is customary to distinguish different periods in Brunner's
2
authorship in tens® of the changes In perspective and emphases which his
theology evidences* For example, one student of Brunner's theology distinguishes
1
a pre-critical, a critical or dialectioal, and a systematic, period. For our
purposes, the crucial period is the critical or dialectical one, for it is
here that Brunner's basic position is formulated* Thus in this introductory
orientation we shall concentrate on Brunner's early formulation of his position
as a critical or dialectical theologian in the latter part of the second and
early part of the third decades of this century* To facilitate this examination
we shall concentrate on four works of this period which are particularly
concerned with the development of this theological position - Per Ilittler (1927),
The Theology of Crisis (1929), Gott und Mensch (1930), and The Word and the
World (1931).
A. ORIGIN l THE NSEP FOR HEFORMULATION
a. Modern Thought: Autonomy
The increasing trend in modern thought, beginning In the Renaissance
in its abandonment of the Christian perspective in the interest of an
adaptation of the thought forms of classical antiquity, through the Enlightenment,
and the Enlightenment in the narrower sense, Rationalism, through German
Idealism to the present century, involves a progressive emancipation of man
from all external limitation and authority* The uncritical assumption of
modern thought is that man is totally independent and complete in himself by
2
virtue of his powers of reason. Such is Brunner's summation of the general
1 Roman Roessler, Person und Glaubei Per Personallsmus der Gottesbeziehung
bei Brail Brimner (MUnchen, 1965)* PP. 19ff* ""
2 Per Mittler (Tttbingen, 1927), p. 81. E.T. The Mediator* tr. Olive Wyon
(London, 1963), p. 105*
The Theology of Crisis (New York, 1929), p* 3*
The Word and the World (London, 1931), p* 113*
3
predicament of modern man. Further, the comprehensive scope of Brunner's theology-
is due in no small measure to Ms equation of this situation with the Christian
concept of sin. The source of this predicament, asserts Brunner, is the pride
of reason\rhich will not be humbled by admitting the existence of any authority
2
above itself. Reason claims for itself unbridled autonomy, and "autonomy is
3
equivalent to sin."
Not only so, but this autonomy, because it is a false autonomy, rests
4
on a corresponding self-deification. Confidence in the ability of human thought
to comprehend the unity of existence is rooted in the more fundamental confidence
5
that this unity is already present in human thought. It is on the basis of the
ancient lie, "Xe shall be as gods", that man assumes his reason is capable of
absolute authority. In short, modern philosophy's uncritical confidence in
6
reason is but a variation of the fundamental and original sin of man, his
usurpation of divine authority, his confusion of himself with Ms Creator.
The development of this thesis is best illustrated in Brunner's
treatment of that phenomenon wMch he regards as both closest and most opposed
7
to the Christian faith, the ethical formulation of Iraraanuel Kant. The Kantian
ethic stands closely related to the Christian faith in its notion of "radical
evil", the recognition of the seriousness of evil in its determination of the
whole personality, and the corresponding responsibility of the whole personality
8
for evil. Kant's concept of radical evil was arrived at by analysing the Good
9
Will, and the conditions under which we will in reality. In the first part of
Ms Religion within the limits of Reason .Alone he was forced to the affirmation
1 Brunner repeatedly affirms that he uses "reason" in the broadest sense to
include all man's natural capacities, qua man. Mitt. p. 81. E.T. 105.
2 Mitt. p. 23. E.T. p. 43? TofC pp. 42-3.
3 NStW p. 71.
4 Ibid. pp. 113-4.
5 Gott und Mensch (Tttbingen, 1930), p. 7. E.T. God and Mail, tr. David 0aires
(London, 1936), pp. 46-7.
6 TofC p. 44? WSW p. 68. 7 Mitt. p. 88n. E.T. p. 112n. 8 Ibid. p.103. E.T. p.127.
9 Ibid. p. 111. E.T. pp. 135-6.
4
of the concept because he attributed responsibility for evil to the moral will
1 2
of the individual. However, this admission left him with only two possibilities;
either he must proceed from this point to embrace the Christian faith, leaving
philosophical speculation behind, or he must renounce this insight in the
interest of his own position as a philosopher of autonomy. In the second part
3
of the book he chose the latter alternative. The unity of the moral will which
he affirmed in the first part of the book is dissolved in the bifurcation of
man into an Intelligible Self and an Empirical Self, and thereby the etliieal
A
dualism between "is" and "ought" is converted into a metaphysical dualism. This
is the case because the Intelligible Self is accredited with the power to
fulfil the "ought", and is described as the true self. Because the moral will
5
is responsible for evil, evil could have been avoided. This is a blatant
return to the autonomy so radically threatened in the momentary flirtation
with the concept of radical evil, the attribution of divinity to man by the
concept of the Intelligible Self.
... in Kant ... it is the moral idea in especial which is identified
with the ground of things, with God, then it is just the idea, the
immanental presupposition of the reason as such, which is termed Godj
it is the Intelligible self which, as the deepest ground of myself,
is at the same time God. ... The Platonic thought of the immanence
of the divine logos in human reason is here specially applied to the
ethical or practical reason; and by this means idealism receives, it
is true, a special tone, but by no means another structure. 6
Thus the autonomous reason is once again affirmed. The Intelligible Self is
blameless because it is divine; the empirical self is blameless because it is
7
mechanical.
The fatal result of this rational ethic is that the autonomy which
1 Mitt. p. 104. E.T. p. 129.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
A GuM p. 27. E.T. p. 74»
5 TofC p. 53.
6 GrtiM p. 5. E.T. pp. 43-4*
7 Ibid. p. 27. E.T. p. 74*
5
is its key feature not only represents an isolation from God, but also from our
fellow man. Not only is man good, and therefore exhorted to a Pelagian work-
righteousness, but this work-righteousness is of necessity an individual matter.
1
The final motive of the Stoical Kantian ethic is self-respect. This i3 the
inherent feature of all rationalism; it involves atomistic isolation. " Individ-
2
-ualism i3 the necessary consequence of rational autonomy ..." If I have the
possibility of realizing the good in and by myself, and if I am thoroughly
competent to deal with life in my own resources, then I have no need of any
external assistance, nor is ray assistance required by anyone else.
Nor is the situation improved by transposing this naive optimism from
the individual to humanity in general. For the Christian faith the important
philosophical difference between eighteenth century Rationalism with its lack
of historical sense and nineteenth century Idealism with its philosophy of
3
history is of no significance. The latter no more recognizes the reality of
history than does the former because the philosophy of history transposes the
"singular", which is the essence of history, into the timeless truths of
reason. History therefore reveals no more than what the philosopher already
4
knows in principle. The individualism of rational autonomy is therefore not
overcome. On the contrary, the confidence in progress, involved in the
generalization of optimistic rationalistic autonomy to encompass the whole of
5
humanity, merely serves to weaken the force of the "ought" for the individual.
b. Liberal Theology? Subjectivism
The optimistic perspectives of Rationalism and Idealism permeaiied the
1 GuM p. 27. E.T. p. 74.
2 W&W p. 69.
3 Mitt. p. 27. E.T. p. 4$.
4 GuM p. 11. E.T. p. 52.
5 Mitt, pp. 91-2. E.T. pp. 115-6.
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thought of the most influential theologians of the nineteenth century* According
to Brunner, liberal theology "is in part the continuation of the old popular
Rationalism, but far more a theology based on German speculative Idealism."^
The idealistic subsumption of history under the category of the Idea, and its
corresponding confidence in progress, when applied to theology meant that
revelation was interpreted as an immanental process by which the truth, latent
in man, was brought to actuality. The basic tenet of liberal theology is the
2
idealistic assumption of continuity.
But if revelation is no more than the unfolding of the latent truth
3
in man, then sin is not serious. Brunner's development of this thesis may be
illustrated from his treatment of the two leading liberal theologians of the
nineteenth century, Schleiermacher and Ritschl. Brunner charges that although
he did not realize it himself "Schleiermacher,s theology is dominated by his
U
philosophy of identity and the corresponding mystical conception of religion."
Man iff essentially spirit, essentially continuous with the divine? hence he is
enjoined to cultivate this inherent divinity in what Brunner classes as a
mystical manner. Such a theology could be formulated only by reinterpreting
the Christian doctrine of sin along similar lines. Schleiermacher is frank
and outspoken, says Brunner, in describing sin as a purely negative factor in
5
the Greek-Idealistic manner of a bondage to the sense-life. Sin is the
degradation of that lower element in man which impedes the development of
spirit, which is man's essential nature. On this basis, original sin is what
might be taimed an evolutionary lag. It is an expression for the natural fact
6
that "sin arose out of the animal nature as a collective entity." Thus says
1 Mitt. p. 76. E.T. p. 100.
2 TofG p. 12.
3 MLtt. p. 108. E.T. p. 132.
l\ GuM p. 1. E.T. p. 38
5 Mitt. p. 108. E.T. p. 132.
6 Ibid. p. 109. E.T. p. 133.
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Brunner, "Original Sin is ... thoroughly explained, and thus denied."
In contrast to Schleiermacher, "Hitachi's whole conception of the
2
Gospel is dominated by the ethical idealism which he took over from Kant."
Because he starts from the Kantian notion of the morel will, his doctrine of
3
sin is more profound than that of Schleiermacher. However, he fares little
better than Schleiermacher in Brunner's assessment because he defined the
subject of the moral will In terras of the idealistic philosophy of history,
broadening it from the individual, as in Kant, to encompass humanity as a
A
whole. Consequently his doctrine is but a variation of the idealistic
5
confidence in progress expounded by Schleieiraacher.
On this basis, Ritsehl replaced the traditional Christian doctrine
of Original Sin by his "kingdom of sin" which is, in Brunner's estimation, no
more than a recognition of the occasion for temptation involved in social life.
6
Sin remains an isolated act of will, and therefore one which can be avoided.
In this context Ritsehl is forced to define sin as ignorance. This is the case
7
because "he rejects the Law and the Primitive State as points of reference."
Thus the failure of liberal theology rests on its uncritical acceptance
of the autonomy of reason, evidenced in its confidence in the goodness of man,
and on its affirmation of the idealistic confidence in progress, evidenced in
its confidence in the evolutionary growth of the kingdom. In short, "modern
8
theology rests upon blindness to the fact of sin." Brunner's charge against
modern theology and modern thought in general is that of Anselm to Boso -
"Nondum consideraatl, quanti ponderis sit, pecoatum."
1 MLtt. p. 109. E.T. p. 133.
2 QuM p. 1. E.T. p. 3d.
3 Mitt. P. 110. E.T. p. 134.
A Ibid.
5 TofC p. 111.
6 mtt. p. 112. E.T. p. 13b.
7 Ibid.
8 TofC. p. 17.
s
c» tarfchodnxy; Objectivism
If liberal theology's failure to tako sin. seriously, and its
corresponding deification of man along the lines of the idealistic concept of
continuity, nay be characterized as aubj ectivism, than the traditional rigidity
of orthodoxy nay be characterized as objectivism. The reason for this is that
"orthodoxy has placed the Bible itself, as a book, in the place which should
1
have been reserved for the fact of revelation." It identifies the words of the
Bible with the Word of God in its doetrine of Verbal Inspiration. It fails to
take the Incarnation seriously because It fails to recognize that true revelation
2
must be at the same time a veiling, protecting revelation from the acquisitiveness
of man so that it can never become his possession, but can only be perceived
3
through faith. Similarly, Scripture must be veiled if it is to be a real
revelation of God Himself, and not a product of man's vain imaginings. In the
end, orthodoxy fares little better than liberalism, for its position is characterized
by its desire for possession and control of the Word of God, and hence it is
guilty of overlooking the seriousness of sin in its over-estimation of man's
ospacity for direct communication of ultimate truth.
In any event, since the advent of modern science, orthodoxy has ceased
4
to be a live option. That Adam, Eve, and the serpent never existed in a paradise
on earth, that the Old Testament "pro-history" is largely mythology, and the
striking differences between the Synoptic, Johannine, and Pauline traditions,
5
are inconvertible facts established by the modern critical scholarship which was
instigated by the embarrassment and opportunity created by modern science. let
science, far from destroying faith, has merely destroyed that which had to be
1 Mitt. p. 15. E.T. p. 34.
2 TofC p. 18.
3 Ibid. p. 19.
4 W&W p. 101.
5 Ibid. p. 99.
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destroyed in the interest of pure faith, namely, "the divine authority of what
1
was really human." We must recognize once for all that we have the treasure of
the divine Word in frail and error-prone human vessels.
Having recognized this, we still have the problem of recognizing the
divine Word in the human words. But we can find no solution in orthodoxy's
rigid tenacity in maintaining the outmoded forms which it regards as essential to
2
the Biblical message. Nor can we find the solution in liberalism's desertion
of the Biblical message in its flight to a stable realm of timeless truth above
3
the relative plane of history. To appreciate where the solution is to be found,
and the success of that solution, is to appreciate the fundamental basis and
method of Brunner's theology, and the success of that method.
B. METHOD J THE REFORMULATION - CRISES A!® THE CONTRADICTION
a. The Crises of the Human Predicament
The charge which we have witnessed against the rationalistic-idealistic
tradition is one which applies to all philosophical speculation. The three
principal "systems" which have recurred throughout the history of thought,
idealism, realism, and the philosophy of identity, usually misleadingly termed
pantheism, bear within themselves: the scars of futility in the parasitic
dependence of each upon the others, and the impossibility of any one gaining
A
victory over the others. These three major philosophical tendencies - idealism,
which approaches knowledge subject-ively, realism, which approaches knowledge
object-ively, and the philosophy of identity which affirms a hidden unity behind
the antithesis of subject and object intuited somehow by man - all have one
1 W6W p. 101. " ' ~~
2 TofC p. 13.
3 W&W p. 100.
A GuM p. 5* E.T. p. AA»
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presupposition in commont their faith in the possibility of reaching a unified
1
gra3p of reality by means of thought, their optimistic tendency to systematize.
This confidence betrays the more fundamental confidence In the integrity and
2
capability of man, that this unity is present in his own thinking. Thus every
speculative philosophy meets the same fate as idealism, it overestimates man in
its disregard of what the Christian faith includes under its doctrine of sin, the
refusal to acknowledge any authority above itself.
... it is precisely this, this freedom from the necessity of having the
word said to one, power to say it oneself, which is the essence of reason,
with which all philosophy operates. 3
This crisis in philosophy is necessarily reflected in the practical
sphere, in the corresponding "systems" of ethics. There are basically two
ethical "systems"* eudaemonistic ethics which takes the realistic approach,
starting, and, if true to itself, ending, with the concept of immediate life-
preserving actions; and idealistic ethics which starts, and, if true to itself,
4
ends, with the abstract moral law. As in philosophy, each thrives on the other,
and therefore neither can achieve an ultimate victory. They resemble their
respective philosophical backgrounds also in their anthropocentric orientation
reflected in their assumption of the goodness of man characteristic of all
5
natural ethics.
Thirdly, the crisis also permeates the field of psychology. Corresponding
to the three philosophical systems are three leading tendencies in psychology -
naturalistic psychology which treats the psychological as an object, idealistic
psychology which treats the psychological as a subject, a unity which comprehends
meaning, and what for want of a better term may be called romantic psychology
1 GuM p. 7. E.T. p. 46.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid. o. 3. £ .T. p. 47•
4 Ibid. p. 26. E.T. p. 73.
5 Ibid. p. 27. E.T. p. 75.
which treats the psychological as the unity behind the surface antithesis between
1
subject and object, the sphere of feeling. The value of each approach is at the
same time it3 limitation. Naturalistic psychology is valid in so far as man can
be subjected to the methods of empirical observation! the more our approach
concerns the personal centre, on the other hand, the less useful such a method
becomes. Idealistic psychology is valid in its understanding of man as a rational
3elf, but because this is its concern it lacks the concreteness of naturalistic
psychology, and can only define individuality negatively. Romantic psychology
is valid in its sphere of the unconscious, but as such it never really comes to
grips with real man.
b. The Crises are Manifestations of the Contradiction
This recurrent theme, the crisis of the human predicament in man's
efforts to understand reality, in his practical efforts to live successfully,
and in his efforts to understand himself, may be, Brunner suggests, an expression
of the fundamental contradiction in human existence which the Christian faith
2
terms sin. This is the irrational element in existence which defies inclusion
in any system. By its very nature, sin, if it is really serious, cannot be
known by us from within the sinful predicament, but can be brought to our
3
attention only by an external act of revelation. Because this is the case, it may
well be that the natural systems of philosophy, ethics, and psychology are
inevitably doomed to crisis because they do not, and by their very nature cannot,
take this fundamental contradiction in existence into account. Their aim at a
comprehensive and systematic account of reality - metaphysical, practical, or
1 GuM pp. 73-6. S.T. pp. HO-4. ~ ~
2 Ibid. p. 77. E.T. p. 147. Brunner here suggests this interpretation of the
contradiction specifically with reference to the crisis of psychology, but
there can be ncr doubt from his preceding presentation that he includes
philosophy and natural ethics in the same contradiction.
3 Mitt. p. 115. E.T.p. 139.
human - must initially presuppose a contradiction-free formulator, capable of
constructing such a system. From the perspective of the Christian faith, which
begins with a recognition of the contradiction, this systematic approach is
inherently theoretical because it ignores this basic fact about man as he is, that
he is man in contradiction.
It follows that Christian theology is not immune from such a crisis
in so far as it purports to present a "system" which includes the doctrine of
1
sin as one element among others. Sin is only really taken seriously in theology
when it is seen in the ideas of the Fall and Original Sin, not as an explanation
2
of the cause of sin, but as a fundamental affirmation of its inescapable reality.
Only in terms of these complementary ideas is sin seen as a truly personal act
for which the individual is absolutely responsible, and at the same time a
3
"fate" which is the inevitable setting of human life.
It Is Brenner's contention that acknowledgement of this situation, the
seriousness of sin both in personal responsibility and in its inevitability,
exposes the crises of human life because it acknowledges the fundamental
contradiction on which these crises rest. It exposes the crisis of philosophy
because the knowledge of sin is only given in revelation which involves
4
"knowledge of God from beyond all human possibilities." Thus the ground is
cut from under the autonomous reason; reason, that is, man, is taken captive
by the revelation of God.
Acknowledgement of the depth of the contradiction also exposes the
crisis of ethics because it involves a recognition of the futility of all human
effort, on which all natural ethics is based. Brenner states his alternative -
1 GuM p.SI. E.T. p. 151.
2 Mitt, pp. 115-6. E.T. pp. 140-1.
3 Ibid.
4 I&W p. 16.
"my own thesis: the sola gratia* sola fide, soli deo gloria of the Christian
faith, that is, the Pauline view of faith, is the only solid foundation for
1
ethics." Only when man's ethical action is based on what God has done, and
not on what he himself must do, is it possible to find fruitful release from
the legalistic captivity to self in the real contrary to sin, faith, not moral
virtue. The contradictions which compose the crisis of natural ethics are
thereby overcome - the contradictions between reality and the ideal, individualism
and collectivism, activity and passivity, and between optimism and pessimism
2
in the ethical outlook.
Finally, and this is the heart of Brunner's thesis, acknowledgement of
the depth of the contradiction exposes the crisis in psychology. The crisis of
psychology "lies in the nature of the case itself, in man himself, whether it be
3
the investigator or the investigated." But here again Christianity cannot offer
any theoretical solution? for this is precisely the message of Christianity, that
every theoretical solution is as such man-made, and therefore a product of the
contradiction itself.
... since knowledge of sin at the same time removes the contradiction
and teaches that it is irremovable, removes it on God's side, and
teaches that it is irremovable on man's side, it is able to indicate
the place where the crisis of man and also the crisis of psychology
has its roots, but it is unable to offer an idea or a system in which
the antitheses are resolved. The solution of this contradiction
cannot be an idea, but can be only the redemption. 4
c. The Solution to the Contradiction Solves the Grists
God's act is the only real solution of the crises of human life
because it is the only real solution of the contradiction which is the essence
of human life as we know it. let this contradiction is not the proper essence
1 TofC pp. 63-9.
2 Ibid. pp. 80-6.
3 GuM p. 77. E.T. p. 146,
4 Ibid. p. 31. E.T. p. 151.
of nan. Sin mast never be regarded as a primary affirmation, in spite of its
unavoidable seriousness, The primary article of faith is not sin, but creation,
That sin is a contradiction means that it is contra a more fundamental reality,
man's creation in the image of God, The two qualifications, "image" and "fallen"
must be affirmed constantly, if we are to know the depth of the contradiction
1
as it can be known only through revelation. But it is only possible to affirm
both qualifications, "image" and "fallen", if we realize that "the essential
being of man as man is identical with his relation to God, So when his
relation to God is changed, it is not some accidental quality in him, but his
2
essential being, which is changed." Idealism is right in regarding selfhood as
the essence of man, but it fails to realize that this selfhood is not of an
3
independent autonomous nature, but rather a relation to its origin, God. Han
is not intelligible in himself, but only in his relation to God, which is his
essence.
But this description hardly improves upon the abstraetness of the
descriptions of the natural psychologies. Han is still an isolated individual.
The realistic side of the Christian message consists in the fact that precisely
4-
at that point where I am bound to God, I am also bound to my fellow man. The
atomistic autonomy of all natural rationalistic psychology is destroyed by the
knowledge of the concrete inter-dependence of creation. Personality is not an
isolated phenomenon, an independent possession, but rather a reality of
5
fellowship. Just as my being is entirely dependent upon God, so too I exist
only in relations with ray fellow man. It is this inter-dependent existence which
is the concrete expression of the image of God in man. As God condescends to man
1 GuM p. 32. E.T. p. 153.
2 Ibid. p. 85. E.T. p. 157.
3 Ibid. t>. 91. E.T. p. 165.
A Ibid. p. 88. E.T. p. 161.
5 Ibid. p. 88. E.T. p. 162.
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in absolute love, so an answering love is solicited of man, an answering love
which finds expression in the out-going acknowledgement of one's inter-dependence
with one's fellows. In this the contradiction, which natural psychology tries
in vain to ignore or bridge, finds its solution, in the love which is the essence
of man, the imago Dei. Here, and only here, is man really a unity. For love,
Brunner claims, is "the single source of all the psychological functions of man.
1
love is knowing, willing and feeling - and only love is that." It is this
perspective, the recognition of man as the "thou" related to God in an "I-tfaou"
relation which is the essence of his being, that Brunner proposes as a vantage
point for psychological investigation. This description, Brunner contends,
overcomes the partial descriptions of each of the competing tendencies in
psychology by seeing man as created in the image of God, created in and for love.
The unity of the human person is thus not, as idealism believes, the
self of reason, nor, as the romantic psychology would have it, the
individuality, nor yet, as naturalism claims, the body, but the love
which includes all. 2
Not that this is meant as a rival theory opposing the systems of natural
psychology for a system of any kind is excluded for the Christian theologian.
3
Ghristian psychology is not constitutive, but regulative. As such, it points
to the contradiction in man as the source of the crisis in psychology, and it
suggests that a new start may be made by seeing the contradiction in terms of
that which it contradicts, the creation of man in and for love.
The three principal manifestations of the crisis of the human
predicament all derive from a failure to recognize the fundamental contradiction
which is the essence of fallen man. Because this contradiction is not recognized,
the procedures adopted in philosophy, ethics, and psychology, are inevitably
1 GuM p. 91. E.T. p. 165. ~~
2 Ibid. p. 92. E.T. pp. 166-7.
3 Ibid. p. 81. E.T. p. 152.
16
theoretical, and the solutions thereby proposed are inevitably fragmentary.
The only real solution is one which comes from beyond the contradiction, the
act of God Himself. The Judgment which reveals the depth of the contradiction
also reveals the futility of every theoretical approach to life. This applies
to the Christian theologian no less than to the philosopher, the moralist, or
the psychologist. The solution is not theoretical, but practical. It is not
ideas with which the theologian ultimately reckons, but the living God. Hence
his method must be appropriate.
It is only by means of the contradiction between two ideas - God and
man, grace and responsibility, holiness and lore - that we can apprehend
the contradictory truth that the eternal God enters time, or that the
sinful man is declared just. Dialectical Theology is the mode of
thinking which defends this paradoxical character, belonging to faith-
knowledge, from the non-paradoxical speculation of reason, and
vindicates it as against the other. 1
C. SOURCES OF THE REFORMULATION
Such a comprehensive and avowedly revolutionary reformulation of the
basic issues of human life demands an investigation of its sources. We shall
consider three primary sources of the reformulation in its thought-background,
and one practical source which accounts in large measure for the impetus to
reformulation.
a. Kant's Critical Method
The first source must be the philosopher whose formulations Brunner
both admires and corrects, Iramanuel Kant. In a recent "Intellectual Auto-
-biography" Brunner affirms, "I have generally held to the critical standards
2
of Kant up to this day."" Our consideration of Kant's ethics has suggested
1 \m pp. 6-7.
2 "Intellectual Autobiography of Esil Brunner", The Theology of Bmll Brunner,
ed. Charles W* Kegley, The Library of Living Theology, Vol. Ill (New York,
1962), p. 5.
that Brunner affirms Kant'B procedure up to a certain point, to the point of
his reaffirmation of the notion of autonomy in the concept of the Intelligible
Self. If the autonomy is simply "conceived in a purely formal way as the Idea
1
of the good will, then it is just as Christian as it is Idealistic." But if
this good will, and its subject, the Intelligible Self, is equated with man as
2
he really is, "thai it becomes opposed to the Christian knowledge of Evil."
Kant, in his analysis of the Categorical Imperative, showed that it is "the
3
principle by which I come to know my formal freedom, l.e. ray responsibility."
But it also reveals ay lack of real freedom, and this no philosopher has ever
A
seen. Thus what distinguishes Brunner's formulation from that of Kant would
appear to be not so much its basic method, as its estimate of man.
Brunner is by no means an irrationalist. He goes so far as to suggest
that "even the Christian acknowledges reason as the greatest gift of the Creator.
Brunner's objection is not to reason, but to the pride of reason, to that
arrogant assumption that by his own capacities man is the measure of all things.
His objection to Kant is not that he employed reason in h±3 formulation, but
that, in spite of his critical method, he did not employ it critically enough.
Instead of following the insight represented by his notion of radical evil, he
reverted to a position commensurable with his basic notion of autonomy. In view
of this, and of his own admission to the effect that he has generally employed
the critical standards of Kant, we may venture to suggest his debt to Kant in
terms of the latter's attest to avoid the rational speculation of idealism, on
the one hand, and the empirical limitation of realism, on the other. It would
seem that Kant's basic method, by which he seeks to incorporate the best of
1 Mitt. p. 88n.' E.T. p. 112n.
2 Ibid.
3 GuM p. 30. E.T. p. 78.
A Ibid.
5 W&W p. 33.
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both positions, and thereby check the rational by the empirical and the empirical
by the rational, because percepts without concepts are blind, and concepts
without percepts are empty, is basically approved by Brunner.
Brunner's rejection of philosophy involves a rejection of "the
possibility of a knowledge of God by means of the reason. The other possible
way of philosophy, which regards the purely formal critical testing of concepts
as the business of philosophy, has always been described by rae as criticism,
and regarded as the inevitable accompaniment of theological study."* The balance
of the concepts of reason by the percepts of experience provides a reliable
episteraologlcal basis, even for the theologian* Brunner ventures to suggest
that this critical approach may also prove fruitful in the field of ethics.
Kant's ethic has admittedly two 3ides* It 13 perhaps possible to treat
the critical line of thought in it as a pure methodology of all ethics,
and so to separate it from his moral teaching and his speculative
idealistic notion of autonomy that it might perform the necessary
service of purification of concepts even for a really Christian ethic. 2
Although Brunner goes on to say that "this new revision remains up to now a
3
mere postulate", it is surely more than a postulate in his own writings* Ilia
affirmation of Kant's success in hi3 ethical formulations, up to the point of
his reversion to the notion of autonomy, is sufficient indication of his respect
for Kant's method.
Yet criticism as such cannot arrive at the truth of revelation* It
can, if it is truly critical, raise the question as to the possibility of some
4
avenue of truth outside the iramanental possibilities of human reason. But the
answer to that question must come from revelation itself, if it is to come at
all. We now approach the sphere of the theologian. He affirms that revelation
1 GuM p. 3n» E .T* p. 4Xn.
2 Ibid. p. 27n. E.T. p. 74n.
3 Ibid.
4 TofC pp. 15-6.
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has come. let in so doing he does not nullify the principles of criticism.
Criticism is not merely a preliminary stage which is transcended by revelation.
In fact, "only a Christian can be truly critical, and only he who is truly
critical can be a Christian. The principles of true Christianity and of true
1
criticism are identical." We may now venture a wider interpretation of
Kant's critical method as a further indication of Brunner'o debt to him# We
suggest that as a Christian theologian Brunner includes revelation under the
category of "percepts", while retaining the meaning of concepts as the possible
affirmations of human reason. Thus the insights of reason (concepts) ere
brought to the bar of judgment of revelation (percepts). By means of this
approach Brunner attempts to avoid the "subjectivism" of liberalism, and the
"objectivism" of orthodoxy.
Modernism and fundamentalism are born of the same mother, that is,
of the fear of sound critical thinking. But, let ae add, this fear
belongs to all of us. It is essentially a part of the "old man"; nay
it is his very essence# It is the pride of the man who will not stand
in the judgment of God, who will not conoede that he is, really and
wholly, a sinner, whose only salvation is the grace of God. 2
In so far as man is not critical he affiaas his autonomy, and in so far as he
affirms his autonomy he is not critical# To be critical is to recognize the
judgment of grace upon our vain search for truth and life, in philosophical
speculation or ethical striving# It in to abandon theoretical reason, and to
see oneself not as the master in thought, but as the subject of grace. Herein
we reach what, for our purposes, is the crucial element in the Kantian
background. For the question of the transition from the theoretical to the
practical is the question of the "Imperative". It is his appreciation for
Kant's "Categorical Imperative", raoreso than epistemological questions, which
1 TofC p. 14.
2 Ibid. p. 21
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must constitute the major area of investigation in terms of Brenner's relation
to Kant. For it is Brunner1 3 contention that Kant, in his concept of the
Categorical Imperative, approximated a Christian position in so far as "in the
Kantian philosophy ... the absolute Good becomes the challenge of the present
1
moment to the individual ..."
b. Kierkegaard's Dialectic
The transition from the theoretical to the practical approach to
life is also the theme of another thinker who has dominated twentieth century
thought perhaps as profoundly as has Kant. Sttren Kierkegaard is the great
opponent of the System. Brunner asserts that he alone, among modern thinkers,
recognized the inherent autonomy in every speculative approach to life, which
"he expressed ... in the striking statement that every system, whatever its
content may be, is, as such, pantheistic, and consequently irreconcilable
2
with the Christian notion of God." Here the critical approach is Immersed
in the dialectical outlook of the Kierkegaardian infinite qualitative
difference between time and eternity. The continuity which is seen as the
basis of liberal theology, and of modern thought in general, is firmly opposed
by the emphasis on radical discontinuity, both in creation and sin.
It was Kierkegaard who first gave more definite direction to our doubt
as to the scientific accuracy or the Christian content of the theology
in which we had been bred, and wiio also equipped us with the new means
of thought and a new courage to think as Christians. 3
This is Brenner's estimate of the significance of Sftren Kierkegaard, and it is
surely not guilty of over-statement. One might venture to suggest that
Brenner's whole thesis, which we have been considering, is in its essential
form a development of the thought of the Philosophical fragments where
1 Mitt. p. 9In. E.T. p. 115ru
2 GuM p. 3. E.T. p. 40.
3 "Continental European Theology41, The Church Through Half A Century. Essays
in honor of William Adams Brown by former students, ed. Samuel McCrea
Caverfc and Henry P. VanDusen (New lork, 1936), p. 141.
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Kierkegaard contrasts the imaanantalisra of the Socratic approach with the
Christian doctrine of sin.
Nor is Kierkegaard's influence confined to the structure of 3runner's
theology, important as this is. Many of the concepts, and indeed of the actual
phrases, which Brunner employs in developing this structure are directly
Kierkegaardian. His critical Christology attempts to avoid liberalism's
rejection of the real historical nature of the Incarnation and orthodoxy's
identification of the historical aspect with the Incarnation itself by the use
of Kierkegaard's concept of the incognito. By this concept he hopes to avoid
any possibility of reducing the Incarnation to an expendable human commodity.
The human personality is a disguise which can only be pierced by faith. Thus
only God Him,self can assure us of the reality of His presence in the Incarnation.
This involves another Kierkegaardian concept, that of indirect communication -
"spirit-communication itself is indirect ... and indirect communication is
2
communication through the word." Of more immediate concern for our purposes
is Brunner's employment of the Kierkegaardian concept of the Individual. The
renunciation of speculation involves a basic alteration in the attitude of life,
the change from spectator to participant. The man who sees himself as a
participant, one who takes life x/ith ultimate seriousness, one who stands
"before God", is the Individual. Nor is this a concept of isolation. For "in
the belief In creation the individual as an individual is always at the same
time the representative of the species# Man is never a mere individual, but
he is also at the same time humanity, and yet as an individual he is absolutely
3
responsible." It is this Kierkegaardian formulation which plays such a
1 TofC p. 35.
2 Ibid. pp. 34-5.
3 Mitt. p. 120. E.T. p. 144*
decisive role in Brunner*s understanding of the Fall and Original Sin.
c. The I-Thou of Elmer and Buber
The concerns behind Kierkegaard1 s definition of the Individual, and
his concept of the inteaxrelatedness of human life, are developed by Brunner
in terns of the I-Thou framework sketched by Ferdinand Ebner and Martin Buber.
Sbren Kierkegaard*s individual who stands before God becomes the individual
whose being is identical with this relation - "the person ... is the same
1
thing as the relationship to God." It is Brunner*s contention that this
I-Thou philosophy is really not a philosophy, but a formulation of the basic
category of the Biblical message. In a recent reply to criticism by Anders
Nygren, Brunner states his confidence in the Biblical origin of the I-Thou
framework.
His objection to me, in spite of all better Intentions, that I, too,
make theology dependent on a philosophy, namely the I-Thou philosophy
of Ebner and Buber, rests on an obvious misunderstanding. What he
calls I-Thou philosophy is no philosophy at all, but the center of
Biblical revelation, made evident as such and formulated theologically;
the name of God. This is nothing else than what Nygren himself did
when he wrote Eros and Agape; he made clear as a criterion of Biblical
thinking a central concept of the Bible which does not appear there in
this sharp antithesis to the other and placed it in contrast with the
idealistic Greek thought world. There can hardly be any doubt that
the divine HF and the address "thou" characterize the Biblical
kerygma just as much as they are unknown to the ontological thought
of the Greeks. 2
Thus the I-Thou framework represents the final significant qualification in
the development of Brunner's theology from the standards of criticism through
the Kierkegaardian dialectic. It may well have its origins in the distinct-
-iveness of the Biblical approach as contrasted with Greek ontological thought,
but whether it can bear the weight of the whole Biblical message is another
1 GuM p. 46. E.T, p. 101.
2 "Reply to Interpretation and Criticism", The Theology of Broil Brunner, op.
cit.f p. 34^*
question.
Although our primary concern is the thought background which provided
the method and concepts for Brunnerls reformulation, we should be guilty of a
great oversight were we to neglect the practical source of insight into the
need for, and the possibility of, such a reformulation.
The real origin of the Dialectical Theology is to be traced ... not to
Kierkegaard, but to a more unexpected source, to a place still farther
removed from the main theological thoroughfare - to the ... two
Blumhardts. ... They were not theologians but they could make theologians
think. ....
Although some of us from our youth had had contact with this source of
insight we still needed a mediator ... he ... was Hermann Kutter. ...
From him we all learned - at least we Swiss Dialectikers - what it means
to reckon with the living God as a reality and to let this reality be
the starting point for thinking. 1
Thus essentially through the mediation of Hermann Kutter the reality of the
living God so powerfully witnessed to by the Blumhardts, father and son,
awakened a glimpse of hope beyond the immanentaliaa of the contemporary
theology and the sterility of orthodoxy; a hope which was formulated in the
theology of Emil Brunner with the aid of the Kantian standards of criticism,
qualified by the Kieikegaardian dialectic, and further qualified by the
personalism sketched by Ebner and Buber.
D. THE QUESTIONS OF SIN AND RESPONSIBILITY
The comprehensive character of Brunner's theology involves the
fields of philosophy, psychology, and morality, as well as the divergent
approaches within theology itself. Consequently the foregoing presentation
of Brunner's basic position raises many issues which must be excluded from
1 "Continental European Theology, The Church Through Half A Century, op.
cit.f pp. 141-2.
our consideration. Broadly considered, Bnumer's position raises questions as
to the adequacy of his classification of philosophy in terms of idealism,
realism, and romanticism, of psychology in terms of a similar scheme, and of
ethics in terms of an idealistic and a naturalistic perspective. In terms of
theology, it raises questions as to the adequacy of his assessments of liberalism
and orthodoxy. Both the question as to the adequacy of Brunner's broad
classifications of philosophy, psychology, and ethics, and the question as to
the adequacy of his assessments of liberalism and orthodoxy, must be omitted
from the main line of our investigation. They can. be but peripheral issues
in relation to our central concern, which is Brunner'g development of the
themes of sin and responsibility. An appreciation of the setting of Brunner'3
theology is an indispensible prerequisite for any attempt to understand his
development of these themes, but having established Brunner'a basic position,
we must concentrate on the specific issues raised by the themes thamselves.
The question of sin and responsibility in Christian theology is
really the question of the seriousness of sin. Since theology traditionally
has formulated the seriousness of sin in terms of the imago Dei concept, this
concept provides the most appropriate atartlag-point for our inquiry into
Brunner's treatment of sin and responsibility. The method of distinguishing
between man as God's creation and man as fallen sinner in terms of the "loss"
of the imago Dei represents a legacy of the Reformers which is one of their
least satisfactory contributions to theological clarification. Their concept
of total depravity, combined with the necessary recognition of the continuing
humanity of man in terms of their concept of a "relic" of the image, sets the
problem for Brunner. His novel solution to this problem claims to avoid the
suggestion of a quantitative demarcation of the effects of sin conveyed by
the "relic" concept by means of a distinction between a persisting "formal"
image and a destroyed "material" image. Thus it will, be our first task to
examine Brunner's doctrine of the imago Dei.
The doctrine of the imago Dei not only provides us with a vantage
point for examining Brunner's treatment of the seriousness of sin, but it also
leads us into the other aspect of our theme, the question of responsibility.
For it is in terms of responsibility that Brunner distinguishes between the
persisting formal image and the lost material image. Thus the question of
the meaning of responsibility is set in that we must determine what is the
"responsibility" of creation, and what is the "responsibility41 of sin, and
what is the common element which allows Brunner to predicate this terra of
both situations. This implies the question of the relation between moral
and religious responsibility, and hence also involves Brunner's affinity with
Kant whose emphasis on responsibility enjoys a prominent place in Brunner's
writings.
Brunner's employment of the concept of "responsibility" as a means
of relating man as God's creation and man as fallen sinner raises the whole
question of Brunner's treatment of the Fall and the related doctrine of
Original Sin. Here we are confronted by the question as to -what is involved
in the doctrine of the Fall itself as an "event" between the Good Creation
and the humanity which stands in need of reconciliation, and the question as
to the relation between this "event" and the present existence of man. At
this point we encounter Kierkegaard's reformulation of the issues at stake
in the doctrines of the Fall and Original Sin.
Finally, having examined Brunner's treatment of the themes of sin
and responsibility, we shall attempt to evaluate this treatment in terms of
the central criterion of Brunner's theology, the sola gratia principle of the
Reformers. For in spite of the contemporary character of Brunaer's presentation,
it is his respect for the central position of the Reformers which constitutes
the basic allegiance of his theological programme. Here we enoounter Brunner^
employment of the I-Thou framework developed by Ebner and Buber. For it is in
terms of this framework that Brunner co-ordinates his allegiance to the sola
gratia principle of the Reformers and his concern for "responsibility".
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CHAPTER II IMAGO DEI
A, THE PROBLEM OF THE IMAGO DEI
The Imago Dei is the concept which the Church traditionally has
employed to distinguish man as God's creation from man as fallen sinner.
The assertion of the Creation narrative that man has been made in the image
of God had to be qualified in terms of the Fall narrative. The usual
procedure was to speak of the "loss" of the image. This, however, created
problems as perplexing as those which it originally set out to solve. For
if man as God's creation possessed the image, and now man as fallen sinner
has lost the image, what is erne to say about man's persisting humanity?
Is this humanum external to the image, or is it indeed included In the image?
If the latter is true, then one can hardly speak of a "total loss" of the
image. Some qualification will be required, whereby man is described as
retaining some "portion" or "remnant" of the original image. These are the
problems to which Em.il Brunner addresses himself in his historical survey
of the doctrine, and in his proposed formulation of the reality which is
here seeking expression.
a. The Distinction between "Zelam" and "Demuth"
The solution which dominated the Church from the earliest reflection
on the problem until the time of the Reformation was, according to Brunner>
based on a false exegesis of Genesis 1:26. This solution distinguished
between image (imago) and likeness (similitude) on the basis of the dual
1 Per Henseh im Wlderspruch (Ziirich, 1965), p. 96. E.T. Man in Revolt,
tr. Olive Wyon (London, 1962), p. 93.
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terminology "zelera" and "demuth", the former being regarded as the natural
unalterable being of man in rationality, freedom, and all those characteristics
which are peculiar to man as man, the latter being regarded as the supernatural
gifts of conformity to the divine will and intention in creation. Brunner
sets cm this foundation the whole weight of the mediaeval two-storey structure
1
of the natural and the supernatural. The origin of this distinction, he claims,
2
is to be found in the writings of Irenaeus.
b. The Reformation Predicament: The "Relic"
This distinction between imago and similitude presented an intolerable
barrier to the Reformers in their desire to speak in total terms of man's being
in both grace and sin. Such a division was to than untenable. Luther
recognized that the distinction was a distortion of the Biblical text, which he
3
saw to be an instance of the common structure of Hebrew parallelism. In this
return to the Biblical meaning of the image of God, Calvin's position is
4
essentially the 3ame as that of Luther. The imago and the similitudo refer
5
to the same reality, man's creation by and for God, the justitia originalis.
But man is not only a unity in creation; he is also a unity in sin. Han has
not lost the siailitudo and retained the imago. Rather both similitude and
6
imago are lost, because man is no longer in the state of .justitia originalls.
Grace is total, therefore sin must be total. But this creates the problem
of relating man's continuing humanity to the image in which man was created.
The solution to this problem the Reformers provided in their concept of the
1 MiW p. 493. E.T. p. 505s DoOTaMkTzftrich, 1950). II. 92. E.T."Dogmatics,
tr. Olive Wyon (London, 1964) > H» 77.
2 MiW p. 102. E.T. p. 100; The Word of God and Modern Han, tr. David Cairns
(London, 1965), p. 43•
3 MiW p. 96. E.T. p. 94; DII p. 91. E.T. p. 76.
4- MiW p. 4-96. E.T. p. 509; "Die Frage nach dem 1Anknllpfungspunkt' ala Problem
der Theologle". ZdZ, 10, Heft 6 (1932), p. 523n.
5 MiW p. 114- E.T. pp. 111-12.
6 Ibid.
1
"relic". We cannot say that any part of man has remained untouched by the
corrosive effects of sin, but \ve must say that man has remained man in spite
of the total disorientation of his life involved in the Pall. Thus they
took the inconsistent step of ascribing to man a "relic" of the original
image which they had previously equated with the justitia originalis.
c. Brunner's Solution; The Formal and Material Images
Neither the distinction between imago and similitude, which he
attributes to Irenaeus, nor the Reformers' concept of the "relic", satisfies
Brunner as a description of the relation of man as God's creation to man as
fallen sinner. The distinction between imago and similitudo tends to
compromise the totality of sin, and suggests an area of man's being immune
2
from the effects of sin. The concept of the "relic" is a more acceptable
approach, but it too has the unfortunate feature of suggesting a quantitative
3
definition of the effects of sin. Brunner affirms, with the Reformers, the
4
total depravity of man's fallen state. But he affirms the continuity between,
creation and sin, not by the relic concept, but by a distinction between
a "formal" and a "material" concept of the image, a distinction which he
5
attributes to the Lutheran theologian of the last century, von Oettingen.
It is Brunner's contention that there are two concepts of the image
of God in Scripture, but the distinction lies not in the dual terms zelem
and demuth. but rather in the variance between the Old Testament and the
6
New Testament concepts of the image. The Old Testament, according to Brunner,
1 Miw p. 96. E.T. p. 94-
2 Ibid. p. 499. E.T. p. 514.
3 Ibid. p. 499. E.T. p. 514; Revelation and Reason, tr. Olive Wyon (London,
1947), p. 70.
4 MiW pp. 151, 499- E.T. pp. 150, 514* Christianity and Civilisation (London,
1949), II, 55} Fr n iinknpkt p. 523.
5 MiW p. 497. E.T. p. 511.
6 Ibid. p. 490. E.T. p. 501.
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present® the image in the "formal" sense of man's derived responsible being,
his existence as subject, the Mew Testament in the "material" sense of
conformitas to the will of God which is the true content and destiny of man's
1
being. In this context, only the New Testament speaks of the "loss" of the
image, or rather presupposes its loss, because its concern is the restoration
2
of the image in Jesus Christ. Thus, Brunner claims, the Old Testament formal
3 4
image remains as the shell of man's being, his inherent responsibility, the
5
inhuman persistence of inverted humanity, the impersonal persistence of
6
inverted personality. On the other hand, the material image has been lost.
Man does not live in the love of God by which and for which he has been
7
created.
B. THE BIBLICAL FOUNDATION
a. The Old Testament and New Testament Images
The Biblical foundation for Brunner's distinction between formal
and material image rests on the contention that such a distinction is involved
between the Old Testament and New Testament doctrines of the image. In
Brunner's opinion, the Old Testament doctrine of the image is a purely formal
one describing man as subject, that is, that transcendental quality inherent
in the structure of human existence which permanently distinguishes man from
8
the rest of creation. This characteristically Old Testament meaning of the
image also appears in the New Testament, so that the Old and New Testament
1 B&R p. 54-
2 HLW p. 491. E.T. p. 501, Wahrhelt als Begegnung (Berlin, 1938), pp. 98-9.
E.T. Truth as Encounter, tr. David Cairns (London, 1964-), p. 14.7.
3 KLW pp. 170, 226-7. E.T. pp. 170, 229.
4. Ibid. pp. 157, 178. E.T. pp. 156, 178, B&R p. 173.
5 J&W pp. 169, 446. E.T. pp. 169, 456, "Die andere Aufgabe der Theologies"
ZdZ, 7, Heffc 3 (1929), p. 264- " '
6 MIW pp. 137, 446. E.T. pp. 136, 456. 7 Ibid. p. 107. E.T. p. 105.
8 B&R p. 54.
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contrast is also contained within the New Testament itself. The passages
2
which Brunner cites in support of this contention ares I Cor. 11:7 where it
is stated that man "is the image and glory of God", and James 3s9 where men
are said to be "made after the similitude of God". However, this is a
secondary use of the concept in comparison to the characteristically dynamic
New Testament use which describes the image in the material sense of conformitas.
the fulfilment of the structure of humanity as God wills and destines it. The
3
primary passages Brunner cites in this connection are: Romans 8:29 which speaks
of being "conformed to the image of His Son", II Cor. 3sl8 which states that
"we all openly beholding as in a mirror the glory of the lord, are changed
into the same image from glory to glory, by the Spirit of the lord", Ephesians
4.s&4 which describes the putting-on of the new man "which after God is
created in righteousness and true holiness", and Col. 3:10 which describes
the new man as "renewed in knowledge after the image of Him that created hira."
In this way Brunner expounds the formal-material distinction as a
thoroughly Biblical one. The difficulty which he encounters consists in the
fact that these two concepts of the image are simply acknowledged in the
K
Bible, but nowhere is their relation to one another set forth. Therefore,
to arrive at some statement of the relation between the formal structural
image and the dynamic material image, Brunner concedes that he has to employ
5
a process of "extrapolation". "The conception of the imago del belongs, as
others, such as that of history, to those elements of biblical doctrine
which we have to understand more between the lines than in the lines themselves,
1 MLW p. 4-91. E.T. p. 502^
2 DII p. 91. E.T. p. 76.
3 Ibid.
4 Jaw p. 491. E.T. p. 502! MR p. 54-
5 WaB p. 99. E.T. p. 147.
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1
that is to say, we have to get it out of the totality of biblical teaching."
This "extrapolation" results in the affirmation that the loss of the image
which the New Testament presupposes cannot be the loss of the image in the
2
Old Testament sense. The image which is lost can only be that Image which
is restored in Jesus Christ, or more accurately, that image to which man is
being conformed through Jesus Christ. Hence the formal image remains as
the God-given structure of man's existence, while the material image is lost
through man's refusal to conform to the divine destiny for him, and is
3
restored through Jesus Christ.
b. Brunner's Biblical Insights
The first comment that must be made about Brunner's discussion of
the Biblical references to the imago Dei is that he uncovers certain facts
about the Biblical material which have not always been recognized in
discussions on the topic. We may select three of these facts which. Brunner
presents. First, he affirms the Reformation recognition of the parallelism
which is involved in the us© of zelem and deauth in the Creation narrative.
In the tradition of the Reformers, he rightly rejects the exegesis which
distinguishes these terras in such a way as to solve the problem of the
relation between the imago Dei and sin by asserting that the former, as
man's natural endowment, is retained, while the latter, as the supernatural
conformity to God, is lost. Secondly, he draws our attention to the fact
that there is no unified cone apt of the imago Dei in Scripture. He is
undoubtedly right in his contention that there is an Old Testament concept
of the image and a New Testament concepts although he may not be ®o sound
1 The Scandal of ChristianitvTLondon, 1951). pT~5?h ~~
2 WaB p. 99. E.T. p. 147.
3 Ibid. p. 99. E.T. p. 14&.
in his method of relating the two. Thirdly, Brunner also recognises that
Scripture makes no reference to the loss of the Old Testament image. On the
contrary, there is good reason to conclude from the references to it that it
is not lost. The killing of man is prohibited because he has been made in
the image of God (Gen. 9*6). And, as Brunner notes, two references in the
Hew Testament (I Cor. lis? and James 3*9) suggest that man, in spite of sin,
is the image of God. And yet man must "put on the new man, which is renewed
in knowledge after the image of him that created Him." (Col. 3*10).
c. Problems of the Formal-Material Distinction
While Brunner recognises two concepts of the image of God in
Scripture, his contention that the Old Testament image is a formal image,
the unalterable responsible structure of human existence, and that the Hew
Testament image is a material image, the being in love which is the time
fulfilment of human existence, raises many questions. On the one hand, it
suggests that man is created in the formal image to which the material
1
image is added. On the other hand, Brunner insists that the material
image is integral to the formal, that is, that God has given man his
2
determination in Creation. The immediate solution to this conflict consists
in the recognition that the image of which the Creation narrative speaks
is not the image of Creation. For the "imago, understood in the Old
3
Testament sense, is merely a 'relic1 of the original, total imago." But
far from solving the ambiguity, this explanation makes the doctrine even
more difficult.
The original image knows no distinction between formal and
TDII pp. 66-7. E.T. pp. 56~
2 Ibid. pp. 71-2. E.T. p. 60.
3 B&R p. 70.
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1
material. Yet the image of which the Creation narrative speaks is merely
a formal image. The material image, which together with the formal image
constitutes an undifferentiated unity in Creation, is the Hew Testament
image. The reasoning seems to be* man is created in the Wordj the Word is
the source of the New Testament imagej therefore, man is created in the New
Testament image. "It is not the Old Testament narrative as such, but its
meaning fulfilled in Jesus Christ, which is the 'Word of God' in which alone
2
we can understand ourselves." One would hardly question this affirmation,
but the line of reasoning which Brunner employs in implementing it raises
serious doubts. For he seems to overlook one basio fact, namely, the
distinction between the New Testament and Old Testament images. In the Old
Testament the image is predicated of man, while in the New Testament the
image is predicated of Christ. Consequently the New Testament image means
something very different from the Old Testament image. "In the New
3
Testament the original is always present in the image." The Old Testament
image, on the other hand, implies a likeness in basic unlikoness. "By
4
stating likeness, he also implies distance." Indeed, it is remarkable
that the concept "image of God" should appear in a faith which was based
5
upon "the sense of the greatest possible distance from God." Nevertheless,
the concept does appear, and it appears as a predicate of man - man is made
in the image of God. The New Testament affirms this in the two passages
xdiich Brunner notes, but the concern of the New Testament is not with this
image as such. Between the Old Testament and the New Testament the concept
TTfll p. 71. E.T. p. 60. "
2 MiW pp. 36-7. E.T. p. 84.
3 Gerhard Kittel, Theological Dictionary of the New Testament.
ed. Gerhard Kittel, tr. & ed. G.W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids, 1964), II, 395.
4 N.W. Porteous, "Image of God", The Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible
(Nashville, 1962), II, 684. **
5 Gerhard von Had, Theological Dictionary of the New Testament,
op. cit., p. 390.
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of the image undergoes a transformation. It no longer means a creaturely
reflection of God, but now signifies "what completely corresponds to the
1
•prototype'."
The difficulty which these two concepts of the image involve for
the systematic theologian is that they are not related in Scripture. The
indication is that the Old Testament image persists, and man is transformed
from this image to the image of Christ. But there is no reference to a lost
image. Brunner seems to assume that this Nex/ Testament image to which man
is to be conformed was his at the first, and through sin was forfeited,
leaving only the Old Testament image. One must question, therefore, whether
he takes seriously the two concepts of the image which Scripture presents.
2
It may be significant that in his survey of the Biblical background for the
doctrine of the image, Brunner refers to the passages in both Old and Hew
Testaments x-riiich predicate the image of man, and to certain New Testament
passages which define the image as the destiny of the believer in being
conformed to Christ, but neglects to mention the passages, principally
II Cor. 4-2-4 and Col. 1:15, which equate the concept of the image with Christ.
In any event, we must hold certain reservations about the adequacy of
Brunner's distinction between formal and material as a method of relating
the Old Testament and the New Testament images. The distinction seems to
be rather between man and Christ, between "the first man [who] is of the
earth, earthy; [and) the second man jwho] is the Lord from heaven" (I Cor.
15j 4-7). And on this basis, the relation between the two images is set
forth, "as we have borne the image of the earthy, we shall also bear the
image of the heavenly" (I Cor. 15:49).
1 Porteous, op. cit., p. 684.
2 MiW p. 490. E.T. pp. 500-1.
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C. IHENAEU8: THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN 33-1400 AND SIHILITUDO
a> The Distinction in Irenaeus
It is Brunner's contention that the disastrous distinction between
zelem and demuth is traceable to the writings of Irenaeus, where the
anthropology presented is "Gnosticism purified by Scripture, with a strong
1
element of general Greek philosophy." Irenaeus1 imago doctrine is seen as
2
a variation of the Valantinian Gnosticism which he was opposing. The
justification for this view rests primarily on two passages in Irenaeus'
Contra Haereses. In V. 16. 2. we are told that whereas man was made in the
image of God (secundum iaaginem Dei factum esse hominem). because the Word
(Verbug) was still invisible after whose image (cuius secundum imaginem)
man was made, man easily cast off the similitude to him (propter hoc autem
3
et similitudinea facile araisit). Clearly, a distinction is here dram
between imago and similitude?. In a parallel passage the distinction is
equally obvious. Speaking of the "animal man", who lacking the Spirit is
characterized merely by the soul, Irenaeus describes such a man as "having
indeed the image in his structure, but not assuming the similitude in fact
by the Spirit" (imagines quidem habens in plasmate. 3imilitudinea vero non
4
assumens per Spiritum). Not only are imago and similitude here distinguished,
but the very terms which Irenaeus employs lend credence to Brunner's contention
that the natural-supernatural bifurcation can be traced to the imago-
similitudo distinction in Irenaeus.
b« The Contexts In which "Image" is Used
It Is rather striking that the two passages noted above (V, 16. 2.
1 M1W. p. 492. E.T. p. 504. ~
2 Ibid.
3 Irenaeus, Contra Qnnea Haereses Libri Quinque (Lipsiae, 1853), tr. John
Keble, Five Books of S. Irenaeua Bishop of Lyons Against Heresies (London,
1372), v. 16. 2.
U Ibid. V. 6. 1.
and V. 6. 1.) are the only places where Irenaeus posits a clear distinction
between imago and similitudo. The terns are used elsewhere in a seemingly
careless manner which does not conform to the distinction represented in
these passages. The interpretation of Irenaeus' use of these terms is
complicated by the fact that the original Greek words which stand behind the
1
Latin imago and similitudo have been lost to us. Consequently any
Interpretation is handicapped by the fact that it must depend on the adequacy
of the Latin terras. In addition to this, commentators on Irenaeus are
involved in the difficult task of determining the contorts in which the
terms are used. Irenaeus applies the terms to Christ, to Adam, to fallen
man, and to regenerate man. It may well be that the difficulty in the
interpretation of Irenaeus has been increased needlessly through failure
2
to distinguish the contexts in which the terms are used, not that this is
always an easy task.
Approaching Irenaeus with a realization of the hazards which must
be encountered, we shall select several passages where the context in which
the image is used is clear. With reference to Adam and to fallen man, he
clearly states that we have lost both the imago and the similitudo in Adam,
and that they are restored in Jesus Christ (quod peridideramus in Adam, id
est secundum imaginem at 3imilitudlnem esse Dei, hoc in Christo lesu
3
reciperemus). Of redeemed man, he says that by the will of the Father we
shall be made like unto God and perfected, in that man will be made according
to the image and likeness of God (Similes nos el efflciet et perficiet
voluntate Patris; efficiet enira hominem secundum imaginem et strailitudlnera
1 Arnold Struker, Gottebenblldlichkeit des Ilenschen, quoted by David Cairns,
The Image of God in Man (London, 1953), p. 74.
2 Klebba, Die anthropologie des heiligen Irenaeus, Cairns, op. cit., p. 74»
3 Irenaeus, III. 13. 1.
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1
Dei). Of the image in Creation, Irenaeua says that man was made after the
image and likeness of God (factum esse hominem secundum imaginem et
2
slmilitudinera Dei). Thus no distinction is made between imago and simil.itudo
in reference to fallen man, redeemed man, and original man. We are left,
therefore, with the contradictory assertions that the imago is retained and
the simnitudo lost in sin, and that both the imago and similitudo are lost
in sin and restored in Christ.
If the whole problem is not to be dismissed as insoluble, we must
move on to ask in what contexts the terms are used in the two passages on
which Brunner bases his interpretation of Irenaeus. Obviously the first
passage (V. 16. 2.) is concerned with Adam, the original man who was made
in the image of God. But since this involves the whole question of the
Primitive State, we shall omit consideration of it for the moment. The
second passage (V. 6. 1.) is less dear in its reference. The context
will be assigned in terms of the definition of the "Animal Man" who is
said to possess the image in his form, but to lack the likeness by the
Spirit. It has been suggested that "the 'animal man* is essentially man
3
as originally created by God." On this interpretation, the likeness by
the Spirit may well be regarded as a supernatural addition to the natural
image, so that something like the classical lmago~similitudo distinction
will be the inevitable outcome. It is extremely doubtful, however, whether
the passage can bear this interpretation. A much more likely interpretation
is suggested by the equation of the animal man with fallen man. "Clearly,
the man 'of an animal nature' is here the natural man after the Fall, who
has still the image, while a special gift of the Spirit is needed to
1 Irenaeus, V. 8. 1.
2 Ibid., V. 2. 1.
3 John Lawson, The Biblical Theology of Saint Irenaeus (London, 1948), p. 207.
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perfect him, and give hira the likeness or similitude which was lost at the
1
Fall." This represents a much more plausible interpretation of the passage.
Althought it is perhaps unfortunate that the likeness by the Spirit is
described as "a special gift of the Spirit". The passage as a whole is most
intelligible if it is seen as a polemic against the Gnostic dualism between
body and Spirit.
V. vi. 1 is an attempt to safeguard the whole man, body, soul and
Spirit. He takes issue with the Gnostics who denied the salvation
of the body. It is in this polemical situation that Irenaeus makes
the distinction which he does, and we ought to notice that his
opponents, whom he wanted to refute, made the same distinction
between imago and similitude as signifying at times body and at
times Spirit. Irenaeus takes a weapon out of their own armoury by
saying that if we let only the body be saved, then one has the imago
without the similitude, and if we let only the Spirit be saved, then
one has the s^titudo without the imago - but in neither case are
we speaking about the whole and completed man. 2
The main contention of the passage, then, is precisely the reverse of the
imago-similltudo distinction. Far from regarding the Spirit as a
supernatural similitude added to the natural image, the point is that man
is incomplete without the Spirit. "The strange thing is that this passage,
in which a distinction is made between imago and similitudo, is one of the
clearest demonstrations of any in Irenaeus that the Spirit is not a
supernatural addition to the purely human, but it is on the contrary
3
humanity*s own completion."
The question of the relation between the image and sin remains.
If we regard this passage as referring to fallen man, then the only answer
is that the similitudo is lost while the imago remains. Yet if we are not
to deny the thesis that Irenaeus is primarily concerned with man as a unity,
we shall hesitate to equate this with the classical imago-similitudo
1 Cairns, p. 75.




distinction. The next stage in our analysis demands an examination of the
other passage on which Brunner bases his interpretation of Irenaeus. With
this we pass to the concept of the Primitive State.
c. The Concept of the Primitive State
The other passage (V. 16. 2.) on which Brunner bases his interprot-
-ation of Irenaeus states that since the Word was invisible after whose image
man was made, man easily cast off the similitude to Him (Adhuc antra invisible
erat Vepbum, cujug. pepundufq fegiiiop }\omp £actug. foer&t. Propter hoc autem
et similitudinem facile amisit.). Brunner's interpretation, that this
involves a distinction between imago and similitudo similar to the later
distinction between the retained natural imago and the lost supernatural
similitudo, rests on the identification of the imago with man's rational
nature. It is Brunner's contention that Irenaeus' imago doctrine has its
"starting-point ... in ... the Aristotelian distinction between man and the
1
creatures which are not endowed with reason." This distinctive rationality
of man constitutes the imago which cannot be lost. To this communion with
2
God is added as the similitudo.
3
The passage which Brunner cites in support of this interpretation
is one in which Irenaeus is concerned to lay the responsibility for sin at
man's own feet. Irenaeus argues that because man is rational, and similar
to God, possesses free will, he is responsible for the direction of his
life (homo vero rationabilis, et secundum hoc slmilis Deo, liber in arbitrio
*""" "
u "
faetua et suae potestatis, ipse sibi causa est). But this passage makes it
very clear that the rational man who possesses free will is the man of God's
1 MiW p. 493- E.T. p. 504.
2 Ibid. p. 103. E.T. p. 100.
3 Ibid. p. 493. E.T. p. 505.
4 Irenaeus, 4* 3.
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Creation. Here again we see how important it is to determine the context
in which Irenaeus' references occur. For in this passage Irenaeus describes
fallen man as having lost true reason by living irrationally, opposing the
righteousness of God (rationabilis factus amisit verara rationed, et
irrationabiliter vivens. adversatus est iustitiae Dei). Since true reason
is lost, it is hardly plausible that the imago can be equated with the
unalterable rational nature of man. This still does not solve the problem
of the distinction which Irenaeus presents between imago and similitudo,
but it does suggest that a facile equation of the distinction with the later
imago-similitudo distinction is to be suspect.
Brunner concedes that it is difficult to tell just what Irenaeus
regards as having been lost through the Fall of Adam. On Brunner's
interpretation the imago could not be lost, and the similitudo was only
1
present in germ. This interpretation presupposes that the distinction
between imago and siailitudo is a feature of the Primitive State itself.
Undoubtedly, Brunner is sound in his affirmation that for Irenaeus the
Primitive State was one of child-like innocence. Yet he may not be so sound
in his further affirmation to the effect that "Adam's advantage was innocence,
2
not righteousness." This divorce of innocence from righteousness suggests
that righteousness is something which man must acquire for himself in
addition to the innocence in which he was created. On this interpretation,
something like the natural imago and dispensable supernatural similitudo
is inevitable. But this distinction between innocence and righteousness
is not evident in Irenaeus himself.
1 mw p. 493. E.T. p. 505.
2 Ibid. p. 87n. E.T. p. 84n.
It .is ••• hardly correct to speak, as Srunner does, of man, in the
view of Irenaeus, as being sealed by his condition as a "child" in
such a way that his distinctive mark is innocence, not righteousness.
If we set innocence and righteousness over against one another, then
we must necessarily think of righteousness as being the sum of a
series of righteous works. But righteousness is rather the unbroken
receiving of life from the "hands" of the Creator? it is man's
acquiescence in his own creation and not his self-willed resistance
to God. 1
V/e have yet to determine x-jhat is involved in the distinction
which Irenaeus makes between imago and 3imilitudo. Obviously, the
distinction is clear enough in Irenaeus to give Brunner's interpretation
some plausibility. However, we have reached the point where we must
suspect the adequacy of Brunner's equation of the distinction in Irenaeus
with the later two-storey doctrine of the image. We have also arrived
at a possible explanation of the source of Brunner's interpretation, in
that he seems to justify it by projecting back into Irenaeus' doctrine of
the Primitive State a typically two-storey distinction between innocence
and righteousness. One final stage remains before attempting a
re-evaluation of Irenaeus' doctrine of the image. In order to determine
the significance of the distinction between imago and sirallitudo in its
relation to the Primitive State, we must examine Irenaeus' doctrine of the
image in the light of his central concern, the doctrine of recapitulation.
d. The image and Recapitulation
The doctrine of the imago Dei is distinctly a secondary and
subordinate doctrine in the writings of Irenaeus. It is in the context
of his central concern for the doctrine of recapitulation that Irenaeus
2
demonstrates his concern for the doctrine of the image of God. It is
because of the New Testament image of God, Jesus Christ, that Irenaeus
1 Wingren, p. 31.
2 Cf. Cairns, p. 74*
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is concerned with the fact that according to the Old Testament doctrine man
is made in the image of God. It is this centrality of the doctrine of
recapitulation which ultimately calls in question Qrunner's contention that
Irenaeus' doctrine of the image has its "starting-point ... {IaJ ••• the
Aristotelian distinction between man and the creatures which are not endowed
with reason.'1"*"
Whatever tho connection between the rationality of man and his
being made in the image of God, it is clear that Irenaeus does not simply
equate the image with man's distinctive rationality. A much more prominent
feature of his doctrine is the insistence on man's dependence on God. For
example, he emphasizes that life is not at the disposal of man, nor is it
a self-contained quality of his being, but wholly a gift of grace (Hon
enia esc nobis, neaue ex nostra natura vita est, sed secundum gratiaa Dei
2
datur.). Similarly, the soul is not an independent principle of life, but
flourishes in the life it receives from God (sic et anima ipsa quidem non
3
est vita, pariicipatur .gutem a Deo sibi praestitam vitam). In reference to
Adam, Irenaeus affirms that at no time did Adam escape from the hands
(i.e. the Son and the Spirit) of God (Hon enim effugit allquando Adam
A
aanus Dei ...). In terns of this insistence on the dependence of man
upon God, it is hardly plausible that the starting-point for his doctrine
of the image could be the Aristotelian distinction between man and the
lower creation in terms of rationality. This is not to say that the image
of God does not involve the distinctive rationality of man.
The equation of the similitude with a supernatural dispensable
conformity to God is just as improbable as an adequate assessment of
TTB.W p. 4-93. E.T. p. 5o£ "
2 Irenaeus, II. 34- 3.
3 Ibid. II. 34- A*
A Ibid. V. 1. 3.
Iranaeus' doctrine of the image as is the equation of the imago with
rationality. The suggestionHhat his designation of Adam's loss by the
2
phrase "robe of holiness" (sanctitatis stola) is susceptible to the donuni
superadditua interpretation can hardly command serious attention in terras
of the context in which it occurs. Its use would seem to be dictated more
by literary considerations than by a desire to describe Adam's loss in
terms of a supernatural gift. For he speaks of the "girdle by which he
displayed his penitence in practice" (Etenim per succinctorium in facto
ostendit suam poenitentiara). which he also describes as "clothing suitable
to disobedience" (condignum tamen inobedientiae amictum fecit), and
specifically states that what Adam lost was "the character and thoughts of
children" (ouoniam indolera et puerilem amiserat sensum). Thus the "robe of
holiness" would seem to be merely a figure of speech in the context of the
similar concepts of the "girdle of penitence" and the "clothing suitable to
disobedience".
These considerations lead us to the conclusion that in his doctrine
of the image of God, Irenaeus is much more concerned with the whole man than
with a concept of man which splits him into a natural rational being and a
supernatural God-related being. This interpretation accords much better
with the central doctrine of recapitulation, in reference to which the
doctrine of the image of God is expounded. The image of God involves a
destiny which man easily cast off in his child-like Primitive State, and
which is restored in Jesus Christ. It is that pledge or assurance (pigaus)
which leads to the "perfecting and preparing of incorruption, practising
by little how to receive and bear God" (ad perfectionem et preparationem
1 Lawson, p. 202.
2 Irenaeus, III. 23. 5.
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incorruptelae. paullatim assuescentes capers et portare Peura). This pledge
"will make us like Him, and perfect us by the will of the Fathers for it
will make man to be after the image and likeness of God" (Similes nos ei
efficiet et porficiet voluntato Patris s efficiet enim honinem secundum
2
iiaaglnem et aimilitudlnem Dei.). Similarly, it is by "training" or
3
"guidance" (ductus) that man comes to be in the image of God, This concept
of the image is a corollary of his doctrine of the Incarnation as a
recapitulation of Adaa' s los3. The Incarnation is not an intrusion, but
because man was made after God's image and likeness, it is a righteous and
xaerciful assumption by God of what belongs to Him (quod dictum est in
prinoipio factum esse hominem secundum imagiaera et similitudlnen Dei, non
.4-
aliena in dolo diripiens, sed sua pxxspria iusta et benlgne assumeng.).
e. Re-evaluation of Irenaeus' Distinction
We are led, therefore, to two conclusions, which we shall summarize
in the reverse order to that in which they have been achieved. First, we
are compelled to interpret Irenaeus' doctrine of the image in terms of his
central doctrine of recapitulation. This involves a concept of the image
which regards man as a unity In which his destiny is to image God. Secondly,
Brunnar's detection of a natural-supernatural distinction in Irenaeus'
distinction between the imago and the similitude depends upon an unwarranted
divorce between innocence and righteousness in Irenaeus' doctrine of the
Primitive State. The key passage (V. 16. 2.) states that although man was
made in the image of God, the Word was yet invisible after whose image man
was made, so that he easily cast off the similitude to Him (Adhuc enim
X'lrenaeus, V. 8. 1.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid. IV. 38. 3.
4 Ibid. V. 2. 1.
invisible erat Verbum. cuius secunduia imagines homo factug fuerat. Propter
hoc aatera et aimilitudlnem facile aaiait.). Now if this similitude is
regarded as a righteousness which man made in the image of God failed to
achieve, then it is inevitable that the passage will be interpreted as a
precursor of the classical Imago-similitudo distinction. The passage itself,
however, is much more conducive to an interpretation which finds the original
righteousness in the innocence of the first man. The fact that the Word,
after whose image man was made, was still invisible facilitated the opposition
to that righteousness in man*s taking life into his own hands. Thus man,
k
created in the image of God, cast off the similitude in that he ceased to
reflect the goodness of God in his creaturaly gratitude.
If this interpretation is accurate, and it seems to be the only
one which will accord with Irenaeus' varied pronouncements on the doctrine
of the imago Dei, then what we have in Irenaeus is not a precursor of the
later imago-similitudo distinction, but an attempt to relate the Old
Testament image which is predicated of man with the New Testament image,
Christ, the express image of God, after whose image man wa3 made. The
development of this interpretation Is beyond the scope of our concern. It
is sufficient for our purposes to note that it represents a much more
plausible account of Irenaeus' doctrine of the imago Dei than does the
contention that his distinction between imago and aimilitudo represents a
precursor of the classical natural-supernatural distinction. We are
forced to conclude, therefore, that Brunner does Irenaeus a great injustice
in making the rare passages in which a distinction is made between imago
and similitude a central interpretative principle for evaluating his
presentation of the doctrine of the imago Dei. It would seem that Brunner
is too ready to accept the efforts of the Roman Catholic scholar, Klebba,
to find a justification for the later imago~similitudo distinction in the
writings of such a respectable Father of the Early Church as Irenaeus. On
2
the whole, Wingren's assessment, that this procedure is anachronistic in
that it seeks to discover what Irenaeus thought of a distinction which did
not appear until long after his time, must be accepted.
D. THE REFORMATION PREDICAMENT: THE "RELIC"
Although the distinction between imago and similitudo in terms of
natural and supernatural cannot be attributed justly to Irenaeus, it remains
true that this distinction did appear in the history of theology. In spite
of the fact that it may not always have been as crudely drawn as the natural-
supernatural distinction, particularly in St. Thomas Aquinas and the Roman
3
Catholic theology which has derived directly from him, some qualification
of this compromising formulation constituted the basic issue which the
Reformers were challenged to oppose in their anthropological considerations.
Any suggestion that there was some aspect of man which did not need
redemption mitigated against the Reformers' understanding of the Gospel as
sola gratia. Because grace is total, sin must also be total. "Reformation
is identical with the knowledge that this synthesis (i.e. of nature and
4-
grace] is not possible, because man is not only sinful, but a sinner ..."
There can be no compromise between the totality of grace and the totality
of sin.
1 Cf. Brunner's appreciative comments on Klebba, MiW p. 492. eTt." p. 504-~
2 Wingren, p. 157.
3 Karl Barth, NelnJ Antwort an Emil Brunner. Theologische Existenz heute,
Heft 14- (1934). pp. 32ff. E.t. In Natural Theology, tr. Peter Fraenkel
(London, 1946), pp. 95ff.
4- GuM p. 2. E.T. p. 40.
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A* IXJTHBR
a» The Imago-Similitude Distinction
Lather, gays Brunner, was responsible for recovering the true
Biblical doctrine of the image which had long been distorted by the jraago-
similitudo distinction, in his recognition that these two terras denote
what is in fact an instance of Hebrew parallelism^" Brunner lays special
emphasis on Luther's statement that if the imago is to be equated with
natural powers of reason and will, then Satan is in the image of God, since
he is certainly more gifted in this respect than any man (Si enim istae
potentiae sunt imago Dei, seouetur etiaa Satanara ad imagine® Dei conditum
ease, qui profecto ilia naturalia longe habet validiora, guar, nos haberaug,
2
sicut est memoria et intellectus auramus et voluntas obstinatiasiraa.).
With this the Augustinian trinity of memory, intellect and will is swept
3
aside as unprofitable, and indeed extremely dangerous if it leads to a
defence of man in terras of his rationality and freedom.
Yet the clear denial of the natural-supernatural distinction
does not necessarily involve the equation of imago and sirailitudo. In at
least one passage, Luther expressly notes the necessity for distinguishing
the two concepts (quantum ego diligenti observatione potui deprehendere,
4
est aliaua inter haec duo vooabula differentia). His contention is that
similitudo is a qualification of imago. The term imago denotes a figure
(figura) in the sense of a 3tatue (statua). Similitudo, on the other
hand, refers to a perfection of the image (perfectlo tmaginis). This
distinction seems dangerously similar to that distinction whose destruction
1 M1W p. 495. E.T. p. 507; DII p. 91. E.T. p. 76. *
2 Martin Luther, Martin Lathers Werke (Weimar, 1911), 42, 46.
3 Ibid. p. 45.
4 Ibid. pp. 247-8.
Brunner attributes to him. This similarity all but reaches the point of
identity when Luther goes on to say that the terra aimllitudo is used in the
Genesis narrative as a qualification to show that man is not only like God
in his ability to reason, or in his possession of intellect and will, but
also in the fact that he has a will and intellect which understands God,
and wills what God wills (nan solum referat Deura in eo, quod rationed seu
intellectuia et voluntatem habet. sed etiara, quod habet similitudinem Dei,
hoc est, voluntatem et intellectuia talem, quod Daug intelligit, quo vult,
quae Pens vult). One might well interpret this as evidence of the classic
distinction between a natural, rational, indestructible imago and a
supernatural, relational, destroyed airailltudo. Indeed, it may be an
indication that Luther was not as free from the traditional background of
the doctrine as Brunner suggests.
Whatever the relation between Luther's doctrine of the image in
Creation and the classic iraago-sim.llitudo distinction, it is abundantly
clear that he did not employ this distinction in relating the image of God
and sin. For in the next paragraph he makes the uncompromising declaration
that through sin both the Imago and the similitude are lost (sed per pecoatum
turn similitudo turn imago amissa est). Thus we are led to the conclusion
that while Luther does not equate imago and similitudo, but rather describes
the latter as a qualification of the former, nevertheless, he does not
distinguish them so far as the perversion of man's relation to God through
sin i3 concerned. Consequently we must affirm Brunner's contention that
Luther effected a basic transition from the classical imago-similitudo
distinction to a unified conception of the image in which man is seen as
a unity in grace, justitia originalis, and in sin, where both Imago and
50
similitudo are lost.
b. The "Imago Publica" and the "Imago Privata"
Having established this unified conception of the image of God
which equates it with the justitia originalis. Luther is faced with the
problem of accounting for man's continuing humanity. Here Brunner notes
two solutions proposed by Luther. The first is a distinction between the
1 2
imago publica and the imago privata. This is the Biblical foundation for
3
the second solution, the concept of the "relic". In commenting on Gen. 1:26,
Luther suggests that the reference here is to a similitudo publica "in our
likeness" which suggests the dominion which man is given over nature (tesctus
videtur sonare de publica: 'slailem nobig' i.e. soil, in gubernandis rebus);
whereas Paul in I Cor. 15:49, speaking of bearing the image of the heavenly
as we have borne the image of the earthly, refers to a similitudo privata
(Paulus loquitur de similltudine privata).
This distinction between a public similitude and a private
similitude seems to indicate an effort on Luther's part to account for
the distinction which Scripture presents between the Old Testament image
which is predicated of man and the New Testament image which is predicated
of Christ. Indeed, it is very tempting to affirm, with Brunner, an
interpretation of this passage which sees in it a distinction between a
formal structural Old Testament image, the similitude publica. and a material
relational New Testament Image, the similitudo privata. This is especially
suggested by the further assertion that the similitudo publica remains in
sin, undestroyed by the Fall of Adan (haec similitudo manet sub peccato
1 DII p. 91« E.T. p. 76} R&R p. 69J Fr n Anknpkt p. 523.
2 DII p. 91. E.T. p. 76.
3 Luther, W.A. 42, 51.
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abhuc. non abstullt earn simllitudinea ad Adam). whereas the similitude
•private, referred to by Paul, was lost through siu in the loss of goodness
and justice (sed Paulus geht holier; earn siailitudinea abstullt peceatura,
sell, bonltatea, lustlciam). let caution is suggested by the fact that
Luther uses the terra similitude. The suggestion would seen to be rather
that the distinction between the sinilitudo publics and the siailitudo
privata is a secondary consideration in terns of the doctrine of the imago
of God. This is further confirmed by the basic fact that Luther's central
affirmation is that man is a unity in grace and in sin. In terms of these
considerations, we must hold some reservation about setting the whole
weight of Luther's Biblical position on such a slender base. The fact that
this distinction is not developed beyond the point of a sketchy definition
of the terras similitude publica and similitudo privata suggests that it is
not crucial to Luther's position. To develop it into a distinction between
the Old Testament and New Testament concepts of the image is perhaps a
more advanced argument than the passage warrants.
c. The "Relic"
sin with the concept of the image is to be found in Luther's concept of the
"relic". Brurmer suggests that the identification of the imago with the
jostitis originalia, and the subsequent doctrine of the total loss of the
image, always results in the qualification "down to a 'gnall relic' which
remained." This concept of the "relic" is necessary in order to maintain
some continuity between the imago which is defined as totally lost and the
humanitas which is involved in the obvious continuation of man's distinctive
The more common method of relating man's continuing humanity in
1
1 mi p. 495. E.T. p. 503.
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1
humanity. There is good reason to conclude that this is an essentially
accurate estimation of Luther's predicament. He shovra some concern about
the obvious difference between man, even as sinner, and the rest of the
creaturely creation (Etsi igitur imago ista pene tota sit amissa, taaerx
2
maxima est differentia hominls et coeterorum animaliua.). It is striking
that here, where Luther is concerned with the "maximum difference", he
employs the qualification "almost totally" (pene tota) in describing the
loss of the image.
How Luther can combine a doctrine of total depravity which
describes the image, considered as .justitia originalis, as totally lost
with a concept of the image, with reference to man's distinctive humanity,
which is described as "almost totally" lost is not easily discernible. One
thing is clear, however, that is that he is not attempting to salvage any
portion of man from the corrosive effects of sin. Consequently the "relic"
of the image -which remains is depreciated in no uncertain terras. In the
paragraph, quoted by Brunner, in which Luther suggests that the equation of
the image with reason and freedom would mean that Satan is in the image of
God, his prior sentence indicates that while memory, will and mind have
remained, they are most corrupt and gravely weakened, and indeed thoroughly
leprous and unclean (Meeaoriara, voluntatem et mentem habemus euidem, sed
corrupti3sima et gravissime debilitata, into, ut clarius dieam, prorsua
3
leprosa et iramunda.). He goes on to assert that those who wish to equate
these powers of memory, will and mind (the Augustinian formula) with the
image, must qualify their definition with the admission that these powers
are now thoroughly corrupt and leprous. Thus he admits that they may be
1 fttW p. 97. E.T. p. 95.
2 Luther, W.A. 42, 50.
3 Ibid. 42, 46.
regarded as the image in the same way as a leprous human being is still
regarded as a human being.
d» The Unified Concept of the Image
Thus, in Luther, we are left with the contradictory assertions
that man has lost both the imago and similitude in sin, and that a "relic"
of the image or the similitude publica remains in sin. The distinction
between the similitude publica and the similitude privata may represent an
attempt to reconcile the two senses of the image presented in Scripture,
the Old Testament creaturely image, and the New Testament image of exact
correspondence, Jesus Christ. But this seems to be but a passing thought
in Luther's writings. The position which he most consistently presents
involves a unified view of the image in which it is equated with man's
original righteousness, and therefore lost in sin, and restored in Christ.
Not only does this fail to account for the distinction between the Old
Testament and the New Testament concepts of the image, but it must
necessarily exclude any reference to the humanity of the sinner in the
imago concept. In this interpretation, the concept of the "relic" represents
an unwarranted intrusion.
The source of Luther's predicament is quite evident. It lies in
his concern to speak in total terras of both grace and sin. His basic concern
is to see man as a unity in grace and in sin. He emphasizes the totality
of sin, so that the totality of grace may be known and desired. Otherwise,
the more sin is minimized, the more grace declines in value (nisi recte
cognoscatur magnitude raorbi. remedium quoque non oognoscitur nec desideratur.
Quanto enim magis peccatura extenuaveris, tanto quoque gratia magis vilescet.).
1 Luther, W.A. 42, 107
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Thus it would seem that Brenner's assessment of lather's doctrine
of the image is essentially a valid one, although we might hold some
reservations about the importance Brunner attaches to his distinction between
"khe aimilitudo publica and the similitudo privata. His break with the
classical imago-similitudo distinction represents a significant return to
a concept of the image which is much more compatible with the Biblical
witness wherein man is seen as a unity in grace and in sin. His equation
of the image with justitia originalls. however, represents a position which
can predicate no legitimate connection between the humanity of the sinner
and the concept of the image of God. In this position the concept of the
"relic" represents an unwarranted intrusion.
B» CALVIN
a. The Imago~S1.mllitudo Distinction
Calvin's doctrine of the imago Del represents basically the same
position as that of Luther, with the one qualification, that "within the
common doctrine of the Reformers of the Justitia origjnalis and of the
corruptio totalis - the coneere of the humanitas- is perceived more clearly
and urgently than within Lutheran theology, without, on that account,
1
becoming Humanistic." Such is Brunner's evaluation of Calvin's anthropology.
Calvin, like Luther, recognizes the terms zelea and demuth to be
an instance of Hebrew parallelism! and, like Luther, regards the latter as
a qualification of the former. The philosophical speculation over these
terms which regards zelem as the image constituting the substance of the soul,
and demuth as the likeness referring to its qualities, is ridiculous (Uhde
1M1W p. 496. E.T. p. 509.
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ridicules esse apparet qui subtilius philosophantur in nominibuB illls,
sive Zelem, hoc est imaginem, 3tatuant in substantia animae, et Bemuth,
1
hoc eat sirailitudinea, in gualitatibus). Demuth is added to zelem by way
of explanation (exegetlce repetit)* Equally clearly in his Commentary on
Genesis 1»26, he characterizes the usual distinction in terras of "substance"
3
and "accidents" (ut imago sit in substantia, similitudo In accidentibus);
and defines this distinction in terras of the natural-supernatural structure
(sub imagine tradunt contineri dotes quae Deus in humanam naturam constulit:
sirailitudinep exponent dona gratuita). Calvin1s evaluation of this
distinction is here summed up in his assertion that before defining the
imago, he would deny that it differs from the similitude (Ego priusouam
imaginera Dei definiam, a similitudine differre nego.).
b. The Image as Imaging
When Calvin does proceed to define the image, he does so on the
basis of its restoration in Jesus Christ. It is his contention that what
the image means cannot be better known than from the remedy provided for
the corruption of nature (Id vero non aliunde melius quam ex reparatione
^ . ... ....
corruptae naturae cognosci potest.). Calvin assumes that Scripture presents
a unified conception of the image. He does not concern himself with the
distinction between the first Adam who was of the earth earthy and the
second Adam who was the Lord from heaven in so far as the definition of the
image of God is concerned. By examining the restored image in Jesus Christ,
he hopes to comprehend the real meaning of the original lost image in Adam
(Quoniam deleta est imago Dei in nobis per lapsum Adae, ex reparatione
1 John Calvin, Institutionis Christiane" religionis libros I et II, Opera
Selecta, ed. Petrus Berth et Guilelmus Niesel (Munich, 1923), III, E.T.
Institutes of the Christian Religion, tr. Henry Beveridge (London, 1962),
I, I. xv. 3*
2 Ibid. I. xv. 3.
3 Calvin, Commentarii in Quinque Libros Mosis, Corpus Reformatorum
(Brunswick, 1882), LI, 26.
4 Calvin, Inst. I. xv. 4*
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iudicandum est quails fuerit.)). This is what G.C. Berkouwer calls Calvin's
2
"heriaeneutic method".
The result, or presupposition, of this "herraaneutic method" is
a relational doctrine of the image wherein the image consists in imaging
the goodness of the Creator. Adam bore the image of God in as much as he
3
was united to God (iraaginem Dei Adam gestasse quatenus Deo coniunctua erat).
However, Brunner's contention that Calvin displays more concern for the
humanum than Luther is supported by the main clause of this same sentence
which maintains that the likeness of God is to be sought only in those marks
of superiority whereby God has distinguished Adam .from all animals (Del
taraea similitudinem non alibi quaerendam esse contendo quam in illis
praestantiae notis qulbus Adam Deus insignlverat prae aliis animantlbus.).
Thus Calvin can speak of the image in the relation of man to God, and also
in the endowments of man which distinguish him from the rest of creation.
let these two interpretations are not so diverse as they might appear. For
in both cases the basic thought is that God's image is reflected in man as
in a mirror. "There is no doubt that Calvin always thinks of the imago in
K
terras of a mirror." The basic thought is that God images Himself in man.
This in this same passage in which he has spoken of the image as dependent
upon man's relation to God, and also of the superiority by which God has
distinguished Adam from all animals, he can speak of the excellence
"engraven" (inseulpturn) on Adam, and also of God the Creator beholding in
man whom He created, as in a mirror. His own glory (in quo sua glorlam
C
creator ipsi conapici quasi in speculo voluit). In both cases the thought
1 Calvin, C.R. LI, 26.
2 G.C. Berkouwer, Man: The Image of God, tr. D.W. Jellema (Grand Rapids,
1962), p. 37.
3 Calvin, Inst. II. xii. 6.
4 T.F. Torrance, Calvin's Doctrine of Man (London, 1949), p. 36.
5 Calvin, Inst. n. xii. 6.
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is one of God imaging Himself in man.
c. The "Relic"
Thus, like Luther, Calvin conceives the image in a unified manner.
Also like Luther, he is confronted with the problem of accounting for man's
continuing humanum in his desire to speak in total terms of man's being in
both grace and sin. Brunner suggests that his solution to this is his
1
concept of a "defaced reason", and as such is unsatisfactory. In support
2
of this, Brunner refers to a passage in which Calvin distinguishes between
natural and supernatural gifts. Here Calvin records his appreciation for
the Auguatinian distinction which describes man's natural gifts as corrupted
(corrupta) by sin, and the supernatural gifts as withdrawn (escinanitum),
the latter being defined as the light of faith and righteousness which
would have been sufficient for the attainment of heavenly life and everlasting
felicity (fidel lucem ouam instltiaa. quae ad caelestem vitam aeternamque
foelicitatem fdiplpnandarp suffic erent). The picture grows even more sombre
as Calvin goes on to assert that in addition to the light of faith and
righteousness, soundness of mind and Integrity of heart (sanitas mentis et
cordis ractitudo) were also withdrawn, and it is this which constitutes
the corruption of the natural gifts. For in spite of the remaining residue
of intelligence and judgment and will, the mind is weak and immersed in
darkness.
This depreciation of fallen man's capabilities may be seen as a
rebuttal of the classic natural-supernatural distinction. In a preceding
3
section of this same chapter, while again affirming his pleasure in this
Auguatinian distinction, Calvin attacks those who propound it because
TT&W p. 496. E.T. p. 510.
2 Calvin, Inst. II. ii. 12.
3 Ibid. II. ii. 4.
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scarcely one in a hundred understands it. The problem, says Calvin, is that
they do not consider what power (valeat) remains to man whose natural gifts
have been corrupted, and whose spiritual gifts have been withdrawn. This
is the core of Calvin's teaching on the subject of the "relic". There can
be no compromise in acknowledging the totality of sin. Although some
obscure lineaments of the image remain in us, they are so vitiated and
mutilated that they may truly be said to be destroyed (Nunc etsi obscura
quaedara imaginis illiua lineamenta in nobis residua maneat t sunt tamen adeo
vitiata et rautila, ut vere dicere liceat esse deleta.)* In short, no part
escapes the infection of sin (nulla pars est peccati labe non infecta)?
But having said this, we must nevertheless affirm the good Creation of God.
It will not do to despise the gifts of God. For in so doing we insult God
Himself. But Calvin asks rhetorically whether we can deem anything worthy
of praise, without realizing that it is provided by God (Porro landabilene
3
aliauid gut preeclarum censebiraus. ouod nan recognosearns a Deo provenire?).
This is Calvin's central concern. Whatever we retain ought to be ascribed
to God's indulgence, without which our rebellion would have resulted in the
total destruction of our nature (quod nobis relietum 631, Dei indulgentiae
merito debere ascribi: quia nisi nobis perpercisset, totius naturae interitum
secum traxlsset defectio.). Therefore, the natural gifts which remain
cannot be contaminated (inquinari) in themselves (per se), but they have
ceased to be pure to polluted man, lest he should obtain praise by them
5
(nequara inde laudem conaequatur).
d. The Unified Concept of the Image
Thus, in Calvin as in Luther, we are left with the contradictory
1 Calvin, C.R. U, '27'. TlSIcT. J 'Calvin', Thai. II. ii. 15.
ly Ibid. II. ii. 17. 5 Ibid.
aseertions that man has lost both imago and similitude in sin, and that
a "relic" of the image remains to fallen man. The distinction between the
Old Testament creaturely image and the New Testament heavenly image i3
united in the basic thought of the image as God's imaging of Himself in
man. Yet there is substance to Brunner's contention that Calvin shows more
concern than Luther for the humanitaa which distinguishes man even in sin.
In his concern not to despise the gifts with which God has endowed man
precisely because they are the gifts of God, Calvin demonstrates Ms concern
with the distinctiveness of man. But the identification of these gifts as
a "relic" of the image is inconsistent in terras of the original equation
with the .iustitia originalis. The image, because it involves the active
reflection of God, is totally lost in sin. Therefore, the introduction of
the concept of the "relic" represents an illegitimate intrusion into Calvin's
basic doctrine of the image of God.
E. THE CONTROVERSY WITH KARL BARTH
Brunner's contribution to the doctrine of the imago Del consists
essentially in Ms distinction between two senses of the image, the "formal"
Old Testament sense, and the "material" New Testament sense. By this
distinction he claims to avoid the natural-supernatural dichotomy of the
traditional view baaed on the imago-similitude distinction, as well as the
suggestion of a quantitative demarcation of the effects of sin inevitably
involved in the concept of the "relic". The issues involved in this
distinction between the "formal" and "material" senses of the image can
best be appreciated in terras of the 1934- Controversy with Karl Borth.
a. The Theses and Counter-Theses
Brunner begins his contribution to the discussion with Barfch,
Natur und (Made, by asserting that Barth's denial of the validity of Ms
formal-material distinction rests on a misunderstanding as to just what he
1
means by it. He contends that they are agreed in their concern with sola
gratia, which means that revelation, the Word, can be the only norm for the
2
Church's proclamation. On the basis of this confidence in their essential
agreement, Brunner proceeds to enumerate six theses in which he presents
what he considers to be Barth's position in regard to the imago and the
3
corresponding questions of natural theology. On the basis of the sola
gratia principle, and the acceptance of the Bible as "the sole ultimate
standard of truth", Brunner suggests that Barth maintains a position wMch
denies:
1) any remnant of the imago in fallen man,
2) any general revelation of God in nature, conscience, and history,
3) any grace of creation and preservation, active from the creation
of the world, and evident In God's preservation of the world,
4) any ordinances of preservation (lex naturae) by which we could
recognize the will of God as normative for our own action,
5) any "point of contact" for the Gospel in fallen man,
6) any continuity between the "old" and "new" man, whereby grace is
regarded in any sense as a perfecting of nature.
Having summarized what he considers to be Barth's position,
4
Brunner proceeds to enumerate six " counte2>theses" by which he hopes to
clarify the basic agreement wMch he is confidant exists between Barth
1 Natur und Gnade: Zum Gespr&ch ioit Karl Barth (Ttibingan, 1934), 2nd ed.
(1935), p. 3» E.T. in Natural Theology, tr. Peter Fraenkel (London,
1946), p. 16.
2 Ibid. p. 5. E.T. p. IS. 3 Ibid. pp. 7ff. E.T. pp. 20ff.
4 Ibid. pp. 9ff. E.T. pp. 22ff.
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and himself.
1) A distinction must be made between imago in the formal sense, by
which man is and remains man, and imago in the material sense of
eonformitaa which is totally lost through the Fall.
2) A distinction must be made between the subjective and objective
aspects of revelation in Creation - objectively this revelation is
the basis of man's responsibility for sin, and is a thoroughly
Biblical concept; subjectively it is perverted by human sin so that
it is not really revelation, but the basis for sinful idolatry,
and thus is not saving revelation.
3) A distinction must be made between divine presence and human distance
whereby a "preserving grace" is acknowledged, so that sinful man is
still sustained by the grace of Creation in spite of his sin.
4.) Within this "preserving grace", social life is maintained by
"ordinances of creation" such as matrimony, and "ordinances of
preservation" such as the state.
5) The formal imago Del, man's persisting "subjectness", in the sense
of "capacity for words" (Wbrtrahchtigkeit) and "responsibility"
(Verantwortlichkelt) is the "point of contact" for the Word of
God and the Holy Spirit.
6) The relation between the "old" and "new" man is not simply one of
discontinuity, in so far as the fact of self-consciousness is not
destroyed by the act of faith, but persists as the identity of the
subject in both the "old" aid "new" man.
b. Barth's Denial and the Counter-counter Theses
The contrast between these two seta of theses suggests that
62
Brenner is mistaken either in his evaluation of Berth's position or in his
conviction that a fundamental bond of agreement exists between Barth and
himself. Barth's reply, Neini, contends that both these judgments are true,
although not in the manner which the contrast between these two sets of theses
suggests. Barth affirms the distance between himself and Brenner in terms of
1
their respective assessments of the task of their theological generation.
His concern to "learn again to understand revelation as grace and grace as
revelation and therefore turn away from all 'true' or 'false' theologia
2
naturalis", he judges to be irreconcilable with Brenner's contention that "it
is the task of our theological generation to find its way back to a tree
3
theologia naturalis*" On this basis, Barth rejects Brenner's summary of his
position as a misrepresentation of his theological concern, in virtue of the
fact that it is baaed on a concept of theologia naturalis which he rejects.
He refuses to give a systematic account of the denial of natural theology,
such as that which is attributed to him in Brenner's theses, because such an
L
account would be itself natural theology. However, having rejected the
systematic denial of natural theology, Barth proceeds systematically to
5
demonstrate the errors of the counter-theses proposed by Brenner.
Essentially Barth's argument is that in so far as Brenner's
distinctions are concerned with the purely "formal" aspects of human existence,
they are merely statements of the obvious, but that this obvious form never
exhausts Brenner's contentions for the formal aspect. For example, in the
basic distinction between the formal and material senses of the imago, Barth
affirms the distinction between man and the lower creation, but asserts that
6
Brenner is not satisfied with this obvious formal description of man. In so
1 Barth, Neinl, pp. 7-8. E.T. p. 70. 2 Ibid. p. 8. E.T. p. 71.
3 NuG p. 44* E.T. p. 59* A Barth, Main.' pp. 11-12. E.T. pp.74f-5
5 Ibid. pp. 15ff. E.T. pp. 73ff. 6 Ibid. pp. 16-17. E.T. p. 79.
63
far as he goes beyond the obvious assertion, he contradicts the Reformation
principle of sola scriptura - sola £ratia^ But Brunner does not deary that
hia "formal" image has content. To argue that you cannot have complete form
2
ihLthout any matter, is to miss the point of Brunner's doctrine. He clearly
asserts, in a post-Controversy clarification of his doctrine, that the formal
imago has a great deal of content, but is formal in terms of power to be
3
righteous in the sight of God. Sin is not the emptying of man's being, but
its perversion, so that man is not merely a shell of his true self, but
4-
rather a being in self-contradiction. These terms, "formal" and "material",
5
are merely concepts which enable us to speak about a complex reality, and
as concepts should not be permitted to obscure the reality they are meant to
serve. This is not to say that Brunner's distinction between the formal and
material image does not present any problems. The point is that it does not
present the problems which Barth here raises. It is not Brunner's contention
that the Image can be designated by mere form withour any matter. On the
contrary, the whole problem of Brunner's doctrine consists in the matter
which the formal element is said to contain. Barth is most Instructive on
this point in later writings, but in the debate itself his criticism misses
the mark.
Barth presents a similar criticism of Brunnor's doctrine of
general revelation. He holds that Brunner's contention for a general
revelation, or a revelation in Creation, in so far as it is a formal concept
denoting man's preoccupation with his idols, is undeniable, but as a concept
which implies that fallen man can have any true knowledge of God or any
knowledge of the trie God, it proceeds beyond the merely formal, and assumes
1 Barth, NeinJ. p. 17." E .T. p. 30. ~
2 John Baillie, Our Knowledge of God (london, 1963), p. 30.
3 MW p. 498. E.T. p. 513.
4 UGMM p. 45.
5 MLW pp. 107, 493. E.T. pp. 105, 513.
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positive material significance. Barth suggests that Brunner means that the
one true God is known by man without Christ, and without the Holy Spirit,
1
although this knowledge is turned into idolatry. But in an article written
prior to the debate, Brunner clearly affirms: "The natural knowledge of God
2
is neither knowledge of God, nor really knowledge of God." Ih the debate
itself, as well as in his recent Dogaatlk, he distinguishes between the
formal objective revelation of God in His Creation, and the material subjective
3
idolatry of sinful men. This distinction is based on the much discussed text
of Romans lilSff. Objectively, God is revealed in His Creation? subjectively,
man turns this revelation into idolatry and is unable to know the God there
revealed. In this interpretation, Brunner is in good company.
20. For the invisible thing3 of him. God V himself is invisible?
but because his majesty shineth in all his works and creatures, men
ought in them to acknowledge him? for they do plainly show forth their
workmaster. ....
To the intent that they should be without excuse. Hereby it
doth easily appear what men get by this demonstration? namely, that
they can allege no excuse before the judgment of God, but they are
justly condemned. Let this distinction therefore stand? the
demonstration of God, whereby he maketh his glory apparent in his
creatures, in respect of the brightness thereof, is clear enough? but
in respect of our caecity is not so sufficient. Yet we are not so
blind that we can pretend ignorance, to quit us from the blame of
naughtiness or perversity. First, we conceive with ourselves there is
a God? secondly, that the same whosoever he be, is to be worshipped.
But here our reason faileth, before it can obtain either who is God,
or what he i3. 4
Again, this is not to deny that there are problems involved in Brenner's
concept of general revelation or the revelation in Creation. Indeed, it may
be that Berth's detection of a positive material significance in the concept,
even in the subjective aspect, is not without its justification.
The allied concept of "preserving grace" presents a similar dilemma.
1 Barth, Neini, p. 18. E.T. p. 81.
2 Fr n Anknpkt p. 510.
3 HuG pp. 13-14- E.T. p. 26? Dogmatik Vol. I. E.T. Dogmatics, tr. Olive Wyon
(London, 1962), I, 132f.
4 Calvin, Commentary on Romans, tr. Christopher Rosdell, ed. Henry Beveridga
(Edinburgh, 1844)# pp. 26-7.
It is Barth's contention that Brunner posits an "abstract preserving grace"
in addition to the one grace of Jesus Christ, and thereby severs creation and
I
reconciliation. But Brunner's concern is to emphasize that creation and
2
preservation is also the result of God's grace, a concern which he elsewhere
charges Barth with neglecting.
The problem of the formal-material distinction is climaxed in
Brunner's concept of the point of contact (.Anknhpfungspunkt). Part of the
confusion here may be the result of Barfch's rendering of Brunner's term
Wbrtm&chtigkeit (capacity for words, speech) as Offenbarungsmiichtigkeit
(capacity for revelation), let there is some justification for Barth's
interpretation in the very term which Brunner uses. For Wortm&chtigkeit
employs the singular Wort which could suggest that it is a capacity for
"the Word" which Brunner means to express. This is not Brunner's intention.
"Unter 'Wortfhhigkeit'» 'Wbrtragichtlgkeit', 'Ansprechbarkeit' verstehe ich
die Tatsache, dagg der Hensch keine sturarae Kreatur ist, aondern dass er -
3
wie man anf deutsch sagfe - 1 des Wortes mhchtig' ist." let the difference
between Brunner and Barth on this point cannot be dispensed with as a mere
confusion in terminology. Although the terms themselves may have added to
the confusion, the basic problem i3 the underlying distinction between the
formal and material aspects of the point of contact. Brunner does not wish
to attribute any positive contribution to man in respect of his salvation.
The "capacity for words" and "responsibility" which constitute the formal
imago Dei by which man continues to be man, and is as such the point of
contact for the Gospel, this "'receptivity' must not be understood in the
4
material sense." In this contention Barth and Brunner are agreed* If the
1 Barth, Neinl, pp. 20-1. E.T. p. 84*
2 Das Gebot und die Qrdnungea (TUbingen, 1932), pp. 593-4-* E.T. Tire Divine
Imperative, tr. Olive Mjon (London, 1964-), p. 615.
3 NuG (1935), p. 45.
4 NuG p. 18. E.T. p. 31.
formal imago is really formal, then, says Barth, it represents an obvious
assertion. For obviously "nan is man and not a cat", and if we choose to call
this the "'point of contact1, 'the objective possibility of divine revelation',
1
then all objections to these concepts is nonsensical." But it is Earth's
contention that Brunner is not satisfied with stating this formal fact, but
rather makes salvation dependent upon this formal addressability, thus
attributing to man a positive share in achieving salvation. On this basis,
Earth's rendering of Brunner's Worim&ohtigkeit as Offenbarungsrahchtlgkeit
is not so much a confusion of terms as a didactic expression for the positive
content which he feels to be intrinsic to Brunner's concept. His own claim
is that "the fact that God 'reaches' man with His Word may very well be due
to something other than the formal possibility of his being addressed and
2
his huaanitas." Here the difference between Barth and Brunner is seen to
be much more basic than a confusion in terminology. Brunner would hardly
deny that "the fact that God 'reaches' man with His Word ... is ... due to
something other than the formal possibility of his being addressed and his
huaanitas." But he would also want to affirm that man's humanitaa is somewhat
more significant than a mark of distinction which prevents confusion between
mm and cats. Unlike Barth, Brunner takes account of the human pre-requisites
of faith.
We cannot say we believe through or with the reason, in a certain
sense we believe against the reason. But we can say even less?
we believe without the reason. The humanum, what distinguishes us
from the animals, is the place where faith happens. 3
Every preacher presupposes a basic knowledge of grammar and an appreciation
for logical argument. This is not itself a capacity for the Word, but it is
A
a capacity for words which i3 a pre-requisite for any proclamation of the Ward.
1 Barth. Neinl. p. 25. E.T. p. 83.
2 Ibid. p. 26. E.T. p. 39«
3 Fr n Anknpkt p. 514*
A NuG (1935), p. 4-9.
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As such, it is not a matter of insignificance. Again, however, Barth is
instructive, in that it is important to clarify the distinction between man's
addressability in this sense of rational compotence to understand discourse
and his addressability in terms of his capacity to receive the Word.
The corresponding question of the continuity and/or discontinuity
between the "old" and "new" man, raises the same issues. Again Barth claims
that Brunner's concern for the continuity in the identity of the subject
endows the formal concept of man's identity as subject with a positive
1
"capacity" for salvation, without which God could not accomplish His miracle.
Undoubtedly, there is great danger in Brunner's definition of continuity in
terms of the formal imago, the responsible structure of human life, the
inherent subjectness of man. On the other hand, there is a continuity In man.
Obviously this continuity can exist only by the mercy of God. But to say
this tells us nothing about the continuity itself. If it is illegitimate to
define this continuity because this would presuppose a "neutral" element in
man untouched by sin, then theology has nothing to say about the sinner who
denies God and yet continues to exist as man.
c. Evaluation of the Debate
It is extremely difficult to evaluate the merits of either side
in this debate. It has been suggested that Brunner is nearer the truth, but
"confused and compromising"? whereas Barth is untrue to the facts, but consistent
2
in his argument. This evaluation has also been proposed on the basis of the
contention that "Brunner accepts too many of Berth's presuppositions in his
fundamental premises to be able to present his own position with plausibility
3
and consistency." Hence it is argued that Brunner is nearer the truth, but
1 Barth. Neini. pp. 28ff. K.T. pp. 91-2.
2 Baillie, p. 30.
3 Reinhold Niebithr, The Mature and Destiny of Han (New York, 1964.), II, p. 64n.
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because of his greater consistency Barth wins the debate. Admittedly, there
is a certain confusion in the distinctions which Brunner draws. The terra
"formal", which is in many ways the focal point of the debate, is shrouded in
an ambiguity which will demand investigation in due course. Thus, in terras
of the issues involved in the debate, this may represent a fair evaluation.
However, in terras of the debate as a whole, there is good reason to suggest
that this verdict would have to be reversed. For in his initial assessment
of the issues involved, Barth denies the theses attributed to him by Brunner
because to give the rejection of natural theology systematic treatment would
be itself to indulge in natural theology. He specifically states that "'natural
theology' does not exist as an entity capable of becoming a separate subject
within what I consider to be real theology - not even for the sake of being
rejected."* let from this uncompromising refusal to give any systematic
treatment to the rejection of natural theology, Barth proceeds systematically
2
to reject "Brunner's Natural Theology4'. Consequently, if we must speak of a
victor in this debate, then it must surely be Brunner to whom this dubious
honour is directed. It may well be that within the discussion of the issues
raised in the theses and counter-theses Barth is victorious because of his
greater consistency, but in terras of the debate as a whole the reverse is the
case because Barth accepts Brenner's terms of debate, and indulges in the
natural theology he rejects.
d. The Gulf between Barth and Brenner
The subsequent references to each other in their later writings
demonstrate the gulf which exists between Brunner and Barth, in spite of the
occasional expression of hope that the other is approximating the writer's
1 Barth, Neini, p. 12. E.T. p. 75.
2 Ibid. pp. 15ff. E.T. pp. 78ff.
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position. The most fruitful approach for understanding this gulf is suggested
by Brunner in his article "The New Barth", which is a reply to Berth's
observations in his Church Dogmatics. Ill# ii, on Brunner's most comprehensive
treatment of the issues surrounding the imago Dei, his Per Mensch im Widerspruch.
In this article, Brunner suggests that the "concept of 'real man' is the
particular crux of the reader attempting an interpretation."^"
Barth's principal reaction to Brunner's presentation of the formal-
material distinction in Per Mensch im Widerspruch is a perplexity as to which
of two concepts of man, which he claims to find in this presentation, is
really representative of Brunner's doctrine. On the one hand, Brunner clearly
asserts as "the first principle of his anthropology" that man can be known
only fro© the Word of God, and that this Word of God "constitutes for man not
2
only the basis of cognition but also being". On the other hand, Brunner's
emphasis on human responsibility leads Barth to ask "whether we can take it
that the actuality in which we recognize real man as God's creature is the
actuality, and only the actuality, which he acquires as a partner in the act
3
of God's gracious dealings ..." Barth fears that Brunner deserts his major
premise, that man has his being in the Word of God, and can be known only
from the Word of God, in the interest of a "neutral" concept of man. Thus he
suggests that for Brunner "man seems to be free to realize his being either
in loyalty or disloyalty to God, to choose as his master either God, h-impaif
or the devil, either to confirm or to deny his creatureliness and therefore
his being in the Word of God."^ Thus Barth concludes that the Ward of God
in the historical revelation in Jesus Christ is only the noetic basis of
man's being, not the ontic, the latter being associated with the universal
1 "The New Bsrth", SJofTh, 4, No. 2 (1951), p. 126.
2 Barth, Church Dogmatics, tr. H. Knight, G.W. Bromlley, J.K.S. Reid, and
R.H. Fuller, ed. G.W. Bromiley and T.F. Torrance (Edinburgh, I960), in,
ii, 129.
3 Ibid. p. 130.




Brunner's principal reaction to Berth's more recent formulations of
his position is a perplexity as to what he means by the assertion that every
2
man has his being in Jesus Christ. He will accept this if it means "that
eternal Word and purpose of God which was revealed and became historical
3
reality in Jesus Christ." But Barth's apparent identification of the covenant
of creation with the covenant of grace suggests that this is not all that he
A
means by the assertion, and as such provides a barrier to Brunner's compliance.
The crux of Brunner's resistance resides in his contention that through sin
man is excluded fi*om the covenant, and that his restoration can be accomplished
only "through the second Word of God, the Word of Atonement in so far as a
5
man believes."
On this basis we are forced to affirm a real gulf between Brunner
and Barth, a gulf which is evidenced in their respective definitions of
real man. The fact is that Brunner's "real man" finds no place in Barth's
theology. Barth's "real man" is what Brunner designates as "true man". For
Barth, real man is "man in Christ". For Brunner, real man is "man in self-
contradiction". This gulf which separates Brunner and Barth is based on a
more fundamental divergence, namely, the difference in their concepts of
revelation. Both are agreed that man can be known only In the Word of God
and that man has his being In the Word of God. But within this initial
agreement, there is an equally basic divergence. For Barth the Word of God
is Jesus Christ, the incarnate Word. It is in this Word that man has his
being as well as the knowledge of his being. For Brunner the Word of God is
both the pre-incarnate Logos and the incarnate Word, Jesus Christ. The
1 Barth, Church Dogmatics. Ill, ii, 131-2.
2 "The New Barth", p. 132.
3 Ibid.
A Ibid. p. 133.
5 Ibid. pp. 133-4- (italics are Brunner's).
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being of nan ia in the former, while the knowledge of that being is in the
latter.
There i» complete agreement between U3 on the point that the Word
of God, that is Jesus Christ as the perfect Word of God, is the
ratio cogmoBcendl of the creaturely nature of nan. Difference of
opinion begins only where Barth asks if for me Jesus Christ is
only the ratio cognoscendi and not as for him the ratio essendi.
the ground of the creaturely being of man. Let me first confess
my incapacity to understand what is meant by saying that every
man - including also such as lived a thousand years before Christ
- has his being in the history of Jesus. 1
Brunner's confession of "incapacity to understand" is not surprising.
The apparent equation of Creation and Redemption suggests insurmountable problems.
If one considers Earth's remarks with reference to the New Creation, however,
they shed a great deal of light on this whole area. Man has his being in Jesus
Christ because in Him there is a New Creation. No man stands outside the
atonement effected once for all in the Word become Flesh. Man is not simply
created in the Word and left to decide for or against this Word. He is created
in the world for which Christ died. There can be no doubt that Barth has
recovered the cosmic sweep of the Gospel in his emphasis on the finality of
the atonement, and in so doing has exposed many of the errors in the popular
conception of a "potential atonement" which man must perfect for himself.
However, Earth's contribution is not without its problems. If man has his
being in the incarnate Word, does this mean that the incarnate Word is the
Creator? On this basis it is difficult to see how the "becoming flesh" has
any real significance, l-fore important for our immediate concern, if man's
real being is in Jesus Christ, what is one to say about the being of the
sinner who denies Jesus Christ? It is not our concern to inquire into Barth's
answer's to these problems. Our concern is to demonstrate the gulf which exists
between Brunner and Barth, and to seek any illumination which their mutual
1 "The New Barth", p. 132,
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criticisms may offer. Thus it is sufficient for our purposes to note that
Brunner exposes the primary difficulties in Earth* s presentation - the lack
of concern for "real man", and the refusal to distinguish between the pre-
incarnate and the incarnate Word.
On the other hand, Brunner does not have these problems. The chief
concept of his anthropology, in so far as the predicament of real man is
concerned, is man in self-contradiction. This is developed in terns of the
distinction between the Logos and the incarnate Word, whereby the former is
the ratio essendi of man's being and the latter is the ratio cogaoscendi of
man's being. But just as Brunner exposes the difficulties in Earth's theology,
so too Earth exposes the difficulties in his.
Let us agree that it is soj that man as the creature of God has his
being in the Word of God. ... But my question is whether we can
take it that the actuality in which we recognize real man as God's
creature is the actuality, and only the actuality, which he acquires
as a partner in the act of God's gracious dealings. ... Is he free
for what God in His freedom does with him and for him in this act?
... Does the history inagurated between God and himself reach its
goal in his historicity? Is his capacity for decision his capacity
to do justice to the decision of God which is prior to it? In all
this do we have to do with a specific content of his being and not
with its mere form, not with a mere possibility, potentiality,
disposition and capacity, but with those which are actualized in
that act of God's gracious dealings? Is his freedom, therefore,
very different from a neutral freedom in which he might not
correspond to the Word of God (as he should do according to Brunner),
but might equally well refuse to do so? Only if this is the case
can it be said that he is in the Word of God. 1
In the suggestion that Brunner's presentation involves a "neutral freedom"
Earth exposes the chief difficulty in Brunner's theology. The concept of
the formal image, the "subjectness" which characterizes man In spite of his
relation, to God, be it positive or negative, there may be the suggestion
that man may relate himself to God in either manner. We shall 3eek to
clarify this problem through an examination of Brunner's concept of the
1 Earth, Church Dogmatics. Ill, ii, 129-30.
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sinner as "'man in self-contradiction", and his distinction between the formal,
and material image.
F. MM IN SELF-CONTRADICTION
a» The Relation between the Old Testament and Hew Testament Images
Scripture presents two concepts of the image of God. The Old
Testament, and the two passages in the New Testament, predicate the image
of man. The characteristic New Testament use, however, predicates the imago
of Christ. TJfolike the Old Testament image, which implies likeness in basic
unlikeness, the New Testament image signifies an exact correspondence. As
we have seen, the difficulty which this situation presents for the systematic
theologian consists in the fact that the relationship between the two images
is not defined in Scripture. Sin has come in between, but Scripture does
not explicitly relate the concept of the image to sin. The references to man
being made in the image of God (Gen. 9:6, James 3:9) and to his being the
image of God (I Cor. 11:7) suggest that the image in the Old Testament sense
is a predicate of man which designates his nature irrespective of sin. let
the New Testament image, Christ, is needed - man must be "renewed into knowledge
according to the image of him who created him." (Col. 3:10). Much discussion
about the imago Dei has been unprofitable because of the failure to recognize
these two concepts of the image in Scripttire.
The Reformers detected the error in distinguishing between zelem
and demuth in Gen. 1:26 so as to relate the image of creation to sin by
positing the retention of the natural imago and the loss of the supernatural
similitudo. Yet they did not consistently recognize the distinction which
Scripture does present between the "creaturely" image, which is predicated
7U
of man, and the "heavenly41 image, Christ, the image of God who created man,
to whom man is to be conformed. Combining these images in a unified concept
of man's active reflection of God, they were forced to posit the total
destruction of the image. Yet they were not so insensitive as to fail to
recognize that the concept of the image which is presented in the Creation
narrative does have some connection with man's being as such, the quality of
humanity which distinguishes man from the rest of creation. However, having
identified the image with active reflection, and having propounded a doctrine
of total corruption, no legitimate possibility remained of accounting for
man's continuing humanity. The Reformers created the possibility by the
inconsistent introduction of a concept of a "relic" of the image, which
somehow acknowledged the humanity of man while still affirming a doctrine of
total corruption. It is this problem which provides the context for Brunner'3
interpretation of the concept of the imago Dei.
It is Brunner's contention that the concept of the "relic" is
wholly inadequate as a means of relating the imago Dei and sin.
... we must abandon the dubious idea of a 'relic' of the Imago.
which was introduced by the Reformers. For it says both too
much and too little; too much, because it seems to suggest that
there is a sphere In human existence which is not affected by
sin; and too little, because it does not take into account the
fact that man - precisely in his sin - bears witness to his
original relation with God, that also, and particularly in sin,
he manifests his 'theological' nature, as one who 'stands before
God', and is related to God. 1
Obviously the crucial question here is - how is the sinner related to God?
The imediate answer is that he is related to God by his very being. The
affirmation that man is made in the image of God refers to the distinctive
nature of man. He is a creaturely analogy to the Creator. His being
represents an analogia entis to the being of the Creator.
1 ItLW p. 107. E.T. p. 105.
b. The Analogia Entis
In creation man is made in the image of God, and by the very nature
of his being he continues to be the image of God in spite of sin. "The fact
that man can speak is similar to the fact that God speaksj the fact that man
1
is Person, is an analogy to the Being of God as Person." Barth has criticized
this doctrine, affirming that it constitutes the basic position of Roman
2
Catholicism to which Protestant theology is opposed. To this charge Brunner
retorts that Barth himself employs the analogia entis. It is Bmnner's
contention that in his conception of the imago Dei as a relational reality
3
on the creaturely level, Barth employs the analogia entis. This suggests that
Brunner and Barth do not mean the same thing by analogia entis. Barth rejects
it on the ground that it implies a continuity between God and man. After
identifying the analogia entis id.th Catholic theology and liberalism, Barth
asserts: "In the Bible ... it is not a being common to God and man which
finally end properly establishes and upholds the fellowship between them,
4
but God's grace." The assumption is that analogia entis is prejudicial to
grace. But if this were the only possible Interpretation of the analogia
entis, Brunner would agree that it would have to be rejected. It is his
contention that it is not the only possible meaning of the concept, and,
indeed, that it is not a fair criticism of Catholic theology.
For an analogia entia too - even in the Roman Catholic sense -
always has as its primary presupposition that God's being end
man's being are unlike, as esse a se and esse a deo are unlike.
It is an analogy between things basically different, namely
between divine Independent, and creaturely dependent, being. 5
1 DII p. 27. E.T. p. 22.
2 Barth, Church Dogmatics, tr« T.H.I,. Parker, W.B. Johnston, H. Knight and
J.L.M. Halre, ed. G.W. Bromlley and T.P. Torrance (Edinburgh, 1957), II,
i, 242f.
3 The analogia relatlonis, which Brunner claims is an analogia entis, is
the seocual relationship - "the sex relationship is the true humanum"
Cf. Barth, Church Dogmatics, tr. J.W. Edwards, 0. Bussey and H, Knight,
od. G.W. Bromlley and T.F. Torrance (Edinburgh, 1953), III, i, 186.
4 Barth, Church Dogmatics, II, i, 243.
5 "The New SartW', p. 127.
This does not mean that Brunner accepts the Roman Catholic doctrine
of the analogia exitis. On the contrary, he rej ects it when it involves "the
neo-platonic analogia entis which since Bonaventura has made its home in
1
Roman Catholic theology." 13runner's contention is that there is an analogy
of proportionality inherent in creation, which, far from demanding a pre-
-supposition of continuity between God and man, is grounded in the contrast
between the independent Creator and the dependent creature. In Berth's terms,
it is an analogy grounded In grace. It is an analogy, therefore, which
precludes "natural" knowledge of God. Thus it is directly opposed to the
popular interpretation which is rightly or wrongly identified with Roman
Catholic theology.
This particular use of the idea of analogy presupposes the inviolable
character of human knowledge, in accordance with the fact that man
has been created in the image of God; it does not take into account
the fact that God's revelation in Creation, as such, taken by itself,
is not sufficient to lead sinful man to a true knowledge of the
Creator. It overlooks the fact that wherever man has tried to know
God by his own efforts, on the basis of that which is at his disposal
as a creature among other created being, he has never attained his
goal. The natural "knowledge" of God is actually no knowledge of
the true God, but is always inevitably a mixture of true knowledge
and the deification of the creature. 2
Thus by the analogia entis Brunner means to convey a concept of the imago Dei
whereby man is like God in his creaturely being. Both aspects must be
maintained - the likeness and the ereatureliness.
c. The Relational Understanding of the .Analogia Entis
Man is "like" God in his very being, in a creaturely manner. But
this represents only one side of Brunner's concept of the being of man. The
other side implies the direct antithesis of the concept of the analogia entis.
In this other side of Brunner's concept of man's being, he equates the being
1 "The New Barth", p. 127.
2 DII p. 23. E.T. pp. 22-3.
of man with his relation to God.
It is ... difficult for us to combine the ideas of "structure"
and "relation". And yet it is the distinctive quality of human
existence that its "structure" is a "relation"! responsible
existence, responsive actuality. The Biblical testimony on this
point is ruthlessly logical; man is the being who stands "before
God", even if he is godless. 1
Now analogia entis involves a conception of man in himself. It is a concept
which can be predicated only of a self-contained being. For it is a comparison
between two beings. It is not at all easy to reconcile this with the equation
of being and relation. 'What we seem to be left with are two contradictory
propositions: 1) man is a being in himself, and 2) man's being is his relation
to God. If we are not to abandon Brunner'a anthropology as a paradoxical
balancing of mutually exclusive conceptions, we must determine the connection
between his two definitions of being.
It may be that a hint of the reconciling principle is given in the
manner in which he distinguishes his analogia entis concept from that of
Catholicism. Be is concerned to disown any neo-platonic conception of a
community of being common to God and man. The likeness is predicated of man
only in the context of basic unlikeness. Thus this concept of the analogia
entis, if taken seriously as Brunner suggests, implies a relation in the
fact that man is creaturely dependent being. Man does not possess being in
himself, but only in relation to the Creator. Then man's being is not
essentially definable in itself, but only in terms of God who grants him
being. "It is not that man as he is in himself bears God's likeness, but
rather, that man is designated for and called to a particular relation with
2
God." If this combination of analo?ria entis and being as relation represents
a fair construction of Brunner's basic anthropological position, then we might
1 DII p. 71. E.T. p. 60.
2 WaB p« 97. E.T. p. 146.
venture the further suggestion that this combination may be defined as "being
for God". This "being for God" may be a fair representation of Brunner's
understanding of the Old Testament image, which he describes as "the positive
1
fact that he has been made to respond - to God." Of the Old Testament image,
2
Brunner says: "It signifies above all the superiority of man within creation."
To this he adds: "This superior position in the whole of creation, which man
3
still has, is based on his special relation to God ..." Thus the image of
God involves both man's distinctive endowments, that which distinguishes him
from the rest of creation, and the total orientation of his being in that as
creature he is made for the Creator. Man is created for God. This is his
essence and destiny. If he were to escape this destiny he would cease to
exist. It is to this end that man is endowed with all the distinctive
characteristics which distinguish him from the rest of creation. On this
interpretation, Brunner's concept of the sinner as man in self-contradiction
becomes quite intelligible.
d. Man in Self-Contradiction
Man is a unity in faith and in sin. The difference consists neither
in the loss of a supernatural relation which leaves man's "natural" nature
intact, as the false exegesis of zelem and denuth suggests} nor in the retention
of "relics" of the original image. Rather man 's "unified 'theological' nature
is perverted by sin, but in this perversion it still always reveals the traces
of the image of God in the human structure, so that it is actually the formal
4-
•human' clement which betrays man's lost origin." This seems to be in accord
with the witness of Scripture to the persistence of the Old Testament image,
Tdii p. 66. E.T. p. 57.
2 NuG p. 10. E.T. t>. 23.
3 Ibid.
4 MiW p. 4-99. E.T. p. 514-
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and also seems to explain the need for the New Testament image. "That which
man, who has become and is ever becoming a sinner, retains of this divine
1
origin in creation is not nothing, but it is the source of his perversion."
In sin man grasps the image of God as his own possession. The lie of the
serpent was "le shall be as gods." Indeed, it was no lie. For this is
precisely the result of sin. lien become "as gods". In taking life into his
own hands, man usurps the place of the Creator. He becomes his own god.
Through the Fall the unity of being and destiny, or of the •I1
and the 'Self' has been lost. Hence sinful man is forced contin-
-ually to seek his Self or himself. Instead of circling round
God the human life-movement now circles round the Self - lost
and therefore sought. 2
Man is made for God. Consequently he cannot live without God. But through
sin he has set himself in the place of God, and, therefore, is doomed to be
his own god. His grandeur has become his misery, and his misery reflects
his grandeur. This is maa in self-contradiction.
In Dod's Creation mm is created not only for love, but in the
love of God, which fills his whole life. Original existence in
the love of God, and its counterpart, existence for eternal life,
is not a mere ideal, or a law of obligation, but it is the God-
created nature of man. When man decides against this divine
destiny he is in opposition, not only to an ideal destiny, but
also to his own nature, and this self-contradiction is now within
himself. 3
Man in self-contradiction, interpreted in terras of the concept of man's being
as "being for God" so that it is the very essence of man that he is a being
who cannot escape this destiny, provides a possible explanation of the
continuance of the Old Testament image in sin.
At this point, it i3 instructive to note a related concept, the law
of closeness of relation. By this concept Brunner accounts for the significant
achievements of man in spite of sin, and also presents the distinctive
1 R&R p» 74-
2 MiW p. 227. E.T. p. 229.
3 DII pp. 88-9. E.T. p. 73
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judgment of the Christian knowledge of sin.
The nearer a field of inquiry lies to that centre of existence
where everything is at stake, i.e. where we have to do with
the relation to God and the being of persons, the more clearly
is the Christian viewpoint distinguished from every other one,
while tlie antithesis between Christian and non-Christian
becomes the more indistinct the farther the object of knowledge
is distant from the personal centre. 1
This is a fundamental perspective of Brunner's whole theology. It is
especially determinative for his doctrine of the imago Dei in his dialectical
concept of the relation between the image and sin in terras of man in self-
contradiction. Sin is essentially personal. Consequently its effects are
most disastrous in the personal sphere. In impersonal activities the effects
of sin are not so obvious. The competence of a mathematician, for example,
is not directly related to his faith or lack of faith. In personal relations,
on the other hand, the effects of sin are manifold. The competence of a
father may well be determined by his faith or lack of faith. Obviously this
is a dangerous principle. It can be misconstrued as a reduction of the
totality of sin, as is done in a quantitative interpretation of the concept
of the "relic" of the image. But it is also a noble effort to avoid this
danger. As such it is worthy of recognition. Bow one distinguishes bet-ween
the personal and the impersonal, is, of course, a most delicate issue. Be
that as it may, this principle and the corresponding doctrine of man in
self-contradiction provides a promising basis for a doctrine of the image
which takes into account the continuing distinctiveness of man in spite of
sin, while affirming the total reversal involved in the Fall of man. In sin
man does not lose anything, and yet he loses everything. The distinctiveness
of man, including his need for God, is not lost through sin. Rather the
whole man is re-directed in sin, introverted, so that self replaces God.
1 WaB E.T. pp. 5V5* R&R p. 383j MiW p. 66. E.T. p. 62.
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Therefore sin is total. The most laudable feature of this presentation is
its- accordance with the witness of Scripture. The totality of sin, and the
continuance of the itnago Dei in sin, ore held together without violence to
either doctrine. Thus the presentation offers a possible explanation of
the references of Scripture to the continuance of the Old Testament image in
spite of sin, and also accounts for the need for the Mew Testament image.
G. THE FORMAL AND MATERIAL IMACES
a. Formal and Material
Brunner's doctrine of man in self-contradiction represents only-
one side of his doctrine of the imago Dei. The concept of man in self-
contradiction is a concept which is concerned with man in himself. As we
have seen, man is not describable in himself because he is not a self-
contained being. He has been made for God. Thus man in self-contradiction
represents an abstraction. It is a definition of the sinner who takes life
into his own hands. He is still man created for God, but now Self replaces
God, so that the God-man dialectic becomes the creature-sinner dialectic.
Therefore, if our interpretation of Brunner's doctrine represents a fair
grasp of his meaning, the man who can be understood only in terras of his
relation to God is now understandable only in terms of the contradiction
within his own being, his introversion of the divine determination in
Creation whereby Self replaces God.
But man in self-contradiction is not only an abstraction, it is
also an impossible situation. For Self cannot replace God. Man was made
for God, and cannot be content to serve and worship Self. The need for
God, which is integral to man's being, cannot be satisfied by Self. At this
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point we encounter a difficulty in Brunner's presentation which suggests that
our exposition of the concept of man in self-contradiction has been somewhat
inadequate. For it is not the need for God which is integral to man's being,
but responsibility to God. This is the common unalterable characteristic of
man's being in Creation and in sin. He owes himself to God. This is what
Brunner calls the formal image of God, the unalterable responsible being of
1 2
man. This is also the Old Testament image. We have already noted the
peculiarity of this contention that the Creation narrative presents "this
3
'neutral' or 'formal' conception of man's 'nature'and have seen that the
answer is that "the imago, understood In the Old Testament sense, is merely
U
a 'relic' of the original, total imago." The original image knows no
5
distinction between formal and material. The true relation to God which is
given in Creation, lost in sin, and restored in Christ, is described as the
6
material image which Brunner also designates as the New Testament image.
b. The Old Testament and New Testament Images as Formal and iMaterial
We have suggested the difficulties which Brunner's distinction
between the formal and material images presents from the point of view of
the Biblical witness. In Scripture the Old Testament image is predicated
of man in his creatureliness, while the New Testament image is equated with
Christ, and therefore conveys the idea of an exact correspondence, in contrast
to the context of basic unlikeness in which the Old Testament image is
predicated of man.
Nothing could make clearer the tremendous impact of the revelation
of God in Christ than the fact that it has almost completely
obliterated the thought of man as being in the Image of God and
1 MiW pp. 170, 499-500. E.T. pp. 170, 5H.
2 DII pp. 67, 92. E.T. 57, 77.
3 B&R p. 53.
A Ibid. p. 70.
5 DII p. 71. E.T. p. 60.
6 Ibid. pp. 67-8. E.T. p. 57.
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replaced it with the thought of Christ as being the image of God,
that being understood in the sense of perfect correspondence to
the divine prototype. 1
Thus the contrast between the Old Testament and Hew Testament images consists
not in the distinction between a formal and a material sense of the image,
but in the contrast betveen the creaturely image of God which is predicated
of man, and the perfect image of God which is Christ.
In terms of this contrast between the two concepts of the image in
Scripture, Qrunner's distinction between the formal and material image would
seem to be more a division of the Old Testament image itself. Yet it is a
distinction which encompasses the New Testament image in so far as the Hew
Testament image designates the destiny of the believer to be conformed to
Christ. It is a distinction between man who conforms and man who does not
conform to the divine destiny. Considered in this light, we might anticipate
difficulty in distinguishing Brunner's doctrine from the classical distinction
between the unalterable zelera and the dispensable derauth. The definitive
question is - Is the material image integral to the formal image? Or other-
-wiae expressed - Is sin a possibility given in Creation?
c. The Possibility of Sin
The formal image, which Brunner also refers to as the Old Testament
image, involves the inalienable structure of man's existence as responsible
2
being, the inherent legal structure of human life, the Gesetallchkeitsatruktur.
The material image, which Brunner also calls the New Testament image, involves
3
the true determination of man's existence as being in love, Sein in hiebe.
This distinction is required because of sin, and therefore represents an
abstraction which has no place in the divine Creation.
1 Port©ous, p. 634.
2 MiW p. 500.
3 Ibid. p. 170.
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We must note *.. that necessary as it is for us to think of the
Imago Dei with this distinction between the formal and material
aspect, from the point of view of the divine Creation it does
not exist. God calls man into existence in order that he may-
respond to Him aright - not in order that he may respond wrongly
or rightly. 1
let this distinction is potentially present in the original imago. For
Brunner continues*
God has made man in such a way that he can respond as God wills
him to do. A certain freedom of choice, which makes this response
possible only becomes visible when the wrong response has been
made. 2
It is at this point that Berth's detection of a "neutral freedom" in Brunner's
presentation is significant. "Is sin a possibility foreseen and contained
3
in the creaturely being of man?" That is to say, is man created so that he
can respond rightly or wrongly to God? We have seen that Brunner denies
this, and yet in an inverted way denies his denial by suggesting that the
possibility of a wrong response is demanded in order to assure the genuineness
of the right response.
It seems that here wo must make a distinction between two senses
of the word possibility. Obviously sin is possible. Otheivise there is no
such thing as sin. The fact of sin implies the possibility of sin. Now if
sin is rebellion of the creature against the Creator, as Brunner says, then
it is both possible and impossible. It is impossible in the sense that it
has no place in the economy of the divine Creation. The creature exists by
the mercy of the Creator, and as such can live only in the determination of
the Creator. Therefore it is impossible that the creature should deny this
dependence. On the other hand, gin is a fact. The rebellion has taken
place. Thus sin must be possible, and since sin is the rebellion of the
creature against the Creator, its possibility must lie in this very fact
1 DII pp. 71-2. E.T. p. 60.
2 Ibid. p. 72. E.T. pp. 60-1.
3 Berth, Church Dogmatics, III, ii, 130.
that the creature is not the Creator. This fact, which by Creation makes
sin impossible, by the agency of the tempter makes sin possible in the
suggestion that the Creator-creature distinction is not the only possibility.
This is the irrationality of sin. It has no place. It enters through the
unidentified serpent. Thus sin is both possible and impossible. It is
impossible from the point of view of Creation. It is possible in the very
structure of Creation once its possibility is awakened. But it is this
possibility which comes from outside which creates the possibility in the
economy of the divine Creation. The creature must be seduced into questioning
his creatureliness. These questions regarding the origin of sin and the
irrationality of sin are central issues for an appreciation of Brunner's
theology, and consequently will demand more thorough treatment in later
sections. At present it is sufficient to notice the difficulty with which
Brunnar is involved in this area. On the one hand, he denies the possibility
of sin in Creation. "God calls man into existence in order that he may
1
respond to Him aright - not in order that he may respond wrongly or rightly."
On the other hand, he casts doubt on the seriousness of this denial in
suggesting a "neutral" freedom behind this true freedom for God. "A certain
freedom of choice which makes this response possible only becomes visible
2
when the wrong response has been made." This seems to suggest that sin is
an inherent possibility of creaturely being. Now this is not an impossible
doctrine for one who holds that creaturely life is essentially a test of
moral fortitude whereby man is required to prove or disprove his qualifications
for eternity. It is an impossible doctrine, however, for one who insists that
God has given man his determination in Creation. If, in fact, Brunner does
1 DII pp. 71-2. E.T. p. 60.
2 Ibid. p. 72. E.T. pp. 60-1.
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allow for the "neutral" freedom which Barth believes he detects in his
presentation, this clarifies his doctrine of the formal and material image.
d. Two Senses of "Formal"; "Neutral" and "Negative"
If the formal image is equated with the analogia entia in the
sense that it is a description of man in himself, irrespective of his relation
to God, and the material image is defined as conformity to God which is lost
through sin, then it is difficult to see how this differs from the classical
distinction between the natural imago and the lost supernatural similitude.
"This distinction of a 'formal' and a 'material' image of God is » historically
viewed - a resumption of the mediaeval Catholic distinction between the two
expressions employed in the Old Testament narrative, 'image' [Midi and
1
•likeness' pDinlichkeitl, imago and aimilitudo." Undoubtedly there is a
real problem here in Brunner's presentation. On the one hand, he speaks of
the unified theological image being perverted, or perhaps more accurately,
2
inverted, through sin. This is the dialectical concept of the image which is
involved in the definition of the sinner as man in self-contradiction. On
the other hand, he asserts that the formal image remains untouched, while the
3
material image is completely lost through sin. The suggestion is that the
material image is not integral to the formal image, so that one could conclude
that the formal image is the basic one, upon which depends the material image.
This would mean that man as unalterable formal image of God can choose to
relate himself to God either positively or negatively. At this point we
detect a basic ambiguity in Brunner's doctrine of the imago Dei. It seems
that the word 'formal' is being used in two senses. On the one hand, it
1 Carl Stange, "NatUrliche Theologie". ZsyTh. 12 (1934-35), p. 370.
2 ittW p. 499. E.T. p. 5H-
3 Ibid. p. 227. E.T. p. 229.
means "negative"; on the other hand, "neutral".
The formal image is a predicate of man in ain. It Is a description
of man's negative relation to God in sin, in contrast to the material image
which designates man's positive relation to God in Creation and Redemption.
The formal image is also a predicate of man irrespective of his relation to
God. It is, therefore, a neutral concept which designates man's essential
nature in itself. It is easy to conclude from this that what is involved in
Brunner's distinction between the formal and material image is indeed a
resumption of the mediaeval distinction between a natural retained imago
and a lost supernatural simllitudo. But such a facile conclusion ignores
the problem with which Brunner is wrestling. The fact is that Scripture
does predicate the Old Testament image of man, and continues to do so
without regard for the fact that man is a sinner. There is, therefore, a
common element peculiar to man in Creation and in sin, and this involves
the concept of the image of God.
e« Two Senses of "Neutral"
It will not do to dismiss summarily the idea of a neutrality in
the imago concept. It seems that we must make a further distinction, one
between two senses of the term "neutral". On the one hand, it may mean
"common". In this sense we must certainly affirm a neutral concept of the
image. On the other hand, it may mean indifferent to sin. This sense of
the term must be excluded from the concept of the image.
The difficulty in Brenner's doctrine of the image is that it seems
to involve both senses of the term "neutral". On the one hend, the dialectical
doctrine of the image suggests that the neutrality involved is that of a
as
common being of man which remains in sin, but which is by no means indifferent
to sin.
... the nature of man is to be understood as a unity, from the
point of view of man's relation to God, without the distinction
between nature and super-naturej this unified 'theological'
nature is perverted by sin, but in thi3 perversion it still
always reveals the traces of the image of God in the human
structure, so that it is actually the formal 'human* element
which betrays man's lost origin. 1
The image of God consists in man's being for God as well as in his unique
endowments. Through sin man does not lose this destiny. If he did he would
cease to exist. Rather he ceases to fulfil this destiny, and instead becomes
being for Self. The Self replaces God, so that even if the thought of God
should arise it is not the God in whose image he is made which is involved,
but the God whom he makes in his own image. Nothing is lost, and yet every-
- thing is lost. Man remains man, but instead of God there is the Self. Man
retains his destiny and his endowments, but because Self replaces God both
destiny and endowments are perverted. This is man in self-contradiction.
On the other hand, the categorical distinction between the formal and the
material image suggests that 'formal1 refers to a common being of man which
not only remains in sin, but which is indifferent to sin. "The human element
as form, as structure - namely, as responsible being - has remained; the
2
human element as content, that is, as being in love, has been lost." Instead
of "perversion" or "inversion", we now hear of "remained" and "lost".
Responsible being has remained, and being in love has been lost.
f. Man in Contradiction
It is difficult to see how the concept of a unified image which is
perverted or inverted through sin, and a dualistic concept of a formal image
1 MLW p. 499. E.T. pp. 513-14*
2 Ibid. p. 170. E.T. p. 170.
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which is retained and a material Image which is lost can be combined in any
consistent manner. It may be that we hare been too hasty in assuming that
Brenner'a concept of the analogia entis and the equation of being and relation
can be combined to yield the concept of man in self-contradiction. For Brunner
does not say that man has his being only in relation to God. Rather he asserts
that man's being is his relation to God. This equation of being and relation
excludes any concept of man in himself such as the concept of man in self-
contradiction presupposes. If man's being is equated with his relation to
God, and if sin involves man's denial of this relation, then in sin man denies
his own being. The result of this line of reasoning is that one can say-
absolutely nothing about the sinner because as sinner he is non-existent. The
fact that he continues to exist can only be attributed to God's grace, but
nothing can be affirmed about the being of the sinner himself. The only
other way around this logical result of the equation of being and relation
is to affirm a continuing relation to God from man's side. Then it is not
man in self-contradiction with which we are concerned, but man in contradiction,
that is, man who somehow transcends the contradiction in his own being. On
this interpretation, our development of Brunner's concept of man in self-
contradiction proves to be grossly inadequate. That presentation was based
on the interpretation which assumes that, in the words of one of Brunner's
recent interpreters J "The dialectical relation God-man has become the inner-
anthropological dialectic of the man in self-contradiction, the man in contrast
1
of image of God and sinner." But now it appears that man in self-contradiction
is not really concerned with a contradiction within man, but with a contradiction
in which man is involved.
1 Roessler, p. 41.
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The concept of nan in self-contradiction involves a transcendent
reference in that nan is not describable in himself, but only in terras of
his being for God. Brunner preserves this transcendent reference for fallen
man in terras of his concept of the revelation In Creation, but this is
interpreted from the side of fallen man so as to suggest that he is in some
sense superior to the contradiction.
Humanity in the formal sense is never without relation to the
knowledge of God and to the determination for God. Man as
huaanum has either God or an idol. 1
In terms of Brunner's distinction between the objective and subjective aspects
of the revelation in Creation, the knowledge of God and the determination for
God will be objectively given, but subjectively perverted into idolatry. Yet
Brunner affirms of the sinner; "Ilia knowledge of God is his humanity - as
2
disfigured and questionable as this knowledge is." The result of this is
that we seem to be left with a basic contradiction in Brunner's theology
between his doctrine of revelation and his concept of fallen man. He seems
to affirm more for fallen man than his doctrine of revelation will permit.
The problem is climaxed in his concept of "responsibility".
g. Ambiguity in the Meaning of "Responsibility"
The corollary of man in self-contradiction is self-responsibility.
In presuming to be his own god, the sinner takes responsibility for his own
life. Yet Brunner insists that fallen man is responsible to God.
... the divine determination in the Creation is far higher than
our negative self-determination} in other words ... the divine
(positive) and the human (negative), are not in equal proportions;
this comes out in the fact that although, through sin, we cease to
express our responsibility, we do not cease to be responsible. We
do not even cease to be aware of responsibility. Responsibility
still remains the characteristic formula for the nature of man,
1 Fr n Anknpkt p. 552.
2 "Pie andere Aufgabe der Theologie", Zd2, 7, Heft 3 (1929), p« 264-
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for fallen man as well as for man in his origin. But responsibility
is now no longer the formula of his reality, but only the formula
of his obligation, and through this fact its meaning is profoundly
changed. 1
The difficulty in Brunner's presentation is that the prcfound change In the
meaning of responsibility is not what one would expect in terras of his concept
of the sinner as man in self-contradiction. For the change is not from
responsibility to God to responsibility to Self, but rather from responsibility
in love to legalistic responsibility. This antithesis of law and love suggests
a possible influence of the Kantian contrast between duty and inclination which
shall have to be investigated. For the present we may content ourselves with
the observation that it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that 3runner is
confusing hi3 perspective as a theologian with the perspective of "natural man".
As a Christian, Brunner can affirm the sinner's responsibility
2
before God, but this affirmation can hardly be predicated of the sinner himself.
It almost seems as though Brunner i3 charging natural man with Pharisaism, a
legalistic attempt at self-justification before God. But such a position
represents a highly sophisticated religious orientation which can hardly be
associated with man in general. What can be associated with man in general
is the responsibility for his own life which he assumes as a sinner, the moral
responsibility which has as its ultimate point of reference the moral agent
himself. It may be that Brunner's whole position rests on an unacknowledged
shift in meaning in the term "responsibility".
Responsibility, which is one of the two terms Brunner uses to define
the formal Image (the other is the equally indefinite term "subject") can be
used in at least three senses. It can mean a neutral concept which is a
predicate of man's being in itself. The chief concept of Brunner's anthropology,
1 I-E.W pp. 156-7. E.T. p. 156.
2 Cf. Carl Stange, "Natttrliche Theologle", ZsyTh, 12 (193V35), pp. 378ff.
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1
the definition of man as "responsible being", carries this neutral sense of
2
the term. Man' s being is essentially responsive actuality. This is a
description of man in himself regardless of his orientation. It is a concept
which implies relation in that man is created to respond to God, but as a
working concept, the relation to God, positive or negative, is external to
the responsible being itself. When responsibility is used as a description
of man's relation to God, the term acquires two further meanings, depending
upon the positive or negative character of the relation. In Creation man is
responsible to God in that he owes his being to God, and exists only by the
mercy of God. In sin man is responsible to God in that he Is answerable
for the negative response to God which he has made. When these three senses
of the term "responsibility", the neutral, the positive, and the negative,
are combined in the one concept of the formal image of God, the distinction
between the moral sense of responsibility as an affirmation of man's being
in itself and the religious sense of responsibility as an affirmation of
man's relation to God becomes obscured. It may be that Brenner's distinction
between a formal and a material sense of the image of God is only possible
because of this ambiguity in the word "responsibility". If this is the case,
then Brenner's doctrine of the iraago Wei is built on an ambiguity which is
insoluble within the context of the doctrine itself. Its clarification
demands an examination of Brenner's use of the terra "responsibility".




The analysis of Brunner's doctrine of the Imago Dei has resulted
in the suspicion that his distinction between a formal and a material sense
of the image is possible only because of an ambiguity in the meaning of the
term "responsibility" which enables him to employ it in tliree different
contexts without acknowledging the distinctions which the different contexts
involve. The formal image is a predicate of the sinner as well as a predicate
of the common characteristic of man in Creation, sin, and Redemption. Hence
the formal image is a predicate of man's negative relation to God, and also
an ingredient in his positive relation to God. It is therefore a neutral
concept which describes man's being irrespective of his relation to God.
In an effort to clarify this complexity, we shall begin with an
examination of the three senses which the term seems to have in Brunner's
writings. The neutral sense of responsibility appears in Brunner'3 concept
of man as responsible being which is a formal definition of man's being as
"responsive actuality". This use of the term is neutral in the sense that
it is a description of man's being in itself without regard for the
character of the "responsiveness" involved. The negative sense of the terra
involves the situation of the sinner, and therefore implies culpability.
The positive sense concerns man's relation to God in Creation and Redemption,
and thus implies the ability to respond. Having presented Brunner's three
principal senses of the term "responsibility", we shall then endeavour to
penetrate beneath this ambiguity to what, as we have suggested, may be the
basic confusion underlying this oscillation which enables Brunner to use the
one terra to describe three different situations, namely, the question of the
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distinction between moral responsibility and religious responsibility.
I. THE THREE MEANINGS OF "RESPONSIBILITY"
A. RESPONSIBILITY AS RESPONSIVENESS
a. Responsive Actuality
Man has his being in the Word of God. This major premise from which
Brunner constructs his anthropology is inaaediately qualified by the assertion
2
that man is "summoned to receive the Word actively." The distinction between
man and the lower creation consists in the fact that man is created not only
3
"by His Word", but also "for and in His Word". Hence to be true man, man
must respond to the Word. "Responsibility is existence in the Word of God
4
as an existence which is derived from and destined for the Word of God."
This is the unique position of man in Creation; man alone is "responsive
5
existence". Unlike the lower creation which comes finished from the hand of
God, man's being is a being "in self-knowledge and self-determination on the
6
basis of being known and determined." This is the fundamental meaning of
the term "responsibility" as it is employed by Brunner. Responsibility is
7
"responsive actuality", and as such it is the essence of human existence.
"God has created man ... in such a way that he must himself determine to be
a
that for which he was designed." From the point of view of man this means,
9
in the Kierkegaardian phrase, "the specifically human is decision." Man is
the being whose essential nature is response, and only in the exercise of
1 MiW p. 75. E.T. p. 72.
2 Ibid. p. 99.E.T. p. 97.
3 Unser Glaube (Zttrich, 1939), p* 42. E.T. Our Faith, tr. John W. Rilling
(London, 1962), p. 39.
4 MIW p. 57. E.T. p. 53. 5 Ibid p. 69. E.T. p. 65. 6 Ibid. p. 100. E.T. p.97.
7 WaB E.T. pp. 19, 31- 8 GuO pp. 15>4- E.T. p. 170.
9 "Die Botschaft Sftren Kierkegaards". NSR, 23, Heft 2 (1930)» p. 92.
that response is he truly human. This is the basic meaning of "responsibility",
at least in the formal sense, "responsiveness" or "responsive actuality".
b» Kant's "Imperative" and Kierkegaard's "Individual"
If we enquire into the basis of this "responsive actuality", we
encounter two of the principal influences on the development of the concept
of responsibility in Brunner's theology. It is Brunner's basic affirmation
1
that "our responsibility can only be based on the divine claim." In an
article on Kant and Kierkegaard, he asserts that in contrast to the "general
subject" of the theoretical reason, the "Categorical Imperative" singles out
2
the single "Individual". Here the Kantian "Categorical Imperative" and the
Kierkegaardian "Individual" combine to foreshadow the "responsible being"
of Brunner's theology.
The impact of Kant is seen in Brunner's contention that "through
3
this Categorical Imperative I first know that I am an I, a responsible subject."
A
It is "through the 'You ought." that ray personality is called into existence."
Such references, demonstrating a profound appreciation for the Kantian
5
Categorical Imperative, are by no means rare in Brunner's writings. In his
estimation, Kant effected a fundamental break with the classical notion of
the person which was based on the idea of a common reason in which man
participated in divinity. "Among the philosophers it was Kant who first
shook this thousand-year-old tradition by his definition of the person as
6
a responsible being ..." Hot only did this represent a break with the classical
Greek outlook, but it also meant a return to the true Christian understanding
of persons. For in thi3 Kantian concept of the person, Brunner affirms, "the
TGuO p. 279.' E.T.~p. 295.
2 "Das Grundproblem der Phllosophie bei Kant und Kierkegaard", ZdZ, 2, Heft 6
(1924), p. 39.
3 Ibid. A Ibid.
5 GuO p. 13. E.T. p. 27; "Freiheit als Verantwortlichkeit"« Schweizer
Monatahefte, 37, Heft 5 "(1957), p. 358.
6 MiW p. 103. E.T. pp. 100*1.
1
Christian idea forced its way into philosophy." Kant's concept of the
person as a moral being represents a move toward a Christian understanding
of man. In this respect, Kant's "conception of personality as the 'freedom
2
of a rational being according to moral laws' ... is decisive." As an
indication of the basis for this appreciation, it will be sufficient to
notice one reference from Kant's Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone
in which he characterizes "the predisposition to animality in man" as
"living being", "the predisposition to humanity in man" as "rational being",
and "the predisposition to personality in man" as "accountable being".
The predisposition to personality is the capacity for respect
for the moral law as in itself a sufficient incentive of the
will. ... We cannot rightly call the idea of the moral law,
with the respect which is inseparable from it, a predisposition
to personality; it is personality itself (the idea of humanity
considered quite intellectually). 3
Yet in spite of this significant development in Kant, his doctrine is not
ultimately acceptable. Jbr "the Christian idea ... forced its way into
philosophy; but the notion of the one, autonomous reason left no room for
A
this idea to develop." Thus in the end it is not the Christian, but the
rationalist, concept of man which is presented in Kant's notion of
responsible being.
Brunner's assessment of Kant suggests that his initially promising
approach to man in terms of the concept of "responsibility" breaks down in
his bifurcation of man into an empirical self and an intelligible self, so
that the concept of responsibility is internalized.
The most serious approach to the idea of true responsibility is
presented in Kant's Categorical Imperative; but it too - through
the idea of the intelligible, autonomous self - finally ends in
self-responsibility without any feeling for the 'Thou', whereby
1 MiW p. 103. E.T. pp. 100-1.
2 Ibid. p. 22Qn. E.T. p. 222n.
3 Immanuel Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, tr. T.H. Gareene
and H.H. Hudson (Chicago, 19347, pp. 21ff.
A MiW p. 103. E.T. p. 101.
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we cannot even say that the empirical self is responsible to the
intelligible selfj for the empirical self is not capable of
responsibility because it is causally determined. 1
This assessment of Kant's doctrine of responsibility will demand more detailed
examination. Fbr the present we may merely note that it is Brunner's contention
that through the bifurcation of man into an empirical and an intelligible self
Kant deserted the true imperative, and because of this his development of the
concept of man as responsible being loses its promising significance.
In view of this assessment of Kant, and of Brunner's own contention
that true responsibility singles out the "Individual", we may venture the
suggestion that the further development of Brunner's doctrine of man as
responsible being bears a striking similarity to the Kierkegaardian concept
of the singling out of the "Individual" in the "teleological suspension of
the ethical". In Kierkegaard's schema of existence in the three stages, the
aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious, the ethical is superior to the
aesthetic in that it represents the beginnings of "seriousness" in which the
individual forsakes the uncommitted self-centred life of indulgence for the
life of committment to the universal. But "the ethical as such is the
universal, and as the universal it applies to everyone, which may be expressed
2
from another point of view by saying that it applies every instant." Thus
"the particular individual is the individual who has his telos in the
universal, and his ethical task is to express himself constantly in it, to
3
abolish his particularity in order to become the universal." The goal of
the ethical is the abolition of particularity, which we may define as self-
assertion, and resignation to the universal. The ethical represents the
recognition of the equal rights of all men, and the acceptance of just
1 MiV p. I89n. E.T. p. I99n.
2 Sttren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, tr. Walter Lowrie (New York, 1954)>
p. 64-
3 Ibid. pp. 64-5•
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relations in which no individual strives to assert himself to the detriment
of his fellows. But the ethical is not the religious. It is an intermediate
stage between the aesthetic and the religious.
The religious stage of life involves a concept which is not
associated with the ethical, the concept of faith. Herein lies the decisive
contrast between the ethical and the religious. For "faith is this paradox,
that the particular is higher than the universal - yet in such a way, be it
observed, that the movement repeats itself, and that consequently the individual,
after having been in the universal, now as the particular isolates himself as
higher than the universal.This is the incomprehensible paradox of faith
as it is expressed in "the teleological suspension of the ethical", the
unique example of which is Abraham's willingness to sacrifice Isaac. From
the ethical point of view, which is the universal, Abraham's contemplated
act can only be described as sin. It violates the subordination to the
universal which is characteristic of the ethical. But from the point of view of
2
faith, Abraham "is justified over against it", i.e. over against the universal.
The distinction between the two is the distinction between the Individual and
the universal. As the "Individual" elevated above the universal in "the
teleological suspension of the ethicaL", Abraham is either justified as the
"Individual" or not at all. His action cannot be justified in terras of the
ethical, which is the universal, because this by its very nature discredits
3
the individual. The similarity between the Categorical Imperative which
commands the emergence of the "person" and the teleological suspension of the
ethical which elevates the "Individual" above the universal category of the
ethical is striking.
1 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, p. 65.
2 Ibid. p. 66.
3 Ibid. pp. 80-1.
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In addition to this apparent similarity between the Kantian
Categorical Imperative and the Kierkegaardian teleological suspension of
the ethical, there is a more basic divergence between the two in that Kant's
Imperative is purely formal, whereas Kierkegaard's "Command" prescribes a
definite content. We shall have to take account of this basic difference
when we come to evaluate Brunner's concept of responsibility. At this stage,
where we are concerned merely with tracing the development of Brunner's
concept, we may ignore this difference because Brunner does not take it
into account. In the concept of responsibility, as Brunner presents it,
the basic orientation is that of the Kantian Categorical Imperative qualified
in terms of a unified concept of the person such as that presented in
Kierkegaard's concept of the "Individual". The Kantian Categorical Imperative
is not productive of true "responsibility" or of true "personality" because
1
it is not a "genuine act of command, but a universal law." It remains
within the ethical sphere, as Kierkegaard has described it, the sphere of
the universal. As such it is an immanent law in Kant because he subordinated
his concept of radical evil to his concept of autonomy in dividing man into
an empirical sense-bound self and an autonomous rational self which is its
2
own legislator. This destroys the concept of responsibility because "this
imperative is in Kant immanent in the rational self", and thus involves a
3
"responsibility to oneself, which annuls the very concept of responsibility."
This means that the Kantian concept of personality is also abstract in that
it describes the person as self-sufficient and autonomous in contradiction
to the inter-dependence which characterizes true personality. "Kant does
not recognize a claim on man which makes him person; but in the last resort
this claim comes from himself, namely, rational self-respect, and thus
1 Religionaphilosophie evangelischer Theo'logie '(Maachan. 1927), p. 36.
E.T. The Philosophy of Religion from the Standpoint of Protestant
Theology, tr. A.J.D. Farrer and B.L. Woolf (London, 195p. 76.
2 GuQ p. 32. E.T. p. 46; R&R p. 410. 3 WaB E.T. p. 20.
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leaves man without any relation to the 'Thou'."^
The Kierkegaardian concept of the "Individual" succeeds where
Kant failed in that it regards man as a unified person subject to the
command which comes from beyond himself. Unlike Kant, Kierkegaard did not
define man from the point of view of autonomy. He took the "ought" much
2
more seriously than Kant. His "Imperative" xs a real one, external to man,
and therefore demanding a real response on the part of man. His inconceivable
paradox represented by "the teleological suspension of the ethical" resembles
what Brunner regards as the true Imperative which cannot be reduced to the
3 4
levelling confines of thought. In the Kierkegaardian "Individual" we have
the genuine Imperative which Kant abandoned in the interest of autonomy.
c. The I-Thou Framework
One further qualification is involved in Brenner's development of
the concept of responsibility as the distinctive feature of human life, as
"responsive actuality". If "Individual" is taken in the ordinary sense of
the term as referring to an individual, then it can be interpreted abstractly
so that no advance will be made beyond the Kantian concept of the autonomous
rational person. It is Brenner's contention that this outcome may be avoided
in the recognition that responsibility "receives its concrete content through
the fellow man. " For the development of this aspect of responsibility,
Brunner employs the I-Thou frame-work associated with the names of Ferdinand
Ebner and Martin Bubor. In this I-Thou framework there is not only the
genuine Imperative - "Responsibility presupposes one who addresses me primarily,
g
that is, from a realm independent of rayself, and to whom I am answerable." -
1 MiW p. 220. 12. T. p. 223. 2 GPhKK p. 43- 3 Ibid. pp. 44ff.
4 GuO p. 688. E.T. p. 702. 5 "Freiheit als Verantwortlichkeit", p. 360.
6 Martin Buber, Between Man and Man, tr. R. Gregor Smith (London, 1947),
p. 45. "" ~
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but also the recognition of the concrete nature of responsibility.
"In order to come to love", says Kierkegaard about his renunciation
of Regina Olsen, "I had to remove the object". This is sublimely
to misunderstand God. Creation is not a hurdle on the road to God,
it is the road itself. We are created along with one another and
directed to a life with one another. Creatures are placed in my
way so that I, their fellow-creature, by means of them and with
them find the way to God. A God reached by their exclusion would
not be the God of all lives in whom all life is fulfilled. A God
in whom only the parallel lines of single approaches intersect is
more akin to the "God of the philosophers" than to the "God of
Abraham and Isaac and Jacob". God wants us to come to him by means
of the Reginas he has created and not by renunciation of them. 1
That aspect of Kierkegaard's doctrine which we have suggested provides a
basic contrast with the Kantian Imperative, namely the fact that Kierkegaard's
Imperative prescribes a definite content, not/ suggests that this evaluation
of his position presented by Buber is somewhat inadequate. For that content
which the "Imperative" contains concerns precisely "the Reginas" who, in
Ruber's estimation, are mere obstacles for Kierkegaard. However, as we have
been able to defer consideration of this issue in reference to the distinction
between Kant and Kierkegaard because Brunner does not take account of it, so
too we are able to defer it in reference to Ruber's I-Thou framework because
it is Ruber's category which Brunner employs in defining the content of
responsibility.
In the I-Thou framework the Categorical Imperative becomes the
"thou-address" of the living God, the pure Subject, the I, and the "Individual"
becomes the "thou" thus addressed. True personality and true responsibility
do not come from the Categorical Imperative as such, because "I am an 'I'
2
only because, and in so far as, God addresses me as 'thou'." This is the
ultimate source of responsibility and of personality. But, and here the
distinctive contribution of the I-Thou framework appears, the concrete expression
1 Ruber, Between Man and Man, p. 52.
2 GuO p. 137. E.T. p. 153-
of thia responsibility is given through the fellow-man. For "I ara responsible
1
always only in regard to another man." It is through the second I-Thou
relation with my fellow-man that the primary I-Thou relation with God is
expressed. There is no personality and no responsibility in isolation. Rather,
2
"there is genuine human life only where there are two men, I and Thou." Yet
this concreteness must not be permitted to submerge the primary transcendent
element of the principal I-Thou relation. For "not to our fellow men are we
3
responsible, but for them we are responsible to God." The fellow-man
provides the concrete setting of responsibility. It is only in the I-Thou
relation with our fellow-man that our responsibility can be realized. But
the ground and source of responsibility is God. Similarly, it is only through
the I-Thou relation with our fellow-man that personality is realized. Without
the "Thou" there is no "P. Personality is not an individual possession,
but a social reality. The "Thou" of the fellow-man is given in the social
solidarity of Creation. That is to say, the inter-dependence of human life,
characterized by the I-Thou framework, is grounded in Creation. In spite of
Buber's dissociation of his position from that of Kierkegaard, this insistence
on the inter-dependence of human life is as prominent in Kierkegaard's concept
of the "Individual" as encompassing both himself and the race as it is in
Buber's I-Thou framework. However, it is the I-Thou framework which Brurmer
employs in diveloping his concept of the concrete content of responsibility.
Thus we can confine ourselves to this framework for the exposition of Brunner's
doctrine. Because God the Creator has created us for fellowship, it is only
in fellowship, in the human I-Thou relation, that we can know Him. For God
"can only become concrete and real in a relationship with the human 'Thou'."
r Das Ikundp'robiem der Ethik (Zurich, 1931). P« 28.
2 Ibid.
3 "Frolheit als Verantworfclichkeit", p. 361.
U GuO p. 280. E.T. p. 296.
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This is based on the previous assertion that "the power •which alone can make
1
the 'I* responsible to the 'Thou' is God."
d« Responsiveness is a Formal Concept
"Responsiveness" is a formal concept in that it designates man's
essential being without reference to the nature or quality of the response
involved. This basic sense of responsibility as "responsive actuality"
indicates its antecedents in the Kantian "Categorical Imperative", qualified
by the Kierkegaard!an "Individual", and given concrete expression in the
"I-Thou" framework sketched by Ebner and Buber. The end result of this
combination of diverse concepts is a definition of the essential nature of
man as a responding being. "In this 'being-addressed' and 'must-answer'
we have our existence as persons or our personal being, what distinguishes
2
us from every other known form of being."
The fact that Brunner can employ such diverse concepts as the
moral Categorical Imperative of Kant, the notion of the command of faith
which confronts man from beyond himself as in Kierkegaard's concept of the
Individual elevated above the ethical, and the I-Thou framework of Ebner and
Buber, in his definition of man as "responsive actuality", suggests the
complexity of his concept of "responsibility". Because of this diversity
behind his concept of man as "responsive actuality", the analysis we have
presented has not been without overtones of the other meanings of responsibility
which Brunner's use of the term suggests, the sense of "answerability" and the
sense of "response-ability". We must now turn to these concepts which define
the actual character of the relation in which man as "responsive actuality"
stands, depending upon whether that relation is qualified negatively or
1 GuO p. 279. E.T. p. 295.
2 "Freiheit als Verantwortlichkeit", p. 360.
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positively.
B. RESPONSIBILITY AS CULPABILITY
a. Responsibility and "Real Man"
The definition of responsibility in terms of "responsiveness" is
abstract in that it is not concerned with responsibility in the normal sense
of the terra, answerability, or at least it is concerned with this sense only
parenthetically. In defending dialectical theology against the charge of
"unreality", levelled at Kierkegaard by Grisebach, Brunner retorts that
Grisebach "overlooks the fact that all human speech is necessarily 'unreal',
1
because sinful men never stand concretely in the 'I and Thou' relation."
It is this abstract meaning of responsibility which characterizes Brunner's
basic definition of human nature; man is essentially a responsive being,
regardless of the nature or character of the response involved.
When the position of real man is taken into account, however, the
terra "responsibility" takes on a more definite meaning. No longer is it the
formal category for understanding man's essential nature. Rather it is now
a description of the predicament of "real man". For "between the true man
and the real man stands that contradiction, which determines the whole of
2
human life, even the whole human constitution." Not only is man the being
who must respond, and only in responding realizes true humanity; but he is
now the being who has responded, and must accept "responsibility" for that
3
response. He is not only responsible, but guilty. Responsibility viewed in
terras of the concrete situation is always in relation to the past, a past
which represents "guilt". This does not alter the fact of man's responsibility,
1 Eph p. 93. E.T. p. 181.
2 "Imago Dei". NSR, 2, Heft 8 (1934), p. 432.
3 GuO p. 137. E.T. p. 153-
1
but "his responsibility now bears the character of guilt." Responsibility
in this concrete sense means "culpability". Man "is still a responsible
being, even in his irresponsibility, there, where he denies his responsibility
2
and sets himself in opposition to his origin." The fact that man is described
as "irresponsible" suggests the change in meaning which the term undergoes in
the transition from the abstract definition of man as "responsive actuality"
to the concrete consideration of man aa fallen and guilty. It also raises
one of the most difficult questions of Brunner's theology. For in spite of
the irresponsibility of man's fallen state, Brunner insists that he can be
addressed on the basis of his responsibility. It is In this context that
Brunner's employment of the Kantian Categorical Imperative is most pronounced.
b. The Inescapable Categorical Imperative
It was the fact of sin, the profound contradiction in man as he
3
actually is, on which the Kantian Categorical Imperative floundered. In
Brunner's estimation, Kant's failure to take radical evil seriously, which
he could have done only by forsaking the autonomy of the philosopher for
the confession of the believer, led him to reduce the Categorical Imperative
to an immanent law through his bifurcation of man into an empirical self and
U
a legislating intelligible self. Nevertheless, Kant's return to the notion
of autonomy, in internalizing the Categorical Imperative, does not diminish
the significance of the Categorical Imperative as such. The statements
which we noted in considering responsibility in the abstract sense of
"responsive actuality", to the effect that personality emerges through the
"ought" of the Categorical Imperative, are equally applicable to responsibility
in this concrete sense of "culpability". Indeed, this is properly the place
"l Fr n Anknpkt p. 523.
2 MiW p. 82. E.T. p. 79.
3 Rph p. 36. E.T. p. 76.
4- GuO p. 32. E.T. p. 46.
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for such statements. They were employed in the previous section to illustrate
the influence of Kant in Brunner's development of "responsibility" as the
principal category of anthropology. However, Kant's primary meaning was
undoubtedly "accountability", as the above reference from his Religion Within
1
the Limits of Reason Alone shows.
Brunner employs the Kantian concept of the Categorical imperative
as designating the responsibility which is characteristic of fallen man
because it is his estimation that Kant perceived the true meaning of
responsibility before reverting to the perspective of autonomy in the
bifurcation of man into an empirical self and an intelligible self. Thus
if the Categorical Imperative is taken seriously, then the division of man
by which Kant deserted the true Imperative will not be possible. For in this
division Kant lost both the Imperative and real man. The result of his
reversion to the notion of autonomy is that Kant's real man is somewhere
between the empirical and the intelligible self, and also between the
2
naturally individual and the universally spiritual. But if the Categorical
Imperative is taken seriously, then the empirical self and the intelligible
self are seen in their unity as one undivided culpable person. It is in this
sense that "the 'Thou shalt' of the Categorical Imperative means the emergence
3
of the idea of personality." Similarly, if the Categorical Imperative is
taken seriously, then the naturally individual and the universally spiritual
are seen in their unity in the concrete responsible individual.
The theoretical reason knows nothing of an I, but only of a
general subject. But the Categorical Imperative speaks to me,
this single man, in its absolute concreteness. Justification
is now demanded from me. A
T^CfT~above^T9SI
2 GuO pp. 667-8. E.T. p. 702.
3 Ibid. p. 13. E.T. p. 27.
A GPhKK p. 39.
This serious and unavoidable Categorical Imperative is somehow,
and in some measure, known by man even in his sinful fallen state.
Even as an unbeliever, man knows of the Categorical Imperative,
of a spiritual power that limits his own will. He knows that
he does not simply belong to himself. ... No one ever lived
wholly without consciousness of responsibility. 1
As responsibility abstractly considered is the essence of true man in the
sense of "responsive actuality, so responsibility concretely considered is
the essence of real man in the sense of "culpability" 'which he cannot avoid.
Even in sin the dignity of man, the specifically human, evidences itself in
his dim though inescapable awareness of responsibility. But the dimness of
this knowledge is a further indication of the depth of the human predicament,
and of the corresponding misunderstanding of responsibility. For "man of
himself knows God's Law ... but not Ills Command, and because he does not
imow the Law as His Command, he does not rightly know the meaning of the
2
Law, which is love."
It is in this distinction between Law and Command, a distinction
which will merit further attention when we come to evaluate Brunner's
doctrine, that Brunner finally distinguishes his Imperative from that of
Kant. Kant, because of his autonomous perspective, was doomed to misunder-
-stand responsibility. It is only within the Christian revelation that we
see the stark reality of sin, and hence the proper meaning of responsibility.
For responsibility is not a subject for theoretical definition, but a reality
which is known only in the concrete situation of life. "This sense of
responsibility is never neutralj we become aware of responsibility either
along the negative path of the voice of conscience or along the positive one
3
of faith." In the former case, responsibility represents the awareness of
1 Dogmatik Vol. III. E.T. Dogmatics, tr. David Cairns (London, 1962), XII, 149.
2 GuO p. 100. E.T. p. 115.
3 Ibid. p. 143. E.T. p. 158.
ray Inescapable culpability, and, though dimly, an awareness of 3one higher
source before whom I am responsible. But it is a "negative path", and not
a knowledge of God. The other source of the sense of responsibility, "the
positive one of faith" is the proper knowledge of God. How the negative
path of the "voice of conscience" yields place to the "positive one of faith"
is the mystery of divine grace. "A conscience in itself, within which faith
1
could be born, does not exist." On the contrary, "the No of conscience
2 ~
must be brought to silence in the Yes of forgiveness." The fact that this
3
happens, "that guilt comes to maturity is entirely a work of grace." Yet
in this "work of grace" man's sense of responsibility plays a major role.
It is this dialectic of responsibility and grace which represents the most
difficult subject of Brunner'a theology.
C. RESPONSIBILITY AS RESPONSE-ABILITY
a< Freedom as Dependence and as Choice
The formal meaning of responsibility which designates the essence
of man as "responsive actuality", when considered in terms of the character
of the response involved, issues in two further senses of the term. When
the response involved concerns the negative qualification of the sinner, then
responsibility means "culpability. On the other hand, when the response
involved concerns the positive qualification of the creature as he is in
Creation and again in Redemption, then responsibility means " response-ability"
This third meaning of the term involves the concept of "freedom". In tliis
meaning of responsibility, Brunner's major premise is that man has "true
freedom only in complete union with his Creator." Contraay to the popular
1 GuO p. XA3* E.T. p. 133.
2 Pr n Anknpkt p. 517.
3 Ibid. p. 513.
4. GuO pp. 45-6. E.T. p. 59.
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1
conception of freedom as "unboundness", autonomy, true freedom is identical
2
with being bound to the will of God. This freedom in being bound to the
3
will of God is the same as responsibility. This is the ultimate meaning of
responsibility, perfect freedom in affirming the purpose for which we are
created.
It is this true freedom from which man turns in renouncing his
dependence upon God. Real man does not know this true freedom because his
life is permeated by the chasm which runs through his existence as fallen
man. It is only through the Pall that life becomes involved in the
A
distinction between good and evil. This distinction i3 reflected in the
concept of freedom as "choice", an arbitrariness in which man is conceived
as being in a neutral position above the dualism between good and evil.
The basis for this misconception of freedom consists in man's confusion of
the God-given independence with which he is endowed in Creation with an
5
independence from God. The result of man's emancipation is not freedom, as
would be the logical conclusion from the definition of freedom as choice,
but rather the very opposite of freedom, namely, bondage. "The freedom of
the will in decision is a phantom. Man is no free one, but a slave, a
6
slave of the world, and of his self ..." Because man has been created in
freedom for God, any other orientation is bondage. By "misusing his freedom"
7
man has "lost his freedom".
b. The boss of True Freedom
The problem of how man could ever "misuse" that freedom which is
identical with dependence upon God represents one of the central issues in
1 "Freiheit als Verantwortlichkelt", p» 354-
2 Das Grand-problem der Ethik, p. 26. 3 Ibid.
A Rph p. AA• E.T. p. 91» 5 WaB p. 70. E.T. p. 121.
6 "Christlicher Glaube nach reformierter Lehre", Der Rrotestantismua der
Qegenwart (Stuttgart, 1926), p. 245.
7 GuO p. 137. E.T. p. 153.
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Brunner's theology. Me have already encountered the difficulty which his
explanation raises in considering his doctrine of the formal and material
senses of the image of God. On the one hand, he regards this distinction
as a product of sin, and therefore one which is foreign to the good Creation.
On the other hand, he suggests that this distinction is potentially present
in Creation itself, because of his contention that the possibility of a
wrong response is required in order to assure the genuineness of the right
response. It may be that the solution to this dilemma rests upon the
interpretation of the formal meaning of responsibility which Brunner denotes
as "responsive actuality", the essentially responsive nature of man. For
Brunner qualifies his primary definition of freedom as dependence upon God
in terms of his concept of man as "responsive actuality". Not only does true
freedom consist of complete dependence upon God, but it also involves actively
willed consent to this dependence. This qualification of freedom in terms of
man's active participation is based on the fact that God has endowed man with
a relative independence so that he is not only a dependent being, but "a
1
dependent-independent being". It is this relative independence which
constitutes the uniqueness and the grandeur of man. Indeed, "this liberty
of self-determination forms the very essence of selfhood ... it is personal
2
existence itself." At the same time, this "liberty of self-determination"
constitutes the danger to human life, and in the real existence of fallen
man forms the basis for the misery of man. Only one who is created for the
true freedom of the liberty of self—determination in the dependent-independent
relation to God can experience the agonizing bondage in which the very grace
of God is known as the impossible demand.
1 WaB p. 33. E.T. p. 92.
2 GuO p. 154- E.T. p. 170.
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Here a further qualification, is demanded. As might be expected
from Brunner's doctrine of the formal and material senses of the image,
fallen man is described not only in terms of utter bondage and complete loss
of freedom, but a qualification is made by a parallel distinction between
formal and material freedom. Man is free only when he determines himself
in accordance with the basic determination given in Creation. "But if man
chooses to live on another basis ... he is still formally free ... he is
still a being who understands and determines his own course of action, but
he no longer possesses material freedom ... He has become the slave of his
own emancipation."* Here again we encounter problems similar to those
involved in the distinction between the formal and material senses of the
image. On the one hand, the use of the tern "freedom" to designate what
from the perspective of true freedom is only definable as bondage, appears
questionable. The formal freedom seems to parallel what the rational
perspective of natural man regards as freedom, namely, choice. Chi the other
hand, the concept of formal freedom would seem to be demanded for two reasons.
First, it is a corollary of the concept of dependent-independent being. In
order that man may respond to God in true freedom there must be, according to
Brunner, the possibility of responding irresponsibly. This involves the
question of the relation between the freedom in Creation and the freedom
which is predicated of fallen man. Secondly, the concept of formal freedom
is demanded by the attribution of responsibility to fallen man. It is
Brunner's concern to distinguish the "un-freedom" of the fallen state from
the determinism with which, in his estimation, it has bean associated in
2
the history of theology. This involves the question of the relation between
1 GuO p. 154* E.T. p. 170.
2 DII p. 140. E.T. p. 122; WaB p. 104- E.T. p. 152.
the formal freedom of fallen man and the material freedom of redeemed man.
In both cases, with reference to Creation and fallen man and to Redemption
and fallen man, the question is one of the relation between a freedom which
is intrinsic to man and a freedom which is given only by divine confrontation.
It may be that what i3 involved i3 a contrast between moral freedom, which
is a predicate of man as a responsible moral agent, and religious freedom,
which is a corollary of divine confrontation. It will be along these lines
that our evaluation of Brunner's doctrine of responsibility will have to
be conducted. At present we may content ourselves with a clarification of
the problem which Brunner's distinction between formal and material freedom
presents.
True freedom is identical with dependence upon God. Formal freedom,
from the point of view of true freedom, i3 bondage; "it is freedom to sin,
1
it is freedom for eternal death." The common element which permits the
term freedom to be applied to both is the ability to choose. True freedom
2
presupposes "a certain freedom of choice". Formal freedom means that even
fallen man is "a being who understands and determines his own course of
3
action." Here the question arises as to whether, on this basis, formal
freedom is not the more basic of the two. The immediate answer is that it
A
is not. Man is given his basic determination in Creation. He is a being
5
who knows and determines himself on the basis of being known and determined.
Man is not created with a "neutral" freedom by the exercise of which he may
equally well respond to God responsibly or irresponsibly. "God calls man
into existence in order that he may respond to him aright - not in order
6
that he may respond wrongly or rightly." Yet the possibility of a wrong
1 MLW p. 263. E.T. p. 271. 2 DII p. 72. E.T. p. 61.
3 GuO p. 154. E.T. p. 170. A MLW p. 100. E.T. p. 93.
5 MiW p. 100. E.T. p. 97. 6 DII pp. 71-2. E.T. p. 60.
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response is implicit in Creation itself. For the initial premise that man
is given his basic determination in Creation, that his freedom is freedom
for God, is qualified by the assertion that this freedom is really freedom
only if there is "a certain freedom of choice" along vith it. "God has
made man in such a way that he can respond as God wills him to do. A
certain freedom of choice, which makes this response possible, only becomes
1
visible when the wrong response has been made." Yet the concept of freedom
as choice "is already the effect of sin, and of separation from his connexion
2
with God." Brunnor's position seems to be that this awareness of freedom
as choice, once it is achieved, enables us to see it, from the perspective
of faith, as the unknown freedom which makes true freedom possible. Here
we seem to be confronted with two possible interpretations. On the one hand,
this unknown freedom of Creation which becomes known through its exercise in
the Fall can be seen as an attempt to ensure the creaturely independence of
man in whom God wills a real counterpart to Himself. On the other hand, the
concern to predicate a freedom of choice, behind the primary freedom of
dependence in which and for which man is created, may be an accomodation to
the "existentialist" emphasis on "decision". If decision is the specifically
human, then man may be more human in his post-Fall state, after he has taken
the ultimate choice upon himself. It is clear that Brunner would not endorse
such a view of man. Yet it is also clear that there is a real problem in
this emphasis which he places on freedom as choice.
c. Restricted Freedom and the Free Restriction
Brunner's dialectical affirmations on freedom are made in the
context of the I-Thou framework. In terras of this framework, God is pure
1 DII p.' 72. E.T. ppt 60-1,
2 Ibid. p. 72. E.T. p. 61.
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Subject, which in terras of freedom means that lie alone is absolutely free,
1
absolutely spontaneous. On the human side, the fact that man is a "Thou"
is based on the fact that by Creation "man is derivatively what God is
originally." Thus man too is free in the sense of spontaneity, but, and
this is the decisive point, man is free "derivatively". It is because of
this all-important contrast that for man "a maximum of freedom is at the
3
same time a maximum of dependence." This is the context of responsibility.
"Responsibility is restricted freedom, which distinguishes human freedom
from divine freedom ..." Yet in spite of this emphasis on the fact that
human freedom is "derived" and therefore a restricted freedom, he goes on to
affirm that "it is a restriction which is also free - and this distinguishes
5
our human limited freedom from that of the rest of creation." Thus on the
one hand, Brunner affirms that the ability to choose is not a maximum of
human freedom, but rather that freedom to say "Yes" or "No" is a limitation
of freedom. True freedom consists in dependence on God. Yet on the other
hand, In order that this dependence be free, even the restriction must be
subordinated to freedom. It cannot be denied that this central dialectic
in Brunner's doctrine of responsibility and freedom presents a real difficulty.
d. The Return to True Freedom
This ambiguity in Brunner's concept of freedom is no less difficult
in the explanation of how the formal freedom of the fallen state becomes the
material freedom of the redeemed than it is in the explanation of how the
true freedom of Creation becomes the formal freedom of the fallen state.
Real man, man in his fallen state, possesses formal freedom in his ability
7
to "determine his own course of action", but he no longer possesses material
2
6
1 JfeB E.T. p. 53.
3 Ibid. pp. 39-40. E.T. p. 93.
5 Ibid.
7 GuO p. 154- E.T. p. 170.
2 Ibid. p. 97. E.T. pp. 145—6.
4 DII p. 66. E.T. p. 56.
6 MiW p. 260. E.T. p. 264.
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freedom in that this formal freedom is itself bondage. Man is free only in
so far as he is responsible, and he is responsible only in so far as he is
free. This was the insight which Kant reached. It is thus that the person
first merges in the claim of the Categorical Imperative. However, the
co-implication of responsibility and freedom cannot be affirmed in terms of
responsibility as "culpability" and freedom as "material freedom". The
responsibility which is implied in formal freedom is merely the negative
path from which true responsibility and true freedom emerge. How this
happens, and the significance of the Categorical Imperative in this transition,
constitute the major difficulty in Brunner's distinction between formal and
material freedom. The immediate answer, and one which Brunner repeatedly
1
affirms, is that this transition can be attributed only to divine grace. That
the demanding address of the Categorical Imperative which makes man a responsible,
"culpable", person becomes the Thou-address of the living God who makes man a
response-able person is the mystery of divine grace.
let from the human point of view this transition involves a
reorientation, in some respect, on the part of man. The responsibility which
is experienced in the claim of the Categorical Imperative implies an ultimate
source to which we are responsible, and in virtue of which we are free, in
as much as "the imperative is not at all understood by us other than as
2
demonstration of will." Here the limits of the Categorical Imperative, as
such, are reached, just as in the knowledge of guilt and radical evil the
3
limits of the "critical principle" are reached. The identification of the
will behind the Categorical Imperative can occur only through revelation.
Since the Categorical Imperative, like true "criticism", represents the
1 GuO p. 143. E.T. p. 15&J Fr n Anknpkt p. 518.
2 GPhKK p. 41.
3 Ibid.
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limits of the human possibility, it constitutes only a transitional stage
between irresponsible egoism and true responsibility in fellowship. If this
stage is not transcended, the possibility of reverting to a merely utilitarian
concept of responsibility is an immanent danger. "Whoever does not trust
himself to accomplish this step from the Categorical Imperative to the
acknowledgement of a divine will, because it appears to him not rationally
founded, stands in permanent danger of confusing the moral imperative with
that utilitarian worldly wisdom, and therefore of misunderstand^and losing
1
the basic essence of humanity." In Brenner'3 estimation, this was the
failure of Kant himself. Between the responsibility of the Categorical
Imperative and the responsibility before the living God, there stands faith.
The above account might suggest that the transition involved in
moving from the acknowledgement of the Categorical Imperative to the
acknowledgement of the divine will is a human prerogative. That these, as
•well as other, statements of Brenner on the subject suggest such an interpret-
-ation, cannot be denied. This may be an indication of the profound impact
of Kant on his thought. On the other hand, contrary assertions, stressing
the radical discontinuity between the "natural" responsibility before the
Categorical Imperative and the responsibility of faith before God, are not
lacking. Brenner asserts, for example, that "it is the arrogaace of man that
he understands the bond of God as a double-sided one, a bond of two equal
2
partners." Because of this misconception, "we think of our relation to
Him as a conditional ones if you keep my commandments, then I will be your
3
God." Clearly then, Brenner does not regard the transition from the
acknowledgement of the Categorical Imperative to the acknowledgement of
the divine will as a human prerogative.
1 "Freiheit als Verantwortliclikeit"» p. 360.
2 "Christlicher Glaube nach reformierter hehre", p. 248.
3 Ibid.
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Yet even in the responsibility of faith there are traces of what
might well be a continuing significance of the Categorical imperative. On
the one hand, a distinction is drawn between the conception of faith of the
believer from within, and the conception of faith of the natural man from
without.
... from the standpoint of the "natural man" faith is foolhardy
rashness, a leap in the dark. From the standpoint of faith itself,
it is not rashness, but necessity; not a leap, but a case of being
drawn and carried along. What from the human standpoint must be
regarded as placing far too heavy a responsibility on the individual
factor - a decision in an exaggerated and maximum degree - when
viewed from the standpoint of faith as such, is not a decision but
a free gift, not exaggerated activity but sheer passivity. 1
On the other hand, a distinction is drawn within the knowledge of faith
itself between the passivity of faith in the gift and the activity of faith
in the demand. "The promise of grace and faith refer to ray being as it is
determined apart from myself; the Divine Command and obedience refer to ray
being, not apart from myself, but as it ought to be determined by means of
2
my will ..." On the basis of these two sets of propositions, one might
conclude that through the foolhardy leap of faith from the sense of
responsibility engendered by the Categorical Imperative to belief in the
divine will behind it one experiences the gift of faith through grace, and
therein knows true responsibility in the accompanying Divine Command. Yet
faith itself is a gift, and only on the basis of this is it a human activity.
The difficulty is accentuated most clearly when we attempt to
state how the formal freedom, which from the point of view of faith is
bondage, becomes the material freedom of faith. On the one hand, Brunner
dismisses the suggestion that this formal freedom of choice can be employed
1 Rph p. 12. E.T. pp. 29-30.
2 GuO p. 93. E.T. p. 111.
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to realize the material freedom of faith.
Here is the critical point between Catholic and Reformation
theology. The hearing, faith, the Yes-saying where it cornea
to that, is wholly God's work, but the No-saying is of nan.
The No-saying ability must not be expanded dialectieally so
that the Yes-saying also becomes his act. 1
The Yes-saying is the divine break-through into "that circle of immanental
2
possibility in which man is captured through sin." The formal freedom,
which is bondage, can be transformed only from without. This is the
uncompromising correlate of the recognition of the totality of sin and of
3
the sole efficacy of grace. On the other hand, Brunner elsewhere, in
reference to the formal personality which he regards in terms of freedom
and word-ability (Wortf&hlgkeit), states: "Man cannot say nothing, he can
only say 'yes' or 'no'." The suggestion that formal freedom makes some
contribution to the return to true freedom in faith, and responsibility
before God, can easily be read from such statements. It Is not at all easy
to reconcile these two contradictory lines of thought running throughout
Brenner's treatment of the relationship between freedom and responsibility.
The most obvious avenue of clarification resides in an examination of the
relationship between moral responsibility and freedom and religious
responsibility and freedom.
II. MORAL AND RELIGIOUS RESPONSIBILITY
Brenner uses the term "responsibility" as a predicate of the
essential nature of man, and as a description of the negative and positive
relation to God. The manner in wiiich we have presented these three senses
of the terra - the predicate of man's essential nature as "responsiveness",
"Die andere Aufgabe der Theologie", p. 268.
2 Ibid.
3 Pr n Anknpkt p. 522.
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the description of the negative relation as "culpability", and the description
of the positive relation as "respose-ability" - admittedly has been inadequate.
This inadequacy does not invalidate the threefold representation of Brunner's
concept of responsibility, but rather consists in the fact that these three
senses of the terra are inter-woven in Brunner's thought in a more complex
manner than the above analysis suggests. We have come to the conclusion, or
at least the suspicion, that behind this confusion over the meaning of the
term there lies a more basic ambiguity in the relation between moral
responsibility and religious responsibility. The most obvious starting-point
for an examination of this possibility is the Kantian background which enjoys
such a prominent place in Brunner's writings on the subject. As we have seen,
Brunner is highly appreciative of the centrality of the moral Imperative in
Kant. In fact, as we have also seen, it appears that the only significant
complaint he registers against Kant's treatment of the subject of responsibility
in terms of the Imperative is directed against the letter's ultimate subjection
of the imperative to the concept of the autonomous, self-legislating intelligible
Self.
There is, indeed, a certain analogy between Kant's conception
that personal being can only be grasped as freedom under the
imperative and what we said about responsibility. For the
imperative is indeed the expression of responsibility. And
yet this imperative is in Kant immanent in the rational self.
... Responsibility is for him not a relationship but something
immanent; responsibility not only for oneself - which it is in
faith also - but responsibility to oneself, which annuls the
very concept of responsibility. 1
This criticism suggests that Brunner accepts the Kantian setting for the
problem of responsibility, while seeking to avoid the consequences which he
judges to be a product of Kant's rationalism.
1 WaB E.T. pp. 19-20,
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Kant indeed defined "person" in the light of the moral law
and thus felt himself obliged to define "personal" life as
responsibility; we do this too, and most decidedly, but from
the standpoint of a higher responsibility; we are persons,
because, and in so far as, we have been called by God. 1
In an effort to determine the relation between the "higher responsibility",
which Brunner wants to affirm, and the moral responsibility of Kant, we shall
examine Kant's own affirmations on the subject in the hope of detecting
something of Brunner's debt to him.
A. TIE SOURCE 0? RESPONSIBILITY IN KANT
a. The Conflict between Kant's "Fundamental Principles" and his "Critique"
The central concept in Kant's writings on the subject of respons¬
ibility is that of the Imperative, or more precisely the Categorical
Imperative. Among the many ambiguities involved in this concept, the
different pronouncements as to its source is the most striking. The difficulty
is most apparent in the variance between the concept of the Imperative
presented in the Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals and that
presented in the Critique of Practical Reason.
In the Groundwork he seems to think that the moral law is both
justified and established by an independent and necessary
presupposition of freedom. In the Critique, on the contrary,
it is our consciousness of the moral law which leads to the
concept of freedom; and in such a consciousness Kant no longer
finds difficulty. 2
Behind this distinction there lies a conflict as to the source of the Imperative.
For the "independent and necessary presupposition of freedom" suggested by
the Fundamental Principles is, in fact, the concept of the autonomous, self-
legislating reason, whereby man is himself the source of the Imperative;
whereas in the Critique the Imperative is of divine origin.
_____
2 H.J. Paton, The Categorical Imperative (London, 1963), p. 203.
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In the Fundamental Principles, Kant begins by identifying "duty"
1
as the only source of morally valid action. From this a second proposition
follows: "That an action done from duty derives its moral worth, not from
the purpose which is to be attained by it, but from the maxim by which it
is determined, and therefore does not depend on the realization of the object
of the action, but merely on the principle of volition by which the action
2
has taken place, without regard to any object of desire." Finally, a third
proposition is added: "Duty is the necessity of acting from respect for the
3
law." Now the crucial question arises - whence the law? The immediate
answer is that for the will "there remains nothing but the universal
conformity of its actions to law in general, which alone is to serve the
will as a principle, i.e. I am never to act otherwise than so that I could
4
will that my maxim should become a universal law." This is the Categorical
Imperative, the universal demand of duty, but in order to answer the question
as to the source of the Imperative we must consider an alternative formulation
of it. This formulation involves a judgment as to the value of human life
whereby the imperative becomes: "So act as to treat humanity, whether in
thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal,
5
never as means only."
This formulation of the moral imperative [i.e. to treat humanity
as an end) so very much agrees "with what we all feel to be true
that we are very apt to ignore the fact that in the course of
this argument Kant has passed from the view that duty is conceiv-
-able only in terms of 'something whose existence has in itself
an absolute worth, something which, being an end in itself, could
be the source of definite laws', to the view that duty is conceiv-
-able only in terms of the absolute worth of every finite rational
creature; and the result is going to be that each rational being
is to be regarded as the source of a law which at other times
Kant can describe as holy. 6
1 Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphyaic of Morals, tr. Thomas
Kingsmill Abbott, Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the
Theory of Ethics (London, 1889), pp. "lOff.
2 Ibid. p. 16'. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. p. 18. 5 Ibid. p. 47.
6 A.E. Teale, Kantian Ethics (London, 1951), p. 168.
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Thus with this reformulation we arrive at the source of the Imperative; it is
man himself, or the self-legislating reason, "the will of every rational being
1
as a universally legislative will."
On this principle all maxims are rejected which are inconsistent with
the will itself being universal legislator. Thus the will is not
subject simply to the law, but so subject that it must be regarded as
itself giving the law, and on this ground only, subj ect to the law
(of which it can regard itself as the author). 2
Thus Kant has moved from the stipulation that moral validity can be predicated
only of actions done solely from duty, to the conclusion that duty must be
wholly self-determined, if it is to be completely free of motives which
militate against moral purity. In fact, failure to realize this latter
principle, Kant contends, has been the reason for lack of success in previous
moral theories.
For when one has conceived man only as subject to a law (no matter
what), then this law required some interest, either by way of
attraction or constraint, since it did not originate as a law from
his own will, but this will wa3 according to a law obliged by
something else to act in a certain manner. Now by this necessary
consequence all the labour spent in finding a supreme principle of
duty was irrevocably lost. For men never elicited duty, but only
a necessity of acting from a certain interest. Whether this
interest was private or otherwise, in any case the imperative must
be conditional, and could not by any means be capable of being a
moral command. I will therefore call this the principle of
Autonomy of the will, in contrast with every other which I
accordingly reckon as Hetoronomy. 3
We are not concerned, at this point, with the difficulties which this
development involves, or with the basis for it, but merely with the result
itself. The result is the principle of autonomy, the confidence in the
universal legislative ability of the individual will.
In the Critique of Practical Reason Kant is equally insistent on
the principle of autonomy. let there his insistence involves a concept of
duty which has a distinctly numinous quality.
1 Kant, Fundamental Principles, Ab. p. 4-9•
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid. p. 51.
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Duty.1 Thou sublime and mighty name ... What origin is there worthy
of thee ... a root to be derived from which is the indispensable
condition of the only worth men can give themselves? 1
Kant's answer to this rhetorical question is strongly reminiscent of the
concept of autonomy presented In the Fundamental Principles.
It can be nothing less than a power which elevates man above himself
(as a part of the world of sense), a power which connects him with
an order of things that only the understanding can conceive, with a
world which at the same time commands the whole sensible world, and
with it the empirically determinable existence of man in time, as
well as the sura total of all ends (which totality alone suits such
unconditional practical laws as the moral). This power is nothing
but personality, that is, freedom and independence on the mechanism
of nature, yet, regarded also as a faculty of being which is subject
to special laws, namely pure practical laws given by its own reason!
so that the person as belonging to the sensible world is subject to
his own personality as belonging to the intelligible world. 2
The concept of "pure practical laws given by its own reason" suggests the
concept of the autonomous, self-legislating reason of the Fundamental Principles,
but there is a fundamental difference. The laws of the individual rational
being are "special laws", they are "maxims" which only approximate the moral
law as such. Otherwise expressed, the source of the genuine imperative is
not man, but God. In finite beings "the law has the form of an imperative,
because in them, as rational beings, we can suppose a pure will, but being
creatures affected with wants and physical motives, not a holy will, that is,
3
one which wauld be incapable of any maxim conflicting with the moral law."
Man is autonomous in that he is his own law-giver, but if his laws are to be
morally valid, they must correspond to the moral order itself which is not of
man's making. The most that man can achieve is "purity", but "in the supreme
intelligence the elective will is rightly conceived as incapable of any
U
maxim which could not at the same time be objectively a law." The distance
1 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, Ab. p. 130.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid. p. 121.
U Ibid.
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between the "holy" will of God and the potentially "pure" will of man is one
that man can only strive indefinitely to bridge.
This holiness of will is, however, a practical idea, which must
necessarily serve as a type to which finite rational beings can
only approximate indefinitely, and which the pure moral law,
which is itself on this account called holy, constantly and
rightly holds before their eyes. The utmost that finite practical
reason can effect is to be certain of this indefinite progress
of one's maxims, and their steady disposition to advance. 1
This distinction between the autonomous, self-legislating reason of the
Fundamental Principles and the reason which can originate only maxims which
approximate the laws of a "holy" will is precipitated by the consideration
that duty itself does not provide the goal of moral effort;. This goal, the
summura bonum, includes both virtue, the pure morality motivated solely by
2
duty, and happiness, the appropriate reward of virtue. But in itself the
moral will cannot assure Itself happiness in proportion to virtue attained.
Accordingly, the existence of a cause of all nature, distinct from
nature itself and containing the principle of this connexion, namely,
of the exact harmony of happiness with morality, is also postulated.
Now, this supreme cause must contain the principle of the harmony
of nature, not merely with a law of the will of rational beings, but
with the conception of this law, in so far as they make it the
supreme determining principle of the will, and consequently not
merely with the form of morals, but with their morality as their
motive, that is, with their moral character. Therefore, the suamum
bonum is possible in the world only on the supposition of a supreme
Being having a causality corresponding to moral character. 3
The identity of this supreme Being is disclosed aa being God, conceived as an
intelligence, which is the condition of "a being that is capable of acting on
the conception of laws", and will, which is "the causality of such a being
4
according to this conception of laws."
The positing of a necessary connection between virtue and happiness
appears as a foreign element in the pure morality of duty. However, the source
1 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, Ab. p. 121.
2 Ibid. p. 206.
3 Fold. pp. 221-2.
4 Ibid. p. 222.
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of this concept is disclosed in Kant's subsequent comments on the subject.
The concept of happiness, which is foreign to the concept of morality as
defined by duty, is borrowed from Christianity.
Now Christian morality supplies this defect (of the second
indispensable element of the surmaum bonum) by representing
the world, in which rational beings devote themselves with
all their soul to the moral law, as a kingdom of God, in
which nature and morality are brought into a harmony foreign
to each of itself, by a holy Author who makes the derived
suramum bonum possible. 1
At this point the distinction between the imperative of the Critique and that
of the autonomous reason suggested by the Fundamental Principles becomes
clear. In the subsequent references to "duties as divine commands" the
suggestion of the divine origin of the imperative is made explicit.
In this manner the moral laws lead through the conception of
the summurn bonum as the object and final end of pure practical
reason to religion, that is, to the recognition of all duties
as divine commands, not as sanctions, that is to say, arbitrary
ordinances of a foreign will and contingent in themselves, but
as essential laws of every free will in itself, which, nevertheless,
must be regarded as commands of the Supreme Being, because it is
only from a morally perfect (holy and good) and at the same time
all-powerful will, and consequently only through harmony with this
will that we can hope to attain the summum bonum which the moral
law makes it our duty to take as the object of our endeavours. 2
b. The Explanation for the Conflict
The contrast between the concept of the autonomous, self-legislating
reason presented in the Fundamental Principles, and that of the recognition
of duties as divine commands presented in the Critique, is striking. Two
possible explanations have prevailed in the course of Kantian criticism. One
is that the concept of God in the Critique represents an unwarranted intrusion
3
into Kant's system. The other is that Kant presupposes the existence of God
1 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, Ab. pp. ~225-«6.
2 Ibid. p. 226.
3 Teale, p. 218.
1
throughout his whole argument. In spite of the seeming incompatibility of
these two explanations, they are, in fact, easily reconcilable. The
compatibility of the two is revealed in the suggestion that although Kant
began with the assumption of a God in whom the moral order is grounded, he
neglected this assumption in developing his concept of the amoral source
of the imperative from the self-legislating reason, so that recourse to
God as the gurantor of happiness proportionate to virtue represents an
2
unwarranted intrusion in this ethic of autonomy.
Brunner's estimation of the Kantian ethic implies this twofold
explanation. It is his contention that "behind his £[.9. Kant'"a] Categorical
3
Imperative lies the narrative of the giving of the law on Sinai." But
Kant's development of the imperative in terms of duty for duty's sake,
conceived as the purely formal morality of autonomy, is concerned only with
the "ought" and can have no relevant connection iri.th the "is". For "the
Kantian philosophy offers no link between the world of existence - and,
4
indeed, the concrete world, as it now is - and that which ought to be." The
link which Kant does provide is illegitimate on his established basis. It
is, in fact, a concession to the Eudaemonism which his system supposedly
combats - "a principle has actually been introduced which contradicts the
5
fundamental idea of the system, the idea, namely, of well-being." On Kant's
rational basis, any concept of well-being is excluded by definition. "The
formal rational conception of law ... provides no foundation for the idea
6
that the Good ought to be that which furthers the welfare of all." It is
Brunner's contention that this unjustified principle is not simply an
indication of Kant's concession to Eudaetaonisra, but is, in fact, a product
1 Teale, p. 11. 2 Ibid. pp. 217ffh
3 DI E.T. p. 151. 4 GuO p. 34- E.T. p. 4£. 5 Ibid. p. 25. E.T. p. 39.
6 Ibid. p. 25. E.T. pp. 39-40.
of Ms Christian background- "Kant's actual alliance with Eudaemonisra can
only be understood when we remember that Kant was not merely an Idealist,
but that he was an Idealist with a Christian foundation, and that in the
conception of God the Creator, Christianity provided him with a link between
that wMch is and that which ought to be, which, although it had no logical
right within Ms system, was, nevertheless, firmly established in his real
1
thought." The wisdom of this assessment is attested by the manner in wMch,
as we have seen, Kant introduces the Creator God as gursntor of happiness
proportionate to virtue in Ms Critique of Practical Reason. Further, there
is no doubt that Brunner's overeall assessment of Kant's position, as a
blend of Christianity and rational philosophy, perceives the essential setting
of Kant's moral theory. How these two elements are related, however, is
another matter.
c. The Testimony of the "Opus Postumum"
The importance wMch this interpretation of Kant has in Brunner's
theology demands an examination of Kant's alliance with the Christian faith.
This question is illuminated from Kant's own writings published in the Opus
Postumua. The first observation wMch must be made from what he says there
on the subject is that it is indeed inconceivable that Kant could have
propounded Ms moral theory without the Christian background from which Ms
thought emerged. The statements he makes there fully justify the remarks of
the editor of the Opus Postumum to the effect that Kant believed in "the
2
real trans-subjective existence of a personal (theistic) God", and indeed
3
that "Kant was always a decided theist." In the Opus Postumura the assumption
1 GuO p. 34. E.T. p. 49.
2 Erich Adickes, Kants Opus postumum (Berlin, 1920), p. 776.
3 Ibid. p. 831.
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of the existence of God, so unobtrusive at tinea in Kant'a moral theory, is
clearly linked with the Categorical Imperative. "There i3 a God for there is
in the raoral practical reason a categorical imperative which extends to all
1
rational world-beings, and whereby all world-beings are united." Or more
firmly stated - "The reason behaves according to the categorical imperative,
and the law-giver is God. - There is a God for there is a categorical
imperative." Indeed, "the categorical imperative, and the [considerationsj
grounded thereon of all duties of men as divine commands, is the practical
3
proof of the existence of God."
The second aspect of this problem which comes to light in the Opus
Postumum is that this "moral proof" is only valid for "moral man". Indeed,
this might serve to explain the absence of reference to God in the treatment
of duty in the Fundamental Principles. For "that such a being [I.e. GodJ
exists cannot be denied, but it is not affirmed (i.e. from the transcendental
philosophy as strict science] that it exists outside the rational thinking
U
man." In fact, "God is 'the product of our own reason1, 'the ideal of a
substance which we create ourselves'. ... 'more precisely! the reason makes
5
(creates) itself the concept of God' ..." Adickes' explanation of this
seeming contradiction between the knowledge of God in the categorical
imperative and the mere self-created conception of God of the rational thinking
man hinges on the contention that in the latter we have to do with pure reason
which is the sphere of the transcendental philosophy. For "the transcendental
philosophy has to do only with the mind of man, its formal functions and a
6
priori products, never with any kind of trans-subjective realities." In
short, when pure reason attempts to comprehend God, it is stopped short by
1 Kant, Opus posturaum, ed. Erich Adickes (Berlin, 1920), p. 773.
2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. p. 732. 4- Ibid. p. 735. 5 Ibid. p. 793.
6 Adickes, p. 792.
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the thing in itself. For the pure reason God is possible, but no more
provable than the reality of space and time. In Adicke3 t words, we are
left with nthe thoroughly legitimate thought in the transcendental philosophy,
that an affirmation of the absolute (trans-subj active) existence of God is
1
just as unallowable as of the world of space and time." It is otherwise
with the practical reason. The practical reason is the will. Its concern
is not conceptions, but duty. In the moral sphere, in contrast to the purely
rational, God is a necessary postulate. "The concept of God is a principle
of the moral-practical reason - to consider the knowledge of all duties of
2
men as divine commands." It is the formal nature of duty, of the Categorical
Imperative, which constitutes the necessity for seeing duties as divine
commands. "The idea of the absolute authority of an absolutely direct
command of duty of a moral being is the divinity (the person who commands)
of the same (divlnitas formalis). A substance which possesses this authority
3
is God. - That such a substance exists cannot be proved." The numinous
quality of duty suggests the divine origin of the imperative - "the categorical
imperative governs with absolute authority, and because of that its formal
A
character is apprehended as command of divinity." Thus the affirmation of
the existence of God remains essentially a subjective judgment. The concept
of duty demands the recognition of God, and yet, in itself, duty is such a
noble phenomenon that it can be considered without reference to the subjective
judgment as to its source. This may explain the apparent contradiction
between the concept of the Imperative presented in the Fundamental Principles
and that presented in the Critique. "All duties of men are to be considered
as super-human, i.e. as divine commands. Not as though one therein must
1 Adickes, p. "93.
2 Kant, Opus postumura, p. 809.
3 Ibid. p. 312.
A Ibid.
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presuppose a particular, 1aw-promulagiting person jeiq. substance], but it
lies in the moral practical reason? there is such a reason in man? the moral
practical reason commands equally categorically as a person through the
1
imperative of duty." Thus it seems that Kant's high estimation of the
practical reason can permit him to speak of the imperative as the product of
autonomous, self-legislating man as well as of God.
d, Kant's Rational Christianity
Clearly, Kant's concept of the Imperative displays a conflict of
interests. On the one hand, the numinous quality attaching to duty, and the
corresponding necessity for seeing duties as divine commands, betrays the
influence of Kant's Christian background, without which his moral theory is
inconceivable. Philosophers who approach Kant's ethical writings purely as
a formal analysis of morality, and seek to judge it in terms of its inner
coherence and logical consistency, provide an unsatisfactory account of
Kant'3 work. Indeed, at times Kant is distinctly theological, especially
in his Religion Within the limits of Reason Alone where he is concerned
with original sin, and even deals with such a distinctly theological topic
2
as substitutionary atonement. This theological aspect of Kant is also a
definite element in his concept of the Categorical Imperative as leading to
religion through the recognition of duties as divine commands.
On the other hand, Kant is confident in the ability of reason to
determine its own course autonomously. Brunner's contention that these
two aspects are discernible in Kant's ethical theory is indisputable. However,
that these two elements are as basically antagonistic for Kant as Brunner
suggests, is not so obvious. Kant's own estimation of the merits of these
1 Kant,' Opus postumum, p. 823.
2 Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, pp. 68ff.
respective sources of morality is presented succinctly in the Opus Fostuaura.
I believe from the bottom of my soul, and after the most mature
reflection, that the doctrine of Christ, purged of all clericalism,
and understood to express itself in conformity with our method, is
the moat perfect system, which I at least can think of, to promote
peace and happiness of the swiftest, most powerful, most secure, and
most universal kind in the world. Only I believe also that there is
yet another system, which grows completely out of the pure reason,
and leads even thereto? but it is only for skilled thinkers, and
certainly not for mm generally; and even should it find favour, so
must one still choose the doctrine of Christ for practice. 1
One significant phrase in this statement does not come under consideration in
Brunner's analysis of Kant, the phrase - "and understood to express itself in
conformity with our method". In fact, Brunner' s contention that Kant is
striving to reconcile the conflicting interests of Christian theology and
autonomous reason suggests that he minimizes the extent to which Kant's
doctrine of reason has shaded his concept of the subject matter of theology.
The Kantian ethic ... has an Idea of God in the background, but
this Idea is not the Stoic idea but the Christian idea - although
somewhat weakened by a certain tinge of Deism: but it is now common
property from his opus postumum, how Kant strove to the very last
to eliminate thi3 theological background from his ethical theory,
and that he was unable to do so. It is this which gives the Kantian
ethic its divided character. 2
Kant's confidence in the ability of the autonomous reason certainly suggests
more than "a certain tinge of Deism". In fact, one might suggest that the
method by which he sought to "eliminate the theological background from his
ethical theoxy" was thoroughly deistic. "The categorical imperative is not
set in the highest commanding substance which is outside me, but is a command
or prohibition of my own reason. - Yet, nevertheless, it is still considered
3
as proceeding from a being, which has irresistihle power over all." The
most obvious interpretation of such a statement, which is indeed typical of
the seemingly contradictoiy position represented in the Opus Postumum, is that
1 Kant, Opus postumum, p. 763.
2 GuO p. 561. E.T. p. 579.
3 Kant, Opus postumum, p. 322.
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Kant is propounding a deistic doctrine as the context of his ethics» Thus
interpreted, the source of the Imperative may well be God, but by His
endowment of taan in Creation, in which he has set man on his own feet, or,
more accurately, on his own reason, man is fully capable of providing his
own Imperative. Certainly, the suggestion of an internal battle, on Kant's
part, between autonomy and theonoiay, is not so poignantly represented by the
Opus Postumum as Brunner would suggest.
If we start from the most fundamental antithesis of all, from
that between an ethic based on immanence and one based on
transcendence, then certainly the intention of Kant at this
point is not clear. Can it be that a theonomy lies behind his
principle of autonomy? Is it then possible that he had found
the point where both become one, and thus the point at which
the contradiction is overcome? Above all, the recent publicat-
-ion of Kant's opus postumum has shown us, most impressively,
the way in which Kant wrestled with this very problem. It has
shown us equally clearly that a solution of this problem along
the lines suggested by Kant is impossible. His essentially
Idealistic point of view can never be combined with the
recognition of a "divine substance" - as Kant expressed it -
that is, with the recognition of a personality which confronts
me as Thou. 1
Undoubtedly, Brunner is perfectly sound in his contention that the problem
cannot be solved along the lines which Kant suggested, but it is possible
that he underestimates the satisfaction with which Kant contemplated his
own solution. The Opus Postumum does not suggest the conflict in Kant's
own mind between his rational basis and Christian theism which Brunner
attributes to him. The solution may be that Kant was more convinced of the
susceptibility of the Christian faith to rational explanation than Brunner
is prepared to recognize. An interpretation of Kant's position with regard
to Christianity, which is more compatible with Kant's own statements in the
Opus Postumua, is presented by Abbott in his preface to his translation of
1 GuO p. 31. E.T. pp. 45-6
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Kant's major ethical writings.
Kant's own position with respect to Christianity is that of a
Rationalist. He accepts the whole moral and spiritual teaching
of the New Testament, because he finds it in accordance with
reason, and this being so, he judges that it is a matter of no
practical consequence whether its introduction was supernatural
or not. 1
Kant's ethical theory is unimaginable without reference to his Christian
background in which he matured; nevertheless, the conception of the Christian
faith which lies behind his theory bears his own distinctive rationalistic
stamp.
e. Brunner's Debt to Kant
If the above interpretation reflects a fair understanding of Kant's
basic position, then the question arises as to whether Kant's Imperative was
ever a genuine one. Brunner assumes it was. In spite of his censure of
Kant's principle of autonomy, he is unmistakably impressed by Kant's present-
-ation of the Imperative in so far as it is not the Imperative of the self-
legislating reason. In contrast to the speculation of theoretical reason,
"the categorical imperative speaks to me, this single man, in its absolute
2
concreteness." Indeed, "in the Kantian philosophy ... the absolute Good
3
becomes the challenge of the present moment to the individual." It is a
sobering thought, however, to realize that the individual thus singled out
is rational man. Brunner is not unaware of this.
Even where the law is conceived quite formally, as in Kant's
Categorical Imperative, where it expresses the pure form of
responsibility itself and renouncing all content loses its
statutory character, it does not cease to be abstract and
impersonal because it remains a law of obligation. It does
not put me in contact with the 'Thou' - whether divine or
human - but with the abstract entity 'reason'. U
Brunner is aware of the rational nature of the Kantian Imperative, but his
1 Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, "Memoir of Kant", Kant's Critique of Practical
Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics, p. Ixi.
2 GPhKK p. 39. 3 Mitt. p. 91n. E.T. p. 115n. /, MiW p. 159. E.T. p. 153,
opposition to it is based on the fact that it is a law of obligation. This
suggests that Brunnar is using Kant to combat Kant. For it is Brunner's
contention that the reality which does {Hit me in contact with the •Thou1 is
love. We have already seen that this opposition between law and love, which
is axiomatic for Brunner, suggests a Kantian influence. The final decision
on this possibility will depend upon the status Brunner accords to law.
This must await our final chapter where the relation of Law and Gospel will
be considered. For the present, we may pursue this direction in a more
general way in the examination of the chief contrast by which Brunner
distinguishes his position from that of Kant with regard to the Imperative,
his contrast between Law and Command. We have already suggested that this
development in Brunner's doctrine suggests a parallel with Kierkegaard's
concept of the teleological suspension of the ethical, and that Kierkegaard's
concept is basically distinguished from the Kantian position in that it
prescribes a definite content, whereas the Kantian Imperative is purely
formal. It is this difference between Kant and Kierkegaard which will concern
us in examining Brunner's distinction between Law and Command.
B. LAW AND COMMAND
a. The Universality of Law and the Particularity of Command
Kant is a moralist with a Christian background, and not a theologian
concerned with morality. Consequently morality provides the determinative
context in which any and all theological issues must be set. Brunner's
method of stating this is to distinguish between Law and Command.
... it is only the transcendental conception of law and not the
theological conception of command which is legitimate in the
Kantian ethic. Law, however, in contrast to command, is that
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which is not intended, for any particular time, it is non-
individual, it is timeless and universal. As a rational
moralist, that is, as one who thinks of the good will not
in view of an actual Divine command but in view of the law,
Kant also believes absolutely in the possibility of an
ethical system, that is in the possibility of constructing
timeless valid norms of duty for actual conduct. 1
As a moralist, Kant cannot appreciate a theological concept of command. He
can speak only in terras of law, because a strictly rational ethic cannot
include a concept of a law-giver. "Within strict thought all transcending
2
from the law to the law-giver must be described as mythological.w
This contrast between Law and Command is presented most distinctly
in Kierkegaard's concept of the teleological suspension of the ethical. In
Abraham'3 willingness to sacrifice Isaac, which Kierkegaard takes as the
classic example of this phenomenon, the contemplated act of murder, which is
ethically indefensible, is sanctioned by the direct command of God. Thus,
as we have seen, Kierkegaard's "Command", like Brunner's distinction between
Law and Command, differs from Kant's "Imperative" in that the former is
particular, whereas the latter is universal.
b. Kierkegaard's Distinction between Universal Duty and Absolute Duty
The distinction between the particularity and universality of the
Command represents only one side of the contrast between the Kantian Imperative
and the Kierkegaard!an Command. In addition to the distinction between
particular and universal, Kierkegaard's concept centers on a distinction
between the universal and the absolute.
The initial premise of Kant's ethical theory is that duty is the
sole source of morally valid action. So concerned is he to establish the
purity of motive that it becomes the whole subject of ethics.
1 GuO p. 33. E.T. p. 48.
2 "Ge3etz und Offenbarung", Anf8nge der dialektischen Theologle (Mtochen,
1962), I, 292.
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• •. an action done from duty derives its moral worth, not from
the purpose which is to be attained by it, but from the maxim
by which it is determined, and therefore does not depend on
the realization of the object of the action, but merely on the
principle of volition by which the action has taken place,
without regard to any object of desire. 1
On this basis, the moral worth of actions "cannot lie anywhere but in the
2
principle of the will without regard to the ends." We have already seen
that Kant had to come to terms with Eudaemoniam in order to give content to
this formal ethic of duty. Here the contrast with Kierkegaard's notion of
the divine cotmaand is most striking.
It is Kierkegaard's contention that within the context of duty as
a formal concept, the pure categorical imperative, duty for duty's sake, the
concept of duty is self-defeating.
The ethical is the universal, and as such it is again the divine.
One has therefore a right to say that fundamentally every duty is
a duty toward God; but if one cannot say more, then one affirms
at the same time that properly I have no duty toward God. Duty
becomes duty by being referred to God, but in duty itself I do not
come into relation with God, 3
Duty is determined by its content. In the duty to love one's neighbour, for
4
example, one comes into relation with one's neighbour. If one speaks of God
in this context, then God is equated with the moral order, the universal
demand of duty. Within the ethical sphere, which is the sphere of the
universal, "God becomes an invisible vanishing point, a powerless thought,
His power being only in the ethical which is the content of existence. If
duty is to have any relation to God, it must have its source in God, in the
absolute, and not in the universal •which is the ethical. "The individual ...
determines his relation to the universal by his relation to the absolute,
6
not his relation to the absolute by his relation to the universal."
1 Kant, Fundamental Principles» Ab. p. 16. 2 Ibid"
3 Sdren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, p. 78. 4 Ibid.
5 Ibid. 6 Ibid. p. 80.
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c. The Inseparability of Command and Commanded in Kierkegaard
It is in relation to the absolute that Abraham Illustrates the
teleological suspension of the ethical, which is the universal. In terms
of the ethical, Abraham's duty is to love Isaac. "Abraham's relation to
Isaac, ethically speaking, is quite simply expressed by saying that a
1
father shall love his son more dearly than himself." There can be no doubt
that Abraham fulfilled this ethical demand. Kierkegaard is so highly
appreciative of this fact that he betrays lack of confidence in his ability
to expound Abraham's love for Isaac with anything like full justice.
... I would describe how Abraham loved Isaac. To this end I
would pray all good spirits to come to ray aid, that ray speech
might be as gloving as paternal love is. I hope that I should
be able to describe it in such a way that there would not be
many a father in the realms and territories of the King who
would dare to affirm that he loved his son in such a way. 2
Ethically considered, then, Abraham is above reproach. let it is not through
this fulfilment of duty that he is related to God. Quite the contrary, it
is through the demand to contradict this duty that the relation to God is
established. For the demand to sacrifice Isaac comes from God Himself -
3
"it wa3 God who tried Abraham."
At this point the distinction between Kant's Categorical Imperative
and Kierkegaard's teleological suspension of the ethical is radically
disclosed.
What ordinarily tempts a man is that which would keep him
from doing his duty, but in this case the temptation is
itself the ethical ... which would keep him from doing
God's will. But what then Is duty? Duty is precisely
the expression for God's will. A
The distinction between Kant's Imperative and Kierkegaard's Command is a
distinction between the universal demand of duty and the absolute demand
1 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, p. 67l 2 Ibid. p. 42
3 Ibid. p. 34.- A Ibid. p. 70,
138
of God. The significance of this distinction consists in the fact that, in
contrast to Kant's formal Imperative, Kierkegaard's Command prescribes a
1
definite content. The "recognition of all duties as divine commands" begins
with the ethical, and never gets beyond the ethical because it presupposes
that man knows what God requires. The message of Kierkegaard's concept of
the teleological suspension of the ethical is precisely the reverse. Only
God Himself can prescribe the individual's duty. The fact that this is not
what man conceives as his duty on the ethical plane constitutes the passionate
conflict which makes the demand of God a true trial, and i3 expressed in
2
Abraham's case by "the pain of his trial".
The demand of God sets the individual on a plane above the ethically
familiar, a plane which discloses frightening possibilities for evil as well
as for good, the possibilities of murder and of sacrifice. It was this which
constituted the agonizing trial which Abraham endured, and which constitutes
the uniqueness of faith.
The paradox can also be expressed by saying that there is an
absolute duty toward Godj for in this relationship of duty
the individual as an individual stands related absolutely to
the absolute. So when in this connection it is said that it
is a duty to love God, something different is said from that
in the fore-goingj for if this duty is absolute, the ethical
is reduced to a position of relativity. From this, however,
it does not follow that the ethical is to be abolished, but
it acquires an entirely different expression - that, for
example, love to God may cause the knight of faith to give
his love to his neighbour the opposite expression to that
which, ethically speaking, is required of duty. 3
The ethical expression for Abraham's contemplated act is murderj religiously
A
considered, it is sacrifice. The decisive qualification which makes what is
ethically indefensible, religiously obligatory, is the demand of God and the
possibility of meeting that demand, which in Abraham's case is provided by
1 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason. Ab. p. 226.
2 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, p. 63. 3 Ibid. p. 80. A» Ibid. p. 41.
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his love for Isaac.
Isaac he must love with his whole soul} when God requires Isaac
he must love him if possible even more dearly, and only on this
condition can he sacrifice him; for in fact it is this love for
Isaac, which, by its paradoxical opposition to his love for God,
makes his act a sacrifice. 1
It is this insistence on the necessity for Abraham to love Isaac, and to love
him even more dearly in the face of the demand to sacrifice him, which gives
2
the lie to Buber's contention that for Kierkegaard the "Reginas" of this
world are hurdles to be overcome in the ascent to God. The toleological
suspension of the ethical does not consist in the fact that Abraham was
willing to sacrifice Isaac. The whole point is that he was not. The life
of Isaac meant more to Abraham than his own. "If Abraham had doubted ... he
3
would have plunged the knife into his own breast." Abraham was not willing
to renounce Isaac. "By faith Abraham did not renounce his claim upon Isaac,
A
but by faith he got Isaac." The teleological suspension of the ethical
demands a total trust which is radiant with hope for this life. It is not
\
a committment to a higher path which works itself out on the familiar plane
of the ethical. It is a faith in the total demand of God for this present
life. As 3uch, it prescribes a definite content.
Yes, if Abraham the instant he swung his leg over the ass's back
had said to himself, "Now since Isaac is lost, I might just as
well sacrifice him here at home, rather than ride the long way
to Moriah" - then I should have no need of Abraham, whereas now
I bow seven times before his name and seventy times beforw his
deed. If this had not been the case with Abraham, then perhaps
he might have loved God but not believed; for he who loves God
without faith reflects upon himself, he who loves God believingly
reflects upon God. 5
The distinction between moral and religious responsibility, then, as
Kierkegaard presents it, does not consist merely in the recognition that
1 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, p.
2 Cf. above p. 101.
3 Kierkegaard, p. 35. A Ibid. p. 59. 5 Ibid. p. 4-7.
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duties are divine commands, but In the detailed obedience to demands which
are not discernible on the familiar plane of the ethical.
d» Brunner's Debt to Kant and Kierkegaard
Whatever the difficulties presented by Kierkegaard's concept of
the teleological suspension of the ethical, and they are not few, the contrast
with the Kantian Categorical Imperative is quite clear. In terms of this
analysis, we may now re-examine Brunner's indebtedness to Kierkegaard. We
have suggested that Brunner's contrast between Law and Command bears a
striking similarity to Kierkegaard's teleological suspension of the ethical
in terms of the contrast between the particularity of the Command as opposed
to the universality of Law. However, in the light of the contrast between
Kierkegaard's concept and Kant's Categorical Imperative now discernible, the
parallel ends here. For in Kierkegaard's presentation, the command is not
only specific, but it is also detailed with regard to content. The command
cannot bo separated from what is commanded. In this respect, Brunner's
position is more compatible with that of Kant. "Theologically expressed: Not
what God demands is important, but whether one is willing to take the claim
of God - what it always is - as the guide, the consciousness of responsibility
1
opposite Him, the 'first command' is the decisive one." Brunner does not
conceal the fact that this is a Kantian allegiance. "The formalism of the
2
Kantian ethic is in most precise agreement with the New Testament ethic."
This formalism is founded on the conviction, unthinkable in Kierkegaard's
presentation, of the separability of command and commanded. "This formalism
is nothing other than the knowledge that only the obedience opposite God
3
Himself, nothing of details, decides between good and evil."
1 GPhKK p. 39.
2 "Gesetz und Offenbarung", p. 292n.
3 Ibid.
Brunner's concern is the wholly legitimate one of emphasizing the
absolute nature of the divine demand, in contrast to all utilitarian concepts
of human ambition. Yet the question remains, assuming the illegitimacy of
a utilitarian perspective, what gives the responsibility of faith content?
The problem with which Brunner confronts us is this - he seems to be
endeavouring to combine the formalism of Kant's Categorical Imperative with
the particularity involved in Kierkegaard's concept of the command of faith.
How is this possible? The Immediate solution to Brunner's predicament is
suggested by his reference to Kant's concession to Eudaemonisra. As we have
seen, it is Brunner's contention that Kant's alliance with Sudaoraonisra is
1
only intelligible in terms of his Christian background. This contention is
hardly open to dispute in view of Kant's own admission that Christian morality
2
provides the link between the attainment of virtue and its appropriate reward.
But Brunner insists that while this intrusion of the concept of the Creator
God is illegitimate in Kant's rational ethic, it is quite legitimate in a
similarly formal Christian ethic. In spite of his recognition of the
incompatibility of the Kantian ethic and the true Christian ethic, Brunner
regards the two as easily reconcilable. This is so because the rationalist
basis provides an ethic which is in essential agreement with the Christian
ethic. "Kant placed his ethic deliberately alongside the Christian ethic,
and made no secret of the fact that the formal principles he had discovered
produced exactly the same ethic as that of the Gospels - although the basis
3
is different." Now it is undoubtedly true that the formalism of the Kantian
ethic is parallel to the Christian ethic In that the Christian ethic demands
absolute obedience, and as such excludes all utilitarian motives. In an
age when morally valid action is determined in terms of the anticipated
1 GuO p. 34- 13.T. p. 49»
2 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason. Ab. pp. 225f.
3 GuO p. 30. E.T. p. 45.
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consequences, it is well to recall Kant's emphasis on the authoritative
imperative, the Categorical Imperative, a3 distinguished from mere hypothetical
imperatives which refer to a certain end. It is not so obvious, however, that
this formalism of the Kantian ethic is parallel to the Christian ethic in
its lack of content. It is not obvious that one must depict the imperative
as being completely empty in order to eliminate all possibility of utilitarian
compromise. Brunner gives no indication of any difficulty in these two
senses of "formality". The formality of the Christian ethic a3 absolute
demand also involves the formality of complete lack of content. In other
words, the distinctive feature of the Christian ethic is the motive it
provides. The assumption seems to be that man is able to give content to
this motive himself. "So far as motive is concerned, our motto is: 'all from
Christ', but where the concrete demand is formulated, the only rule is:
1
loyalty to the order of Creation." Brunner never doubts that command and
commanded can thus be separated.
The parallel to Kant's ethic of duty represented by Brunner's
formal ethic of motivation clarifies the difficulty in distinguishing between
moral and religious responsibility in Brunner's writings. We have suggested
that Kant's rational understanding of Christianity raises the question as to
whether his imperative was ever a genuine one. Brunner1s alliance with Kant
now raises the question as to whether Brunner really deals with religious
responsibility at all. Not only does he say that "morality appears - so far
as it is genuine, i.e. so far as an absolute demand is involved therein -
2
as latent religion"; but he seems to suggest also that the passage from
moral responsibility to religious responsibility involves merely the recognition
1 DII p. 267. E.T. p. 226.
2 Das Symbolische in der religibsen Erkenntnis (Tubingen, 1914-), P« 75.
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of the ultimate source of moral obligation, the recognition of duties as
divine commands. The feeling of respect for our fellow man is intimately-
bound up with the "reverence for a highest being."
But it is impossible to prove the identity of both, the
categorical imperative and God's will. We are here in a
sphere where every proof loses its value, in the sphere of
faith and of religion. 1
Apparently the distinction between moral responsibility and religious
responsibility is essentially the recognition of the true absoluteness of
duty. The suggestion is that Kant did not go far enough - "the critical
philosopher, if he cannot become a believer, will always somehow make a
2
weakening attempt (see Kant)." The contrast with Kierkegaard's distinction
between duty as the 3elf-enclosed sphere of the ethical and duty which comes
from God, is striking. If our analysis is faithful to Brunner, it would seen
that his doctrine of responsibility bears a strong idealistic tinge. Since
he himself has suggested that idealism is distinguished from Christianity
in terms of the recognition of evil, it will be well to examine Brunner's
account of this distinction.
C, IDEALISM AND EVIL
a« Brunner's Assessment of Kant's Concept of Evil
Kant's concept of evil represents a curious blend of the Christian
doctrine of Original Sin and the rationalist confidence in the basic integrity
of reason. In his concept of "radical evil" Kant demonstrates a profound
appreciation for the seriousness of fallen man's predicament such as lias
been formulated traditionally in the Christian doctrine of Original Sin.
1 "Freiheit als Vorantwortlichkeit", pp. 359-60.
2 Erlebnis, Erkenntnis und Glaube, (TUbingen, 1923), p. 33.
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... evil is radical, because it corrupts the ground of all maximsj
it is, moreover, as a natural propensity, inextirpable by human
powers, since extirpation could occur only through good maxims,
and cannot take place when the ultimate subjective ground of all
maxims is postulated as corrupt ... 1
Yet from this uncompromising affirmation of the "bondage of sin", which
clearly approximates the Christian doctrine of Original Sin, Kant goes on to
reverse his judgment: "yet at the sane time it must be possible to overcome
2
it, since it is found in man, a being whose actions are free." Brunner's
assessment of the Kantian concept of evil represents an essentailly credible
explanation of Kant's basic position. "The answer of Plato - and of all the
idealists after him including Kant - is that only our animal nature ... our
3
sensuous or bodily nature, is responsible for moral evil." It is ultimately
the rationalist, and not the Christian, concept of evil which prevails in
Kant.
This judgment of Brunner, however, represents only one side of his
assessment of Kant. One would expect, in terras of his appreciation for the
4
influence of Kant'3 Christian background, that Brunner would describe the
concept of radical evil as a rationalist corruption of the Christian doctrine
of sin. Such is not the case. On one occasion he declines to investigate
the possibility of Kant's concept being a product of his Christian background,
and instead contrasts it as an impersonal concept with the personal doctrine
of sin presented in Christianity.
... the Kantian doctrine of radical evil is not the Christian
doctrine. It is not our business here to enquire whether it is
derived from the Christian doctrine or notj in any case, in vital
seriousness it lags far behing the Christian doctrine, although
it certainly attains far greater heights than all other philosoph-
-ical theories of evil. The reason why the Kantian doctrine lags
behind the Christian view is that it remains within the sphere of
mere reason, and this means that it is not truly personal. For
it measures man only by an impersonal law. 5
1 Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, p. 32.
2 Ibid. 3 Dili E.T. p. 384. 4 DI E.T. p. 151.
5 Mitt. pp. 117-18. E.T. p. 142.
It is strange that Brunner should decline to investigate the possibility
that Kant's concept of radical evil may be derived from the Christian doctrine
of Original Sin. Yet it is true that this possibility is never seriously
considered by Brunner. His most consistent position with regard to the
derivation of Kant's doctrine assumes that it is purely a product of his
rational philosophy. "It is not an accommodation to his Christian environ-
-ment, but an expression of the most stringent and sharpest conceptual
1
analysis, when he speaks of 'radical evil'."
It is Brunner's contention that Kant's doctrine of radical evil
need not be referred to the Christian doctrine of Original Sin because it is
thoroughly explicable in terras of his moral philosophy.
He, the enemy of all muddled thinking, of all would-be clever
profundity, the relentless logician, is forced by the very
nature of the problem to come to the paradoxical conclusion
of "inborn guilt". He reaches this conclusion simply because he
sees what a moral will means, because he has understood the
moral phenomenon better then other thinkers. 2
There can be no question of the moral setting in which Kant presented his
doctrine of radical evil. But this is something different from the contention
that it was a product of the moral philosophy as such. Brunner's assessment
would present no problem if he were merely contending that Kant has transposed
insights from the Christian faith into a moral setting. For unquestionably
it is morality which is the central concern in Kant. Brunner's assessment,
however, is much more radical. It is not his contention that Kant's doctrine
is presented in moral terras, but that it is derived from the moral as such.
"The doctrine of radical evil was a necessary consequence of the purity of
3
his conception of morality." In the final analysis, Brunner is really
affirming that "radical evil" represents a rationally discerned and rationally
1 Dili E.T. p. 257. " ~ "
2 Mitt. p. 103. E.T. p. 123.
3 Ibid. p. 104. E.T. p. 123.
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discernible doctrine.
Kant's idea of radical evil remains the most serious attempt ever
made by any philosopher - who does not bring his system into
conformity with the Christian revelation - about evil. In spite
of this, however, his doctrine certainly cannot be considered as
the reformulation of the Christian truth about sin. It is the
expression of that which the man who reflects seriously upon evil
can discover for himself. 1
When we consider the serious view of bondage represented in Kant's concept
of radical evil, it seems strange that this concept should be described as
rationally discernible.
b. Kant's Basic Confidence in Reason
We have already seen reason to question whether Kant's imperative
was ever a genuine one because of the basic confidence in reason on which his
moral philosophy is founded. We must now question Simmer' s affirmation that
Kant's concept was possible because he started with the "divine Law".
... Kant' s theory of Radical Evil ... shows how an exact and
unprejudiced analysis of evil comes very near to the Christian
truth. ... Kant is able to conceive evil in its personal unity
because he understands man as a unified personality. He is able
to do so, without starting from the Christian revelation, because,
and in so far as, he starts from the idea of the divine Law ... 2
Again, this would be quite intelligible if Brunner were simply contending that
behind Kant's doctrine of radical evil, as behind his concept of the Categorical
Imperative, there stands the Christian knowledge of a supreme law-giver to
whom man is answerable. But this is not what Brunner is affirming. On the
contrary, he is contending that Kant's doctrine of radical evil springs from
an "idea of the divine Law" which is something other than the Christian
revelation. He goes on to state his main criticism of Kanti "as soon as the
idea of the divine Law gives place to the law of Reason, as soon as he once
more regards the person as autonomous, as a self-legislator, then he also
1 MiW p. 123. E.T. pp. 126-7.
2 DII p. 109. E.T. p. 95.
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1
loses the view of radical evil."
The ambiguity in Brunner's assessment of Kant rests on an ambiguity
in the Kantian position itself. It is Brunner's contention that Kant oscillates
between a concept of autonomy and one of theonomy becuase he is working with
the concept of law and not with revelation. "The law is ambiguous, for it
can be interpreted sometimes from the aspect of theonony, and sometimes from
2
that of autonony, and for that reason the depths of evil cannot be perceived."
What Brunner does not seem to take into account is that in the concept of law
as the pure fact of law, the Categorical Imperative, even the theonomy must
be based on autonomy. This is the lesson to be learned from Kierkegaard's
distinction between universal duty and absolute duty. Brunner assumes that
Kant is really dealing with divine law. The problem comes, in Brunner's
estimation, when Kant abandons this divine law which prescribes the contrast
between is and ought, and establishes the contrast within man himself in the
bifurcation of man into an empirical and an intelligible self. Although at
times Brunner 3eeras to recognize that this bifurcation was inherent in Kant's
position from the outset.
If we hold to the most impressive formulation the natural moral
consciousness has received, that of the Stoic Kantian ethic, we
find that precisely this ethic leads to insoluble contradictions.
It wishes to establish an imperative, but the principle of autonomy
converts the imperative into the will of the intelligible ego. It
professes to recognize evil in the concept of "radical evil", but
again the principle of autonomy does not permit it to seek this
evil in the innermost kernel of the person. It professes to give
due recognition to the contradiction in man, but it makes the
ethical contradiction into a metaphysical antithesis between the
intelligible and the empirical self. 3
This could be interpreted to mean that the outcome of this approach is implicit
in its method from the start. There i3 good reason to believe that this is
what Brunner means in this presentation of the situation. For he continues:
1 DH pp. 109-10. E.T. p. 95.
2 Ibid.
3 GuM p. 27. E.T. pp. 73-4-
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It tries to make the irimperative a serious one, by locating it in
a will which confronts mankind, but the transcendentalism of its
philosophical method ... does not permit it to conceive of the
divine will as a will which confronts us. For it cannot acknowledge
a God metaphysically known without ceasing to be critical, and it
cannot aclcnowledge a self-revealing God without ceasing to be
philosophy. 1
But from this early evaluation of the Kantian predicament, Brunner has gone on
to develop a theory of the imperative wherein it is assumed that the problem
in Kant comes when he converts the genuine Imperative into the law of the
2
intelligible self. As we have seen from his recent Dogmatik, Brunner affirms
that Kant "starts from the idea of the divine Law". Thus the problem only
comes when "the idea of the divine Law gives place to the law of Reason",
that is, when the ethical dualism between is and ought gives place to the
metaphysical dualism between the empirical self and the intelligible self.
This latter interpretation assumes that initially Kant is dealing with a
genuine imperative. There can be no doubt that this, and not the more
critical evaluation suggested in Gott und Mensch, represents Brunner's
most consistent position, with regard to Kant.
On this latter interpretation, it would seem that Brunner would
be forced to accept the assessment of A.D. Lindsay as to the basic similarity
between Kant and St. Paul. It is Lindsay's contention that Kant's distinction
between the empirical and the intelligible world is basically the same as that
which Paul draws between the "law in my members" and the "law of my mind".
Man is a creature of two worlds, the intelligible world of reason,
of which he is aware in his recognition of his obligation to act
according to its principles, and the world of nature, where as a
physical creature he is conscious of inclinations and desires
prescribed to him by his physical nature and by the effect upon it
of the surrounding physical world. As free, he is undetermined by
the natural order just because, as a moral being, he is determined
by and subject to the laws of the moral orders and the laws of the
1 GuM p. 27. E •T. p. 74*
2 DII p. 109- E.T. p. 95
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moral order are the legislation of his rational will. "For I
delight in the law of God after the inward man; but I see another
law in my members, warring against the law of iay mind and bringing
me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members. So
then with the mind I myself serve the law of God, but with the
flesh the law of sin." Kant's distinction and St. Paul's are in
essence the same though what St. Paul calls the law of God is for
Kant the law of self-legislative reason. 1
This contention that the contrast between the law of self-legislative reason
and the law of God is the only difference between Kant and St. Paul, which
would seem to represent Bnmner's basic position as well, overlooks one
important fact, namely, that there is a fundamental difference between
rational law and divine law. The fact is that the reason was never in
question in Kant. It is not simply a case of his deserting the true imperative
for a concept of the autonomous self-legislating reason. Kant's imperative is
rational from the outset. It is not an imperative which confronts man from
beyond himself, but an imperative by which reason is to subdue the inclinations.
The contrast between is and ought is a contrast between empirical and
intelligible from the outset. The problem as it was formulated by Kant is -
how can reason be motivated to regulate the inclinations?
If we had only to do with a being in whom Reason was irresistibly
dominant, we should not need to raise any further questions* but
having to treat of a being with affections and appetites distinct
from Reason, and not of tbetaselves dependent on it, we must answer
the further question: How is Reason to maintain its authority in
spite of these resisting forces? i.e. What is the motive? 2
Thus the problem in Kant's moral theory, from the Christian perspective, does
not begin with his identification of the imperative with the self-legislating
reason, as Brunner suggests. The bifurcation between the empirical self and
the intelligible self is implicit in Kant's theory from the beginning,
precisely in the contrast between duty and inclination. We have already seen
that Brunner' s contrast between law and love suggests a parallel to this
1 A.D. Lindsay. Kant (London. 1934.). PP. 195-&
2 Abbott, "Memoir of Kant", op. cit., p. 1.
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Kantian contrast between duty and inclination. Examination of this possibility
must await the final chapter where consideration will be given to Brunner's
concept of Law and Gospel. We may note at this stage, however, that since
Brunner does not seem to appreciate fully the significance of the rationalistic
basis on which Kant's imperative is founded, in that he regards it as a
genuine imperative prior to its identitication with the self-legislating
self, he casts suspicion on his own appreciation for the distinction between
the divine command and the formal concept of duty involved in the rational
categorical imperative. If this represents an accurate assessment of Brunner'3
relation to Kant, it clarifies his contention that radical evil represents a
rational insight.
c. Responsibility and the Knowledge of Evil
The importance of Brunner's contention regarding the rational
discernibility of evil consists in the fact that it explains how he can move
so naturally from moral responsibility to religious responsibility. If
rational man can know evil as a bondage which is "inextirpable by human
1
powers", then he is very close to the Christian knowledge of sin as a
self-enclosing separation from God. We are here faced with the question of
guilt, and of responsibility for guilt. It is at this point that the final
decision on Brunner's doctrine will have to be made. This will be considered
in the final chapter. At present, we may prepare the way for this evaluation
by a further glance at the parallel between Kant and Brunner on the concept
of responsibility.
Kant began with the concept of moral responsibility in terms of the
imperative, and from this developed a concept of total responsibility whereby
1 Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, p. 32.
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man Is regarded as a fully self-sufficient being in himself.
Though he begins by reaffirming the view that the consciousness
of duty is the ratio cognoacendi of freedom, while freedom is
the ratio esaendi of duty, he ends by saying that a man must
unhesitatingly admit that it is possible for him to do what he
recognizes he ought to do and hence is conscious of freedom. 1
From the notion of moral freedom which is grounded in obligation, Kant
proceeds to the notion of arbitrary freedom which is superior to obligation.
The fallacy in this development is well summarized by Teale.
Our freedom does not follow from our awareness of being able to
act accordingly? it follows from our recognition of the fact that
if we were not free, we could never experience moral obligation.
To reverse this order of ideas is to make the proof of freedom
depend on man's ability to act in accordance with his ideas,
whereas the whole point of Kant's argument at this stage is that
the idea of duty is unlike every other idea in that it carries
with it a peculiar feeling of constraint and hence presupposes a
source of action quite different from that involved in man's
ability to act according to any purpose he may entertain. 2
Kant has transformed the legitimate predication of moral freedom which is
the ratio essendi of moral responsibility into an ultimate freedom which i3
superior to the moral obligation.
Brunner is not unaware of the difficulties in Kant's position. His
general reaction may be summed up by saying that from ought to can the
consequence need not follow.
The knowledge of duty which gives Kant sufficient reason to
believe in the goodness of the human heart can only be regarded
in this optimistic way by one who secretly turns duty into will,
who thus recognizes in the mere fact of the Divine Imperative a
divine-human will. If, however, the imperative is understood
simply as an imperative and not as an act of volition - this
means, however, as a divine command - then the fact that I ought
to do so-and-so does not in any way mean that I can do it. 3
Brunner's reversal of Kant's jud^aent is based on the Christian affirmation
of the "bondage of sin". From the Christian perspective, Brunner denies the
1 Teale, Kantian Ethics, p. 271
2 Ibid. p. 272.
3 Mitt. p. 105n. E.T. p. 129n.
152
progression from the moral freedom which is implied in the predication of
moral responsibility to real freedom wherein man i3 seen as truly free. But,
and this is the difficulty in Brunner's presentation, he makes this denial
In Kantian terms.
It is true, as Kant showed, following the Stoic line of argument,
that the imperative of obligation is the principle by which I come
to know my formal freedom, i.e. my responsibility. But it is at
the same time - and no philosopher has recognized this - the ground
on which I become aware of my lack of real freedom. 1
The assertion that "no philosopher has recognized this" does not change the
fact that the recognition is set on a moral basis. If "the imperative of
obligation is ... the ground on which I become aware of ray lack of real
freedom", then it will not be easy to distinguish this position from that of
Kant. The distinction seems to be that Kant affirms, whereas Brunner denies,
real freedom, on the basis of the freedom demanded by the predication of
moral responsibility. In both cases, the basis is the same, the moral
imperative. In the end, it seems that Brunner's sole criticism of Kant is
that he did not come to the conclusion which he himself reaches on the same
basis. This clarifies both the ambiguity in Brunner's natural progression
from moral responsibility to religious responsibility, and his contention that
radical evil is rationally discerned. It also represents a basic conflict
with other affirmations which Brunner wishes to make, the principal one being
the affirmation of the irrationality of sin.
d. Evil and the System
The climax of Brunner's thinking on the subject of the rationality
or irrationality of sin comes in his contrast between evil and systematic
thought. Thought is inherently systematic in that it strives for a tidy
1 GuM p. 30. E.T. pp. 78-9.
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well-rounded conception of reality in which everything has its logical place.
But evil is precisely that which has no place. It does not belong. Because
evil cannot be fitted into any comprehensive system, such as reason demands,
it is irrational. With this approach to the problem we move from Kant to
Schelling, for it was Schelling who, in Brunner's estimation, most radically
exposed the incompatibility of evil and the system. The context of Schelling's
development of this theme is his contrast between the "negative philosophy",
which seeks to prove God, and the "positive philosophy", which begins with
God.
Sometimes Schelling touches hard on this boundary? he proves that
the most important content of the positive philosophy is irrational,
and therefore only to be believed: and still the whole is presented
as philosophy, and therefore - one thinks particularly of his writing
on freedom - as knowledge of reason. 1
Brunner's assessment of Schelling seems to be that he is trying to grasp
rationally what, at times, he recognizes to be irrational. His judgment of
Schelling is that his rational pride will not permit him to make the ultimate
break with his own systematizing. "The philosopher will not take the
2
humiliation of 'must believe' to himself."
One can appreciate the enthusiasm which Brunner displays over
Schelling. For he does represent a step beyond Kant.
The so-called antinomies therefore do not represent, as Kant
thought, a conflict, a collision, of the reason with itself, but
a contradiction between the reason and that which is more than
reason, the proper positive knowledge; and I believe I have
supported ray statement that both these lines of philosophy have
always co-existed and do now co-exist, through the great example
of Kant, who knew well the existence of these contrasts, but
certainly did not consider the possibility of a positive philosophy,
although his philosophy with the claim (the postulate, as he says)
of the real existing God as basis therefore ends with the claim of
a positive philosophy, a transcendence over the mere knowledge-of-
reason. 3
1 PhiloBophle und Offenbarung (Tttbingen, 1925) , p. 41. 2 ibid.
3 F.W.J. Schelling, Philosophie der Qffenbaruag, SSmmtliche Werke (Stuttgart
& Augsburg, 1353), III, 146. "
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This certainly represents a step beyond Kant# Whether it is a step forward
or a 3tep backward, however, is another matter. Kant declined to make
positive affirmations about transcendent issues such as God, freedom and
immortality. The most positive status he would accord such possibilities
was that of "postulates of the practical reason". Schelling has no
hesitation in constructing a positive philosophy to embrace this area in
reference to which Kant confessed the impotence of reason.
Brunner summarizes the ambiguous position represented by Schelling's
Philosophie der Offenbarung: "His Philosophie der Offenbarung presents us
with the curious spectacle of a speculation which constructs in thought the
happenings which it proves can only be discovered not by thought at all, but
1
by something given, as a revelation." This is indeed a "curious spectacle".
In fact, it might be more accurately described as an "impossible spectacle".
For how could one be presenting in thought what cannot be presented in thought?
The implication i3 that revelation is rationally discoverable. This
evaluation which Brunner makes of Schelling's position is most suggestive
with reference to our central concern, the question of the rationality or
irrationality of evil. It is this question which attracts Brunner to Schelling.
It is profoundly interesting to note that on the threshold of the
closing phase of the German Idealist movement, when the Christian
faith in revelation was once more considered as a possibility, the
reappearance of the problem of "evil" in the later works of Schelling
constituted the turning-point. Schelling's treatise on freedom, his
most brilliant piece of work, which is really a dissertation on the
problem of evil, hearlds the decline of Idealsim, and the approach
of Christian ideas. 2
When we turn to this celebrated treatise, "Philosophische Uhtersuchungen ttber
das Weaen der raenachlichean Freiheit und die damlt zuaamraenhangenden Gegenat&nde",
we find that Schelling described evil as an inherent possibility of creaturely
1 Mitt. p. 107. E.T. p. 131-
2 Ibid. p. 99. E.T. pp. 123""4»
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being. He distinguishes two principles, a principle of light and a principle
of darkness, These two principles are united in God, but separable in man.
Upon this separability depends both the fact of revelation and the possibility
of evil.
Now in that the soul is living identity of both principles, it
i3 spiritj and spirit is in God. Now if the identity of both
principles in the spirit of man was as insoluble as in God, then
there would be no distinction, i.e. God as spirit would not
reveal. That unity which is inseparable in God, must therefore
be separable in man - and this is the possibility of good and
evil. 1
Behind this distinction of principles wfcioh are inseparable in God and
separable in man there lies a basic outlook wiiich combines elements of
2
pantheism and idealism in a bewildering manner. The picture presented is so
far removed from anything one would normally associate with Christian thought
that one wonders why Brunner hails the treatise with suoh enthusiasm. He does
not approve of the systematic explanation which ultimately attributes evil to
3
God Himself. In what way, then, did Schelling'a consideration of the problem
of evil mark the turning-point of German Idealism? It seems that Schelling's
merit consists in the positive philosophy in which he proceeded beyond the
limits set by Kant.
Kant refused to locate the origin of evil in a aupra-teraporal
sphere. His only recourse was to take refuge in the inexplicable concept of
"inborn guilt", or else to reduce the problem to the standard idealistic
solution wherein evil is located in the sensual, as opposed to the rational,
nature of man. Schelling is much more consistent in his solution to the
problem. He concludes that evil originates in a transcendental act which
determines the course of the empirical life.
1 Schelling, "Ehilosophlsche Uhtorsuchungen ttber das Wesen der aenschlichea
Freiheit and die darait zusaramenhangenden Gegenstlnde", SSranrtliche Werka
(Stuttgart & Augsburg, 1360), 711, 36
2 Cf. John Watson, Schelling'g Transcendental Idealism (Chicago, 1382), pp. 220ff.
3 Mitt. p. 107. E.T. p. 132.
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Man In the original creation, as shown, is an undetermined being -
(which may be represented mythically as a state of innocence and
original bliss preceding this life) - only he himself can determine
himself. But this determination cannot fall in time? it falls
outside all time, and therefore together with the first creation ... 1
In Schelling's concept of evil as a transcendental act, evil is explained as
the free pro-temporal self-determination which is definitive for the empirical
life. If this doctrine fails the test as an affirmation of the irrationality
of evil, it certainly qualifies for the category of incomprehensibility. We
may readily accept the judgment of one of Schelling's expositors - "to explain
the freedom to will evil or good as due to a timeless act really explains
nothing; it is further away, indeed, from a true explanation than the view of
2
Kant, which it affects to improve but really distorts." But having said
this, we must acknowledge that it seems to be precisely in this conception of
evil as a transcendental act that Schelling's doctrine recommends itself to
Brunner. His own emphasis on sin as act suggests the extent of Brunner's
appreciation. How this concept certainly takes evil seriously in that it
locates it in a pre-temporal decision which is determinative for the terporal
life. In this positive affirmation Schelling represents an advance beyond
Kant. For Kant declined to identify a rational origin of evil.
... the rational origin of this perversion of our will whereby it
makes lower incentives supreme among its maxims, that is, of the
propensity to evil, remains inscrutable to us, because this propensity
itself must be set down to our account and because, as a result, that
ultimate ground of all maxims would in turn involve the adoption of
an evil maxim (as its basis). Evil could have sprung only from the
morally-evil (not from mere limitations in our nature); and yet the
original predisposition (which no one other than man himelf could
have corrupted, if he is to be held responsible for this corruption)
is a predisposition to good; there is then for us no conceivable
ground from which the moral evil in us could originally have come. 3
Kant goes on from here to take refuge in the Fall narrative, which locates the
origin of evil in the unidentified seducing serpent. This not only re-enforces
1 Schelling, op. cit., VII, 335.
2 Watson, p. 233.
3 Kant, Religion Within the limits of Reason /done, p. 33.
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the suspicion that Brunner does not appreciate the significance of Kant's
Christian background for hi3 doctrine of radical evil, but it also suggests
that his insistence on the rational origin of Kant's concept is nore indicative
of his appreciation for Schelling than for Kant.
It seems that Brunner regards Schelling as a more acceptable
companion for Christian theology than Kant because he is logically consistent
where Kant admits defeat. If this is the case, then Brunner's insistence on
the contrast between evil and systematic thought can hardly be taken seriously.
This would explain how he can describe Schelling's positive philosophy as one
which "constructs in thought the happenings which it proves can only be
1
discovered not V thought at all, but by something given, as a revelation."
It would explain also how Brunner can regard Kant's doctrine of radical evil
as a rational insight. This does not mean that Brunner accepts Schelling's
positive philosophy. On the contrary, he regards it as a pointer to the
truth, rather than as the truth itself.
... even Schelling's positive philosophy is only a signal at the
point at which the decision has to be made. The knowledge of evil
decides concerning the relation of truth and history, revelation
and Idea. 2
Schelling's positive philosophy is not the Christian knowledge of sin. let
it is a pointer to that knowledge, and as such it suggests a kinship to the
Christian knowledge. This may indicate something of Brunner's conception of
what the Christian knowledge is. It may be that his theology is unintelligible
without the recognition that it involves a certain element of sympathy with
idealist philosophy.
e. Idealism and Responsibility
Possibly the most fruitful approach to Brunner's theology lies in
1 Mitt. p. 107. E.T. p. 131. 2 Ibid. pp. 107-8. E.T. p. 132,
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the recognition that what is involved is an attempted amalgamation of the
theology of the Reformers with Kantian moral theory. On this interpretation,
many of the central inconsistencies in Brunner's theology become clear. Wo
may illustrate this from two contradictory statements which involve the issue
of responsibility. In close company with the Reformers, Brunner holds a
perspective from which he recognizes the basic incompatibility between the
Kantian approach and that which is demanded by the Christian faith.
Just as Kant's conception of 'person' is derived from the law, the
'Thou shalt' - that means (on the one hand) a responsibility which
is on this side of the contradiction to the generous Creator, God,
and (on the other hand) a personality which no longer knowB anything
about being 'over-against' God - so also his 'radical evil* is only
one manifestation of sin, whose other far more dangerous manifestat-
-ion is precisely that which in the thought of Kant is regarded as
the Good: the fact that man does good by his own efforts. 1
Here we have an affirmation of the totality of grace, and of the totality of
sin, which is strongly reminiscent of the Reformers. The totality of grace
is affirmed in the censure of Kant's basic moralisra whereby it is assumed
that "man does good by his own efforts". The totality of sin is affirmed in
the contention that Kant's imperative involves "a responsibility which is on
this side of the contradiction to the generous Creator, God", and also in the
contention that the sinner "no longer knows anything about being 'over-against'
God".
Yet this affirmation of the basic perspective of the Reformers
represents only one side of Brunner's theology. There is another side which
is directly contradictory, namely, an attachment to Idealistic philosophy
which undermines the position Brunner is attempting to expound.
The idea of autonomy is the centre of moral idealism. It is at
this point that the doctrine of the Intelligible Self arises; it
is therefore also the real starting-point of the Idealistic
1 MiW p. 129. E.T. p. 128,
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philosophy of religion, and the point where Christianity and
Idealism both meet, and are most sharply opposed. The point
of contact is this: if the idea of autonomy is conceived in
a purely formal way as the Idea of the good will, then it is
just as Christian as it is Idealistic. Conflict, however,
arises at this point: if this idea is held at the same time
as a statement about the "true being" of the real man then
it becomes opposed to the Christian knowledge of Evil. 1
Brunner assumes that Idealism presents us with an accurate picture of man as
he "should" be. The contention that "if the idea of autonomy is conceived in
a purely formal way as the Idea of the good will, then it is juat as Christian
as it is Idealistic" clarifies much that is otherwise incomprehensible in
Brunner's theology. It explains how he can regard radical evil as a rationally
discerned insight. It explains how he can speak of the Categorical Imperative
as a formal empty concept of duty which is but one step removed from faith
which recognizes the source of duty. It explains, above all, how he can move
so easily from moral responsibility to religious responsibility.
This idealistic tinge in Brunner's theology seems to substantiate
the suspicion that Brunner is not fully appreciative of the basic confidence
in reason which prescribes Kant's method from the outset, and also colours
his conception of Christianity. It suggests why Brunner can regard Kant's
theory as unsatisfactory only whan it identifies the imperative with the
self-legislating intelligible self, and thus converts the ethical dualism
between is and ought into a metaphysical dualism between the empirical self
and the intelligible self. Brunner does not detect the basis of this
bifurcation in the major premise of Kant's ethical theory, in the contrast
between duty and inclination. Because of this basic acceptance of the
validity of the Kantian Imperative, Brunner can move quite readily from
moral responsibility for free acts to religious responsibility to God. The
1 Mitt. p. 88n. E.T. p. 112n. ~~~
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implications of this ambiguity must be examined in the final chapter where
Brunner's theology will be evaluated in terms of the Reformation criterion
of sola gratia which he himself affirms. Before attempting this evaluation,
however, we shall investigate Brunner's position with regard to the doctrines
of the Fall and Original Sin.
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CHAPTER IV THE PALL AM) ORIGINAL SIN
Christian theology affirms a doctrine of sin which involves a depth
aid seriousness totally Imperceptible to the merely moral understanding of
sin as individual transgressions of the moral law, or even of God's will. The
traditional ecclesiastical doctrine formulates this depth and seriousness in
its doctrines of the Pall and Original Sin. These two doctrines, while
inter-dependent, have traditionally been distinguished in terras of the emphasis
upon the beginning of sin and the propogatlon of sin, respectively. In
Brunner's presentation of these doctrines, the distinction is minimized, at
times almost to the point of obliteration, by his emphasis on "sin as act".
In his concern to affirm personal responsibility, Brunner repeatedly asserts
that sin must always be understood as "act"?* Only when sin is understood
primarily as act, can responsibility for sin be fully appreciated. This is
true not merely of sins, but of sin itself. Thus the sinful state must be
understood as "act", and only on that basis can the "state of sin" be
2
appreciated. Obviously this emphasis represents a departure from the
traditional ecclesiastical doctrine in which the "state of sin", and
consequently the origin of that "state", played a more determinative role.
We must seek to appreciate Brunner's reasons for this departure, and to
evaluate his success in reformulating the traditional doctrine. In order to
do this we shall proceed on the basis of the classical distinction through
which the Fall is primarily concerned with the beginning of sin, and
Original Sin primarily with the propagation of sin. Although this distinction
is not so prominent in Brunner, this procedure need not do violence to his
1 liLW pp. 113n2, 143-9. E.T. pp. Il6n2, 143} DII p. 127. E.T. p. 109?
W3MM pp. 41, 45.
2 MlW p. 119. E.T. p. 117; WaB p. 104. E.T. p. 152.
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distinctive presentation of tho doctrine, but may serve merely as a means of
analysing his whole presentation from these two classical perspectives.
I. THE FALL
The suggestion that Brunner does not maintain the classical distinction
between the Fall end Original Sin as rigorously as has been the case generally
in the history of Christian thought does not imply that he reduces the doctrine
of the Fall to an existential ingredient in the doctrine of Original Sin.
Such an interpretation could be supported by statements from Brunner's writings,
but it would overlook other statements which evidence a particular concern
for the necessity of affirming a Fall, in addition to the affirmation of the
fallenness of humanity. "At the basis of this conception of sin [I.e. as
1
rebellion] there is always the idea of a reversing event." This "reversing
event", the subject of the Christian doctrine of the Fall, is an inescapable
element in any adequate Christian theology for at least two reasons. First,
"we cannot believe, in Christian and Biblical terms, wihhout holding firmly
to the distinction between Creation and Sin, and therefore the idea of a
2
Fall." This is the basic reason, in addition to which a second is affirmed,
namely, that "apart from the doctrine of the Fall it is impossible to
understand Sin as the presupposition of the Hew Testament message of
3
Redemption. Only a fallen humanity need® a Redeemer." Really the two are
aspects of the one basic reason for affirming a doctrine of the Fall - in
Redemption we know the fallenness of humanity, and because of the goodness
of Creation, we must affirm a "reversing ©vent" to account for the discrepancy
between Creation and Sin. Having established the necessity for affirming a
1 DII p. 104. E.T. p. 91.
3 Ibid. p. 103. E.T. p. 90.
2 Ibid. p. 39. E.T. p. 51.
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Christian doctrine of the Fall, we tuna to an examination of Brunner's
understanding of this "reversing event".
A. THE STATUS OF GENESIS III
a# Genesis III is Not Literal Fact
The "reversing event" which the Christian faith is compelled to
affirm has traditionally been identified with the account of the disobedience
of Adam and Eve narrated in Genesis III. Although this is not the only
1
version of the Fall, it is the one which has determined the traditional
Christian doctrine, and it is the one with which Brunner concerns himself.
Since Genesis III has played such a determinative role in the theological
account of the Fall, it is important to define the type of narrative involved
therein. It is generally agreed today that the early chapters of Genesis do
not confront us with a literal account of the beginnings of the human race.
Thus we are faced with the urgent task of relating this narrative to the
faith of the Old and New Testaments, which, with the possible exceptions of
these earlier chapters of Genesis and other scattered portions, has a definite
historical reference. It is in this setting that we must seek to appreciate
Brunner's understanding of the Fall, and particularly at present his estimation
of the status of Genesis HI.
Brunner is frankly outspoken in his rejection of a literal
interpretation of the narrative in Genesis III, and for two reasons. First,
and in his estimation most important, "by clinging to the historical framework
the actual fundamental content of the Christian doctrine of the origin of
2
man has been either concealed or buried." It is his contention that man's
1 Cf. N.P. Williams, The Ideas of the Fall "and of Original Sin (London,, 1927).
pp. 20ff. ~
2 MiW p. 89. E.T. p. 86.
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fallenness, his perpetual contradicting of his origin, is obscured by a
literal interpretation of the narrative. The narrative, interpreted
literally, "is the main source of that 'determinism' with which even Barth
1
reproaches the classic ecclesiastical doctrine." This "theological reason"
for dispensing with the literal interpretation of Genesis III is grounded
in Brunner's desire to emphasize man's present responsibility - "Only
unseriousness creates a distance of thousands of years between us and *Adam's
2
Fall'." That it is necessary to abandon the story of Genesis III in its
narrative form in order to secure the reality of each individual's fall, is
by no means an obvious conclusion. The justification for this contention
will have to be assessed when we come to consider the reality of man's present
fallenness, i.e. under the doctrine of Original Sin. Secondly, and, in spite
3
of Brunner's protests, what seems to provide the most obvious motive for
rejecting the literal interpretation of the narrative, there is "the scientific
4
refutation of the Adam story." Drunner leaves no doubt as to Ms respect
for the scientific challenge - "This whole Mstorio picture of 'the first
5
man' has been finally and absolutely destroyed for us to-day." In one of
6
Ms most recent statements on the subject, Bruaner distinguishes throe possible
positions with regard to the Adm story, and the challenge of modern sciences
first, a literal interpretation of the story in disregard of the modern
post-Copernican view of the universe? second, a compromise between 'Adam*
and the Copernican perspective? and third, the surrender of 'Adam' to the
Gopernican perspective. His conclusion is that the last is the only possible
7
course. let it is not the Gopernican explosion of our concept of space, but
the Darwinian explosion of our concept of time, which has finally reduced
1 MiW p. 91nl. E.T. p. 82M. 2 Erlebnis, ErkenntMs und Glaube, p. 110.
3 MiW pp. 89, 122. E.T. pp. 86. 120. 4 WGMM p. 42.
5 MiW p. 88. E.T. p. 85. 6 DII p. 58. E.T. p. 50. 7 Gf. also WGMM p. 30.
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1
the Adam story to the level of Impossibility. The death blow from Darwinian-
-isra is the summit of a series of attacks beginning with the world-view
created by Copernicus, Galileo and Newton, followed by the development of
historical criticism, the impact of Darwin himself and the whole new series
of ventures in the sphere of pro-historic anthropology, the better knowledge
of the ancient Semitic and Egyptian civilizations, the rise of Biblical
2
criticism, and the development of the Comparative Science of Religion. As
a result, we cannot go back - "we know that there never was a paradise on
earth with Adam and Eve and the serpentj we know that most of the Old
Testament pre-history is mythology, not history, and that there is no
3
unbroken chain of witnesses from Adam and Noah to Christ."
b. Genesis III and Science
In view of this admiration for the achievements of modern science,
Brunner'3 protests that the scientific challenge is only a secondary reason
for abandoning the literal interpretation of the Adam story might seem
unvonvincing. In any event, this admiration prompts us to seek an understanding
of Brunner's concept of the relationship existing between science and faith.
The immediate answer to this question, which has enjoyed such prominence in
the recent past, is that "the conflict between natural science and biblical
A
faith ... is always a sham problem." The unnecessary conflict only arises
when either science or faith presumes to make pronouncements within the other's
sphere. "There is no conflict between science and faith, so soon as one has
noted that faith has nothing to do with the surface and science has nothing
5
to do with the meaning." We seem to be confronted here with an absolute
distinction between the concerns of faith and those of science, whereby
1 DII pp. 93-4. E.T. p. 79. 2 U&W p. 98. 3 Ibid. p. 99. A WGMM p. 29.
5 "Welt und Person", Zwinglikalender (1962), p. 21.
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science is concerned with the "how" and only the "how", and faith with the
"why4' and only the "why". True science and true faith are completely
harmonious. "Thus the real opponent is not science but a false estimate of
science, a scientific monism, i.e. the superstitious belief in one science
1
including all possible forma of knowledge in itself."
The significance of this segregation of science and faith in its
application to the insues involved in the Adam story consists in the
affirmation that science is concerned with the development of the race,
while faith is concerned with the meaning and distinctiveness of humanity.
So long as each respects the legitimacy of the other in its own sphere no
conflict can arise. The prerequisite for such respect is the recognition
that faith deals with the huraanitas, that personal quality of life which
transcends anything that can be known from the animalitag which is the proper
sphere of natural science. Thus while natural science may propound theories
depicting the ascent of man from primitive origins in terms of some form of
evolution theory, this remains in the sphere of the animalitag, and In no
way approaches the sphere of the humanitas which represents a totally new
dimension of life completely discontinuous with the levels of development
of the animalitas, and as such represents the proper and secure sphere for
the concerns of faith.
Once this truth has been perceived, we can watch the further
development of the theory of physical descent with the utmost
indifference, and we shall not be in the least disturbed by any
theories or hypotheses which may be put forward. The whole
problem is not one of zoology, but simply of logic, and it is
quite independent of the results of natural science, whether
of the past or of the future. 2
The conflict with science only arises when either faith presumes to make
pronouncements regarding the animalitaa, or science presumes to make
1 RPh p. 39. E.T. pp. 173-4. 2 DII p. 95. E.T. p. 31.
pronouncements regarding the humanltas. The erroneous presumption of science
can beet be presented in Brenner's own words.
... the misunderstanding on the part of science .•. consists in
the belief that the modem evolutionary theory has invalidated
the conception of the singularity of man. Man, it is said, is
"nothing more than" a mere highly developed animal. In this
phrase "nothing more than" lies the fallacy. ... The continuity
of evolution does not exclude the discontinuity in the thing
itself. 1
On the other hand, faith may also be guilty of infringing upon the proper
sphere of science. Indeed, this has been the traditional presumption of the
Church in its insistence on the factuality of the early chapters of Genesis.
"We are obliged through our conscience, therefore, to thank God that Biblical
criticism came, not so much with regard to the worldly progress of knowledge,
2
but above all with regard to the truthfulness of faith." Because of the
enlightenment received through the Impact of modem science, and the subsequent
rise of Biblical criticism, we can aiad must recognize that "in so far as the
Bible speaks about subjects of secular knowledge, it has no teaching authority."
If the exclusivaness of the respective spheres of science and faith is
recognized, it will be recognized also that the conflict is not between science
K
and faith, but between philosophy and faith? or, theologically expressed,
5
between belief and unbelief.
On first impression, the designation of the conflict between science
and faith as "a sham problem", and the delegation of each to distinct spheres,
bears a more striking resemblance to the Kantian nouraenal and phenomenal
worlds, than to the "historical" faith of the Old and New Testaments. "In a
word, Kant, like many others before him and since, proposes to separate
completely science and religion by restricting them to distinct realms, and
1 WGMM p. 34.
2 " Inspiration und Offenbareng", Per Kirchenfreund. 61, No. 1,3,4- (1927)
p. 50.
3 PI E.T. p. 4B. A HHi p. 89- E.T. p. 173. 5 W&W p. 104.
by this simple device hopes to reconcile the scientific and the religions
1
interpretations of the world." Nevertheless, while this segregation of
science and faith may reflect the Kantian background of the noumenal and
phenomenal worlds, Brunner is not unaware of the fact that the world with
which science deals is the same world in which the events of faith take
place.
Space has indeed only a very remote relation to the contents
of faith. It is otherwise with time. For the Christian faith
is in its essence historical. Time plays a distinctive role
in it. 2
Because "the Christian faith is in its essence historical" it is concerned
with the same world which science investigates. The dualism between faith
and science cannot ultimately bo maintained. let it is not finally annulled.
Herein we reach an inner conflict in Brunner's presentation which apparently
defies any simple solution. The Kantian dualism is augmented by what might
be described as a version of the Kierkegaardian dialectic of time and
eternity. Science and faith are still relegated to separate spheres, but
it is now admitted that they have "a common intersecting line".
Science and faith are on different planes, perhaps we may say
on planes standing vertically at right angles to one another,
and having therefore merely a common intersecting line. The
revelation in Christ takes place in that world which science
investigates, but this revelation cannot become an object of
science. Therefore it is equally stupid not to believe in
God for scientific reasons and to oppose science for reasons
of faith. The battle between Christian theology and science,
which has aroused so much bad feeling between the two, has
proved to be a mutual misunderstanding, caused by an over-
-stepping of limits, partly from the side of faith, partly
from that of science. In principle this problem does not
exist any longer, though in practice it may never cease to
bother us. 3
We may conclude from this that science and faith are not entirely unrelated,
but that their allegiances are mutually exclusive. That is to say, there is
1 Theodore M. Greene and Iloyt H. Hudson, "Introduction" to Iraraanuel Kant,
Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, p. xli.
2 WGMM p. 32. 3 Christianity and Civilisation (London, 1949), II, 22.
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no possibility of basing science on faith or faith on science, but science
can be an ally of faith, and faith can bo a companion of science. Cta the
one hand, "science stimulates us to find a positive and adequate form for
1
the Biblical message of the origin of Creation and the Pall of man." On
the other hand, "the theologically purified doctrine of the Origin and of
the Fall ... can neither be proved nor disproved by the findings of empirical
2
science."
c. Form and Matter
What, then, is the status of the narrative of Genesis III? The
first judgment must be that it is scientifically inadequate. Through the
insights of modern science, we see that the form of the narrative represents
an ancient Weltanschauung which is no longer tenable. The second judgment
must be that, in spite of this human form, there is divine revelation
involved in it, before which the scientist, if he is humble, will acknowledge
the inadequacy of his scientific concepts. The problem with Genesis III
arises because "modern Bible criticism confounds almost thoroughly form and
matter. The form of Genesis III is history, therefore world-knowledge. The
3
matter is a happening between God and man, therefore matter of faith."
However, this division of science and faith, form and matter, begins to
break down when we leam that the inadequate form in which the narrative
is set can be replaced by a form which is immune from further attacks from
the insights of science. The insights of science apparently disprove the
form of the Adam story as it is given in Genesis III, but they cannot disprove
4-
the "theologically purified doctrine of the Origin and of the Fall." This
seems to suggest that it is possible to recast the story in a form which
TMLW p. 91. E.T. p. 88. 2 Ibid. p. 394. E.T. p. 402.
3 "Per Sttadenfall und die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft", Christliche Welt,
40, No. 20 (192677"P- 99^1
4 MLW p. 394. E.T. p. 402.
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transcends any and every Weltanschauung. let it is not the form itself which
Brunner regards as permanent, but rather the matter which it contains. On
the one hand, the form of the Pall story is subject to changej on the other
hand, the matter of the Pall story is permanent.
In the psychological make-up of the lahwist, of Paul or of the
Reformers that world-view and this "matter" of faith are
inseparable momenta ... We also press our faith into a world-
view which 'will be altered just as quickly as that of the
Reformers, of Paul and of the lahwist. But we know that the
matter is not identical with this world-view which we assume. 1
Brunner is quite undisturbed by the fact that his complete separation of form
and matter stands in direct contrast to the inseparability of form and matter
which he recognizes in the narrator, in Paul and in the Reformers. His
confidence stems from the assumption that "Biblical theology does not have
to do with the psychological make-up of the Biblical Scripture writer, but
2
with the subject matter of the Bible." One would hesitate to deny this,
but the problem is thereby accentuated rather than solved. To dismiss the
Adam story because of the divergence between our present day knowledge of
the beginnings of the race and the knowledge of the beginnings of the race
reflected in the Adam story itself is to have very much to do with the
make-up of the author of Genesis III. The literal interpretation of the
story is dismissed on the basis of the narrator's perspective. If we are
concerned with the form of Geneiis HI which can in some way be separated
from the matter which it involves, then we are concerned with the narrator,
for it is the narrator who contributes the form in contrast to the matter
which is revealed.
The difficulty in this idiole presentation consists in this
assumption that there is a matter in Genesis III which can be abstracted
from the form in which it is set. It is only on this assumption that
1 "Dor Stindenfall". p.'"99& 2 Ibid. p. 997
Brunner can disengage the concerns of faith from the embarrassment occassioned
by the challenge of modem science. Yet Brunner is not always consistent in
his separation of form and matter. He criticizes liberal theology for
abandoning the Biblical position In seeking a position above the shifting
plane of history# saying that this "means the same thing as abandoning
1
Christianity." Similarly, in regard to the problem of the Primitive State
as it is involved in the question of the imago Dei, he asserts:
Later theologians, as a rule, have not understood what this
question involves. Their whole attention has been absorbed
in the questions raised by modern sciencej on the one hand,
some of them try to save an impossible doctrine of the
Primitive State by means of apologetics, while others abandon
the historical form altogether as impossible, and in so doing
they lose the meaning of the doctrine of the Primitive State
as well. 2
Clearly, then, Brunner does not wish to advocate a complete disengagement of
the Pall narrative from the "historical" world. let it is difficult to see
how this concern is related to his distinction between an optional form and
a permanent matter in the Pall narrative. For this latter approach seems
dangerously close to a positivistic demarcation of spheres wherein faith is
totally disinterested in the world with which science deals. In this line
of thought we soem to have abandoned the conflict with science rather than
resolved it. A mediating consideration appears at this point in the form
of a distinction between a theoretical and a practical solution. It Is
Brunner's contention that the conflict between science and faith has been
3
solved theoretically, although in practice it may not cease to bother us.
The theoretical solution consists in the recognition of the distinct concerns
of science and faith. The practical difficulty then stems from the overstepp-
-ing of the boundary by either science or faith. But this distinction
1 W&W p. 100. 2 MiW p. 497. E.T. p. 510.
3 Christianity and Civilisation, II, 22.
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between theory and practice, like the distinction between form and matter,
is perhaps not so ultimate as Brunner, at times, seems to suggest. For the
fact that in practice conflicts do arise between science and faith should
caution us against holding too firmly to any theoretical solution. Brunner's
treatment of the problem posed for theology by modem science in terms of a
distinction between a dispensable form and a permanent matter assumes that
the narrative itself is quite transparent. This solution will be effective
only if it is possible to state the substance of the narrative independently
of the form in which it is cast.
d. "Myth" and a Historical Reference
1
Brunner's term for the literature involved In Genesis III is "Hyth".
This term is preferred because of its lack of historical reference. "The
word 'myth* is to be preferred (in spite of its ambiguity) to 'legend' (which
2
Barth suggests), because 'legend' refers to historical fact." let Brunner
is by no means unappreciative of the narrative of Genesis III. He criticises
Ludwig KBhler, who Interpreted the narrative as a primitive attempt at an
aetiological explanation of certain peculiarities and hardships of life, for
"playing with a great thought which was the foundation for the faith for
the most powerful spiritual leaders of the West - from Augustine through the
3
Reformers to Pascal and Kierkegaard ..." Perhaps the key word here is
"thought". It will be recalled that in setting forth Brunner's estimation
of the legitimacy of the doctrine of the Fall, his reasoning was that "we
cannot believe in Christian and Biblical terms, without holding firmly to
U
the distinction between Creation end Sin, and therefore the idea of a Fall."
Again, it may be that the key word here is "idea". Perhaps the best way to
1 DII p. 39. E.T. p. 74- 2 Ibid. p. 89n. E.T. p. 74n.
3 "Die Brde dreht sich", Kirchenblatt ftlr die ref. Schweiz. 41, No.29 (1926),
p. 113.
U DH p. 59. E.T. p. 51.
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understand Brunnor * a conception of the status of Genesis III is to take him
at his word. "The Image of our original parents (Adam and Eve) is only a
vivid way of representing an abstract idea, namely, that we are indeed all
1
responsible, but that our guilt is always regarded collectively."
In short, it is extremely difficult to resist the conclusion that
for Brunner Genesis HI represents certain "ideas" which are eternally
2
applicable. Certainly, as Brunner notes, the Pall story plays a very minor
role in the Bible itself, at least in terms of explicit reference. let this
may merely indicate that it was generally taken for granted and assumed when
the subject of discussion was not the origin of man's predicament but the
salvation fro© this predicament. In any event, the fact that the narrator
of Genesis III and Paul regarded this event as an "historical" fact should
make us cautious about accepting a simple dualism of form and matter such
as Brunner suggests. The conflict with science cannot be avoided so
easily. If we retreat to a sphere of faith where our formulations remain
immune from the attacks of science, we can also be prepared to discover that
our formulations will be irrelevant to science and to the world which it
know. That Brunner appears to do this is obvious. Whether, in fact, he
does do it must be determined through an examination of tiro of the key
concepts of his presentation which have been neglected in this formal
analysis of the status of the Genesis narrative - the origin of sin and
Urgeschichte.
B. THE ORIGIN OP SIN
The rejection of the literal interpretation of Genesis III compels
1 Mitt. p. 120. E.T. pp. L44-5. 2 DII p. 103- E.T. p. 90,
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Brunner to seek an alternative explanation for the reality involved in the
Fall story. Although, at least once, he conceded that the narrative itself
1
is primarily concerned with "the origin of sin", Brunner'a programme is much
less ambitious. His concern is not to describe the origin of sin, but rather
to affirm the reality of sin. "Thus we are confronted by the very difficult
theological task of formulating the distinction between the nature of man in
accordance with Creation, and as sinner, and the idea which this involves of
the Fall of man, without using the thought-form of an historical •Adam in
2
Paradise1 and of the Primitive State." His reason for this procedure is
the assumption that sin must be affirmed only within the context of freedom.
From this he concludes that any attempt to explain sin in terms of its origin
amounts to a denial of the reality of sin. Sin must be allowed to retain its
enigmatic character as a fact which is only meaningful within the context of
freedom. The content of this general position consists in the denial of any
possibility of denoting either a causal origin or a temporal origin of sin.
a. Rejection of a Causal Explanation of Sin
Brunner'a opposition to the causal explanation of sin is illustrated
in his reaction against Schleiermacher's identification of sin with a theory
of evolution - "the whole Schleiermacherian doctrine of inherited sin extends
to the triviality that the sensual is an inherited presupposition of the
human spirit-life, and to the questionable, anti-spiritual affirmation that
3
in it the origin of sin must be sought." Schleiermacher's acceptance of the
dualism of spirit and nature led him to define original sin in terms of the
bondage of the sensual from which the spiritual must progressively emancipate
itself. CM this view, the distinction between Creation and Sin disappears
1 "Pie Erde dreht sich", p. 11/+.
2 DII p. 60. E.T. p. 52.
3 MW p. 242.
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in the distinction between the natural and the spiritual. Sin did not enter
with the Fall of Adam, but rather erupted from the innate sinfulness which
is inherent in nan's natural existence. "If, then, on the one hand, we
discard the view that a change took place in human nature itself, but, on
the other hand, still maintain that an incapacity for good is the universal
state of men, it follows that this incapacity was present in human nature
before the first sin, and that accordingly what is now innate sinfulness
1
was something native also to the first pair." Schlelermscher is guilty of
reducing original sin to the level of a natural phenomenon, ana thereby-
discarding any significant concept of the Fall. "Development in the sense
of the causal process, or in the sense of ideal development: these are the
two categories with which rational thought tries to master history. Both
2
omit the essentially historical element in history: the deed, the decision."
Brunner's objection to the causal explanation of sin is motivated by his
desire to ensure the freedom of sin in terms of which responsibility can be
predicated of man. If sin is an effect of a determining cause, then it can
hardly be charged to man's responsibility. In essence, this is the Kantian
opposition to any minimizing of the responsible freedom -which is regarded as
the essential characteristic of human life, and, as such, can best be presented
in Kant's own words. It is Kant's contention that the actual transgressions
of human life must be rooted in a "subjective ground" which precludes every
form of determinism.
But this subjective ground, again, must itself always be an
expression of freedom (for otherwise the use or the abuse of
man's power of choice in respect of the moral law could not
be imputed to him nor could the good or bad in him be called
moral), hence the source of evil cannot lie in an object
determining the will through inclination, nor yet in a natural
impulse; it can only lie in a rule made by the will for the
1 Friedrich Schleieraacher, The Christian Faith, ed. H.R. Mackintosh and
J.S. Stewart (Edinburgh, 1923), p. 301.
2 MiW p. 427. E.T. p. 436.
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use of its freedom, that ±3, in a maxim. But now it must not be
considered permissible to enquire into the subjective ground in
man of the adoption of this maxim rather than of its opposite.
If this ground itself were not ultimately a maxim, but rather a
mere natural impulse, it would be possible to trace the use of
our freedom wholly to determination by natural causes; this,
however, is contradictory to the very notion of freedom. 1
This Kantian assertion of the impossibility of reducing the freedom which is
assumed to be the subjective ground of human action, and the distinctive
feature of humanity, xjculd seem to foreshadow Brunner's strictures against
the causal explanation of sin embodied in his criticism of Schleiermacher.
In short, the contention is that sin cannot be explained from an analysis of
the subject, the sinner, but must retain its enigmatic quality as a product
of that freedom which is the essential characteristic of human life.
b. Rejection of a Temporal Explanation of Sin
But now the argument moves a step further. Just as sin cannot be
explained causally in terms of an analysis of the subject, so too, it is
maintained, it cannot be explained objectively in terms of an analysis of
history. Because sin is to be seen only within the context of freedom, it
is impossible to derive it from a first cause either in any individual or in
terms of the race. "... the question of When and How of the Fall is one
which cannot be answered from the standpoint of human history, either by the
2
individual or by humanity as a whole." Once again the Kantian antecedents
are clear in terms of Kant's distinction between a rational and a temporal
origin.
In the former sense [i.e. a rational origin}, regard is had only
to the existence of the effect; in the latter [I.e. a temporal
origin], to its occurrence, and hence it is related as an event
to its first cause in time. If an effect is referred to a cause
to which it is bound under the laws of freedom, as is true in the
case of moral evil, then the determination of the will to the
production of this effect is conceived of as bound up with its
1 Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, pp. 16-7.
2 DH p. 116. E.T. p. 100.
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determining ground not in time but merely in rational represent-
~ationj such an effect cannot be derived from any preceding state
whatsoever. Yet derivation of this sort is always necessary when
an evil action, as an event in the world, is referred to its
natural cause. To seek the temporal origin of free acts as such
(as thou# they were operations of nature) is thus a contradiction. 1
That this denial of the possibility of affirming a temporal origin of evil
provides the essential background for understanding Brunner's strictures
against all attempts to define the origin of sin, is affirmed by Brunner's
appreciative comments on the Kantian analysis. Not only does Kant locate the
origin of evil in the 'tendency to evil' which is predicated of every
individual, but "likewise he recognizes the impossibility of discovering a
temporal beginning of this tendency, of this evil personal quality in the
empirical life of the individual, or indeed of even thinking of any such}
2
for every beginning would indeed presuppose this tendency." The origin of
sin is thus transferred from the temporal, which is defined as the sphere
of causality, to the rational, which is defined a3 the sphere of freedom.
Once again, we may venture to employ Kant's formulation as a summary of the
position which is here affirmed.
Me must ... not look for an origin in time of a moral character
for which we are to be held responsible} though to do so is
inevitable if we wish to explain the contingent existence of this
character (and perhaps it is for this reason that Scripture, in
conformity with this weakness of ours, has thus pictured the
temporal origin of evil). But the rational origin of this pervers-
~±on of our will whereby it makes lower incentives supreme among
its maxims, that is, of the propensity to evil, remains inscrut-
-abl© to us, because this propensity itself must be set down to
our account and because, as a result, that ultimate ground of all
maxims would in turn involve the adoption of an evil maxim (as its
basis). 3
It is in this setting that we must see Brunner' 3 refusal to consider the origin
of sin, and his corresponding contention that such a procedure only serves to
minimize the present reality of sin which is the proper concern of theology.
1 Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, pp. 34-5.
2 MiW p. 127. E.T. p. 126.
3 Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, p. 38.
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Brunner's intention in denying the justification of speculation
on the origin of sin is clear. In order to maintain the reality of pergonal /-
responsibility he is compelled to stress the fact that sin is only conceivable
in terms of freedom. Thus the result of his analysis is the same as that
achieved by Kant and Sftren Kierkegaard before him, namely, that sin can be
1
explained only in terns of itself. Kierkegaard, whose development of this
2
theme is applauded by Brunner, has presented this formulation as the "whole
substance" of the Adam story.
Sin came into the world by a sin. If this were not so, then
sin would have come in as something accidental, which man
would do well not to try to explain. The difficulty for the
understanding is precisely the triumph of the explanation,
its profound consistency in representing that sin presupposes
itseif, that by the fact that it is, it is presupposed. 3
The common feature in all these accounts of the inexplicability of sin in
any way other than in terms of sin itself, is the recognition that sin is
only intelligible within the context of freedom. But within this common
concern to protect the doctrine of sin from every causal determinant, there is
an equally significant divergence between the Kantian and the Kierkegaardian
presentations. In Kant's analysis the necessity for defining sin within the
context of freedom leads not only to a denial of any causal origin of sin,
but to a denial of any temporal origin as well. In Kierkegaard the position
is different. Sin is only to be defined within freedom - it is "the sudden",
A
"the leap", the "qualitative" rather than the "quantitative" - but this does
not exclude the necessity for speaking of a temporal origin of sin. In fact,
5
Kierkegaard speaks quite definitely of Adam as "the first man", and distinguishes
him from subsequent men by quantitative determinants as opposed to the
qualitative leap which he shares with all men. That is, "the sinfulness of
1 Mitt. p. 120. E.T. p. 1AA} UGMM p. 39 j MaW p. 242.
2 MLW p. 393. E.T. p. 401.
3 Sftren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, tr. Walter Lowrie (Princeton,
1944)» p. 29.
4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. p. 36.
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the race acquires a history. This however proceeds by quantitative
determinants, while the individual by the qualitative leap participates in
1
it.* Thus for Kierkegaard the leap, the fact that sin can be conceived only
in terms of freedom, does not preclude all reference to the temporal, to the
quantitative background, and therefore to the temporal origin of sin.
The difficulty in Brunner's presentation consists in its affinity
with the Kantian 'rational' explanation, an affinity which seems to overlook
that element of 'history' and 'origin' which finds a place in Kierkegaard's
analysis. Brunner's affinity with Kierkegaard seems to be confined to his
appreciation for the definition of sin as a 'leap', an act of freedom which
transcends all causal determination. This is the absurdity of sin. "For
sin which is not break, irrational choice, absolutely Incomprehensible
riddle, grounded in nothing than the absurdity of the disobedience of the
2
creature against the Creator, is not sin." Therefore sin precludes all
causal explanation. It is to be seen only within the context of freedom.
This is the great merit of Brunner's doctrine of sin, for the exposition of
which he owes a considerable debt to both Kant and Kierkegaard. Nevertheless,
the denial of every causal explanation of the origin of sin does not automat-
-ically imply the illegitimacy of every concrete affirmation concerning the
beginning of sin, as Kierkegaard's analysis shows. The difficulty in Brunner's
account, which follows vary closely on Kant's analysis, consists in the
fact that this implication seems to be uncritically assumed. Kant's analysis
is pervaded by the dichotomy of the noumenal and phenomenal worlds in which
the former is defined as the sphere of freedom and the latter as that of
cause and effect. Now if the temporal is defined as the sphere of cause and
effect, and sin is located within the sphere of freedom, then obviously it
1 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, p. 31.
2 MUW p. 242.
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is ridiculous to speak of a temporal origin of sin. This we take to be the
essence of Kant's distinction between the temporal and the rational origin.
On this account, sin can only properly be dealt with in terms of the rational,
the sphere of freedom which transcends the causality of the temporal, the
sphere of the noumenal world. But this position is more reflective of
idealistic dualism, than of the "historical" faith of the Old and New
Testaments. It is impossible, therefore, to accept Brunner's contention that
the attempt to present the doctrine of the Pall as an explanation of the
origin of sin shows that one has "confused the existential 'whence?' with
1
the causal-metaphysical 'whenee?'." This emphasis on the 'existential' to
the neglect of the 'historical' represents a serious defect in Brunner's
doctrine of sin. It is not wholly true that; "The theme of the Bible is not
the historical origin of sin, but the universal and irresistible power of
2
sin as affecting man's being."
Having accentuated this strand in Brunner's thought, we must hasten
to add that his position is not quite as simple as this analysis would suggest.
It is not the case that he singly equates the temporal and the causal, although!
this often seems to be the case. He expressly criticizes: "Schlatter's
abandonment of all attempts to construct any doctrine of Original Sin or of
3
the Pall is a far too summary empiricism." A further indication of his
divergence from the position outlined above is suggested in his references
to the importance of the tempter in the Genesis narrative.
Man does not sin like Satan himself, purely out of defiance
and rebellion. He is led astray by sin. Evil forces were
already there before him; man is not great enough to discover
sin and introduce it into the world. But man is led astray
1 MLtt. H5n. E.T. p. 14&i. The criticism here is of Schlatter's "erroneous
view that in the doctrine of the Pall there is an attempt to explain the
origin of Evil", but it leaves no doubt that Brunner directs this criticism
against the procedure of defining the origin of sin in general.
2 MiW p. 121a. E.T. p. 120n.
3 GuQ p. 535. E.T. p. 606.
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in such a way that once desire is aroused, it militates against
confidence in God. The sin of man is no purely spiritual matter,
but it always takes place through the medium of the desires of
the senses. 1
This concern to appreciate the sensual element in sin may be an indication of
Brunner'a superiority to the nouraenaL-phenomenal dualism in which sin is
defined wholly in terms of the supra-sensual character of man. In any event,
the parallel between the Kantian "rational" doctrine of sin which refuses
to consider anything but a "rational origin" of sin, and Brunner's doctrine
of the inexplicable nature of sin, is not as close as our previous analysis
has suggested. Yet it may be too close to do justice to the "historical"
perspective of the Old and New Testaments. The final decision on the success
of Brunner's formulation of the doctrine of the Fall will depend upon an
analysis of the concept by which he apparently avoids a causal explanation
of the origin of sin, and an idealistic freedom explanation of the origin of
sin, the concept of Urgeschichte.
C. URCESCHICHTB AND HISTORY
a. Brunner's Change of Position
Part of the difficulty encountered in the preceding analysis of
Brunner's refusal to contemplate an "origin of sin" stems from the fact that
he has changed his position regarding the reality involved in the Christian
doctrine of the Fall. He has acknowledged that his early discussions of the
Fall doctrine dealt with a transcendental Adam and a Fall which is more
Platonic than Christian.
Those who take this view posit a "pre-existent" Adam, and a metar-
historical, or transcendental Fall of this "Adam", thus combining
Platonist and Kantian ideas with the Biblical truth of the first
1 MLW pp. 132-3- E.T. p. 131; Of. also DII pp. 125-6, 162f. E.T. pp. 107-8,
139f.
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human being, created by God and fallen away from God. In so
doing they wipe out the difference between such a transcendental
view of Adam and the Auguatinian, historical, view by describing
the Genesis story as a "legend", or something of that kind. The
gain is evident: all the impossibilities connected with a view
of "Adam" as an historical figure have been eliminated, and this
view does not clash with the modern view of time and space. But
the price which we pay for this solution is too high: it leads us
into a "platonizing" view of Creation as a whole, which must have
a disastrous effect on the doctrine of Sin and the Fall.
.... In any case, this metaphysical theory cannot base itself
upon the Bible, for the Bible certainly does not mean such a
transcendental figure of Adam - neither in the version in Genesis
nor in the teaching of St. Paul - nor a transcendental Fall of man.
Some of us for a time followed this bypath; but we must describe
it as a speculation which is foreign to the message of the Bible
as a whole, and in essentials it contradicts it. 1
At first sight it might seem as though this change of position solves the
basic issues raised in the preceding analysis. However, before we assent
to such a conclusion, we muot see the alternative Brunner proposes as a
replacement for the concept of a transcendental Fall.
b. Urgeschichte and the "Fall"
The key concept in Brunner's presentation of the doctrine of the
Fall is the concept of Crgeschichte, primal history, which apparently avoids
a supra-historical doctrine of a transcendental Fall into history by affirming
a dialectical relationship between time and eternity. "The Old Testament
begins its account of the Prophetic revelation of the Covenant in Israel with
an 'Br-gesehichte' or primal history, which precedes that of Israel, and the
2
revelation of the Covenant." Primal history is that twilight~zone preceding
history proper. It is also the continual source of history, the invisible
3
background behind the visible actions which history records. As such it is
U
the logical correlate of general revelation. It is the sphere of man's
relation to God, as opposed to the merely historical, the temporal.
1 DII pp. 59-60. E.T. pp. 51-2; Cf. also p. 117. E.T. p. 101.
2 DI E.T. p. 17. 3 "Der Stodenfall". p. 997. A DI E.T. p. 17.
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The term, Urgesehichte, has enjoyed a prominence among German
theologians as a concept which preserves the super-natural character of
the events of faith, and at the same time firmly anchors these events in
the historical sphere.
By Urgeachiehta is meant that point in actual and empirical
history where reality in its approach to man, as it were,
definitely arrives, where it speaks to man, makes him the
subject of address, and elicits from him that response of
faith in which his whole being is involved in crisis. Thus
revelation is urgeschichtlieh. super-historical. It is not
historical in the ordinary sense, for no piece of history as
such can be revelation. Nevertheless it is in history, for
revelation is no mere mystical experience but a. real coming
of God, a divine event which is a world event. 1
This would seem to define the basic intention and meaning of Urgeschichte
as Brunner employs it.
This category of Urgeschichte is unlmown to the present day
inquirer in so far as he approaches the Bible with mere
humanistic, not with Christian, assumptions. For the humanistic
there is only the alternative: thought-truth (idea) or
perceived-truth (appearance). But the basic Christian category
is precisely the annulment of this antithesis: the Logos, the
•become flesh1, the revelation reality as one which can be
neither seen nor thought, but only believed. 2
It is Brunner' a contention that through the mighty act of God in history,
the Incarnation, we are given a perspective from which we can perceive the
dimension behind history as we know it, the dimension of Urgeschichte. "It
is this third, •middle1 point of the Urgeschichte, the revelation of God in
Christ, this event, open not to observation but to belief, between Creation
and Fall on the one hand and a redemption out of hisrory on the other - it
is this through which it becomes possible for us to speak of 'Urgeschlchte1
3
at all." Through the Incarnation in which the Urgeschichte is revealed in
history, it becomes possible to speak of that invisible background behind
all history. On this basis, the concept of Urgeschichte is expanded to
1 F.U. Camfield, Revelation and the Holy Spirit (London. 1933)'» P. 217
2 "£er Stindenfall", p. 993. ~~ 3 RPb p. 64- E.T. pp. 126-7.
include both the beginning and end of history, Creation and Fall on the one
hand, and the consummation on the other. Brunner delineates four specific
points in the Christian faith - the Creation, the Fall, Reconciliation and
Redemption. The concept which unites all four is that of Urgeschichte.
"These four points belong to the same 'dimension1: they all refer to the
dividing line between time and eternity; not, however, as a static relation,
1
tut as an actual event."
This presentation of the four main points of the Christian faith
raises many problems. The most important of these is the question of the
adequacy of the concept of Urgeschichte as a category for the Incarnation.
But the problem which concerns us at present is the question of the adequacy
of the concept of Urgeschichte as a category for the Fall. The initial
difficulty which the concept raises is that of its ability to distinguish
between Creation and Fall. Obviously the agents of Creation and of the Fall
are different. Creation is God's act; the Fall is man's act. Brunner makes
this distinction in terms of the affirmation that the Fall is primal history
because it cannot be reduced to historical explanation.
Fall and primal state belong to primal history because what i3
involved therein is an event between God and human personality,
which as such cannot be observed historically. Only its
operation belongs to the empirical world of perception - the
primal event itself lies in another dimension. 2
On this rendering Creation and Fall can be said to be on the same plane, but
we are still left with the problem of stating how this plane is related to
the historical plane as we know it. It is this problem which is most
difficult in any account of the Fall.
1 Mitt. p. 348. E.T. p. 338
2 "Der Sttndenfall". p. 997.
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c. The Fall and "History"
When we turn to the question of the relation of the urgeschichtlich
Fall to the historical plane as we know it, we encounter what appears to be
a contradiction in Brenner's presentation. On the one hand, Brunner speaks
of the Fall as a supra-temporal event - "Guilt knows no temporal beginning.
1
Guiltlessness lies on the other side of time." On the other hand, he asserts!
The temporal is just as much part of our creaturely existence as
the finite. ... it would be a great error to equate the temporal
with that which passes away, and hence to say that the temporal
is a consequence of the Fall - that owing to the Fall, through
sin, man falls into a temporal existence. The temporal is the
essence of that which is created; as creatures we are temporal,
all is temporal. 2
The same contradiction can be illustrated from Brunner's writings in terms of
the concept of history. On the one hand, the Fall is described as pro-
historical.
The symbol of all actual - but not true - creation of culture is the
tower of Babel. It is the repetition in history of that process
which precedes all history as a real a priori! the event which is
known as the Fall. In the Tower of Babel the Fall became historic-
-ally concrete. 3
On the other hand, Brunner acknowledges that history is a predicate of Creation,
and not of the Fall.
Although the whole of the historical life of man stands under
the shadow of the expulsion from the Garden of Eden, yet the
fact of being historical is not regarded as a result of the Fall.
The Bible makes none of those suggestions which later on became
the subject of theological speculation, which were secretly inspired
by the Platonic myth of the Fall. Historicity belongs to the
nature of the Humanus, for it is part of his nature that he must
make his own decisions, and that he can do so, that he shapes his
own life and does not vegitate. -4
Two comments may be made on this apparent contradiction In Brunner's
presentation of the Fall as primal history. First, it may be seen as an
effort to distinguish between •history' as God intended and •history* as we
1 Brlebrils, hrkenntnis und Glaube, p. 110.
2 DII p. 19. E.T. p. 15. 3 GuO p. 4-75. E.T. p. 4^8,
4- DII p. 231. E.T. p. 196.
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know it from this side of the Pall.
Faith has to do with the "false" world that corresponds with the
falsehood of sin. We do not know what a true creation would be
like, any more than we know what a true man would be like. 1
On this rendering, the Fall could be considered to be historical, but it
cannot be defined in terras of history as we know it because "the historical
world which we know and call such begins this side of the origin-condition
2
as a result of the Fall and is concluded through the redemption." This
would seem to indicate that the apparent contradiction involved in the
affirmation of a pre-historical Fall and the denial of a Fall into history
is only an apparent, and not a real, contradiction. The Fall is pre-
historical in that it precedes history as we know it, but it is not a Fall
into history because the history which we knoi* is a result of the Fall, and
not history as it was before the Fall and wold still be had the Fall not
happened.
Unfortunately, Brunner's concept of Urgeschlchte cannot be
reconciled with history as we know it quite so easily as this. For in 3pite
of what one may say about the impossibility of comprehending pure history,
history untainted by the Fall, one fact must be affirmed, namely, that
history in any form, pre-Fall or post-Fall, involves extension in time.
Brunner himself applauds Augustine's foresight in anticipating the modem
3
conception of time in his assertion that time was created with the world.
If we accept this, as we must, then pre-Fall history must share this temporal
extension with what we know as history from this side of the Fall, regardless
of the other differences we may be compelled to acknowledge. But this is
precisely the difficulty in Brunner's presentation. "The Frimitive State is
not an historical period, bit an historical moment, the moment of the Divinely
1 RFh p. 41* E.T." p. &A- 2 "Die Brde dreht sioh". p. 11A.
3 "The Christian Understanding of Tine", SJofTh, U* No. 1 (1951), p. 6.
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created origin, which we only know in connexion with ita contrast, with
1
sin." Therefore primal history is not distinguished from the history which
we know simply because of the absence of sin in it, but also because of the
absence of time. Brunner does make some concession to the "historical" in
his description of the Fall as a "moment". But it is questionable whether
this concession is adequate. Undoubtedly, in dealing with the Fall we are
dealing with a reality which transcends the historical as we know it. Not
only is it urgeschichtlich in the same sense as the Exodus, or even the
Incarnation, but it is also urgeschichtlich in that it is "non-historical",
let it is "non-historical" because we do not know what is involved, and not
because it does not concern the historical plane as we know it. Thus while
we cannot define "the Fall", we must affirm its reality as a "historical"
event. Something has happened between us and the Good Creation which has
inverted the divine economy. The designation of this "something" as an
urgeschichtlich moment may not be an adequate concession to the historical
reality of the reversing event. For this designation seems to suggest a
"value judgment" rather than a historical event. This is the problem of
the "two histories" which enjoys such prominence among German theologians,
a problem which has been curtly summarized by the British theologian, Alan
Richardson.
It is sometimes said that it is a defect of the English language
that it has only one word to do duty for the two German words,
Historie, the merely historical, and Geschichte. the significantly
historical. But at least the English usage helps to remind us
that there is only one history and to prevent us from thinking
of an abstract history, in which facts have no existential
significance, alongside a supra-historical sphere which lies
outside the scope of historical scholarship. 2
We have seen that Orgeschichte, by definition, involves the sphere of Historie.
1 MLW p. 113. E.T. p. 111.
2 Alan Richardson, History Sacred and Profane (London, 1964), p. 155nl.
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but the designation of this reference as a "moment" may not be sufficient
to indicate the historical nature of the Pall. "This history {i.e. primal
histor£j is not historically tangible, is not extended historically in time,
1
but ... constitutes the invisible element in this definite historical element."
Therefore we are led to the second comment which must be made with regard to
the apparent contradiction in Brunner's presentation of the Pall as primal
history. This comment is that there is involved here not only an apparent,
but a real, contradiction. It is instructive to note the occurrence of these
respective elements in the contradiction in the corpus of Brunner's writings.
The quotations which describe the Pall as pre-teraporal and pre-historical
occur prior to the disavowal of any attempt to construct a theory of a
transcendental Fall in Dogmatik II. The quotations which link temporality
and historicity with Creation occur in Dognatlk II itself. It would be very
easy to overestimate the importance of this distinction, but, realizing this,
we might venture the suggestion that it represents a suspicion on Brunner's
part with regard to the legitimacy of the concept of primal history as a
category for denoting the Fall.
d. Brunner's Change of Position and Urgeschichte
In I'ogmatik II Brunner confessed to having presented a Platonic
doctrine of a transcendental Fall in his previous writings. We have also
seen that there is a difference in emphasis between his earlier utterances
with regard to the "historicity" and "temporality" of the Fall, and those
in Dogaatik II. One further fact must now be noticed. The terra Urgeschichte
does not occur in Volumes II and III of the Dogmatik. This means that it
does not occur after Brunner's disavowal of any attempt to construct a
1 Mitt. p. 34-9n. E.T. p. 389n.
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doctrine of a transcendental Fall. This would seem to suggest that
Urgeschichte is to be regarded m a concept associated with that concept of
the Fall which Brunner has rejected. However, a very similar concept is to
be found in Dogmatik II in terms of Brunner's presentation of the doctrine
of Creation. His emphasis on the creatio continue as the invisible
background of evolution bears a striking resemblance to the concept of
Urgeschichta as the invisible background of visible history.
The Creation is the invisible background of Evolution; Evolution
is the visible foreground of Creation. Faith alone grasps that
invisible aspect; science grasps this visible aspect. Evolution
is the mechanism of creation; creation is the spiritual source
and the Final Cause of Evolution. 1
Disregarding for the moment the aspects of this formulation which distinguish
it from the concept of Urgeschichte. we may note the striking parallel between
the two conceptions. The definition of Creation as the invisible background
of evolution bears an unmistakable parallel to the definition of Urgeschichte
as the invisible background of history. "The Creation and the Fall both lie
behind the historical visible actuality, as their pre~suppositions which are
2
always present, and are already being expressed in the historical sphere."
This is the essential meaning of the concept of Urgeschichte as it is
presented in Brunner13 writings prior to Dogmatik II. But the similarity
between the concept of Urgeschichte and the notion of creatio continua does
not seem to extend beyond the subject of Creation. We might say that the
parallel between Urgeschichte. as it is employed in the pre-Dogmatik II
writings, and the notion of creatio continua in Dogmatik II seems to be both
positive and negative. The positive parallel consists in the form which both
concepts share. Both Creation and Urgeschichte involve a basic reality which
1 DII p. 43. E.T. p. 40.
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is inscrutable from the observation of its external workings in the historical
world. The negative parallel consists in the natter wiiich is involved in the
respective concepts. We can equate the concept of Creation in Dograatik II
with tiie concept of Urgeschichte in so far as Urgeschichte is employed to
expound the doctrine of Creation in the pro-Dognatik II writings, but w© can
find no content for the concept from Brunner's post-Bograatik II -writings
which suggests a parallel to Urgeschichie as it was employed in the pre-
Dogmatik H writings to define the Fall. This means that Brunner's rejection
of all attempts to construct a theory of a transcendental Fall does involve
the rejection of the concept of Urgeschichte. Nevertheless, the rejection
of the concept of Urgeschichte to denote the Fall is not absolute. That is
to say, there is a remnant of the concept to be seen in Dogmatlk II in terms
1
of Brunner'3 concept of "Ur-Sunde", primal sin. Apparently we aire not to
conceive of this primal sin in terras of the primal Fall as it was presented
in the pro-Dogmatik II writings, but just how we are to conceive it otherwise
is not at all clear. The situation seems to be that Brunner has rejected the
concept of UrgescMchte as inadequate to denote the Fall, but bias not replaced
it with a clear alternative.
The problem which we encountered in discussing Brunner's refusal to
consider the origin of sin was there presented as an uncritical assumption
of the Kantian dualism of the noumenal and phenomenal worlds whereby causality
was identified with temporality, so that in denying a causal origin of sin a
temporal origin was thereby denied as well. Brunner now seems to recognize
something of the problem in this position, in Ms recognition of the
impossibility of affirming a transcendental Fall, in spite of its attractiveness*
1 DII pp. 128, 130. E.T. pp. 109, 111
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This theory has the great advantage of making us independent of
limitations of time and space. The Fall i3 then on the borderline
of this historical world of ours. Moreover, through sin, humanity
has "fallen" into this concrete historical world. Thus it is not
necessary to ask the question "When?" since this belongs to the
temporal sphere already, any more than it is necessary to ask the
question "Bow?" Thus an intelligible meta-historical metaphysical
"Fall" would correspond to the intelligible concept of the person. 1
In spite of this recognition, it seems that no new position is here involved.
What is involved is the recognition of the inadequacy of the old position.
The problem is still with us. The discrepancy between the Good Creation and
the fallen world which needs redemption forces to speak in terms of a "Fall",
but what we mean when we say this is open to speculation.
We cannot speak of sin without speaking of the Fall, that is,
without understanding sin as apostasy and rebellion. ... But
the question of When and Bow of the Fall is one which cannot
be answered from the standpoint of human history, either by
the individual or by humanity as a whole. 2
Brunner recognized the necessity for affirming a "reversing event" within the
created world. He also recognized the difficulties which this required
affirmation involves because of its inaccessibility in the childhood of the
race, and also because of the fact that we stand on this side of the event
itself. But his acceptance of a transcendental Fall into history in the
formidable period of Ms authorsMp did not permit him to explore the real
difficulties which the Fall doctrine presents.
II. ORIGINAL SIN
The result of the analysis of Brunner's presentation of the Fall
would seem to demand the conclusion that Brunner recognized the necessity
for affirming a "reversing event" late in Ms theological career. Another
way of stating the same conclusion would be to recognize that Brunner's
1 DII p. 117. E.T. p. 101.
2 Ibid. p. 116. E.T. p. 100.
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concern throughout the whole corpus of his writing has been the affirmation
of the "fallennesa" of hisaanity, rather than a concern to affirm the origin
of this fallenness, i.e. a doctrine of the Fall, as such. As a result, the
doctrine of Original Sin plays a much more prominent role in Stunner's
writings than does the doctrine of the Fall, at least in terras of explicit
reference.
We may note two facts about the doctrine of Original Sin, as
Brunner conceives it, by way of introduction. First, it is not a Biblical
doctrine in the strict sense of the word. "The theory of Original Sin which
has been the standard one for the Christian doctrine of man, from the time of
St. Augustine, is completely foreign to the thought of the Bible. " The basis
of this assertion is the conviction that the Bible emphasizes the solidarity
in sin, whereas the Augustinian doctrine of Original Sin presumes to explain
this solidarity in terms of natural heredity.
In Adam all have sinned - that is the Biblical statement; but
how? The Bible does not tell us that. The doctrine of Original
Sin is read into it. 2
This leads to the second fact which must be noted, namely, that in spite of
its weakness, the doctrine of Original Sin is an expression of an essential
element in Christian theology.
In the Christian religion man knows that he has fallen away
collectively from God, and that this Fall, as a sinful and
guilty act, is perpetually and inevitable repeated. Neither
the responsibility nor the necessity are denied; on the
contrary, here alone is sin fully personal, and at the same
time grasped in all its unavoidable force. 3
This, then, is essentially the concern of the doctrine of Original Sin -
the Inevitability of sin on the one hand, and the responsibility for sin on
the other. Brunner'a dissatisfaction with the traditional Augustinian
1 DII p. 119. E.T. p. 103.
2 my p. 143. E.T. p. 142.
3 Mitt. pp. 122-3. E.T. p. 147; Cf. also WGMM p. 41.
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presentation of this double-sided doctrine compels him to reformulate its
essential content. Our task, therefore, is to examine his reformulation
with a view to assessing its adequacy in presenting both aspects of the
doctrine.
A. INEVITABILITY AMD RESPONSIBILITY
a. Brunner's Dissatisfaction with the Aumistinian Doctrine
Since Brunner has concerned himself with the doctrine of Original
Sin throughout his whole authorship, we cannot expect to find any dramatic
reversal of position with regard to the doctrine such as we have found in his
treatment of the doctrine of the Pall. Quite the contrary, Brunner has
consistently affirmed the two-fold content of the doctrine of Original Sin -
the inevitability of sin and the responsibility for sin.
The Biblical revelation ... shows us both in one, since it tells
us that we are sinners, that means human beings who not only sin
now and them, occassionally - that is, every time we do not do
the good - but whose very being is defined as sinj but this also
means human beings who are fully responsible for all the evil
they do, and for the evil in their nature as well. 1
Indeed, Brunner's refusal to render this contradictory doctrine intelligible,
by a clear definition of the relationship existing between inevitability and
responsibility, makes his presentation very unsatisfactory from a logical
point of view, and frustrating in the extreme for anyone who desires a simple
harmonization of these two contradictory affirmations. Yet we must accept
Brunner's contention that both inevitability and responsibility must be
affirmed, in spite of the logical contradiction which this involves. In spite
of this contention, however, a change of emphasis is discernible in Brunner's
presentation of these two aspects of the doctrine of Original Sin. This
1 MiW p. 118. E.T. p. 116.
change is perceptible in at least two respects. First, there is a change
from a concern for totality 'in Adam' to a concern for individual respons¬
ibility. In his early writings Brunner emphasizes the solidarity in Adam's
sin, and asserts that it is only in the recognition of this solidarity that
the seriousness of sin is truly perceived. "Therewith is sin first grasped
as wholly inconceivable, and at the same time as wholly serious, as
indivisible common guilt which precedes every historic moment of the
1
individual as the totality always already present as its *a priori'." In
contrast to this Augustinian-like pronouncement, Brunner1a more developed
position, as reflected in Per Mensch im Widerspruch, reveals a definite
dissatisfaction with this "wholly serious" aspect of the doctrine of Original
Sin. "The stumbling-block of the ecclesiastical doctrine ... consists in
this, that we are made responsible for a sin which someone else has committed."
No longer does faith grasp the solidarity 'in Adam'; rather this is now the
stumbling-block to faith. This predicating of responsibility for the act of
another is what we might describe as an ethical stumbling-block. It is a
central maxim of the moral that responsibility can be predicated only in
terras of avoidability. Moral responsibility implies the free choice of that
for which one is held responsible. Brunner contrasts this ethical stumbling-
block with the stumbling-block of the New Testament, which is always "the
desire to evade responsibility towards God, or the evasion of complete
3
dependence upon His action." It is Brunner fs contention that the traditional
doctrine of Original Sin transposes this stumbling-block of the New Testament,
which proclaims man's responsibility towards God, into the ethical stumbling-
block of an unjust accusation of responsibility for the sin of another. The
result is that the just accusation of the New Testament can be dismissed as
1 "Li§ Erde dreht Bitch", p. 115.
2 MiW p. U4. E. T. p. 143.
3 Ibid.
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an unjust accusation by an appeal to the traditional doctrine.
The change in emphasis is evident also in another aspect of the
doctrine, namely, in terms of the ♦freedom of sin.'. In Gott und Ifensch
Brunner seems to be more impressed by the 'compulsion of sin' than by the
'freedom of sin'.
Just because sin changes the essential being of man [his
relation to God] freedom in the original sense is lost
through it. The sinner is a man who is no longer able not
to sin. Thus freedom is indeed the presupposition of every
sin, but of no sin can it be said that it happens in freedom,
but only that it happens under the compulsion of sin. 1
This emphasis is reversed in the course of Brunner's writings, so that in
Domatlk II he can says "the sinner is in principle capable of avoiding
every particular sin. But what he cannot do is this: he cannot not be a
sinner."2
The explanation for this change in emphasis is to be found in
Brunner's increasing dissatisfaction with the traditional Augustinian
doctrine of Original Sin. Brunner's assessment of Augustine's doctrine is
both positive and negative.
• • • his contribution to the solution has no rival. But his
solution can no longer satisfy us, once our feeling for
personal responsibility has been awakened. 3
On this basis, Brunner criticizes the Augustinian doctrine as a naturalizat-
-ion of sin, consisting in the transposition of sin from the personal sphere
of responsibility to the natural sphere of heredity. "The idea of inherited
sin is ... a most inadequate expression ... (because) ... it leads to the
mistaken view of Sin as something which can be described in naturalistic,
4
deterministic terras, and therefore as something which cannot be avoided."
The 'avoidability' of sin is thus the crucial concept in Brunner's criticism
1 QuM p. 85. E.T. p. 157.2 DII pp. 130-1. E„T. p. 111.
3 M1W pp. 122-3. E.T. p. 121. 4 DII p. 123. E.T. p. 106.
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of the Augustinian doctrine, and in his reformulation of the doctrine of
Original Sin.
However, Brunner's assessment of the Angustinian doctrine also has
a positive side. It will be recalled that he describes Augustine's solution
as "unrivaled", until the feeling for personal responsibility has been
awakened. The content of this positive appreciation of the Augustinian
doctrine consists in the appreciation for that hereditary element in it which
he so strenuously opposes. It is not the case that Brunner simply dismisses
the Augustinian doctrine in the interests of personal responsibility. On the
contrary, he demonstrates positive appreciation for the hereditary factor in
the doctrine of Original Sin.
The peceatua originis is certainly also inherited sin. The
solidarity of being involved in sin manifests itself also in
'inheritance'. What we reject is this: the one-sidedness with
which this one element is made the prevailing and finally, the
only element in the doctrine. 1
The problem involved here is the question of the relation between heredity
and freedom. The term heredity implies a determination over which man has
no control. Brunner wishes to maintain the fact of heredity as a legitimate
ingredient in the doctrine of Original Sin, without affirming the unavoidable
determinateness implied therein. It is his concern to affirm both solidarity
in sin and personal responsibility, and to do this in such a way that the
responsibility is in no way minimized.
b. Brunner's Concern for "Responsibility"
In the light of his dissatisfaction with the Augustinian doctrine,
we can appreciate Brunneremphasis on the freedom of sin and the respons-
-ibility for sin. In order to avoid a deterministic doctrine of Original Sin,
1 Mitf p. 124.. E.T. p. 123? Cf. also p. 145. E.T. p. 144.
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In which the inevitability of sin undermines every real possibility of seriously
affirming the responsibility for sin, Brunner makes it his goal to reinstate
1
the concept of responsibility for sin. He does this ty defining sin as "act",
2
so that even the 'state' of sin must be seen as "act", the act of continual
rebellion against God and against His purpose for man. Consequently, the
3
emphasis falls upon the guilt of the individual as opposed to the "individible
A
common guilt", and on the freedom wherein "every particular sin in itself can
5 6
be avoided" as opposed to the "compulsion of sin". The service which Brunner
ha# thus rendered Christian theology in his re-appraisal of the doctrine of
Original Sin is by no means inconsiderable. One might venture to suggest
that he has provided us with new insight into the "just" condemnation which
Scripture pronounces on us, and thereby has barred from the realms of
possibility every attempt at evasion of responsibility by hiding behind the
cloak of Adam's sin as though we were the innocent victims of circumstance.
If there is one element in the Biblical message which from
time immemorial ha# been clear and beyond all doubt, it is
this: sin and responsibility are Inseparably connected, and
there is no ascription of responsibility, no verdict of guilt,
without accusation and proof of responsibility, that is, no
one is pronounced guilty for something which he has not done.
This is the postulate which clearly emerges from our survey of
the history of the problem. 7
The insistence on affirming responsibility only within the context of freedom
thus represents Brunner's particular contribution to the understanding of
the doctrine of Original Sin.
At this point, however, we must qualify our analysis of Brunner's
presentation. For just as the concern for responsible freedom represents
the particular contribution of Brunner's thought on the doctrine of Original
Sin, so also It represents the particular difficulties which his thought on
1 MLV pp. H8n2, 143-9. E.T. pp. Il£n2, USi DII p. 127. S.T. p. 109.
2 MiW p. 119. S.T. p. 117; WaB p. 104 E.T. p. 152. 3 DII p. 124 E.T. p. 106.
A "Die Erde dreht sioh". p. 115. 5 DII p. 131. E.T. p. 111.
6 QuM p. 85. E.T. p. 157. 7 MiW p. 130. E.T. pp. 128-9.
198
the doctrine raises. The assertion that Brunaer refuses to reduce the two
elements of the doctrine, inevitability and responsibility, to a logically
palatable formula, and the assertion that his particular concern is to sec
responsibility in terms of freedom, suggest the difficulty with which his
formulation is contending. To stress the freedom of sin whereby respons¬
ibility is justly predicated, without thereby weakening the contrary
assertion of the inevitability of sin, is by no means a simple task.
Consequently, Brunner's formulation of the doctrine presents certain
difficulties which suggest that it is not entirely successful in maintaining
the two aspects of the doctrine. The two most obvious difficulties are
those which have been suggested in the reference to the change of emphasis
detectible in Brunner's development of the doctrine. On the one hand, the
transition from the concern of faith with Adam's guilt to the moral concern
with the freely incurred guilt of the individual suggests an individualising
of that concept of solidarity which is an essential aspect of the traditional
doctrine. On the other hand, the transition from the concern for the
compulsion of sin to the moral concern for the freedom of sin whereby respons-
-ibllity can be justly predicated of the individual suggests an atomiaation
of that concept of totality which has also been an essential aspect of the
traditional doctrine.
In both cases, the transition appears as one from faith to morality.
The concern for responsibility, therefore, would seem to be essentially a
moral concern. Viewed in this light, the Kantian antecedents loom large once
again. It is hardly questionable that Brunner's "feeling for personal
responsibility", which prompts his dissatisfaction with the traditional
1 MiW p. 123. E.T. p. 121.
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Augustinian doctrine of Original Sin, has been awakened in large measure by
the Kantian doctrine of moral responsibility. But the Kantian moral respons-
-ibility is essentially individualistic. It is no accident that, as Brunner
notes, "the final motive ... in legal morality is self-respect."* The concept
of responsibility which Kant presents is based on self-respect at the outset.
It is a responsibility which presupposes the autonomy of the individual.
That which Kant regards as the Good, is xeally the essence of the Christian
doctrine of sin.
... his |i.e. Kant 'Is] 1 radical evil' is only one manifestation
of sin, whose far more dangerous manifestation is precisely that
which In the thought of Kant is regarded as the Good: the fact
that man does good by his own efforts. 2
The difficulty In Brunner's whole presentation of the concept of respons-
-ibility is that, while recognizing that this Kantian concept of respons¬
ibility represents the antithesis of the Augustinian concept, he neverthe-
-less accepts the Kantian concept as legitimate in the sphere of morality.
"Responsibility is that which sets the individual as individual apart and
3
makes him independent." The corollary of this is: "This responsibility is
U
the basis of our freedom." As a result, Brunner can pass quite naturally
from moral responsibility to responsibility towards God. Man's moral
responsibility for sins becomes his responsibility for guilt.
Sin and guilt are inseparable. ... Sin and guilt are co-entensive.
Now this is the paradox of sin, that man can, it is true, "do
something about it" and thus he is guilty, but he cannot alter the
fact that he is sinner. 5
The implication seems to be that man somehow transcends the bondage of sin.
The significance of this continuity between moral responsibility and respons-
-ibility towards God will concern us in the next chapter when we consider
1 mt p. 159. E.T. p. 153. 2 Ibid. p. 129. E.T. p. 128. "
3 Ibid. p. 275. E.T. p. 279- 4 Ibid. p. 281. E.T. p. 286.
5 DII p. 124. E.T. p. 106.
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the transition from sin to faith. For the present we may attempt some
general observations on the implications of this "moral" background of
Brunner's thought for his doctrine of Original Sin.
c. The General Tenor of Brunner's Approach
The general impression conveyed by the whole of Brunner's presentat-
-ion of the doctrine of Original Sin is that his concern to emphasis® raspons-
-ibility is prohibitive of an adequate expression of the element of "totality"
- both the totality of the race and the totality of the individual - tradition-
-aliy affirmed in the doctrine of Original Sin. In terms of the totality of
the race, the general impression is that the solidarity in Adam's sin is
neglected in the interests of the guilt of the individual} that the Fall is
neglected in the interests of ray fall. In the concern to avoid the determinism
which he detects in the traditional doctrine, Brunner apparently neglects the
social significance of the Fall. Because sin involves a concept of solidarity
as well as a concept of individuality, one would expect that responsibility
for this situation should b© in some way a shared responsibility. Indeed,
Brunner affirms this.
In the Presence of Christ we cease to particularize sin and to
apportion to each his share in the blame for sin. In Jesus Christ
we see that this individualizing calculation of sin is Pharisaism,
and therefore a lie. 1
Brunner recognizes that this refusal "to apportion to each his share in the
blame for sin" is what distinguishes the Christian concept of the solidarity
2
of sin from "the universality of sin as a numerical totality." In spite of
this recognition, however, Brunner apparently insists- on establishing the
Christian doctrine of responsibility on an individualistic basis, without
seriously taking into account the significance of the social involvement of
1 DII p. 111. E.T. pp. 96-7.
2 Ibid. p. 110. E.T. p. 96.
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Individuals with one another for the concept of responsibility. In Ms
concern to establish the fact that "no one is pronounced guilty for something
which he has not done"J" Brunner sees no alternative to "individual respons¬
ibility" other than "collective responsibilities", which in turn "are based
2
upon the responsibilities of individuals". It is paradoxical in the extreme
that one who opposed both individualism and collectivism in the interests of
the communal emphasis of the Christian faith, and to this end developed the
I-Thou framework as the most adequate expression of the Christian conception
of the solidarity of human life, should have failed to incorporate this in
Ms concept of responsibility. For, as E. La B. CherbonMer has noted, the
concept of the communal nature of human life must certainly imply a concept
of communal responsibility.
If man only becomes man in community, then it is not unreasonable
to speak, as the Bible always does, of his communal destiny. TMs
conception emphatically does not transfer all responsibility from
the individual to an abstract entity like "the state". This would
only make the state a scapegoat for sin wMch belonged properly to
you and me. The point is rather that they are shared sins. Each
individual bears responsibility but not an exclusive responsibility. 3
On occasion, Brunner refers to a communal responsibility wMch aems to
approximate this position, but this is not integrated with the moral
responsibility which represents Ms more fundamental concern. Therefore, the
general impression conveyed by Brunner's treatment of the totality of sin in
terras of the race is that Ms rocogMtian that "in Jesus Christ we see that
A
... individualizing calculation of sin is Pharisiasm, and therefore a lie"
suggests the condemnation of Ms own system.
As the emphasis on responsible freedom presents difficulties for
the concept of Original Sin in so far as it Involves a concept of the totality
1 MLW p. 130. E.T. pp. 128^9.
2 Ibid. p. Zl5. E.T. p. 279-
3 E. La B. Cherbonnier, Hardness of Heart (New York, 1955), p. 138.
A DII p. 111. E.T. pp. 9^71
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of the race, so the position is no less difficult with regard to the totality
of the individual. Brunner affirms the Reformation concept of the totality
of sin in terms of the individual in his assertion that "the meaning of sin,
by its very nature affects the whole, because it aims at making the whole man
free." ^ But this totality of sin does not destroy the freedom of sin, so
that man is seduced into sin out of mere weakness of will. On the contrary,
"man never sins purely out of weakness but always also in the fact that he
2
'lets himself go' in weakness." Even in sin man remains the master. Sin
is basically active. "Even in the dullest sinner there is still a spark of
3
decision, of active positive negation 'which is not merely 'negative'." In
his opposition to the doctrine of sin which emphasises the natural fact of
heredity, Brunner emphasises the "rational" nature of sin whereby sin is seen
as arising from the supra-natural nature of man.
Human sin always contains an element of frailty, of the non-
spiritual, of the sense-element. ... But the more genius a
man has, the closer Ms sin approaches the demonic. 4
The difficulty in this presentation is that it interprets totality in terms
of the supra-natural, as the other doctrine interpreted totality in terras of
the natural. This lends to Brunner's presentation a certain air of unreality
in that it seems to suggest that all sin is "sin with a high hand", sin done
in some measure of consciousness of sin. Kierkegaard has referred to the
element of unreality in speaking of sin as though it were a general predicate
which applied to all men in all circumstances. "The lives of most men, being
determined by a dialectic of indifference, are so remote from the good (faith)
that they are almost too spiritless to be called sin, yes, almost too spirit-
5
-less to be called despair." This raises the whole question of the relation
1 DII pp. 1G7-S. E.T. p. 94. 2 MLW p. 132. E.T. p. 130. ~~
3 Ibid. 4 Dn p. 126. E.T. p. 108.
5 Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death, tr. Walter lowrio (New York, 1954),
p. 232.
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between sins and sin, between morality and faith. The general impression
conveyed by Brunner's presentation of totality in terras of the totality of
•decision* suggests that consciousness of sin is not peculiar to the
Christian faith, but is also a legitimate predicate of the raorai.
The general impression, therefore, conveyed by Brunner*s present¬
ation of the doctrine of Original Sin is that in his concern to emphasize
responsibility he has negleoted the other aspect of the doctrine, the
inevitability of sin. This appears in the apparent weakness of his concepts
of the totality of the race and the totality of the individual as there are
involved in the concept of sin. It is now our task to substantiate this
general impression through an examination of these two aspects of totality
- the nog toil, the relationship between the individual and the race, and
the ego totus, the relationship between sins and sin.
B. ADAM AND HUMANITY
a. Brunner's Reversal of Kierkegaard's Fortaula
Brunner's dissatisfaction with the emphasis on inheritance in the
traditional doctrine of Original Sin leaves him with the problem of restating
the essential content of the doctrine. The solution which he proposes consists
in an application of the Kierkegaardian maxim that "it is part of the nature
1
of man, that each of us is both 'the individual' and humanity." In Brunner's
estimation, this formulation provides the link between the good Creation and
fallen humanity. It is a statement of both the solidarity in Creation and
2
the solidarity in sin. Therefore, it transcends the hereditary definition
of the traditional doctrine of Original Sin. Sin is "transmitted" because
1 DII o. 112. E.T. p. 97.
2 MLW p. 142. E.T. p. 141-
of the solidarity of the race, but it can never be reduced to the terms of
a hereditary principle. The doctrine of Original Sin is not to be formulated
in terms of a biological process. Rather it is grounded in the very nature
of human life as it has been created. The solidarity of creation is the
basis for understanding the solidarity of the Fall.
The first observation which must be made about this formulation is
that it is logically suspect. If "each of us is both 'the individual' and
humanity", then apparently humanity, the race, in submerged in individualism.
What the formula seems to be saying is that A is both A and B. Thus B
(humanity) is a foreign element, and must be accounted for in A (each of us,
or 'the individual'). Indeed, Brenner has charged Kierkegaard's re-interpret-
- ation of the doctrine of Original Sin, in which context this formula occurs,
with precisely this weakness. "The fresh formulation of the doctrine of
Original Sin which Kierkegaard has attempted in his works Begriff der Angst,
is too individualistic to be satisfactory In the light of Brenner's
extensive use of the formula, however, we suspect that this criticism is not
directed specifically against the formula Itself, but against Kierkegaard's
employment of it. This is confirmed by a further reference to Kierkegaard's
failure to escape individualism in which his weakness is traced to the
neglect of that concept which is the antithesis of individualism, the concept
of community. "It is true that in the thought of Kierkegaard the idea of
'community' does not get a fair deal, but in principle it is included in his
2
category of 'the individual'." On the surface this seems to confirm the
logical suspicion suggested by the formula - "the idea of 'community' .. (is]
••in principle ... included in his category of 'the individual'." This
1 GuQ p. 585. E.T. p. 606.
2 M1W p. 281n. E.T. p. 286n.
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certainly suggests the submergence of humanity in individualism. But
Brunner's extensive employment of the formula, in spite of thi3 charge of
individualism against Kierkegaard's doctrine of Original Sin, should caution
us against a facile dismissal of the formula itself. This caution should
cause us to question the basis on which we have suggested that the formula
is logically suspect. Obviously this basis has been the equation of 'the
individual* with 'each of us'. Interpreted in this way, the charge of
individualism is unavoidable. Qsa. the other hand, if we take seriously the
contention that "the idea of 'comrannity' .. Qsj .. in principle ... included
in his category of 'the individual'", then 'the individual' means something
very different from 'each of us'. -'The individual' is then a concept which
encompasses both our peculiar individuality and our solidarity in the
community of creation and sin. Thus the logic of the formula is not A (each
of us) is A (the individual) and B (humanity), but A (the individual) is
a-j_ (himself) and &2 (humanity). Kierkegaard describes this as "the essential
characteristic of human existence, that man is an individual and as such is
at once himself and the whole race, in such wise that the whole race has
1
part in the individual, and the individual has part in the whole race."
However, far from solving the problem of individualism, thi3
re-interpretation of the formula reveals a depth of complexity formerly
unperceived. For, if this latter formula escapes the charge of individualism
in the definition of A (the individual) as encompassing both ai (the
individuality of 'each of us') and (the solidarity of humanity), the
former formula demands the charge of individualism in its equation of A (each
of us) with A (the individual). Thus we may re-state the formula, A is A and
1 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, p. 26.
B, afl ^ (each of ua) la A(the individual) and ^ (humanity). The
difficulty here consists in the fact that this is precisely the formula which
Brunner presents - "each of us is both 'the individual' and humanity.""'' In
this representation the decisive concept is not 'the individual', but 'each
of us1. Thus we are left with the peculiar situation that Brunner recognizes
that "the idea of 'community' .. |is] .. in principle ••• included in ..
[Kierkegaard• • category of 'the individual'"jf and yet subsumes this
two-fold category, 'the individual', under the concept 'each of us'. Nor
is this merely a slip of the pen on Brunner's part. He is quite consistent
in his presentation of the formula. In spite of a direct reference to
Kierkegaard's formula, as quoted above, in which Kierkegaard subsumes both
individuality and community under the category of 'the individual', Brunner
explicitly reverses the formula in saying: " 'man whom God created is always
both this individual and humanity' (Kierkegaard)."^ One further indication
of the consistency In Brunner's reversing of the formula may be noted from
his later writings, Do&aatik II, where he presents Kierkegaard's formula as
the "statement that man is always both the individual as well as the species
(Be/griff der Angst, par. I) The consistency with whioh Brunner presents
this reversal of the formula suggests that there is more involved here then
simply a question of terminology. One could conceivably defend this latter
thesis, however, by contending that Brunner means by 'each of us' and by
'man whom God created' what Kierkegaard meant by 'the individual'. But on
this interpretation, one would be required to explain why Brunner has
1 DII p. 112. E.T. p. 97. 2 M1W p. 281n. E.T. p. 236n.
3 MiW p. 141. E.T. p. 140. In a footnote, Brunner quotes Kierkegaard -
"... die wesentliche Bestimmung menachlicher Existenz, dass der Mensch
Indlviduum ist und als solches zugleich er selbst und das ganze Geschlecht,
so dass das ganze Geschlecht an dom Individuum partigipiert und das
'indlviduum an dora ganzen Geschlecht ..." - and yet in the body of the
text he asserts: " 'der Mensch, den Gott schuf, immer zu&Leich dieser
Einzelne und die Menschheit' ist (Kierkegaard)."
4 DII p. 134. E.T. p. 117.
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transferred the meaning of Kierkegaard's concept of 'the individual' to these
other concepts. A more fruitful approach is to be found in terras of an
analysis of Brunner's understanding of solidarity. This is not to abandon
the problem here presented, but merely to postpone it until an appreciation
of the intention behind Brunner's concept of the relationship between
individuality and humanity is achieved.
b. Brunner'a Intention is the Same as Kierkegaard's
If the charge of individualism can be directed against Brunner's
formula for the relation between individuality aid humanity, it certainly
cannot be directed against the intention behind his adoption of this formula.
Brunner's intention is precisely to oppose individualism by an emphasis on
the communal nature of human life. This is clearly demonstrated in the
remainder of one of the paragraphs in which Brunner reverses the Kierkegaard-
-ian formula.
The isolated individual is an abstraction, conceived by the
reason which has been severed from the Word of God. 'The other'
is not added to my nature after my nature, after I myself, as
this particular individual, have been finished. But the other,
the others, are interwoven with my nature. I am not man at all
apart from others. I am not * I* apart from the 'Thou'. As X
cannot be a human being without a relation to God, without the
Divine 'Thou', so also I cannot lie man without the human 'Thou'. 1
A more definite rejection of individualism could hardly be imagined than that
which is involved in this communal understanding of humanity. The content of
Kierkegaard'3 'individual' is here presented with the aid of the I-Thou
framework of Ebner and Buber. 'The individual' who is both himself and the
race is represented as the 'I-Thou' who is both the I and the Thou. Here,
as in Kierkegaard's concept, individualism is precluded by definition, - "I
1 MiW p. 141. E.T. p. 140,
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am not 'I' apart from the 'Thou'". Otherwise expressed, this means that
personality i3 not a predicate of the I, but of the I-Thou. Personality is
not synonymous with individuality, but rather embraces both individuality
and humanity.
As we earlier said of the divine Thou, we must now say also of
the human thou - man receives his true self only from the thou.
... Thus personality is not something individual, but it is
real only in mutuality, in fellowship. Personality and feliow-
-ship are correlates, i.e. the one is not either thinkable or
actual without the other. 1
Thus Brenner's concept of personality, and his concept of the I-Thou relation
inherent in human life, are direct parallels to Kierkegaard1s concept of
'the individual'. All three concepts include individuality and community by
definition.
c. Explanation for the Reversal
We now return to the question of Brunner's reversal of Kierkegaard's
formula for the relationship between individuality and humanity. An
explanation for this reversal is demanded because of the conclusion that
Brunner is really saying the same thing as Kierkegaard. In his representation
of Kierkegaard's formula, 'the individual' (A) is both himself (a^) and the
race Brunner reverses the terms by saying, each of us (a^) is 'the
individual' (A) and humanity (a^. In his concept of personality, on the
other hand, Brunner approximates Kierkegaard's formula by saying, personality
(A) is individuality (ai) and community (ajj). Obviously the two formulae are
mutually exclusive. Either we have misrepresented Brunner in the first
formula, or he is, in fact, maintaining two contradictory concepts of the
relation between individuality and humanity. The latter alternative seems
1 GuM p. 88. E.T. pp. 161-2.
to offer the more promising avenue of investigation.
Brunner has made statements about personality which do not lend
themselves to the formula indicated. For example, he has distinguished
between "personality" and the "personal" in such a way as to suggest that
there is some personal status apart from the concept of personality indicated.
"The fact that this responsible personality 'before God' is one of human
solidarity does not alter its personal character.""'' This seams to indicate
that solidarity and personality are contradictory. The most obvious
interpretation of the statement i3 that the personal is the individual, but
because there are many individuals involved the responsibility is no less
personal. This raises two questions - the question of the relationship
between solidarity and universality, and the question of the relationship
between the subject of responsibility and the source and object of
responsibility. The latter is the topic of the next section, the question
of the relationship between sins and sin, in which we 3hall have to consider
the relationship between morality and faith. But because of its relation to
the former, we must consider it briefly here.
Responsibility is a formal concept. It is meaningful only in terms
of an explanation m to who is responsible, to whom he is responsible, and
for what he is responsible. The immediate answer to all three questions is
that every man is responsible for his fellovman before God. For "not to our
2
fellow men are we responsible, but for them we are responsible to God."
This, then, is the solidarity of creation. As such it may be taken as the
correlate of the concept of personality which embraces both individuality
and community. Responsibility, like personality, is essentially a social
1 DII p. 121. E.T. p. 10£
2 "Freihoit als Verantwortliohkelt". p. 361.
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concept. But the situation is complicated by the fact that this is really
an abstract explanation of the human situation. Real humanity is not
characterized by the solidarity of creation, but by the solidarity of sin.
But in the solidarity of sin man denies his solidarity. "In sin we ere
bound together as a united body, just as we are bound together in the
Creation, only with this difference, that - and this belongs to sin - we
deny this solidarity in sin."^ The problem now is that man no longer lives
responsibly, but, in fact, denies his responsibility. As a result he is no
longer personal, but wavers between an impersonal individualism and an
impersonal collectivism. He makes himself the origin and goal of respons-
-ibility. In contrast to the responsibility of Creation, where every man
is responsible to God for his fellowman, in the responsibility of sin
every man is responsible to himself for himself. Thus responsibility has
become irresponsibility. Herein, we reach the central difficulty in
Brenner's formula, and, indeed, perhaps in his whole theology. In spite of
the irresponsibility of sin, Brunner insists that man is still responsible.
The fact that man is not responsible is overshadowed by the consideration
that he should be responsible. As a result, the emphasis changes from the
solidarity of human life to the individuality of human responsibility. The
questions of the source and the object of responsibility are relegated to
second place alongside the question of the subject of responsibility.
Therefore the concept of responsibility changes. "Responsibility is that
2
which sets the individual as individual apart and makes him independent."
The significance of this concentration on the subject of responsibility for
the concept of the object of responsibility which Brunner develops must
1 MIV p. 142. E.T. p. 141.
2 Ibid. p. 275. E.T. p. 279
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await the next section yhua we consider the question of the relationship
between morality and faith. The immediate problem is the signiflc.mc® of
this concentration on the subject of responsibility for the question of
solidarity.
We can now return to the question of the apparent abstraction of
the personal frost the previously defined sphere of personality. Personality
is defined as a social reality, and yet Brunner says, "the fact that this
responsible personality ♦before God' is one of human solidarity does not
alter its personal cliaracter."^ The personal character, then, refers to
the individual character of responsibility. The universality of sin is not
explained by the solidarity of sin. In fact, there is no explanation of the
doctrine of Original Bin at all. The inevitability of sin, end the reopons-
-ibillty for sin, are simply affirmed as two contradictory assertions. It
will be recalled that this la what the Bible assarts, according to Brunaor,
- the universality of sin and the responsibility for sin, without explaining
how the two are to be conceived together.
[The Bible] ... conceives sin, the contradiction, wholly
ontologically, so that the whole nature of the individual
iajBsaa being, as well as the numerical totality of all human
beings, is affected by it, and it is quite impossible to
isolate the individual moment, or act, or individual human
being; at the same time it conceives it as wholly personal
and deliberate, so that nothing neutral, no natural element,
is admitted as a ground of explanation. 2
It is not to be denied that we are here confronted with a real problem, the
problem of the reconciliation of the inevitability of sin and responsibility
for sin. ait it soma that Brunner increases the problem, instead of
illuminating it. The key tern hero is "the numerical totality of all human
beings" • Ultimately the solidarity in sin ia reducible to the question of
1 DII p. 121. J3.T. p. 104.
2 MLW p. 119. E.T. p. 117.
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th© universality of sin. As such it must remain inexplicable. Thi3 clearly
contradicts Brunner's recognition of the distinction between the Christian
concept of the solidarity of sin and "the universality of sin as a numerical
1
totality". The real difficulty is that one wonders why Brunner bothered to
appropriate Kierkegaard's formula for the relationship between individuality
and humanity, and, in spite of his reversal of thin formula, to approximate
it in his concept of the 'I-Thou' relationship inherent in the nature of
human life and in his concept of the social nature of personality.
d» Adam and Humanity
It is instructive to note the different uses of the formula as
represented by Kierkegaard and Brunner. Kierkegaard developed the formula
to account for Adam.
The prose of common sense is that the race is resolved
numerically into a "one tiraos one". The fantastic is that
Adam enjoys the well-meant honour of being more than the
whole race, or the anbiguous honour of standing outside the
race. 2
To resolve this problem, Kierkegaard defined man as 'the individual', and
included in that concept both individuality and solidarity. When Brunner
employs the concept, however, it is not Adam with whom he is primarily
concerned, but "the human beings who follow him". He describes Kierkegaard's
formula as a reaction against the traditional doctrine whereby humanity in
made responsible for the sin of Adam.
This led to the fact, as Kierkegaard points out, that the first
man is singled out in a fantastic way from the series of all the
human beings who follow him, and - what is far worse - the human
beings who follow him in the course of history are in a fantastic
way de-humanized. 3
The key phrase here is "what is far worse". The isolation of Adam from the
1 DII p. 110. E.T. p. 96.
2 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, p. 26.
3 MLW pp. 144-5. E.T. pp. 143-4.
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rest of the race is secondary to the de-humanizatian of the rest of the
race. This was not so for Kierkegaard. His primary concern was the
singling-out of Adam. The difference in emphasis is thoroughly compatible
with Brunner's reversal of Kierkegaard's formula. The difference between
the formula, 'the individual1 (A) is both himself (a1) and the race
and the formula, each of us (a^) is 'the individual' (A) and humanity (a^),
is the difference between solidarity and universality.
In discussing Brunner's difficulty in distinguishing a causal
origin from a temporal origin, we suggested that he neglects the "historic"
element in sin which Kierkegaard accounts for in his concept of the
"quantitative determinants", as opposed to the "qualitative leap". This
neglect also involves his refusal to consider Adam as in any way reflective
of a temporal origin of sin. The result is that Kierkegaard's Adam, who is
"the first man", oecoraes in Brunner the concept for the race. "'Adam' ... in
the meaning of Christian theology, is the unity of humanity, not in the
zoological sense, but in the sense of humanitag.""*" This would seem to
indicate that Adam could be set in the third bracket of our formula, so that
he may be symbolozed by (a^), giving us the equation - Adam (a^) is the
race (ag). But Brunner does not simply equate Adam aid the race. It is not
the race as a unity which Brunner means here, but the race as a collective
totality of individuals. He has explicitly stated, elsewhere that "'Adam'
2
is both the individual and humanity." Thus Adam is to be set in the first
bracket of our formula, so that he may be symbolized by (aj), replacing 'each
of us', and giving us the equation - Adam (a^) is the individual (A) and the
community (&2)* Thus with Adam, as with 'the individual', Kierkegaard's
1 DII p. 96. E.T. p. 82."
2 GuO p. 139. E.T. p. 155
2U
formula is reversed, Adam ±3 not 'the individual' (A) and, as such, both
himself (a^) and the race (a^)J but he is each of us (a^) and, as such,
•the individual' (A) and the community (a^)* The result is precisely what
Kierkegaard sought to avoid, "He [i.e. Adam] is not essentially different
from the race, for in that case there is no race; he is not the race, for
in that case there is no races he is himself and the race."* Brunner's
Adam corresponds to this second alternative; he is the race, and the race
as a numerical totality of individuals; he is each of us. As 'the individual'
is subsumed under 'each of us', so Adam is divested of 'himself'. There is
no Adam, except as 'each of us'. The final result is that the individual
and the race are irreconcilable concepts.
e. The Significance of "Adam"
The discrepancy between this result and Brunner's intention demands
an explanation. It is Brunner's intention to understand the individual and
the race so that one is unthinkable without the other. Why, then, have they
become unthinkable with each other? We might seek the answer to this question
in Brunner's dissatisfaction with the traditional doctrine of Original Sin.
It will be recalled that his reason for attempting a reformulation of the
doctrine consists in the contention that Augustine reduced his explanation
to the level of natural heredity, thereby propounding a determinism which
destroys individual freedom and therefore individual responsibility. The
contention is that Augustine's doctrine rests on a false exegesis of Homans
5:12ff. in which Augustine defined theS> from the Latin in quo ("in
whoa" all have sinned) in terras of the hereditary fact of Adam's position as
.2
the head of the race (in lumbis Adami). The exegetical question involved
1 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, p. 27.
2 MLW p. 121n. E.T. p. 119n.
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here is well described by Srunner as "one of the most difficult tasks of
Biblical theology. But at least two things about the passage see® to be
quite clear. On the one hand, Brunner's accusation of a false exegesis is
entirely credible. The phrase § k«vtes S|».<*pTav is more accurately
translated "in that" (or "for that" or "inasmuch as") "all have sinned",
rather than as the Latin suggests, "in whom all have sinned". The meaning
of the passage is then, as Brunner suggests, "that each of us becomes a
2
sinner by his own act." On the other hand, the significance of Adam as
the one men by whom sin entered the world is also clearly expressed in the
tecct ("So- W&s«£xs lav )• Herein lies the
problem in Brunner's reformulation of the doctrine. He regards this reference
to the origin of sin as a deviation from the consistent emphasis on the power
of sin which is the essential Biblical conception. "The theme of the Bible
is not the historical origin of sin, but the universal and irresistible
3
power of sin as affecting man's being." On this basis, the historical
significance of Adaa is dissolved into a didactic significance, whereby Adam
is not the originator of sin, temporally considered, but rather an illustration
of the universal power of sin. "The story of Adam is one of the means by
which Paul interprets the universality and the power of sin."^- The obvious
conclusion, or rather the pre,supposition, is that each of us by our own actions
is Adam*
Science stimulates us to find a positive and adequate form for
the Biblical message of the origin of Creation and the Pall of
man. Only thus, too, will it be possible to clarify and intensify
our opposition to metaphysical evolutionism. Above all, by this
new formulation it will become clear that when we talk about the
origin of man we are not speaking of a certain man called Adam,
who lived so many thousand years ago, bat of myself, and of
yourself, and of everyone else in the world. 5
1 MLW p. 121n. E.T. p. 119n.
2 Dn p. 114. E.T. p. 99.
3 MiW p. I2ln. E.T. p. 119n. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. p. 91. E.T. p. 88.
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The opposition to "metaphysical evolutionism", as we saw in considering the
doctrine of the Fall, is Brunner's opposition to Schleiemacher's definition
of sin as essentially connected with the sensual element of life, and its
impeding of the development of the spiritual. We now see also that it is an
opposition to the Augustinian doctrine of Original Sin. In terms of his
opposition to Schleiermacher, we identified Brunner's concern with his
rejection of a causal explanation of sin. This may also be said of his
opposition to Augustine. In both cases, a causal explanation means a
natural explanation. The difficulty, however, as often happens in a
formulation which emerges in a polemical context, is that Brunner not only
denies a causal explanation, but denies the significance of the natural as
well* In considering Brunner's rejection of every attempt to spe^k of an
origin of sin, we suggested that he appears to confuse the temporal with the
causal, so that in denying a causal origan of sin a temporal origin was
thereby denied as well. In the present consideration, we seem to be moving
toward the conclusion that there is a confusion of the causal with the
natural. Not only is the Fall divested of all temporal significance, but
Original Sin suffers a similar fate as well in that each man is his own
Adam. Not only does Brunner reject "the one-sidedness with which this one
element [I.e. inheritance] is made the prevailing and, finally, the only
1
element in the doctrine", but rejects this element in itself in his rejection
of Adam. Of course, Brunner cannot maintain this existentialized conception
of Adam consistently. In fact, he specifically contradicts it on at least
one occasion.
The stream of death has its origin in the fall of the first
man. His fall is the fall of all, his death the death of all.
Mankind is a unity, and over humanity rules the inexorable law
1 MiW p. 12U. E.T. p. 123.
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of God that death is part of sin. So it was according to the
story on the first pages of the Bible. In the second chapter
of the book "In the beginning" (i.e. Genesis) the first man
was told by God: lou will die if you eat of the forbidden fruit.
He did not obey the command, he wantonly laid hands on what God
has reserved for himself. The fall was followed by the curse
and the curse in turn by corruption. 1
The contrast between this thoroughly naive picture of Adam and the sophistic-
-ated picture of Adam as the unity of the race, is most striking. It is
instructive to note that this naive interpretation occurs in Brunner's The
letter to the Romans, which was originally written for lay readers. Possibly
this is the real test of a theologian's formulations.
Our conclusion, then, must be that Brunner fails to clarify the
doctrine of Original Sin in terms of his definition of the relationship
between Adam and humanity. The result is that Adam is humanity, and therefore
the collectivism and individualism which he so strenuously wishes to deny
remains the context of his own solution. In the end, the fact that we are
•sons of Adam' pales to insignificance beside the contention that we are,
each one, 'Adam'. The irony of the whole situation is that Brunner reaches
this irapass for precisely the same reason that Augustine's doctrine
supposedly reached the conclusion that heredity is the determinative factor
in the doctrine of Original Sin. That reason is the suspicion of the
sensual. Presumably, in Augustine sin is considered to be inherent in
sexuality, and in procreation. Therefore the "transmission" of sin through
procreation is the dominant factor in the doctrine of Original Sin, and, as
such, overshadows the opposite truth that man becomes a sinner by his own
act. In Brunner, sin is divorced from the sensual in that the important
consideration is the "decision" by which man becomes a sinner. Therefore
1 The Letter to the Romans, tr. H.A. Kennedy (London, 1961), p. 44-
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the fact that man becomes a sinner by his own act is the dominant factor in
the doctrine of Original Sin, and, as such, overshadows the opposite truth
that man is bound in solidarity with all the 30ns of Adam.
C. SINS AND SIN
a. The Bondage of Sin: Ego Totua
The aspect of the doctrine of Original Sin which has concerned us
thus far has been that of the totality of sin in terms of the race, the
universality of sin and the solidarity in sin, the nos toti. We now turn
to the other aspect of the totality of sin, the totality of sin in terms of
the individual, the ego totus. Turning to the question of the ego totus,
we find that Brunner affirms the concept in an uncompromising manner. "The
meaning of sin, Toy its very nature, affects the whole, because it aims at
1
making the whole man "free1." This would seem to indicate that we can
refer to the sinner as being in a "state" of sin. Indeed, Brunner confirms
this - "because it [i.e. sin] concerns God, the fact that this act takes
place means that it has already become 'fate', something which 'wo can do
2
nothing about'." Sin necessarily involves a new state of existence for man.
Because sin involves man's relation to God, it means that once it takes
place, it is unalterable from man's side, it becomes guilt. Man's self-chosen
freedom becomes bondage. He becomes the slave of sin, doomed to be his own
god. But all tiiis can be said only as a secondary affirmation. The primary
affirmation must always be that sin is act. "Sin never becomes a quality or
3
even a substance. Sin is and remains an act." Indeed, "Sin, even as
4
Original Sin, is always actus ..." It is Brunner'a contention that sin is
1 DII pp. 107-8. E.I. p. 94.
2 Ibid. p. 127. E.T. p. 109.
3 MLW p. 149. E.T. p. 143.
4 Ibid. p. 119n. E.T. p. 117n.
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conceived in the Bible primarily as act, and only on that basis is it
conceived as a 'state' or a force.
... both the Old Testament and the teaching of Jesus in the
Synoptic Gospels always speak of sin (or, more correctly, of
sins) in the sense of act, and scarcely ever in the sense of
state of being. ... Only against this background can the
Johannine, and still more the Pauline, doctrine of sin be
rightly 'understood, in which sin is mainly spoken of in the
singular, as a state of being, as a force which dominates man. 1
The contention that the state of sin must be seen in the context of
sin as act raises the question of the relation between sins and sin. The
immediate reaction to Brunner's observation is that there is involved here
a reversal of the traditional order in which sins proceed from the state of
sin. Brunner's emphasis on the 'act' of sin reverses the order so that sin
proceeds from sins. We have seen the difficulty which this involves in terms
of the traditional emphasis on the solidarity of the race, namely, that
Brunner minimizes the significance of the 'acts' of sin committed by others
before me. The present concern is the totality of the individual, that
aspect of the doctrine of sin which has traditionally boon termed 'the
bondage of sin'. Once again, the concern behind Brunner's presentation is
the preservation of responsibility for sin against a causal explanation which
reduces sin to a mechanical determinism. "The statement, 'man is a 3inner',
is neither the major term for the logical conclusion: thus all his acts are
sinful, nor is the fact which it describes, the fact of being a sinner, the
2
cause of his individual sinful actions." The implication of this rejection
of a logical or causal connection between sin and sins might seem to be that
there is no definable relation between being a sinner and committing sins,
but such is not the case. The logical and causal explanations are ruled out
1 ItLW p. Il8n. E.T. p. Il6n.
2 Ibid. p. 147. E.T. p. 147.
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in the interest of responsibility. The sinner is responsible because he
himself sins freely, but he sins freely a® a sinner. "A sinner is not a
human being who has sinned a certain rnsaber of times; he is a human being
1
who sins whatever he is doing." On the surface, this statement might
appear very susceptible to a causal interpretation. This is only a surface
possibility, however, because Brunner does not say that being a sinner causes
sins. Although a sinner "sins whatever he is doing", Brunner apparently
reserves for hira the right to choose his sins, - "the sinner is in principle
capable of avoiding every particular sin. But what he cannot do is this;
2
he cannot not be a sinner." On this explanation, it is difficult to see
why Brunner charges Ritschl with presenting "simply a form of Pelagianism,
intensified by social psychology ... [in that he) ... allows for the
possibility of resisting temptation, and in so doing he eliminates the main
3
element from the Christian doctrine, that of totality." The contention is
that "he applies the psychological theories of *environment' to the problem
A
of sin", and thus employs his concept of the 'kingdom of sin' in this socio-
5
psychological sense as "the true content of the doctrine of Original Sin."
Brunner's interpretation of Ritschl is that his doctrine "could equally
6
well be expressed by the proberb: 'evil communications corrupt good manners'."
One can appreciate that there is some justification for Brunner'a assessment
of Hitachi's doctrine. It is Hitachi's basic maxim that sin "has its
7
sufficient ground in the self-determination of the individual will." But,
on this basis, he defines a concept which seems to come very near to what
Brunner means by the totality of sin - "'the law of sin' in the will is a
1 Mitt. pT 117. E.T. pi 142. 2 DII pp. 130-1. E.T. p. 111. ~~ ~~
3 MiW p. 126. E.T. p. 125. A Ibid. p. 126. E.T. p. 124-
5 Ibid. p. 126. E.T. p. 125- 6 Ibid.
7 Albrecht Hitachi, The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliat-
-ion, tr. H.R. Mackintosh and A.B. MacAulay (Bdin&irgh, 1900), p. 349. "
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result of the necessary reaction of every act of the will upon the direction
of the will-power. Accordingly, by an unrestrained repetition of selfish
resolves, there is generated an ungodly and selfish bias."'*' This certainly
seems to be saying essentially what Brunner says in his reversal of the
traditional order of sin and sins. A distinction may be attempted in terms
of Brunner's phrase "in principle", when he says, "the sinner is in principle
capable of avoiding every particular sin." This would then be seen as a
theoretical representation designed to preserve the reality of responsibility.
What it would then mean is that the sinner 'should be' capable of avoiding
every particular sin, hence he is responsible, but in fact he is not capable
of avoiding every particular sin. This possibility is excluded, however,
by the subsequent assertion that "to be a sinner does not necessarily bring
2
with it the particular sinsj every particular sin in itself can be avoided."
The difficulty in distinguishing this from Ritschl»s contention that "by an
unrestrained repetition of selfish resolves, there is generated an ungodly
3
and selfish bias" is increased immeasurably by the explanation as to what is
involved in this possibility of avoiding sins.
If it (i.e. a particular sin] is committed this increases the
compulsion to sin. If it be avoided, moral freedom is increased.
But the sinful tendency never becomes absolute un-freedora, and
moral freedom never becomes the freedom of not being a sinner. A
The distinction between this and the Ritschlian position, so severely censured
by Brunner, is not easily discernible. The essential difficulty seems to
5
consist in the fact that Brunner, as well as Ritschl, is "a good Kantian",
Both are working with a concept of freedom which is essentially moral. As a
result, the explanation of the independence of sins from sin has the advantage
of being able to account for the virtues of the natural man. The moral
1 Ritschl, p. 349. 2 DII p. 131. E.T. p. 111. 3 Ritschl, p. 349.
A DII p. 131. E.T. pp. 111-112. 5 my p. 125. E.T. p. 124.
freedom which can be increased as well as decreased, depending upon the
refraining from, or the committing of, sins, accounts for the moral virtue
which prevails without the bounds of the Christian Church. It relieves us
of the embarrassment which has been noted by Paul Lshraann in reflecting that
when "one has laboriously settled the credentials of believing, one always
sooner or later is bound to encounter another human being who has never been
baptized and appears to be totally unaware of, or indifferent to, the
koinonia, yet who behaves like the Lord's anointed."^" But in solving this
difficulty, this explanation raises far more serious problems. The whole
question of the relation between morality and faith becomes the crucial issue.
b. Morality and Faith
When we turn to Brunner's statements on the relation "between
morality and faith, wo encounter, once again, the contradiction between a
view of the totality of sin which approximates the Augustinian position, and
a mediating view which claims a relative value for the moral as such. On the
one hand, man has lost freedom for the good. In sin the will over-reaches
itself, and becomes its own slave, free only for itself.
It is a will that wants to be more than it can, and over-reaches
itself by this self-exaltation. In short, it is a freedom that,
through over-estimating itself, becomes a slavery, since there
can be no such thing as freedom apart from God. It follows - and
hero comes in the (so to speak) metaphysical element in evil -
that sin is at the same time lack of freedom for good, the so-
called original sin. 2
On the other hand, this totality is modified in terms of a doctrine of
"radical evil" which sees this "lack of freedom for good" in terras of
"nothing purely good".
... radical evil. That will not mean: that man is through and
through bad, and that there is nothing good in Mm. But that
1 Paul Lehraann, Ethics in a Christian Context (London, 1963) > p» 158-
2 RPh p. 44-. E.T. pp. 89-90.
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there is to be found, in man nothing truly good, nothing purely
good, but in all only a mixture of good and evil; that evil
belongs everywhere with it and at the basis of the situation
of human life. 1
This apparent contradiction between the "lack of freedom for good" and
"nothing purely good" is, however, only apparent. The solution of the
contradiction consists in the realization that "good" is used here in two
senses. In fact, there are two types of good, the Good which consists in
the One, and that which consists in the many. "The Good which consists in
the One is the same as being in God. ... But the Good which consists ...
2
in the Many belongs to the moral category." Herein we reach a central
concept in Brunner's theology, the distinction between the sphere of morality
and the sphere of faith. Picking up a distinction reminiscent of Luther and
Kierkegaard, Brunnar places great emphasis on the fact that "the antithesis
3
of sin is not virtue but faith." The contrast between sin and faith
preserves the doctrine of justification by faith from all work-righteousness.
In the light of the fruitlessness of works for justification, we see the
relativity of the distinction between good and evil. "The knowledge of good
and evil arises only after the Fall." The morally good does not avail in
the sight of God. It is as relative as the morally evil. The only thing
good is faith. This, Brunner presents as the distinctive Christian knowledge,
the central affirmation of the Christian doctrine of justification by faith,
and, as such, the rock of offence on which the Kantian "Religion Within the
Limits of Reason Alone" shatters.
... his [i.e. Kant'2 'radical evil' is only one manifestation
of sin, whose other far wore dangerous manifestation is precisely
that tihich in the thought of Kant is regarded as the Good: the
fact that man does good by his own efforts. The fact that through
the Fall alone man 'knows what is good and evil', that already the
1 Philosophie und Qffenbarung. p. XI. 2 DII p. 129. E.T. p. 110.
3 GuM p. 33. E.T. p. 83. K HPh p. 44. E.T. p. 91.
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difference between good and evil is itself the product of the
contradiction, and therefore is only a relative contradiction
- of all this Kant can know nothing, since on the plane on
which he stands such things cannot be perceived. 1
The contrast between sin aid faith is absolute, the problem of the Good in
the Onej the contrast between vice and virtue is relative, the problem of
the good in the many. The Good in the One is of God, and is known only in
faith. The good In the many is the product of man's moral effort, and does
not avail in God's sight.
Thus far the position is similar to Luther's position as reflected
in his distinction between that which is Good before God and that which is
2
good in the sight of men. However, Brunner goes on from this denial of the
merit of moral goodness before God to the conclusion that therefore moral
goodness is of no concern to God. From the statement that "the morally
good ... does not come under consideration 'before God', in the presence of
the final court of appeal", Brunner passes to the further statement;
God declares the sinner righteous. ... how can God call the
evil man good? God does not do so. lie does not say the evil
man is good; God rather passes over this whole moral formulation
of the question. Being good is of no importance to me now, he
saysj what matters to ae is your being with me. 3
One can appreciate that Brunner is striving to express here the absolutely
unmerited grace of God by which man is justified. But that in order to do
this one must say that "being good is of no importance to me [I.e» God]
now" is not at all obvious, particularly from one who is speaking in the
light of the Cross. What is obvious is that Brunner cannot maintain this
bifurcation of morality and faith in the absolute sense in which it is here
attempted. It is no accident that Brunner is forced to concede : "The
morally good - always understood in this relative sense, which indeed is
1 MIW p. 129. E.T. p. 128. * " "
2 Luther, Sermon; "Concerning Them that are under the Law, and Them that
are under Grace", Sermons on the Ifost Interesting Doctrines of the Gospel
(London, 1330), VII, 243ft. * " """ *
3 The Lotter to the Romans, p. 159.
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expressed in the word 'moral' - is in itself, objectively, naturally in
1
closer correspondence with the will of God then the morally bad." Even
more incongrous is the distinctly positive status he accords the morally
good on at least one occasion. In the broad context of the question of
God's existence, Brunner asserts: "Xou know already that there is a God,
2
for you know that good cannot possibly be the same as evil." That the
good referred to here is none other than the moral good, about which God is
apparently so unconcerned, is confirmed in a subsequent sentence - "To ask
3
... 'Is there a God?' is to fail to be morally serious."
We seers to be involved here with two questions - the distinction
between morality and faith, and the relation of morality to God. Perhaps it
would be more accurate to describe these as two aspects of the one question,
the former being the question of the basis of Brunner's concept of the
relation between morality and faith, the latter being the question of the
significance of this concept. Turning to the first question, we seem to
detect remnants of the position which ia supposedly here refuted. It might
not be entirely incorrect to say that Brunner's emphasis on the absolute
distinction between morality and faith is an opposition to the Kantian
supremacy of morality in the sufficiency of the reason. This is not to deny
that the source of Brunner's emphasis is the Biblical message as mediated by
the Reformers. The point is rather that this emphasis is also partly
polemical in that it is presented as the antithesis of the Kantiai autonomy.
The importance of this polemical aspect ia the emphasis on the sole efficacy
of faith is that it accepts the Kantian definition as valid in its sphere.
Sin belongs to a quite different category from that of vice and
virtue. Vice and virtue belong to the empirical sphere, to that
of the "qualities". But sin, like faith, lies beyond the
1 MiW p. 155. E.T. pp. 154-5.
2 Bnaer Glaube, p. 8. E.T. p. 14-
3 Ibid. p. 10. E.T. p. 15.
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empirical sphere, in the sphere of man's relation to God.
Indeed they are his relation to God; the one is negative
and the other positive. 1
This raises the question of the relation of this "empirical sphere" to God,
and leads us to the second aspect of the whole issue, the question of the
significance of this distinction of spheres for Brunner's formulation. The
immediate answer to the question is that the sphere of vice and virtue has
no positive relation to God. It is the sphere of sin, and, as such, is man's
negative relation to God. The difficulty in this emphasis, as Brunner
develops it, is revealed most acutely when we inquire into the positive side
of the situation, and ask what is the status of the moral in faith? Here we
sense the impact of the Kantian position most acutely. The famous Kantian
maxim, which is reducible to the fomula "I ought, therefore I can", is
reversed by Brunner, from the perspective of faith, to the formula, "I ought,
therefore I cannot." It is Brunner's contention that "the good as duty
(Schuldigkeit) is in itself an omen of the perversion, guilt (Schuld)."2
In terms of the positive side of the situation, this results in an inability,
on Brunner's part, to reconcile love and duty.
Love - and this is the paradox - is the one thing signified in
all these commandments, but by that very fact it cannot be
commanded, and does not come into existence through the Command.
... Love can only be present where it is given, not where it is
commanded. 3
The source of this concept of the irreconcilability of love and duty is not
far to seek. "But as Kant has proved, there is no such thing as love in a
4
legalistic ethic. Love cannot be commanded to appear." The significance
of this dichotomy of love and duty for Brunner's ethic is enormous. The
bifurcation of love and duty leads to a bifurcation of motive and content in
the Christian ethic. The love which cannot be commanded is given in Christ,
1 DII p. 123. E.T. p. 106.
2 RPh p. 44. E.T. p. 90j Cf. also GuM p. 30. E.T. p. 7S.
3 DII pp. 264r-5. E.T. p. 224. 4 GuM p. 30. E.T. p. 78.
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and, as such, constitutes the motive of Christian action. The content of
Christian action, however, is not given in Christ, but rather comes from
"Creation". "So far as motive is concerned, our motto is: 'all from Christ',
but where the concrete demand is formulated the only rule is: loyalty to
the order of creation.""*"
Obviously, it is beyond the scope of our concern to define the
complex relationships existing among the various factors which are involved
in Christian ethics. It is sufficient for our purposes to note the difficulty
which is involved in Brunner's ethical position, and the source of that
difficulty. Briefly stated, the difficulty is that the content of Christian
ethics is presented as being somehow natural to man. The love of neighbour,
which the Christian ethic demands, is both known and not known by the natural
man.
... we know from our conscience that we should love our neighbour
as ourselves. This is what the law tells us in our hearts. But
our knowing it does not guarantee our doing it. Indeed, it doe3
not even guarantee the acknowledgement that we ought to do it. 2
What is lacking in the sphere of vice and virtue, therefore, i3 the motive
which propels man to do what he might well do otherwise. This difficulty
can only be fully appreciated when we recognize the background of Brunner'3
ethic. "Agape, which by the nature of things is entirely incapable of
formulation in a law, has at any rate a rational analogy, the Categorical
3
Imperative ..." Now, this analogy, Brunner contends, is both positive and
negative. Agape is similar to the Categorical Imperative in that it too
prescribes the love of our neighbour. Agape is different from the Categorical
Imperative in that "agape cannot be formulated in general laws. One
A
cannot speak of it as a 'principle'." However, this presentation of the
1 DII p. 267. E.T. p. 226. 2 WGMM p. 7A» 3 Dili E.T. p. 30?
A Ibid. E.T. p. 310.
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negative and positive analogy between the Categorical Imperative and Agape
is not exhaustive. For it is also true that the Categorical Imperative is
purely formal, duty for duty's sake. "A good will is good not because of
what it performs or effects, not by its aptness for the attainment of some
purposed end, but simply by virtue of the volition, that is, it is good In
itself, and considered by itself is to be esteemed much higher than all that
can be brought about by it in favour of any inclination, nay, even of the sum
1
total of all inclinations." As Brunner also recognizes, this goodness of
the will in itself corresponds to the Categorical Imperative conceived as
the pure form of the good will.
It is the knowledge of the divine claim, of the divine call, of
my being spoken to by God, that brings my human dignity to
consciousness. Freedom and responsibility is one and the same
thing.
As you know, certain champions of the Kantian philosophy have
believed that they should deviate from him on this point. This
foundation of morality is purely formal. It Is necessary to
complete it through a material value ethic. Kant has already
sufficiently repelled this objection. What is involved is for
that reason nothing other than that for morality not the 'What',
the material, but the 'Why', the viewpoint, the conviction, is
authoritative. 2
The analogy to Brunner's conception of Agape represented by this formal
motivational Imperative is indeed very positive. It is hardly questionable
that Brunner learned his respect for the supremacy of the formal nature of
ethics from Kant. "That this 'Ought' is purely formal, a 'Ebw' and not a
'What', is no rebuke, but precisely the dignity of the ethical; it should be
orientated toward the 'How1 and not toward the 'What', to the disposition
3
not to the material result." This representation of the Kantian ethic in
terms of its formal nature is so similar to Brunner'3 conception of the
formal motivational nature of Agape in the Christian ethic, that it is
1 Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Hetaphysic of Morals. Ab. p. 10.
2 GPhKK p. 39.
3 RPh p. 32. E.T. p. 68.
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extremely difficult to avoid the conclusion that Brunner is exposed to the
very criticiam which he levels against Kant's ethic.
... yet it remains a defect of this ethical system that it
cannot point out exactly what is the nature of human duty.
... It is undeniable that even Kant had to borrow from the
Eudaemonism he had rejected before he could approach the
problem of the nature of conduct. 1
Brunner's recourse to the "orders of Creation" to give content to the purely
formal motivational ethic which is established by Agape, bears a striking
similarity to that inconsistency with which he charges Kant.
The significance of this conflict of love and duty for Brunner's
understanding of the Law will have to await the next chapter, where account
will be taken of Brunner's dialectic of Law and Gospel. We may note in
passing, without further comment at this point, that this conflict appears
to reflect a confusion of legalism with Law, whereby Law is seen solely in
terms of the sinner, and not at all as a correlate of the creaturely. In
any event, the immediate concern is the light which this conflict between
love and duty sheds on the relationship which Brunner conceives between sin
and sins. The conclusion to which we seem to be moving in this regard is
that sin is God's concern, while sins are man's concern. Man's moral freedom
implies his responsibility for sins. But God's concern, as developed through
Brunner's concept of justification by faith, is not with sins but with sin.
Hence, justification provides the motive, the reversed direction, to which
the moral gives content in terras of man's natural morality of creation. The
irony of the whole position is that it results, in large measure, from the
polemic which Brunner conducted in the interest of justification by faith.
That polemic was so concerned to deny the rational autonomy which makes
1 RPh p. 32. E.T. p. 69
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morality ultimate, that it uncritically accepted the legitimacy of the
offensive position in its own sphere. Through the impact of the Kantian
bifurcation of love and duty, Brunaer minimizes the creaturely status of
man in ascribing duty to sin, "the omen of the perversion". As a result,
the emphasis moves from responsibility for sin to responsibility for guilt.
At this point the anti-Kantian polemic has exerted a profound influence on
the formulation of the Christian faith. This is the concern of the next
chapter.
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CHAPTER V I—THOU AND SOLA GRATIA
The centrality of "responsibility" in Brunner's theology suggests
that he deviates from the Reformation principle of sola gratia. We have
detected two lines of thought running throughout Brunner's presentation: one
reflecting the sola gratia principle of the Reformers, and the other revealing
a certain sympathy with moral Idealism, particularly as it has been
formulated by Kant. The admixture of these two perspectives has been most
significant with regard to the emphasis which Brunner places on responsibility.
On the one hand, this terra can be used in the context of the sola gratia
principle as an affirmation that man owes his being to God. On the other
hand, it can be used in the context of moral Idealism as an affirmation
that man is "in himself1' answerable. This admixture of what we have called
moral and religious responsibility, represents the central difficulty in
Brunner's theology. We have already suggested that it is the ambiguity
inherent in this term which facilitates Brunner'a division of man into a
formal and a material image. We have also seen that Brunner's sympathy with
Idealism is reflected In his treatment of the Pall and Original Sin, wherein
the former lacks an adequate historical reference, and the latter ultimately
sacrifices solidarity in sin for the more rational universality of sin. It
now remains for us to exanine Brunner's pronouncements on the subject of
responsibility, and allied issues, in the light of the Reformation principle
of sola gratia.
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A. BRUNNER AT© THE REFORMATION
a. Sola Gratia
Brunner is first and foremost a theologian in the tradition of the
Reformers. The primary perspective of his theology is that of the sola
gratia principle.
... grace can be no individual moment of faith, no particular
"locus" within Christian doctrine. Rather it is the distinctive
all-determining point of view for every Christian statement of
faith. 1
This primary and pervasive character of grace is affirmed in connection with
both the manner of becoming Christian and of being Christian. In regard to
the former, salvation is by grace alone. "The man to whom the message is
proclaimed is utterly a lost one. He is saved sola gratia, through Jesus
2
Christ alone." In regard to the matter of being Christian, the question
of ethics, Brunner's position is equally clear. "... my own thesis: the
sola gratia, sola fide, soli deo gloria is the only solid foundation for
3
ethics." Indeed, Brunner regarded his massive treatise on Christian ethics,
Das Gebot und die Ordnungen, as an attempt to recover the major emphases of
4
the Reformation.
Within the common concern of the Reformers for the sola gratia
principle, it is Luther's formulation of the issues which most appeals to
Brunner. Indeed, he affirms that Luther's grasp of the Pauline doctrine of
justification distinguishes him "as the congenial interpreter of the Apostle
Paul and as the one teacher who in all the Church is nearest to the mind of
5
Christ." It might seem extravagant to single out this one man for such a
unique position, when there have been so many outstanding interpreters of
1 "Gnade Gotten", Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart "(Ttlbingen, '1928},
II, 1262.
2 "Banalit&t oder Irrlehre", Kirchenblatt iHr die ref. Schwelz, 96, No. 17
(1940), p. 263.
3 TofC p. 68. 4 GuO p. 36. E.T. p. 99. 5 Dili E.T. p. 191.
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"the mind of Christ", and yet it is an honest acknowledgment of Brmmer's
allegiance. Consequently he builds his own theology on the foundation laid
by Luther. Thus he affirms "Luther's understanding of justifying faith as
the centre of the message of Christ and as the criterion of all faith, and
it is this which is the fundamental plan on which our Dogmatics are built.
Thus it will be Inther who will concern us in our effort to evaluate
Brunner's development of the sola gratia principle.
b« Against Synergism
A raajor concern of the sola gratia principle is expressed in
Brunner's opposition to synergism, the tendency to regard the work of
salvation as a co-operative effort in which man aid God are seen as partners.
In Brunner's estimation, this tendency is rightly concerned with the human
response to God's gracious action on man's behalf, but it fails to do justice
to the fact that even that response of man is a work of grace.
... synergism doubtless Intends to stress the personal character
of the act of appropriation, but it does not understand the
comprehensive character of grace. It does not understand that
it is due to grace that we can thus respond to God. 2
This concern of Brunner's for the '•'comprehensive character of grace", which
involves even the human response, is significant. For, in terms of his
emphasis on "responsibility", we might suspect that he himself will fail to
do justice to this fact. Thus it is important to note that he is concerned
vrith sola gratia in this comprehensive sense.
The dangers of synergism are seen by Brunner on two fronts, that
of Roman Catholic and orthodox theology in their "objectivism", and of
liberal theology in its "subjectivism". In the Roman Catholic concepts of
1 Dili E.T. p. 210.
2 GuO p. 587. E.T. p. 608.
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sacrament and authority, Brunner sees "a tendency of man's spirit and will
to get something into his power - to manipulate it like an object in definite
ways and within definite limits - something which by Its very nature is not
under human control."* This "objectivism" represents an attempt of man to
assign to himself a more positive role in the divine economy than is possible
within the framework of grace. Not only is this seen in the lioman Catholic
"divinization" of the Church by the concepts of sacrament and authority,
but also in orthodox Protestantism in its "divinization" of the human witness
to the Word contained in Scripture. It is Brunner's charge that orthodoxy,
with its doctrine of verbal inspiration, neglects the truth that "the Word
2
of God is no disposable object, but a free gift of grace", in its identificat-
-ion of the Word of God with the human words of Scripture. It is beyond the
scope of our concern to investigate the legitimacy of these charges against
Roman Catholicism and orthodox Protestantism. It is sufficient for our
purposes to note that Brunner is concerned to affirm the freedom of God over
both Church and Scripture.
On the other hand, the extreme opposite of this objectivizing
tendency also qualifies for the charge of synergism. The "subjectivism" of
liberal theology, represented by Schleiermacher, displays the same tendency
to arrogate to man what properly belongs to God. In contrast to the solus
of the Reformers, Schleierraacher's primary word is "and".
Their [i.e. the Reformers]} life-work is nothing other than a
giant commentary on this one word solus. That is their theology.
But if an "and" steps in its place, so is nothing less than
everything they fought for surrendered, and it would be merely
a tragic-comical misunderstanding, if to this end would be set
as one member of the synthesis, even the faith whose content it
is to exclude this and every "and". 3
1 VaB pp. 15-6. E.T. p. 71.
2 Ibid. p. 17. E.T. p. 72.
3 MuW p. 391.
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Again, it is not within our province to evaluate Brunner's assessment of
Sehleiermacher. It is sufficient to note that, in his opinion, liberal
theology erred in the direction of synergism in its principle of continuity
whereby that which is properly of God was arrogated to man.
Thus Brunner's opposition to synergism occupies two fronts, the one
which he characterizes as "objectivism", and the other as "subjectivism".
But this opposition goes beyond a quarrel with extreme tendencies. It is not
Brunner's concern to strike a middle path between the errors of subjectivism
1
and objectivism. On the contrary, his position challenges the whole
foundation of the object-subject antithesis. Brunner states his thesis thus:
"the use of the object-subject antithesis is understanding the truth of faith
and furthermore in the church generally is by no means self-evident; on the
2
contrary, it is a disastrous misunderstanding." Positively ecxpressed,
Brunner's position affirms the personal category of faith and grace, as
opposed to the inadequate category of the object-subject antithesis. The
latter, according to Brenner, belongs to the causal sphere, and thus falsifies
the understanding of matters of faith which are essentially personal. "A
personal relation simply cannot be rendered by the causal idea which belongs
3
to the sphere of things." This distinction between the causal and the
personal, or between things and persons, is pivotal for Brenner' s position,
and consequently will warrant further attention. At present it is sufficient
to notice that it is presented in the interests of the sola gratia principle,
and in opposition to synergism. It is Brunner's contention that his
"personalism" transcends the antithesis of subject and object, and in so
doing avoids the synergistic calculation of divine and human shares In matters
of faith. "All attempts to estimate the respective shares of the divine
1 WaB pp. 30-1. E.T. p.
2 Ibid. p. H. E.T. p. 69.
3 DEE p. 131. E.T. p. 154-
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subject and the human in faith and in the new life of the Christian are idle
and instead of serving to clarify have done injustice now to this side and
now to the other.Whether, in fact, Brunner is able to formulate this
trans-subj ect-obj ect position satisfactorily so that he does justice to the
truth in both sides, is our central concern. In any event, this is the
task he sets himself.
c. Against Passivism
The sola gratia principle must be rescued not only from the errors
of synergism, but also, according to Brunner, from the errors of passivism,
the assumption that if all is of grace then man is merely acted upon and is
in no way active in the affairs of faith. "On the other hand [i.e. in
addition to the error of synergism] a doctrine of grace which obscures this
personal element by the use of naturalistic images of appropriation for the
2
sake of the objectivity of grace is just as incorrect ..." In this area,
Brunner's favourite corrective consists in distinguishing between miracle
and magic as images for describing the operation of grace. "The creation of
3
the new creature is indeed a miracle of God, but not magic." It is his
concern to retain the sola gratia without thereby depreciating the
importance of, and the necessity for, the human response. In this he claims
to be presenting a thoroughly Biblical account of the operation of grace.
"It is entirely contrary to the Biblical doctrine that in faith ... man
should be 'wholly passive' . .."^
This concern for the human response brings Brunner into conflict
with the Reformers. For, in his estimation, the Reformers erred in their
concern for the sola gratia principle in that they depreciated the
1 Dili E.T. p. 13-
2 GuO pp. 587-8. E.T. p. 603.
3 OuM p. 36. E.T. p. 86; MLW p. 479- E.T. p. 486; GuO p. 143- E.T. p. 159.
4- MiW p. 517. E.T. p. 537.
237
significance of the human response. "It was especially the Reformers1
interest in the 'sola gratia*, the desire to get rid of all traces of
synergism, which led them to understand man as a mere object of Grace, and
thus faith simply as the working of divine Grace.""'' It is Brunner's
contention that the Reformers concluded from the true perception that "man
is solely receptive" in faith that man is purely passive. Receptivity was
replaced by the causal notion of "purely effected", so that "God [became]
2
the cause, faith the effect." This, according to Brunner, is quite
understandable. For the Reformers must be seen in terms of "their struggle
against their sole opponents - the open liberalism of the Humanists and the
3
disguised liberalism of Catholic theology ..." In this light, it is easy
to see why they should have approached a deterministic view of the operation
of grace. But this carries with it the Implication that their position
needs to be amended. Indeed, Brunner affirms that the task of theology
today is precisely the opposite of that which faced the Reformers, the task,
namely, of correcting the deterministic tendency which has permeated theology
since the Reformation.
It may seem curious that Brunner, who says so much about modem
4
aan*s pathological concern for freedom, should regard it as the task of
theology to take account of this very element. Certainly, if his evaluation
of modern history in terms of a movement of emancipation is accurate, then
it would seam that the theologian today is faced with a liberalism, or
"libertinism", far more pervasive than anything encountered by the Reformers.
However, this is Brunner's evaluation of the situation, and it is Important
to note that it represents an opposition to the Reformers, whose basic
1 DI E.T. p. 315.
2 Ibid*
3 MLV p. 254. E.T. pp. 256-7.
4 "Freihe.it als Verantworfclichkeit", pp. 353ff•
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principles Brunner accepts. For Brunner does not claim simply to be re¬
affirming the Reformation position. On the contrary, in the light of
present knowledge, particularly in the field of anthropology, Brunner has
concluded that "it would be impossible to re-affirm the Reformation position
and to go no further.""'' And it is precisely on this question of the
passivity of man, or of the "freedom" of man, that Brunner parts company
2
with the Reformers. In this concept we find the central concern of
Brunner's theology.
It is decisively Biblical that in the knowledge of God his
omnipotence and absoluteness are maintained together with
this freedom of his creaturely counterpart, and every attempt
to deny this face-to-face relationship for the sake of a
supposed exalting of the divine omnipotence will be rejected. 3
It is Brunner's goal to formulate the sola gratia principle so as to take
account of the response of man, and to do that without prejudicing the sola
gratia principle itself. "Man is not an equal partner, for he can only say
»Xes' because he has already received the 'lea' of God as a gift; and yet he
4
is to be a real partner, who may, and indeed should, say 'lee'." It is the
error of passivism which really sparks Brunner's concern for a balanced
exposition of the sola [gratia, principle. In fact, so concerned is he to
refute this error that he will risk the other extreme, the error of synergism.
"We ourselves have also something to do here, whether this is labelled
5
synergism or not."
Recalling Brunner's rejection of synergism, where we saw that he
emphasizes that even the response of man is of grace, we can appreciate that
his passionate concern for the restatement of the significance of that
response, so as to exclude all elements of passivism, sets him a most
challenging task. His method, as we have suggested, is to develop a
1 MiW "Vortwort" p. IS." E.T.' "Forward" p. 10. 2 Ibid.
3 WaB p. 42. E.T. p. 96. 4 DII p. 255. E.T. p. 216.
5 Dili E.T. p. 282.
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personalistic conception of grace and faith, which, in his estimation,
transcends the object-subj ect antithesis. To this formulation we now turn.
D. THE I-THOU FRAMEWORK
a. Rational and Pergonal
Although Brunner's concern to develop the sola gratia principle
in a manner which avoids tho error of passivism in regard to the human
response to God's gracious action on man's behalf is, in his estimation, a
corrective to the passivity involved in the development of the doctrine by
the Reformers themselves, it is not in this context that Brunner's
reformulation takes shape. Rather his development of the theme reflects a
continuous battle with the rationalistic Zeitgeist. Brunner develops the
category of the personal as a contrast to the rational. In this context,
the personal is defined as the other-than-I which I can know only in so far
as it reveals itself to me. "A person is a being of such a kind that -we
cannot ourselves think it, but it reveals itself to us in an act of
1
revelation." This is true of both the person of God and the person of our
fellow-man. "The personality of God, which is the opposite of a God-idea,
2
is His being over against us." The same is true of the personality of our
fellow-man, although obviously there is a difference between the being of
man as person and the being of God as person. The difference, according to
Brunner, is the difference between the absolute and the relative. God alone
is absolutely personal, and therefore remains unknown until He reveals Himself.
Man, on the other hand, is only relatively personal. His uniqueness is
relative, for he is a member of a genus. Therefore we can know something
1 The Scandal of Christianity, p. 41.
2 t&w p. 30.
about man, irrespective of their willingness to reveal themselves, although
true knowledge of men, like true knowledge of God, also depends on their
self-revelation. "The mystery of human personality is not absolute; it is
only relative, because it is not only 'other than I1 but 'the same as I1."
This contrast between the rational and the personal involves
several antitheses by which Brunner distinguishes the two categories. The
first of these is found In the contention that the rational i3 essentially
solitary, whereas the personal is essentially social.
The truth of reason is the truth which everyone can say to
himself ... It lies therefore In the essence of reason, which
sets itself up as the ultimate instance, that it isolates man.
Everyone is a complete man In himself. 2
In contrast to this, the personal is essentially a social category in that
3
man cannot be truly personal in isolation, but only in community. Secondly,
the rational is not only autonomous, but possessive, whereas the personal is
exposed to the challenge of the other. "All that I think ... can, as
4-
something I think, only confirm my autonomy." On the other hand, the
category of the personal issues a direct challenge to my self-sufficiency.
Reality begins where I am "disturbed" in my thinking and
dreaming solitude by what is outside of me, what is not me,
where my thoughts encounter resistance. But nature, which
is impersonal, cannot disturb this solitude, for I can
include It too in my thought and become Its master through
thought. It is, on the contrary, what lies beyond me as
the source of independent speech and will - the Thou, which
really "disturbs" me and thus calls in question ray autonomy. 5
Thirdly, the rational is the sphere of proof, whereas the personal is the
sphere of decision. "Xou cannot prove personal truth, you can only believe
it; and similarly you cannot believe impersonal truth, you can only prove
6
it." Proof excludes decision. For "where the proof rules there is nothing
1 DI E.T. pV 122. 2 Das Grundproblem der Ethik, p. 11.
3 GuO p. 230. E.T. p. 296. K DIH E.T. p. 143. 5 Ibid.
6 WA p. 27.
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to decide." Fourthly, the rational is ahistorical, whereas the personal is
properly the sphere of history. "There is a vital connexion between the
2
personal and history." Just as the personal represents that ■which is other
than I, so too history, according to Brunner, involves a contingency which
shatters ray rational systematizing.
The thinking of reason in the traditional sense is ahistorical.
It deals with substantives and not with verbs. In philosophy
the substantive dominates, but in the Bible the verb, the word
expressing activity. The Word of God is always word and deed,
history. Conversely, in philosophy, history is an alien and an
embarrassment. Only through Christianity did it enter into
philosophy, but even here this happened only in appearance.
Like history, personalis® is an alien and an embarrassment in
philosophy, for one cannot think a person. 3
Fifthly, the rational lies with ray initiative, whereas the personal sets me
in a secondary position of response. "The God of philosophy is by definition
an idea acquired by man's own thinking. The initiative is entirely with
man. On the other hand, the persontil depends on the divine initiative.
"Man becomes truly personal only when he is addressed by the Word of God,
that is in faith."5
The contrast between the rational and the personal is essentially
a contrast between a subject-object antithesis and a subject-subject frarae-
-work. Brunner's whole position rests on the contention that a subject-
subject framework can more adequately express the working of grace and the
phenomenon of faith, than can a subject-object antithesis. In this
reformulation, the reality of grace and faith is presented in terms of the
category of "personal correspondence", in contrast to the passivity which
has been associated with the sola gratia principle; and the truth of grace
and faith is presented in terms of the category of "truth as encounter",
1 Das Grundproblam der Ethik, p. 24.
2 MiW p. 437. E.T. p. 446. 3 WaB E.T. p. 25.
A The Scandal of Christianity, p. 35. 5 W&M p. 30.
1
in contrast, to the autonomous self-sufficiency of rationalist philosophy.
It is Brunner's contention that "our understanding of the message of salvat-
-ion and also of the church's task is still burdened with the subject-object
2
antithesis, which originated in Greek philosophy." In contrast to this
"Greek" outlook, Brunner contends that "the Biblical conception of truth is2
3
truth as encounter." It is the predicament of our Western culture that we
have inherited the essentially personalistic Hebrew outlook of Scripture
4
through the medium of the impersonal thought forms of Greek philosophy.
Consequently Brunner sets himself the task of restating the fundamental
truths of the faith in a subject-subject framework. Thus his battle is
essentially against "rationalism". Proceeding in terms of the antitheses
between the rational and the personal which we outlined above, Brunner
strives to erect a framework for theology which transcends the subject-
object antithesis.
Obviously we are not confronted hare by a simple alternative
between object-subject and subject-subject. Brunner is aware of the
unavoidability of the "objective".
The Biblical understanding of truth cannot be grasped through
the object-subject antithesis: on the contrary, it is falsified
through it. This does not mean, to be sure, that we should avoid
using this conception, since it is indispensable for natural-
rational knowing, or that we can do without it in every respect;
indeed we should have to stop thinking altogether if we entirely
gave up using it. The thesis does mean, however, that where the
heart of faith is concerned - the relation between God's Word
and faith, between Christ and faith - the objective-subjective
correlation must be replaced by one of an entirely different
kind. 5
The result is that, in Brunner's estimation, "the theologian is really a
1 An interesting internal analysis of Brunner's development of the respective
spheres of Being and Truth is presented by Roman Roessler in Person und
Glaube: Per Personalisiaura der Gottesbeziehung bei Emil Brunner (Mlinchen,
2 WaB "Vortworfc". E.T. "forward to the First Edition" p. 2. 3 Ibid.
4 "The Significance of the Old Testament for Our Faith", The Old Testament
and Christian Faith, ed. B.W. Anderson (London, 1964), pp* 247-8.
5 WaB p. 14* E.T. pp. 69-70.
wanderer between two worlds." As a believer, he transcends the object-
subject antithesis} as a thinker, "he remains between the tongs (so to say)
of the object-subject antithesis", even though "his 'theme' ... lies beyond
2
what can be comprehended by means of the object-subject correlation." Yet
the theologian is essentially a thinker, for it is not faith, but thought,
which distinguishes him as a theologian. "The great theologian does not
differ from the rest of the members of the Church by his greater faith, but
3
by his greater powers of thought in the service of faith." Thus we should
expect that the object-subject antithesis will play a major role in the work
of the theologian. let this is precisely what Brunner is striving to avoid.
He is faced with the formidable task of expressing in thought what, in his
view, is opposed to thought, the truth which is real only in encounter.
This contrast between the rational and the personal, between the
object-subject antithesis and the subject-subject framework, represents the
foundation thought of Brunner'3 theology. In general terms, his presentation
of the contrast evokes two contradictory reactions. First, it is evident
that there is something vital at stake here. The "personal" is a key category
of Christian theology. Indeed, the antitheses Brunner presents between the
rational and the personal express definite contrasts between the Hebrew and
Greek perspectives. Thus we can expect to find a decisive contribution to
Christian theology in this concern for the "personal". Secondly, while the
personal represents a key category of Christian theology, we must hold some
reservations about Brunner's formulation of the personal as the antithesis
to the rational. It must be questioned whether the contrast between the
personal and the rational is quite so ultimate as Brunner at times seems to
1 WaB p. 62. E.T. p. 113.
2 Ibid. p. 61. E.T. p. II3*
3 DI E.T. p. 73-
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suggest. For example, it may be that what is involved here is a contrast
between the personal and the rational as it is understood in idealism, and
not a contrast between the rational and personal per se. Brenner's definition
of reason seems to suggest this. "Reason is the abstract way of thinking
which is concerned with argument; this is its character in so far as it refers
1
to idea, law, value and norm." Or, "in knowing the subject always remains
2
greater than the object, because he is the enclosing not the enclosed." It
is not our concern to evaluate the merits or demerits of any particular
episteraology as a servant of theology. However, it is worth noting that
Brunner' a emphasis on the subj ect-subj act framework, and the corresponding
demarcation of the spheres of the rational and the personal, reflects a
rather limited view of reason. The crucial question here is not essentially
one of philosophical epistemology, bit of the subject matter of theology.
We must ask: Does this subject-subject framework provide an adequate
framework for Christian theology?
b. The Adequacy of the I-Thou
The subj ect~3ubject framework is the formal framework in which
Brunner constructs his theology. In concrete terms this is the I-Thou
framework. This means for theology that "I am 'I* only because, and in so
3
far as, God addresses me as 'thou'." On the human plane it means that "the
'I' cannot be personal over against an •it*, but only when it is confronted
4
by the 'Thou1." Brunner's development of the I-Thou framework as an
antithesis to rationalism raises the question as to the place of "reason"
in this framework. But in addition to this preliminary question, there are
other more specific questions, two of which are of particular concern to our
1 MiW p. 241. E.T. p. 244.
2 "Psychologic und Weltanschauung"> NSR, 22, Heft 1 (1929), p. 5.
3 GuO p. 137. E.T. p. 153. 4 Ibid. E.T. p. 191.
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subject. First, the pronounced emphasis on the personal represented by the
I-Thou framework raises the question as to the significance of the impersonal
dimension of life. Secondly, the employment of the I-Thou framework as a
means of distinguishing the Christian conception of the God-man relation
from non-Christian, and particularly philosophical, conceptions, is Incomplete
in itself. The crucial question is: What is the nature of thi3 I-Thou
relation? Both questions stem from the initial formulations of the I-Thou
by its two outstanding exponents, Martin Buber and Ferdinand Ebner. Buber's
formulation is concerned with the distinction between the I-Thou and the
I-It dimensions of life. Ebner's development of the theme is concerned with
the nature of the I-Thou relation in his contention that the I and the Thou
are related through the medium of the word. Consequently a brief examination
of these respective formulations may facilitate our understanding of Brunner's
employment of the I-Thou framework.
The initial reaction provoked by Buber's I and Thou is that one is
here dealing with a mystic poet who does not communicate so much in logically
reasoned thoughts as in poetic images. If it is justifiable to reduce Buber's
poetic descriptions to a rational formulation, then we might summarize his
work as an attempt to distinguish the I-Thou from the I-It dimension of life.
Yet it is the poetic flavour which predominates, so that one risks misinterpret-
-ing Buber by setting his poetry in the strait-j acket of logic. One fact,
however, does appear clearly, that is, that the distinction between the I-Thou
and the I-It is not quite so absolute as some of Brunner's statements on the
subject would seem to suggest. On the whole, the two relations are integrated,
so that the translator's warning in the "Introduction" to the English text of
246
I and Thou is quite appropriate.
It is certainly necessary that I should warn the reader against
a too facile assumption of these distinctions as involving clear-
cut divisions between two worlds in which man may move. There is
one world, which is twofold; but this twofoldness cannot be
allocated to (let us say) on the one hand the scientist with a
world of It and (let us grey) on the other hand the poet with a
world of Thou. Rather, this twofoldness runs through the whole
world, through each person, each human activity. 1
In terms of reasoned thought, then, Buber is concerned to
distinguish the I-Thou and the I-It dimensions of life without abstracting
from the complexity of real life in which the two dimensions are intimately
related. He can do this because of his poetical outlook. In this connection,
the key phrase in Ruber's presentation is "presence". The I-It dimension of
life, as well as the I-Thou dimension, is "exclusively present".
Take knowledges being is disclosed to the man who is engaged in
knowing, as he looks at what is over against him. He will,
indeed, have to grasp as an object that which he has seen with
the force of presence, he will hare to compare it with objects,
establish it in its order among classes of objects, describe
and analyse it objectively. Only as It can it enter the
structure of knowledge. But when he saw it, it was no thing
among things, no event among events, but exclusively present. 2
The significance of this poetical outlook for theology consists in the fact
that when we move from the sphere of objects or of fellow human beings to
that of God, we are left with a conception of God which can only be described,
as sheer presence itself.
God cannot be inferred in anything - in nature, say, as: its
author, or in history as its master, or in the subject as the
self that is thought in it. Something else is not "given" and
God thai elicited from it; but God is the Being that is directly,
most nearly, and lastingly, over against us, that may properly
only be addressed, not expressed. 3
It is curious that the I-Thou framework, which Brunner regards as
the decisive category for the Christian message, should have been developed
1 R. Gregor Smith, "Translator's Preface to the Second Edition" of Martin
Ruber's I and Thou (Edinburgh, 1966), p. ±x.
2 Martin Buber, l""and Thou, p. 40.
3 Ibid. pp. SO-1.
247
first by a Jewish scholar. This would seem to indicate that, while the
category may represent a fair means for interpreting the Old Testament
narrative where the thought is often "I am the Lord thy God" and "Thou art
my people", we can anticipate difficulties in reconciling the I-Thou
framework with the New Testament concept of the Mediator. Yet we do not
have to move to the New Testament to question the legitimacy of the category
as Buber develops it. For as Brenner has noted: "Buber's concept of faith
does not make it clear that even Old Testament faith is an answer to God's
1
action in historical events and in the prophetic Word." There is good reason
to concur with Brenner's estimation that behind this neglect of the "historical"
element in faith there lies a more fundamental problem in terras of Buber's
view of man.
In this connexion a conversation with Martin Buber has remained
in my memory as significant. We spoke about sin. He opposed
sharply the New Testaaent concept, above all, the Pauline concept
of sin, because he saw in this a slur cast upon man's respons-
-ibility to himself and his freedom. 2
There can be little doubt that, in spite of his emphasis on the "Thouness" of
life, Buber i3 working with a concept of man as subject which relegates the
relation to the 'Thou' to a peripheral consideration in comparison to the
importance of the 'I'. Mm is defined as a responsible being in the sense
3
that responsibility refers to "a man holding his ground before reality".
This consideration hardly dismisses Buber's contribution to the understanding
of human life by means of the I~Thou framework. It does mean, however, that
we cannot look to Buber for assistance in understanding how the 'I* and 'Thou'
are to be related. It is sufficient for our purposes to have seen the concern
behind his formulation, and the problems which it raises, particularly the
1 DHI E.T. p. 161. "
2 Ibid.
3 Martin Buber, Between Man and Man, tr. R. Gregor Smith (London, 1961), p. 43•
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problem of the 'I-It' dimension of life within this framework# For an
appreciation of what is involved in the actual * I-Thou * relation itself as
it is applied to the God-man relation, we turn to the second outstanding
exponent of this category, Ferdinand Ebner.
In contrast to Buber's poetical presentation of the ' I-Thou', Ebner's
development of the category is decidedly concrete. This concreteness is
displayed in his concern for the nature of the *I-Thou1 relation, a concern
which issues in the affirmation that the "word" is the medium by which the *1*
is related to the 'Thou'. Efcmer crystallizes his basic position in the
"Forward" to his book, Das Wort und die geistigm Realitfeten, in such a
comprehensive manner that it must be quoted in full.
It does not appear entirely superfluous to me, here in the
Forward, to bring the fundamental thought of the Fragments to as
brief a formula as possible. This fundamental thought is: pre-
-supposed that human existence in its kernel has a spiritual
existence generally, viz., one which is not exhausted in its
natural manifestation in the course of world events) presupposed
that one may speak of something spiritual in man otherwise than
in the sense of a fiction of a poetic or metaphoric nature, or
demanded completely on 'social* grounds: then this is essentially
determined thereby, that it is fundamentally connected with
something outside of it, through which and in which it exists.
An expression, and indeed, an "objectively" tangible expression
of dependence on a relation of such a kind, and one that is
therefore accessible to objective knowledge, is to be found in
the fact that man is a speaking being, that he "has the word".
He does not, however, have the word on a natural or social basis.
Society in the human sense is not the presupposition of speech,
but rather itself has as the presupposition of its existence,
that the word is lodged in man. If then, in order to have a
word for it, we call this spirituality in man, I, and that which
is outside of him, in relation to which the *1* exists, thou, we
must remember that this I and this thou are given to us precisely
through the word, and in its "inwardness") not, however, as
empty word in which dwells no relationship to reality ... but
rather as a word that "reduplicates" its content and real form in
the concreteness and actuality of its being spoken in and through
the situation created by speech. That, in brief, is the
fundamental thought. 1
1 Ferdinand Ebner, pqg Vfort m& .dj.9 ggjgtjgga JtofilltatCQ (Innsbruck, 19211,
pp. 12-13.
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Basically, Ebner's contention is that the fact of human speech has spiritual
significance. This evaluation of the fact of speech is conveyed by the sub¬
title of his book, "Rieumatologische ffra&aente". 'I-Thou' i3 essentially a
spiritual category. Fbr any consideration of the 'I1 in itself is concerned
with the "psychological I". The 'I' which stands in relation to the 'Thou'
1
is the "spiritual I". In this connection, "the word i3 the vehicle of the
2
relation between the I and the Thou." Consequently the fact that man has
words, the ability of speech, is of spiritual significance.
In this concentration on the capacity for speech we encounter both
a theme which is prominent in Brunner's theology and the central problem
posed by Elmer. Elmer's development of the 'word' as the vehicle of the
'I-Thou' relation assumes that the fact of speech has spiritual significance.
This assumption is developed in contrast to a psychological view of man which
treats of him in isolation. But while the spirituality of man is clearly
differentiated from his psychological existence, it is not clear just how
this spirituality functions beyond the sphere of the human 'I-Thou' encounter.
Elmer does not 3eem to concern himself with the problem of defining the
relation between human words and the Word of God. Indeed, he seems to assume
a basic continuity between the two.
The logos of John's Gospel is rightly translated in the pneumatolog-
-ieal sense, which is the only sense which comes into consideration
here, with word, verbum. And this "Word" is also in no way meant as
image and symbol for the only-begotten Son of God, but may and must
be understood "wordly". 3
Thus while Ebner provides a concrete medium for the 'I-Thou' relation, which
is lacking in Buber's formulation, he raises the question as to how this
medium in the human ' I-Thou' relation is differentiated from the medium in
1 Ebner, p. 96.
2 Ibid. p. 77.
3 Ibid. pp. 78-9.
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the divine-huraan 'I-Thou' relation. It seems that Ebner leaves this area
undeveloped. It is at this point that Brunner's development of the 'I-Thou'
framework begins.
We have already encountered the difficulty which Brunner's concern
for the "capacity for words" raised in the debate with Barth. In that
connection, Brunner clarified his position by explaining that it was merely
the fact of human speech which concerned him, and that he regarded that as
an Indirect point of contact for the Word of God In so far as proclamation of
the Word presupposes a knowledge of grammar and an appreciation for the
logical development of thought. We must now examine this concern for human
speech more closely in the light of the 'I-Thou' framework. For in Brunner's
development of the 'I-Thou', he regards the relation between the »I* and the
'Thou' as essentially twofold: on the one hand, it is accomplished through
speech, and on the other hand, through responsibility. "Speech is reason-
1 < 2
in-community", and "community is simply responsibility in its concrete form."
At this point we must observe a subtlety in the German language which is not
approximated in English. In German, i»rd, answer, and responsibility, all
derive from the same root - Wort, Antwort, Verantwortlichkeit. Thus there is
a connection in the German language between the capacity for speech and
responsibility for which the closest parallel in English is the similarity
between answer and answerability. In other words, we are confronted by an
inherent connection between the spheres of speech and of morality. Thus the
critical question, in view of Brunner's designation of speech and responsibility
as the distinctive characteristics of the 'I-Thou' relation, is: Does man's
ability for speech also involve an ability for moral self-assertion? In terms
of the distinction between the human 'I-Thou* relation and the divine-human
1 MiW p. 176. E.T. p. 176.
2 Ibid. p. 139. E.T. p. 138.
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11-Thou1 relation, the question becomes: Does the fact that man can respond
to words also imply that he can respond to the Word? We have already seen
that there is difficulty in Brunner's theology in distinguishing between
moral and religious responsibility. It is in terms of this difficulty that
the adequacy of Brunner's formulation of the 'I-Thou' relation will have to
be assessed.
In addition to the question as to the nature of the ' I-Thou' relation,
and the meaning of 'responsibility', raised by Ebner's development of the
category in terms of the medium of the word, Buber's distinction between the
'I-Thou' and the 'I-It * dimensions of life also raises a question which is
significant in Brunner's development of the 'I-Thou*. Brunner develops the
category in contrast to the rationalistic Zeitgeist. In this context, his
distinction between the two dimensions, the 'I-Thou' and the 'I-It', seems to
be much more pronounced than it is in Buber's presentation. Consequently
this raises the question as to the significance of the 'I-It1 dimension.
This too has already been encountered in our previous analysis in the form of
Brunner's "law of closeness of relation", by which he distinguishes between,
the spheres of the personal and the impersonal. We suggested that this
principle offered a promising means of accounting for man's continuing greatness
in spite of 3in, while still preserving the affirmation of the totality of
sinj but we also acknowledged that it is a most delicate matter as to how one
distinguishes between the personal and the impersonal. In the evaluation of
Brunner's development of the 'I-Thou' framework, we must concern ourselves
with the question as to the success of his differentiation of these respective
elements.
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These, then, represent the central issues in the 'I-Thou' frame-
-work as Brunner develops lti the question as to the nature of the 'I-Thou'
relation, and the question as to the significance of the * I-It1 dimension
within this framework. But these are not two separate issues, rather they
are intimately related. Consequently it would represent an artifical
abstraction to pursue the two questions independently of one another.
Instead, we shall seek to analyse Brunnar's development of the 'I' and the
•Thou' in terras of the two possible relations which may obtain between them,
the relation based on the Imperative and that based on the "Indicative, bearing
in mind throughout the question as to the significance of the impersonal in
both types of relation. But since this relation is described by Brunner in
terms of 'responsibility', it will be well for us to review this concept,
before proceeding to the questions of the Imperative and the Indicative, in
an effort to appreciate precisely what is at stake here.
c. Responsibility and Guilt
We have suggested\hat the central problem in Brunner's theology
revolves around the meaning of the term 'responsibility'. On the one hand,
responsibility can be predicated of man himself. In this connection,
responsibility is essentially a moral term designating man as an answerable
moral agent. It is this sense of the term which is conveyed by Brunner's
description of man as essentially a responsible being. "Responsibility is
2
not an attribute, it is the 'substance' of human existence." On the other
hand, responsibility can be predicated of man's relation to God. In this
connection, responsibility is a religious term. It is this sense which the
term conveys in Brunner's insistence that man owes his very being to God,
1 See above pp. 108, 210.
2 M1W p. 55. E.T. p. 50.
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and therefore Is understandable only in terras of his creation by and for God.
"Responsibility is existence in the Word of God as an existence which is
derived from and destined for the Word of God.""'' Yet it is not at all clear
that this distinction between moral and religious responsibility represents
an accurate interpretation of these respective emphases which the word receives
in Brunner's theology. The difficulty comes out most clearly in a statement
such as: "Han was not, in his origin, a responsible being, but he is still a
responsible being, even in his irresponsibility, there, where he denies his
2
responsibility and sets himself in opposition to Ms origin." This may mean
that man owes Ms being to God, irrespective of Ms acknowledgement of this
fact? or it may mean that man la morally answerable to God, irrespective of
Ms relation to God. If tMs latter is involved, then it is implied that man
stands on Ms own feet opposite God cm the basi3 of Ms 'works', in which case
some form of a meritorious covenant of works will be inevitable. For it is
an essential feature of moral responsibility that it implies a certain freedom.
If a man is to be held morally answerable for an action, it is implied that
he freely chose to commit the action for which he is held accountable. The
problem of religious responsibility is not quite so straight forward. For
while responsibility for sin, not merely sins, implies the free choice of
becoming sinner, it also Involves the 'inevitability' wMch has received
traditional formulation in the doctrine of Original Sin. Man is responsible
for being a sinner, but tMs responsibility is corporate as well as individual.
3
We have seen that Brunner does not do justice to the depth involved in the
traditional doctrine of Original Sin. Indeed, in the final analysis, he
subordinates the concept of the solidarity in sin to that of the universality
1 MiW p. 57. E.T. p. 53-
2 Ibid. p. 82. E.T. p. 79.
3 See above p. 217.
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of sin. This may indicate that we are here confronted by a suppression of the
paradoxical concept of religious responsibility, in the interests of an
individualistic moral responsibility. This possibility is further suggested
by the ambiguity in the word 'responsibility' itself, as we have seen it in
connection with Ebner's emphasis on the speaking ability of man. The fact that
man has the word (Wbri) implies that he can be expected to give the answer
(Antwort). This may mean that he is answerable in that he responds to words,
or that he is morally answerable, i.e. has responsibility (Yerantwortlichkeit).
This movement from answerability in the sphere of speech to answerability in
the moral sphere may also be involved in Brunner's discussion of responsibility.
For, as we have seen, responsibility has a third meaning for Brunner, namely,
the formal concept of 'responsiveness'. Man is responsible in that his basic
nature is one of responding. This could apply as well to the sphere of
speech where man responds to words, as to the moral sphere where man responds
to claims. The difficulty comes when this is applied to the religious sphere.
For man cannot be called upon to respond to God as a moral being responding
to a claim. God's claim must be preceded by and included in the indicative
of grace. The real issue at stake here is the quesrtion of guilt.
Guilt, like responsibility, bears a moral and a religious sense.
Moral guilt concerns answerability for specific acts. Religious guilt, on
the other hand, is concerned with the orientation of life as a whole. Yet a
positivistic demarcation of spheres does not provide a satisfactory account
of the complexity of guilt. Fbr moral and religious guilt are related,
although unlike. Moral guilt does not bear a one to one relationship to
moral responsibility. This is shown in the normal use of language. In
ordinary speech, the adjective 'guilty' is used in connection with morality
more readily than the noun 'guilt'. The noun 'guilt' carries a psychological
connotation in modem eveiy-day speech. It is employed in the sense of
'guilt feelings' or 'a sense of guilt'. This popular use of the term 'guilt'
indicates something more evasive than a designation of accountability for a
specific act. Thus when we shift the emphasis from 'responsibility' to
'guilt', we are approaching a perspective which is more amenable to the sphere
of theology. For theology 13 concerned with 'guilt' in a sense which
transcends the sphere of the moral. In theology guilt refers to the
direction of life as a whole. In theological terms, it refers to man's
self-willed alienation from God. This similarity between theology and
psychology on the question of guilt gives us a vantage point from which to
examine Brunner's doctrine of responsibility. For the difficulty which
Brunner's presentation of responsibility occasions centers in the ambiguity
of moral and religious responsibility. 'Guilt' as a psychological and a
theological term comes in between these two senses of responsibility, and
thus provides a focal point for the clarification of Brunner's meaning.
Psychologically, 'guilt' is subjective in that it refers to a sense
of guilt or guilt feelings. It is not lacking in objective reference, but
this objective reference is indefinite, and indeed may be merely a projection.
The focal point is the subject himself. Theologically, 'guilt' is objective
in that it refers to man's separation from God. It is not so much concerned
with 'guilt feelings' as with the objective fact, disclosed in God's self-
manifestation, that man has left the Father. Both the subjective and
objective senses of the term 'guilt' are presented by Brunner. The former,
the sense of guilt, is presented as the distinctive mark of humanity - "there
25*
is nothing more profoundly human than the sense of guilt; nothing in which
1
the lost image of God manifests its presence more clearly." The latter, the
objective reality of guilt, is presented as the unalterable self-alienation
of man from God.
Sin is not that I have done something wrong, sin is that I have
separated myself from God. ... we have to add "guilt" of sin.
For sin is the destruction of personal communion with God, and,
as such, is a fact which we ourselves cannot alter. ... The
gate of paradise has been closed; before it stands the cherub
with the flaming sword, not allowing us to return. 2
How, the crucial question is: Bow are these two senses of the word 'guilt'
related? Our analysis is facilitated at this point by a middle term which
Brunner develops as the link between objective and subjective guilt, the
term 'conscience'.
Conscience, in Brunner's presentation, refers to both the subjective
feelings of guilt and the objective reality of guilt. Subjectively, conscience
represents an alarm signal indicating "general disorder".
Conscience makes its presence felt on certain occasions of actual
wrong-doing or of failure; but as soon as it makes its voice heard
it announces more than this particular instance of wrong-doing or
failure. It proclaims this fault as an outbreak of the contradiet-
-ion as a whole, as a manifestation of "general disorder". 3
Objectively, conscience represents the perverted relation to God. "The bad
conscience is the way in which we, as sinners, experience the presence of
God. It is, so to ssy, the negative Holy Spirit, the wrath of God as
4experience, life under the curse of the law as a psychological reality."
This double fact of conscience represents two perspectives. In the former,
Brunner, the psychologist, is reiterating a fact common to everyone acquainted
with modern psychology's view of man, the fact of the anxiety and restlessness
of human life. In the latter, Brunner, the theologian, is announcing from
1 MiW p. 173. E.T. p. 178. 2 The Scandal of Christianity, p. 76.
3 GuO p. 141. E.T. pp. 156-7. 4 MIW pp. 202-3. E.T. p. 203.
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the perspective of the Christian faith that this anxiety and restlessness is
not simply a psychological phenomenon, but is grounded in the objective
reality of man's self-alienation from God. Here again, we encounter the
difficulty raised in our analysis of Brunner's concept of responsibility.
On the one hand, this knowledge of objective guilt is presented as the
knowledge of faith.
The man who has lost innocence can no longer appreciate what the
loss of it means. To know whence we have fallen we must be able
to soe our original "place" still, or to see it again. Accordingly
the testimony of faith is that knowledge of sin coincides with the
miracle of the reinstatement of the lost, i.e. the "justification
of the sinner". 1
The gradations in the seriousness of the sense of guilt, subjectively
considered, are only quantitative in comparison to the qualitative distinction
between the subjective sense of guilt and the knowledge of objective guilt
2
accessible only in faith. This insistence on the co-ordination of objective
guilt and forgiveness is the primary emphasis in Brunner's presentation of
3
the subject. let in addition to this primary emphasis there is a secondary
strand in his presentation which suggests that the return of the "origin" in
Christ is not the only possibility. This strand suggests that man can be
summoned to return to the origin himself.
Certainly, apart from God man can do nothing but sin - per
definitionen. But there i3 something else that he can do, and
this he ought to do - he can and should believe, that is, turn
away from hi.3 false freedom and return to union with God. 4
It is interesting to note that this statement occurs in the context of a
refutation of the humanistic objection to the serious view of bondage
represented by the Christian doctrine of sin. This may indicate that we are
not to take the statement too literally. On the other hand, it may indicate
1 RPh p. 37. E.T. p. 77. 2 Fr n Anknpkt p. 524- ~~
3 GuO p. 142. E.T. p. 158J Mitt. p. 186. E.T. p. 212,- UGMM p. 22.
4 MiW p. 271. E.T. p. 274-
that the context determines Brunner's formulations in that he deviates from
the basic position he is attempting to affirm when he trios to formulate that
position as a rebuttal to an external objection from an alien frame of
reference. Thus it may be that this statement is a further indication of
Brenner'a battle with moral idealism. Certainly if we are to take the
statement as it stands, then man con be held responsible for guilt. He who
has separated himself from God, and who is involved in the separation of
humanity from God, can be challenged to reverse this separation. If this is
tree, then the basic position which Brenner is affirming is undermined. The
point at issue is the Christian concept of repentance. It is in teres of
Brenner's treatment of this concept that the final evaluation of his treatment
of guilt, and hence also of responsibility, will have to be made. For the
present difficulty concerns the relationship of repentance to forgiveness.
Brunner's fundamental position affirms that repentance can be real only in
the context of forgiveness. let there is also a strand which declares that
1
"repentance is the presupposition of atonement." The wider contact of this
problem involves the question as to the significance of the Imperative and
the Indicative In the 'I-Thou' framework. Thus it is to these wider issues
that we now turn, In preparation for an evaluation of Brenner's understanding
of repentance.
C. I-THOU AND IMPERATIVE
Brenner's concept of repentance involves a dialectic of law which,
according to Brenner himself, and from all appearances, parallels the dialectic
of Law and Gospel foreulated by Luther. Thus we are cast into the central
1 Mitt. p. 480. E.T. p. 529.
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issues of Luther's theology, and find ourselves confronted by questions on
which Luther scholars are sharply divided. let, in spite of the forbidding
nature of the task, we must attempt some understanding of Luther's doctrine.
In this we shall rely heavily upon the excellent compilation of Luther's
key references to "Law" and to "Law and Gospel" edited by Ewald M. Plass
in What Luther Says; An Anthology, Volume II.
a. Apparent Similarity between Brunner and Luther on "Law"
We have already seen that Brunner'a allegiance to the Reformers
sets a high priority on Luther, to the point of regarding him as "the one
1
teacher who in all the Church is nearest to the mind of Christ." This
allegiance is paramount in the matter of the doctrine of the Law. "Luther
2
understood the Pauline conception of law more clearly than Calvin." Yet,
in spite of this allegiance, Brunner claims no comprehensive grasp of
Luther's doctrine of Law. He acknowledges the complexity of Luther's
utterances on the subject. "Indeed, Luther's utterances about the Law are
in the highest measure full of contradictions; now it belongs to the devil,
now to God, now it is eternal and good as God Himself, now his whole
3
conception of salvation depends on it." There can be no doubt about the
accuracy of this assessment. But it is an assessment which is equally
applicable to Brunner's statements on the Law. For Brunnar's doctrine of
Law shares many of the contradictory assertions proffered by Luther. Thus
an understanding of Brunner's doctrine of Law may be facilitated by a
survey of the major points of comparison with Luther's doctrine.
Both Luther and Brunner use the term "Law" to refer to the Law of
Moses, and to the natural law. For Luther, the Law of Moses, the Decalogue,
1 Dili E.T. p. 191. 2 I&R p. 332n.
3 "her Zoro Gottes und die VersQhnung duroh Christus", ZdZ, 5, Heft 2 (1927),
p. 102.
is not original to Moses.
The Decalog is not of Moses, nor did God give it to him first.
On the contrary, the Decalog belongs to the whole world; it was
written and engraved In the minds of all human beings from the
beginning of the world. 1
Thus the Law as it is presented in the Decalogue is a restatement of the
natural law which is written in the heart from creation. The restatement
is necessary, however, because through sin the law writnen in the heart has
been clouded and darkened.
Later on, since men had finally come to the point of caring
neither for God nor for men, God was compelled to renew these
laws through I-foses and, after writing them with his fingers on
tables, to place them before our eyes in order to present to us
what we wore before the fall of Adam and what someday we are to
be in Christ. 2
Yet this natural law written in the heart from creation is not insignificant.
It is only because of this natural law that the Law of Moses can be recognized.
The preaching of the Law of Moses strikes man because of the original law
3
written in hi3 heart. Brunuer follows Luther In this relation of the Law of
Moses and the natural law. "Although this natural law written in the heart
may be 'dimmer' than that which is revealed in the Scriptures, yet here there
4
is no difference in principle."
Not only do Brunner and Luther seem to present a similar conception
of the Law, but they also seem to be in agreement on the 'office' of the Law.
Luther distinguishes between the Law and the Gospel by asserting that the
5
former demands, while the latter gives. Consequently where justification is
concerned, we have to do only with the Gospel. "In a word, the Law must be
separated from justification as far as the heavens are separated from the
1 Luther, Disputations Against the Antinomians. W.A. 39 I, 473, in What
Luther Says: An Anthology, ed. Ewald M. Plass (Saint Louis, 1959), II#
748, sec. 2311.
2 Ibid. W.A. 39 I, 454, Plass, p. 743, sec. 2313.
3 Luther, "Exposition of Exodus 20:5", Plass, pp. 743-9, sec. 2314-
4 MiW p. 504- E.T. p. 520.
5 Luther, Commentary on Galatians, W.A. 40 I, 336f., Plass, p. 733, sec. 2279.
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1
earth." This does not mean that the Law is useless. Luther has issued
extensive warnings against this logical conclusion which man naturally draws
2
from the message of the Gospel that justification is not be the Law. The
Law has a very definite function and value, but this is different from the
function and value of the Gospel. The Law exercises a "ministry of wrath",
3
the Gospel a "ministry of grace". Plass summarizes Luther's distinction
between the respective offices of Law and Gospel thus: "the Law kills the
4
sinner, not the sinj the Gospel kills sin, not the sinner." In spite of the
danger of generalizations, this seams to represent the heart of Luther's
doctrine of Law and Gospel, and it is a distinction which Luther regarded not
5
only as the most important task of Christian theology, but also as the most
difficult in practiced Yet in itself the Law has a very definite value and,
according to Luther, a twofold function. First, it has a civic use in
7
restraining sin and maintaining order. Secondly, it has a theological function
in terms of its ministry of wrath. In this sense, the Law multiplies and
3
exposes sin. This is "the true function and chief and proper use of the Law."
Because of this theological function, the Law must precede the Gospel. "Before
receiving the comfort of forgiveness, sin must be recognized and the fear of
God's wrath must be experienced through the preaching or apprehension of the
Law, that man may be driven to sigh for grace and may be prepared to receive
9
the comfort of the Gospel." Thus Luther advocates repentance through the
Law. let this is a relative matter. For whether the Law or the Gospel should
be preached can be determined only from the given situation.
1 Luther, Disputations, W.A.39 I, 418, Flags, p. 753, sec. 2332.
2 Luther, Commentary on Galatians, W.A. 40 I> 475f. E.T. Luther's Works,
ed. Jaroslav Pelikan and Walter A. Hansen (Saint Louis, 1963), 26, 305f.
3 Flass, p. 736. 4 Ibid. p. 735.
5 Luther, "Sermon on Galatians 3:23-4" > W.A. 36, 25, Plass, p. 732, sec. 2276.
6 Luther, Commentary on Galatians, W.A. 40 I, 141, Flass, p. 744, sec. 2302.
7 Ibid. W.A. 40 I, 479. E.T. 26, 308. 3 Ibid. W.A. 40 I, 480. E.T. 26, 309.
9 Luther, "Sermon on Luke 5il-ll", W.A. 22, 183, Plass p. 733, sec. 2286.
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When one does not preach faith end does not let our incorporation
In Christ and our becoming a branch in Him be the matter of first
importance, all the world relies on its good works. On the other
hand, when one teaches only faith, people become false Christians,
who, to be sure, highly commend faith, are baptized and numbered
with the Christians, and yet show neither fruit nor spiritual
power. For this reason it is never right, no matter how you
preach to theraj they always lean to one side. If you do not
preach of faith, their works become purely hypocritical. If you
urge faith alone, worics will not follow. 1
Thus Luther's conception of the 'office' of the Law clearly distinguishes it
from the Gospel with regard to justification, and yet gives it a significant
place as a civic restraint and a theological preparation for the Gospel. Once
again, Brunner's doctrine appears to present a parallel to Luther's position.
Brunner affirms the two uses of the Law which are paramount in Luther's
presentation.
Within God's plan it {I.e. the Law! is important in a twofold
connection. It has first a protecting significance ... And
secondly, from the Law springs the knowledge of sin. 2
On this basis, Brunner presents a doctrine of Law-repentance which echoes
3
Luther's formulation. Thus on the whole, Brunner's doctrine of Law would
seem to represent a reformulation of Luther's position. let there are basic
differences. It is to these differences that we now turn.
b. Differences between Brunner and Luther on "Law"
The similarity between Brunner' s conception of Law and that of
Luther may be more apparent than real. Two aspects of Brunner's presentation
suggest that there is something very different here from that which is involved
in Luther's doctrine. First, the parallels which we have noted between the
two doctrines occur, for the most part, in explicit references either to
Luther or to Scripture. When Brunner is concerned with the systematic
1 Luther, Commentary on John. PIass, p. 741, sec. 2296.
2 The Letter to the Romans, p. 141.
3 MiW pp. 505f. E.T. pp. 522-3.
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exposition of his own doctrine of Law, concepts are employed which are
foreign to Lather's presentation. Secondly, the over-all impression conveyed
try Scunner's presentation of the doctrine of the Law differs from that
conveyed by Luther's utterances on the subject. It seems, in fact, that
Brunner's doctrine is expounded in a context very different from that in which
Luther is working.
Lather's doctrine of Law is developed in terms of the contrast
between Law and Gospel. In this context, Law is described as the condemning,
demanding Word of God, in contrast to which the Gospel stands as the freely
pardoning Word of God. We have suggested tlxat Brunner's doctrine represents
a parallel to this. let we must now observe that it also represents a
striking contrast. For the antithesis of Law and Gospel is presented by
Brunner as the antithesis of law and love. On the one hand, Brunner affirms
a position which is strongly reminiscent of Luther.
The law only reveals the sin of man in the sight of God. ... It
can only forbid sin. But it has not the power to deliver man
from the power of sin. Only through the justification of the
sinner, of which man receives assurance in the cross of Jesus
Christ, is man set free from the power of sin, brought into a
new relation to God, and receives the love of God. 1
On the other hand, this contrast between the bondage of the Law and the
deliverance of the Cross is presented as the contrast between the demand for
love and the impossibility of its realization. "The law demands: lou should
love; but this law is powerless. Merely demanded love is a thing of
2
impossibility." This difference of phrasing may not be particularly
significant in itself. It may be merely a different way of saying the same
thing. let the context in which this version of the antithesis occurs
suggests that there is more involved here than merely a question of terminology.
1 Dili E.T. p. 307.
2 Glaube und Ethik (Thun, 1945), p. 22.
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For Brunner continues:
In Kant it means: You ought, therefore you can. Slow we know:
Because the content of the "You ought" is love, the statement
must run precisely the opposite: You ought to love, therefore
you cannot. If you could, you would not "ought", but would
i-dthout an ought. 1
This latter statement implies a thought which would have been completely
strange to Luther. For Brunner seems to be affirming that the consaand to
love is illegitimate. Its existence is self-contradictory. At this point
we have left the theological presentation of the doctrine of Law, and turned
to a polemical comparison between the Christian concept of the bondage of
sin and the optimism of Kantian moral theory.
Brunner's presentation of the dialectic of Law and Gospel in terras
of an antithesis to the Kantian moral theory represents that secondary strand
which we have detected in his theology. In this context, Brunner affirms not
that man cannot justify himself before God, which is the whole point of the
Law-Gospel dialectic, but that the idea of love being commanded is inherently
contradictory. The source of this view is to be found in the Kantian theory
which he is opposing.
Love to God is impossible ... For a command to like to do a thing
is itself contradictory ... and no creature can ever reach this
stage of moral disposition. ... love, which apprehends no inner
reluctance of the will toward the law ... would cease to be virtue.
Such a love would be 'religious enthusiasm'. 2
The antithesis here is not between, law and love as relations to God, but
between will and emotion within man himself. The net result of this acceptance
of the Kantian dichotomy is that Brunner is left with a false paradox.
Love - and this is the paradox - is the one tiling signified in
all these commandments, but by that very fact it cannot be
commanded, and does not come into existence through the command.
1 Glaube und Ethik, p. 22.
2 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, Ab. pp. 176-7, quoted in WaB E.T. p. 29n.
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The commandment of Love, since it emphasizes the whole meaning
of all the commandments, eliminate® itself as commandment. Love
can only be present where it is given, not where it is commanded. 1
The Achilles' heel of this conclusion is the fact that love is commanded.
Brunner knows this well, and affirms it when he is dealing with the Biblical
2
message itself. But when he is concerned with the development of his doctrine
of law, he adopts the Kantian dichotomy between will and emotion, duty and
inclination.
This internalization of the Law-Gospel dialectic in the antithesis
of law and love, will and inclination, tarings us to the other striking
difference between Luther's doctrine of Law and that which is presented by
Brunner. We have seen that Luther thinks of Law in terras of the natural law
written in the heart In creation and the Law of iloses, the Decalogue, which
is a restatement of the law originally written in the heart. Thus it is
the one Law of God which is involved in Luther's presentation. But Luther
also uses the term 'law' to refer to the legalistic attempt at justification.
It is in this sense of the terra that law is contrasted with Gospel.
... what exactly does Luther mean by 'the law'? like Paul, he
oscillates between 'Law' in the strictly Jewish sense (the Law
of Moses) and 'law' generally as a method of self-salvation.
Occassionally the distinction can be indicated by using a
capital 'L' where the Old Testament Law is intended; but it is
not always possible to be sure which meaning Luther has in
mind, and often, no doubt, no distinction is required. 3
It is this double reference of the terra 'law* which creates the major obstacle
in the interpretation of Luther's doctrine of Law. It is also here that the
major difficulty in Brunner's doctrine is disclosed. The difficulty is
poignantly represented by two contradictory evaluations of Luther's position.
On the one hand, Brunner affirms that, so far as this conception of law as
1 DH pp. 264.-5. E.T. p. 224-
2 DI E.T. p. 197.
3 B.A. Gerrish, Grace and Reason: A Study in the Theology of Luther (Oxford,
1962), p. 107.
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the antithesis of the Gospel is concerned, the question as to the definition
of the 'Law' involved is Insignificant. "It does not matter whether it is
the Jewish Law, or the law written in man's heart; it is all the same (Horn, i
and ii); in any case it is clearly opposed to the righteousness of faith
(Rom. iii), although 'in some way or other' it is God's own Law."* Gn the
other hand, in spite of this assurance that the identification of the 'Law'
in question is unimportant, Brunner asserts that Luther's primary concern
is the natural law.
The Jewish Law as such has no longer much interest for Luther.
But he is intensely interested in ... the law which is written
in the heart of man, which he also describes by the phrase lex
naturae, which comes - through the patristic literature - from
the Stoics. 2
It is rather curious that a matter of indifference should suddenly become a
matter of intense concern. ¥e saw in our examination of Brunner's evaluation
of Kant's Onus "flostumum that the extreme tension which he found there between
autonomy and theanomy was more reflective of a tension in his own thought
than in that of Kant. So too we must now suspect that this intense concern
for the law written in the heart is more indicative of Brunner's own position
than It is of Luther's.
Brunner's interpretation of Luther is largely determined by the
outstanding Luther scholar of the last centuiy, Theodosius Hartxaek. In
3
Brunner's opinion, "Hamack seems to have solved almost completely" this
major difficulty in the interpretation of Luther, the understanding of the
Law-Gospel dialectic. Hamack' s solution revolves around the twofold
knowledge of God, the Knowledge of God in the Law and the knowledge of God
in the Gospel. The success of this solution rests on the contention that
1 MiW p. 502. E.T. p. 518.
2 Ibid.
3 "Per Lorn Gottes und die Verstthnung durch Christua", p. 102.
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"the knowledge from the law is known, to the reason." The contention, as
such, is easily substantiated. For Luther has stated this himself. "Tims
far comes the reason in knowledge of God, that it has legal knowledge, that
it knows God's command, and what is right or wrong." (So welt kfoaet die
Vernunft in Gotten erkentnis, dag sle hat cognitionem legalera, das sie wgig
2
Gotteg gebot, und wag recbt oder unrecht 1st.) But from this affirmation of
the cognitio legalis, Harnack concludes that this law is as valid a base for
the Law-Gospel dialectic as is the Law of Moses. "When Luther speaks of the
Law in connection with the fact of the salvation of the whole human race, so
he does not mean a particular temporary form of the same, as the Mosaic, which
3
is only valid for the Jews, but the law in its unity and universality ..."
This line of interpretation can be substantiated from scattered statements in
Luther's writings, but it overlook® one major element in Luther1 s doctrine of
the Law. The fact is that for Luther sin has not left this law written in
the heart intact. Thus, ag another Luther scholar affirms, the Law must be
preached to man.
Should the natural, law again be awakened in man, so must it be
preached to him on the basis of Scripture. Man no more bears it
in himself, that it comes without preaching; but conversely the
preaching of the Law touches the heart only because the law is
originally written in the heart. 4-
It would seem that the line of interpretation which Brunner follows emphasizes
the latter half of this dialectic at the expense of the former. The law
written in the heart, V means of which the Law of Ifoses is recognized,
overshadow the fact that the Law of Moses must be preached. In fact, Luther's
doctrine of Law and Gospel seems to present a twofold dialectic, the dialectic
1 Theodosius Harnack, Lathers Theologie (Erlangon, 1862), Part I, 93".
2 Luther, Sermons on the Gospel of St. John, W.A. 668. E.T. Luther's
Works, ed. JaroslSTPelikan (Saint Louis', 1957), 22, 151-
3 Harnack, p. 4&S.
A Paxil Althaus, Die Kthik Martin Lathers (Giitersloh, 1965), p. 35.
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of natural law and the Law of Moses, and the dialectic of Law and Gospel.
Some such construction will have to be affirmed if one is to do justice to
Luther's varied pronouncements on the subject. Yet Brunner systematizes
lather's doctrine into a single Law-Gospel dialectic. Luther's doctrine
presents us with a complex of situations, that of the "natural mm", the Jew,
the would-be Christian, the Christian, etc. But this diversity is condensed
in Brunner's presentation into the antithesis of "being under the law" or
"being In Christ". "Being 'under the law' - in contrast to being 'in Christ'
- means that man stands upon his own feetj it appeals to that which man can
do for himself. This contrast between "being under the law" and "being in
Christ" is, in itself, a fundamental axiom of Luther's theology. But when
Brunner proceeds to apply this contrast to men in general, he neglects an
important element of lather's doctrine, namely, that the Law mat be preached.
He does not concern himself with tire question as to the 'Law' which is involved
in the Law-Gospel dialectic.
In the concept of law for the Reformers something like a unity
of morality and religion is given, about which, we do not have
to ask more widely concerning the more exact content of these
laws and of their relation to the "Law of Moses" and to the
"Law of Christ". 2
Thus Brunner systematizes the two primary meanings of 'Law' in Luther's
presentation, the Law of Moses which is a restatement of the law written in
the heart, and law as a method of self-salvation. The end result is a
formulation which is very different from that which Luther presents. It is
a formulation which can b© substantiated from Luther's writings, but one
which neglects important elements of his doctrine in the interests of
systeraatizatioa. The contrast between the two is more one of perspective
1 DII p. 262. E.T. p. 222.
2 Pr n knknpkt p. 516.
rather than one of divergence on specific issues. Since Brunner's doctrine
of 'Law' is formulated in the context of the I-Thou framework, we can expect
to find some explanation for the difference of perspective through an
examination of the relation between I-Thou and the Law.
c« Law and Imperative in the I-Thou Framework
Brunner presents Luther's Law-Gospel dialectic as a dialectic of
law and love in which the contradiction between legalism and faith is
presented as the contradiction inherent in the notion of love being commanded.
On the other hand, he systematizes Lather's two meanings of 'Law', the Law
of Moses which is a restatement of the natural law, and law as a method of
self-salvation, into a unified conception of law as the antithesis to the
Gospel. The two developments in Brunner'a presentation are intimately
related. For law as opposed to love is both a statement of the contrast
between legalism and faith, and a statement of the contrast between the
personal and the rational. It is in this context, the context of the contrast
between the personal and the rational, that Brunner's doctrine of law is
developed.
Brunner presents the contrast between law and love as a contrast
between law as a prescription and love as a spontaneous identification.
"Between me and God, between me and ray neighbour, there stands this 'something'
the law which it is possible to define; the neighbour becomes a •case'."'1'
Instead of the immediacy of love, the legal relation separates me from God
and from ay neighbour. Yet this is not simply a contrast between the
calculated less or more of legalism and the superabundance of love. It is
also a contrast between law as a material reality and love as a formal
1 GuO p. 122. E.T. p. 13&.
270
relation. In this sense Law represents an alien element In the personal
relation of faith# This embarrassment to the personal framework caused by
the material concept of Law is most pointed in the question as to the relation
between Law and Christ. The truth in the contrast between "being under the
law" and "being in Christ" is absolutized, so that it is difficult to see
the connection between Christ and the Law.
The commandment of Love is not only the heart of the law, it is
also its end. Christ is the end of the Law, not only its
fulfilment. He who is in Christ is "no longer under the lav".
One who is filled with the love of God does not need to be
commanded to love God; we cannot "order" such a person to do
this or that as the law does. 1
2
Brunner is aware that Christ is the fulfilment of the Law. But there is
another strand in his presentation which by-passes this relation between
Christ and the Law. In this second strand, he describes the atonement as
transcending the moral sphere.
God passes over the whole moral formulation of the question.
Being good is of no importance to me now, he says: what matters
to me is your being with me. 3
We could overlook this statement, regarding it as an extravagant emphasis on
the righteousness which is of grace, were it not for the fact that it
represents a consistent strand in his argument. Indeed, he entitles a
section of Wahrheit als Begegnung, "God's Act of Atonement Apart from the
Law". Thus it is impossible to regard Brunner's contrast between law and
love as a restatement of the Law-Gospel antithesis. It is not only legalism
which is opposed to the Gospel, but Law itself.
\}q have suggested in considering Brunner's distinction between the
rational and the personal that this distinction raises the question as to
the significance of the rational; or in terms of the I-Thou framework, the
1 DII p. 264- E.T. p. 224.
2 RSsR pp. 335-6.
3 The Letter to the Romans, p. 159.
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emphasis on the I-Thou In contrast to the I-It dimension raises the question
of the significance of the I-It. It is this question which now confronts us
in connection with Brunner'a doctrine of Law. For it seems quite clear that
for Brunner the Law belongs in the I-It dimension. It is a 'something1 which
comes between the I and the Thou. It is impersonal, and renders the relation
between the I and the Thou impersonal in that the Thou comes to be treated as
a "case1. Consequently the significance of the Law diminishes in proportion
to the importance attached to the personal I-Thou relation. Since the I-Thou
relation is all-important, the Law all but loses any significance it might
otherwise have. It is relegated to the sphere of reason.
The law as a statute necessarily contains an impersonal element.
... It does not put me in contact with the 'Thou' - whether
divine or human - but with the abstract entity 'reason'. 1
The Law is impersonal; but the impersonal is the sphere of reason; therefore
the Law belongs to the sphere of reason. It is here that Brunner parts
company with Luther, although he claims Luther's sanction for hi3 proposal,
and quotes Harnack to verify it. "The perception of the Divine law as law,
that is, the cognitio legalis, also belongs in principle, according to the
2
most strict Reformation view, to the realm of 'natural knowledge1." We
have seen that Luther does say this himself. But it is doubtful that he meant
by it what Brunner means. This comes out in Brunner's next sentence. "No
one is without some sense of responsibility, and there is no Christian
missionary or spiritual adviser who does not make this sense of responsibility
3
his point of contact." Brunner does not mean that reason know God's Law,
but that it is acquainted with the fact of law. The "sense of responsibility4*
is an inherent feature of human life. In Brunner's opinion, Luther's contrast
1 Mi* p. 159. E.T. p. 153.
2 Ibid. p. 66. E.?. pp. 63—3*
3 Ibid. pp. 66-7. E.T. p. 63.
between Law and Gospel is concerned with Law as "the fundamental principle
1
of the natural self-understanding of man." Here the contrast between the
perspectives of Brunner and Luther becomes crucial. Brunner can cite Luther
as an ally in this conception of Law which he is presenting, but the fact
that he does so suggests either a misunderstanding of Luther or a conscious
deception. For the impression conveyed by Luther's references to the
rational knowledge of Law does not suggest a perspective which is primarily
concerned with the self-understanding of natural man. Rather Luther seesas
to refer to the knowledge of Law among non-Christian peoples in illustration
of the fact that the Law is an inherent fact of creation. In so doing it is
•the Law1 which is his concern, and not "the fundamental principle of the
natural self-understanding of man". For he cites specific laws which the
natural reason seems to affirm. "Although the same truth was stated still
more clearly by Moses, it still remains true that all rational beings can
of themselves determine that it is wrung to disobey father and mother, and
2
the government, to murder, to commit adultery, steal, curse, and blaspheme."
It would be difficult to substantiate \rf.th chapter and verse the contention
that Luther taught a meaning of the Law such as Brunner suggests. Brunner
can substantiate his claim by combining references to the natural law and to
law in the sense of legalism, but this combination seems to be foreign to
Luther himself. It Is a combination peculiar to the context of the rational-
personal antithesis. For in this context, law belongs to the sphere of the
rational. It is an 'It' which represents an intrusion in the basic I-Thou
framework.
Once again, the Kantian antededents loom large. For it is in terms
1 MiW p. 502. E.T. p. 513.
2 Luther, Sermons on the Gospel of St. John, W.A. 46, 667. E.T. 22, 150.
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of Kant's Categorical Imperative that Brunner presents his interpretation of
Luther. "Thus the problem is posed of the CaregoricaL Imperative which indwells
reason; for the 'law of nature', for Luther, is always a law of obligation,
1
even where it meets us as the Word of God in an order of creation." Brunner8s
interpretation of Luther extracts all content from the Law, and in this way
facilitates the identification of the two basic senses of 'Law8 in Luther,
the Law as God's Law and the law as a method of self-salvation. The law is
purely formal, the Categorical Imperative, the fact of obligation per so.
There is a motif at work here which is foreign to Luther, the motif which
emerges from the polemical opposing of the Christian message to the
perspective of Kantian moral idealism. From this perspective law is seen as
a companion of reason in contrast to the Gospel which is concerned with the
sphere of the personal. Thus law is interpreted in rational terms. "The
Idea should be classed with the Law, and has the same dignity and the same
2
ambiguity as the latter." It is in this sense that the Law is contrasted
with the Gospel as man's way of self-salvation as opposed to God's way of
3
grace. In this antithesis between God's way and man's way, the Law occupies
L
a boundary sphere. It is both God's Law and man's law. It is man's law in
5
so far as it is known as laws - "we know laws but never the Law." As the
Law it is God's Law, but this Law is the pure fact of law, the Categorical
Imperative. Not only does Law as a material reality find no real place in
the formal I-Thou framework, but in so far as it is significant, it is the
purely formal Categorical Imperative.
Consequently Brunner's doctrine of Law ends in contradictions. On
the one hand, he affirms that the Law is God's Law, and yet the fact of law
1 MiW p. 503. E.T. pp. 518-9.
2 GuO p. 591. S. T. p. 612.
3 "Gesetz raid Qffenbarung". p. 290.
A Ibid. pp. 290-1.
5 Ibid.
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itself is a result of sin.
The Law itself may indeed be good and holy, so far as its content
is concerned. For what it demands is God's demand. But the fact
that man possesses this demand in the form of the Law, is the
result of sin: it has "slipped in between". 1
On the other hand, although the content of the Law is divine, this content is
insignificant in comparison to the fact of law which is the result of sin.
"Not what God demands is important, but whether one is willing to take the
claim of God - what it always is - as the guide, the consciousness of
2
responsibility opposite Him, the 'first command' is the decisive one." In
the I-Thou framework, Law occupies an uneasy position. It is an 'It' which
must be accounted for in some way or other. To be sure, Brunner does not
omit the idea of Law as a divine material reality. "The Law of God is a
3
moment in his making of the Covenant." Indeed, "the Decalogue is a
4
wonderful summary of the Law as a whole." Such statements are strongly
reminiscent of Luther's position which affirms: "both are God's Word: the
Law, or the Ten Commandments, and the Gospelj the latter was first given by
5
God in Paradise, the former on Mount Sinai." But this is only one element
of Brunner's presentation. It is also true that the Law is an 'It' in the
I-Thou framework. Brunner's most consistent means of accounting for it is
to divest it of all content and reintroduce it as the Imperative.
D. I-THOU AND INDICATIVE
a. Imperative and Indicative
There are two possible types of relation within the I-Thou frame-
-work, that which is based on the Imperative and that which is based on the
1 DII p. 263. E.T. p. 223. 2 GPhEK p. 39.
3 "Ihe Significance of the Old Testament for Our Faith", p. 256.
4 DII pp. 257-3. E.T. p. 219.
5 Luther, "Sermon on Galatians 3:23-4"* W.A. 36, 25* Plass, p. 732, sec. 2276.
Indicative. In the employment of the framework as a category for Christian
theology, it is crucially important that these two types of relation be
carefully distinguished, and defined in their respective settings. For if
the sola gratia is to be affirmed, then the Imperative can exist only after,
and within, the Indicative of grace. Brunner affirms this position in his
1
insistence that "the Gospel is not an imperative? it is an indicative."
This is true of the original creation of man, as well as of the reconciliation
through the Gospel. "The Primal Word is not an imperative, but it is the
2
indicative of the Divine love: 'Thou art mine'." And it is only on the
basis of this indicative that the imperative is issues.
... First the gift (Gabe), then the task (Aufgaba). Of course this
"then" is not chronological. Gift and task areHot to be separated
from each other. The act in which God comes toward his people and
in which he confrents his people is the same act. 3
This we take to be an affirmation of the sola gratia principle of the
Reformers. The primary and comprehensive word is the indicative of grace,
and it is only within this indicative that the imperative can be established.
Once again, however, we are not confronted by a simple re-affirmation
of the Reformation position. Indeed, it is particularly in this question of
the relation between imperative and indicative that the significance of that
second strand of thought in Brenner's presentation becomes clear. Brenner's
affirmation that "there is, indeed, a certain analogy between Kant's conception
that personal being can only be grasped as freedom under the imperative and
4.
what we said about responsibility" raises the alarm signal. For this
emphasis on the Kantian Imperative threatens to undermine the primary position
which Brenner is attempting to affirm. Brenner seems to regard the moral
personality, engendered by the Categorical Imperative, as but one step removed
1 W&tf p. 125." ~~
2 liiW p. 100. E.T. p. 98.
3 "The Significance of the Old Testament for Our Faith", p. 255.
A WaB E.T. p. 19.
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from the personality created in the indicative of grace. It is his contention
that "through this Categorical Imperative I first know that I am an 'I*, a
responsible subject.""^ The purely formal duty for duty's sake effects the
emergence of personality. It is "through the 'lou oughtJ' that my personality
2
is called into existence." In effect, Brunner seems to be affirming that
man's realisation of himself as a moral person is the first step to his
appreciation of the indicative of grace. If this is Brunner1s position, then
there can be no question of the priority of the indicative of grace. Not
only does the indicative cone second, but it is dependent on the prior
imperative. It may be that Brunner succeeds in reconciling these two elements
in his concept of repentance. This will be the place where the final
clarification can be expected. In the light of these assertions regarding
the importance of the Categorical Imperative, however, it seems that we are
confronted by two mutually exclusive trains of thought# This evaluation is
strengthened by Brunner' s insistence on the form of the imperative even in
expressing the indicative of grace.
The First Commandment also begins with the indicative: I AM the
Lord thy God. But this indicative must be heard: Thou shalt
have none other gods before ME. ... It is the Lord who commands
- on pain of punishment - that we are to take His grace seriously. 3
It is not easy to see how this insistence that even the indicative upon which
the commandments are based must be heard as an imperative can be reconciled
with the primacy of the indicative which is the essential position Brumier
is attempting to affirm. It is quite compatible with this position to affirm
that the indicative must be followed by the imperative.
The new man exists and continues to exist only in the obedience
of faith. This is his reality. Therefore immediately behind the
indicative: "Thou art the new man", stands the Imperative: "Be
the new man". U
1 GPhKK p. 39. 2 Ibid.
3 Mitt. p. 565. E.T. pp. 613-9#
4 GuO p. 145. E.T. p. 161.
But Brunner's concern for the imperative is not confined to this insistence
that it be affirmed within the context of the indicative. In so far as he
goes beyond this, he endangers his sola gratia principle. The final decision
will have to be made in terras of Brunner'a doctrine of repentance, but before
this doctrine is examined, one other aspect of Brunner's presentation must be
noticed. The question of the respective significance of the imperative and
the indicative is grounded in a deeper question, the question as to the
nature of the Atonement. Consequently, before investigating Simmer's
doctrine of repentance, we must turn to the question of the treatment of the
Atonement in the I-Thou framework.
b. I-Thou and Biraaaliakeit
We have seen that Brunner's insistence on the personal I-Thou
relation creates an embarrassment with regard to "Law". For in this context
the Law is an "It", and consequently finds no integral place in the I-Thou
framework. We should expect to find a similar situation with regard to the
Mediator. For it is not easy to see how a concept of a Mediator can have an
integral place in this framework in which the emphasis is on the present
relation between God and man. We should aspect the doctrine of the Spirit to
play the dominant role, while the doctrine of the Mediator and the 'historic'
Atonement will represent a foreign element.
The question which concerns us is really the question of the
•objective' in the subject-subject framework. It is the question of the
'historic' Atonement effected once for all in the Incarnation. The first
thing that must be said about th±3 question in terms of Brunner's presentation
is that the suspicion that it must represent a foreign element would seem to be
unfounded. For Brunner's writings abound in references to the Atonement
effected through the Incarnation: "Faith is first and foremost a relationship
1
to this factum perfecting to God's saying act in the past." Not only is this
the ground of faith, bit it is an event of cosmic significance which is valid
for all time.
Here the decision is made in history. Jesus Christ is therefore
the fullness of time because In him occurs the turning point of
the ages. ...
... This is the decision which alone deserves the name of
decision in the profoundest sense of the word. It is therefore
the decision which either is never, or only once, made. 2
3
This Einmaligkeit, once-for-allness of the Atonement, although it would seem
to represent an intrusion in the I-Thou framework, is, in fact, one of the
dominant themes of Brunner's theology. This is not surprising when we realize
that Brunner is a theologian of the Reformation tradition. His central
affirmation is: "the Christian faith is simply faith in Jesus Christ."^
Brunner has affirmed his allegiance to the faith of the Fathers in
a memorable passage in the "Preface" to Per Mlttler.
I have nothing new to say; on the contrary, ray main concern is
to make clear that what is said here has been the faith of the
Christian Church from the very earliest days. 5
Yet, in spite of this claim to be re-affirming the age-old message of the
Christian faith, Brunner's remarks in the opening paragraph of this same
"Preface" reveal that there is also a novel element involved in his
presentation.
"God alone matters": this is the one question which concerns
humanity supremely. ... But the thing that matters supremely
is not whether man is "aware" of, or has a "feeling" for
"something divine", but whether he knows God as the One who
challenges him to decision. The question of God - in the form
of decision - is the question of Christ. Religion, and an
incipient "awareness" of the Divine, exists indeed in every
1 Dili E.T. p. A.
2 WGMM p. 62.
3 Mitt. p. 7. E.T. p. 25.
A Dn p. 281. E.T. p. 239 - 5 Mitt. "Vortwort" p. VI. E.T. "Preface" p. M.
part of the world, but there is only one "place" at which God
challenges man to decision, because He Himself confronts man:
Jesus Christ. 1
Brunner may be presenting "the faith of the Christian Church from the very
earliest days", but he is presenting it in an age which has learned the
superiority of the practical reason, the importance of 'decision', and the
awareness of 'confrontation'. Thus the question is: Does Brunner succeed in
presenting "the faith of the Christian Church from the very earliest days"
in this contest of 'decision' and 'confrontation'?
Once again, we encounter two lines of thought in Brunner's
presentation. One affirms the Einmaligkeit. "Only in the Reconciliation
2
achieved by Jesus Christ do we understand what Creation and Redemption mean."
The other line of thought is more compatible with the I-Thou framework. "The
'natural' existence of man ... must be understood ... from the two points of
3
view of creation and of sin." It seems that when Brunner is concerned about
'natural man', he neglects the Incarnation in the interests of the contrast
between creation and sin. This could mean that the sinner stands outside the
Atonement effected once for all, until he decides to set himself within its
compass, in which case the imperative would certainly be the primary word.
On the other hand, if the indicative is to be the primary word, then the
sinner must be proclaimed to be within the compass of the Atonement effected
once for all. This is not to deny the necessity for, or the reality of, the
human decision; nor is it to adopt a theory of universalism. Rather the point
is that the Gospel cannot be one possibility among others. Yet it cannot be
denied that Brunner seems to affirm such a position on occasion. The fact
that he does indicates a difficulty in his concept of the Einmaligkeit of the
Atonement.
1 Mitt. "Vortwort" p. V. E.T. "Preface" p. 13.
2 GuO p. 108. E.T. p. 123.
3 Ibid. p. 43. E.T. p. 62.
It is beyond the scope of our concern to evaluate Brunner's
Christology. let we cannot avoid this crucial aspect entirely, if we are
to appreciate the difficulty in his treatment of the Binmalifdcelt of the
Atonement. In his Christology, Brunner follows Melanchthon's famous dictum
that Christ is known from His benefits, thus approaching the Person of Christ
from His Work rather than the Work from the Person?" This procedure is not
surprising in view of Brunner's emphasis cm 'Act' as opposed to 'Being'. Nor
is it surprising that this procedure has come In for severe criticism. The
charge is that the emphasis on the Work of Christ has reduced the subsequent
presentation of His Person to the level of repetition.
The concept of Encounter has really robbed the traditional locus
on Christ's "person" of any raiaon d'etre as a separate theological
topic. The evidence of it is that the Dogmatics, Chapter XII, is
reduced almost entirely to repetition and polemic. The next
development may well be to take more seriously the union of work
and person and give a fully integrated analysis. If not, the
divine "person" will continue to hover over history as a raeta-
-physical abstraction. 2
It is this warning that must direct us to the difficulty in Brunner's
Ghristology. For the corollary to the divine Person hovering over history
is the affirmation that only the human person was actually in history. A
tendency in this direction is to be found in Brunner's presentation in
Per Mittler.
Christ has indeed assumed human nature, but not a human person.
Thus He may have assumed the possibility of being tempted - the
possibility of sin which is connected with the historical
personality - but He did not assume the corrupted personality
spoilt by Original Sin, that is, the necessity of falling in
temptation. To fall in temptation - in spite of Original Sin
±3 never a natural fact, but always and only a personal act.
Hence it is said of Christ: He was tempted in all points like
as we are - yet without sin. He stepped into the abyss. He
entered wholly into human life, even descending to the deepest
depths of the "sinful flesh". He allowed the powers of the abyss
to work their will upon Him - but He did not make the abyss
wider, for that would have destroyed the meaning of His coming. 3
1 DII p. 317. E.T. p. 271.
2 Edward A. Dowey Jr., "Redeemer and Redeemed as Persons in History",
The Theology of Brail Brunner. ed. Charles W. Kegley (New York, 1962), p. 204-
3 Mitt. p. 285. E.T. pp. 319-20.
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The curious thing about this refusal to permit Christ a human person is that
Brunner does not employ the concept of solidarity which he finds so important
in other connections. We really seem to be confronted here by a remnant of
the Augustiniun biological view of Original Sin, which Brunner elsewhere
combats so fiercely. Yet it is perhaps not so curious. For, as we have seen,
it is not really solidarity in sin, but the universality of sin, which finally
prevails in Brunner's theology. Thus while it is affirmed that Christ "entered
wholly into human life, even descending to the deepest depths of the 'sinful
flesh'", it is also affirmed that "He did not assume the corrupted personality
spoilt by Original Sin". This corresponds to the emphasis on the Divine
Person.
God does not send a man, but His Son. It is not a man who obeys
Him, but His Son. This is why this "sending" and this "willing-
-ness to be sent" cannot bo regarded as an event within the sphere
of history. 1
Undoubtedly this statement is true and important, and it is perhaps unfair to
criricize Brunner's complex Christology in so sketchily a manner. Yet it
must also be the case that the Son obeys "as man", and it is this aspect which
is weak in Brunner's Christology. For in the final analysis, the human
Person is an uneasy guest in the I~Thou framework. In spite of the fact that
the Einmaligkeit represents a consistent emphasis throughout Brunner's
theology, it really does not belong. The proper category for the I-Thou is
the present. Hence the emphasis on the Work of Christ at the expense of an
adequate integration of the Person, inclines well with this context. For
faith is concerned with the present Christ, the Christ who is known from His
benefits, and is somewhat at a loss to fit the 'historic' Christ into this
framework. This latter i3 more appropriate in thought than In faith. "What
1 Mitt. p. 277. E.T. p. 311.
2S2
is constitutive in thinking, that I think something - this distinction between
1
the objective and subjective - finds no place in faith.11 Of course, Brunner
is aware that "even God's Word in some way contains doctrine, and even the
2
faith that is the response of prayer contains knowledge"; but "doctrine seen
by itself, that is, separated from the Word of God as the event of encounter,
3
stands in the closest relation to the law." Thus the Elnraaligkeit suffers
the same fate as the Law in the I-Thou framework. The danger of this
situation is disclosed by Brunner himself? "The counterpart of unhistorical
religion, religion without a Mediator, is the failure to recognize the
radical character of the guilt of sin." We need only add that the radicalness
of guilt must be proportional to the condescension of the Mediator, and to the
Einmaligkeit of the Atonement effected in Him. In the I-Thou framework, as
Brunner presents it, this Einmaligkeit, the once-for-aHnesB, is not integral.
Thus as the incompatibility of the Law with the I-Thou framework carries with
it the suggestion that man can tell himself the Law, so the incompatibility of
the Einmaligkeit with the I-Thou framework carries with it the suggestion that
man can effect reconciliation in some measure himself. Both suggestions are
incompatible with Brunner's basic position, but they are none the less real.
E. RESPONSIBILITY AND SOLA GRATIA
a. Faith as Crisis of the Moral
Brunner's I-Thou framework relegates the Law as a material reality
to a peripheral position In the interest of the formal imperative. Luther
never thinks of 'Law' in a formal sense, other than as a designation of
legalism, but always means specific Laws, supremely the Law of Moses. Thus
1 WaB p. 62. E.T. p. 114-
2 Ibid. p. 68. E.T. p. 119.
3 Ibid. pp. 88-9. E.T. p. 138.
K Din E.T. p. 7.
we can suspect that this discrepancy will have repercussions in the concepts
of repentance which Brunner and Luther present, although once again Brunner
claims to be following Luther. His concern is to emphasize "what Luther calls
'law-repentance*, which he defends against the Antinoraians as a necessary
1
preliminary stage on the way to the repentance of faith." Once again, we
encounter a concept in Luther's theology over which there is great difference
of opinion, and therefore one which we cannot hope to examine adequately.
Relying on the compilation of Luther's key references to "Law and Gospel"
made by PIass, w© assume that Luther's basic position consists in the
contention that it is the office of the Law to drive a man to Grace.
It is true, we live In the New Testament and ought to have the
preaching of the Spirit only. However, since we are still clothed
in flesh and blood, the preaching of the letter is also necessary
in order first to put people to death by the Law and destroy all
their self-confidence, so that they may know themselves, become
hungry for the Spirit, and so be a people prepared for the preach-
-ing of the Spirit. Thus it is written of St. John that he
prepared the people for Christ by preaching repentance, which was
the ministry of the letter, and then led then to Christ, saying
(John 1:29): Behold Him, He is the Lamb of God who takes away the
sin of the whole world. This was the ministry of the Spirit. 2
The insistence on the priority of Law, and the preaching of repentance, creates
problems in the interpretation of Luther. This is particularly true in our
age which is so familiar with the idea of 'decision'. Thus it is a formidable
task in itself to determine just what is involved In Luther's statements to
the effect that repentance must precede the Gospel. Rather than enter into
this complex question, we observe a comment of Calvin on the subject, a
comment which we take to represent an important concern of the sola gratia
position.
Christ and John, it is said, in their discourses, first exhort
the people to repentance, and than add, that the kingdom of
heaven is at hand (Mattah. iii. 2, iv. 17). Such, too, is the
1 MiW p. 207n. E."T. p. 208n.
2 Luther, V.A. 7, 653ff., ILLass, p. 736, sec. 228-4.
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message which the Apostles received, and such the course which
Paul followed, as is narrated by Luke (Acts xx. 21). But
clinging superstitiously to the juxta-position of the syllables,
they attend not to the coherence of meaning in the words. For
when our Lord and John begin their preaching thus, "Repent, for
the kingdom of heaven is at hand" (Mattah. iii. 2), do they not
deduce repentance as a consequence of the offer of grace and
promise of salvation? The force of the words, therefore, is the
same as if it were said, As the kingdom of heaven is at hand, for
that reason repent. For Matthew, after relating that John so
preached, says that therein was fulfilled the prophecy concerning
the voice of one crying in the desert, "Prepare ye the way of the
Lord, make straight in the desert a highway for our God" (Isaiah
xl. 3). But in the Prophet that voice is ordered to commence with
consolation and glad tidings. Still, when we attribute the origin
of repentance to faith, we do not dream of some period of time in
which faith is to give birth to it: we only wi3h to show that a
man cannot seriously engage in repentance unless he know that he
is of God. But no man is truly persuaded that he is of God until
he have embraced his offered favour. 1
This insistence that we must "deduce repentance as a consequence of the offer
of grace and promise of salvation" may well be representative of Luther's
doctrine as well. In any event, we take it that it is an essential affirmation
of the sola gratia principle.
When we turn to Brunner's presentation of 'repentance', we find,
once again, an uncompromising affirmation of the sola gratia perspective.
"It is not the word of demand which annililates me, but the word of assurance
that creates me anew, which makes the change from autonomy to dependence a
2
reality." This is so because "only through the assurance of grace do I
3
become truly a man who depends on God." But at this point we encounter the
difficulty which soots to be involved in Luther's doctrine, namely, the
difficulty of the priority of repentance.
Only through the imperative "Repent" do we come to the indicative
of faith, of the new life 'in the Spirit'. For this reason faith
itself is called the obedience of faith. ... Even faith in the
forgiving mercy of God stands under the imperative: "BelieveJ" 4
1 Calvin, Inst. III. iii. ii.
2 Dili E.T. p. 144-
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid. E.T. p. 234.
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We have declined to investigate this strand of thought in Luther's presentation,
but we must examine its implications in Brunner's formulation. For it is
critically important for the maintenance of the sola gratia principle that
the imperative be issued only after and within the context of the indicative
of grace.
Brunner'a development of this theme Involves a dialectic between
lav-repentance and the repentance of faith. "Faith itself must continually
issue from repentance, as, on the other hand, repentance is only completed in
1
faith." The adequacy of this dialectic depends on a distinction between the
repentance which precedes faith and the repentance which is only possible
within faith. It is this necessity for a clear distinction between these two
types of repentance which constitutes the chief difficulty in Luther's doctrine.
His contention that Law must drive a man to Grace may mean that man must see
the hopelessness of his situation under the Law, or it may mean that man must
actually repent of his legalism prior to the knowledge of grace. If this latter
sense of repentance, the repentance which recognizes the error of legalism
prior to faith, is involved in Luther's theology, then the sola gratia principle
is endangered. For it must be a primary axiom of the sola gratia principle
that man's self-willed alienation, his guilt, means a total inversion of his
relation to God which cannot be recognized for what it is until the original
relation is restored. The difficulty in the interpretation of Luther at this
point is accentuated by the fact that we are posing a question which Luther
did not raise. We are asking: How did Luther deal with the false autonomy of
sin? This notion of autonomy is essentially a modern concept. The importance
of this difference of perspective for a proper understanding of Luther's
doctrine of the two realms has been indicated by G. W. Forell.
1 GuO p. 67. E.T. p. 81.
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For an understanding of Luther's practical principle of social
ethics, it is basic to understand his teaching of the two realms
of human existence, the secular and the spiritual and to keep
firmly in mind that the very word secular creates a semantic
problem in our time. For Luther the secular realm was also God's
realm, and modern naturalistic and agnostic connotations of this
term tend to confuse the meaning of Luther's thought. 1
This difference of perspective is particularly crucial in the matter of
repentance. For whatever Luther's understanding of the repentance which must
precede faith, it is a repentance within the context of God's activity. If
this may mean that man must repent through the Law, before he can receive the
confort of the Gospel, this does not carry the implication that man must of
himself come to the Gospel via the Law. It is God's Law which breaks man,
the material Law which must be preached. Thus the only question hero, with
reference to the sola gratia principle, is whether man really can see his
predicament in terms of the Law prior to the preaching of the Gospel.
Brunner's Insistence on the priority of repentance presents this
same difficulty. "Man must stop on the way he is going and must turn around.
2
... The preaching of repentance is therefore the first task." But Brunner
is not unaware of the difficulty involved in this concept.
How can we expect that proud man should renounce this self-defence,
when precisely self-defence and self-assertion are the sign of his
condition as sinful man?
There are here only two possibilities: Either we believe that
sinful man can himself achieve the penitence necessary for faith,
this conversion and self-surrender. If so, then his sin cannot be
so bad as we have hitherto claimed. Or else something from outside
of him must penetrate within him to transform his unreadiness into
readiness, his self-assertion and resistance into self-surrender
and acceptance. In the first case, theological thought is involved
in a self-contradiction. We believe man capable of acknowledging
himself as a sinner, and at the same time we believe him able to
achieve this knowledge himself, by which he would prove that he is
not so bad a sinner after all. 3
If one is to maintain that repentance must precede faith, then one must
carefully distinguish this repentance from the repentance of faith which is
1 G.W. Foreil, Faith Active in Love: An Investigation of the Principles
Underlying Luther's Social Ethics (New York, 1954-), p. 15.
2 WaB p. 114. E.T. p. 161. JDIIIE.T. P- 10-
287
no human possibility. Brunner presents this difficulty with a clarity which
is not characteristic of Luther's presentation. But this divergence is a
reflection of the more basic divergence of perspectives between Brunner and
Luther. The concern with the natural possibilities of man, around which the
question of repentance as a human possibility revolves, is foreign to Luther.
Luther's concern is to emphasize that man cannot justify himself before God.
In Brunner's perspective this emphasis is augmented by the question as to
whether man can of himself Icnow that he cannot justify himself before God.
Thus not only is the question of the priority of repentance raised, but also
the question of the human possibility of repentance.
With the question of repentance as a human possibility, we move
from the sphere of theology to that of anthropology. Thus we are faced not
only with the problem of the relation of repentance and faith, which is the
problem of Luther's presentation, but also with the problem of the psychology
of repentance. It is here that the distinction between Luther and Brunner is
particularly evident.
The presupposition of faith is repentance. It Is of course true,
that in the last resort even repentance is the work of God and is
only fulfilled in faith. But it also precedes faith - faith in
the specific Christian sense. At the outset it belongs to the
"human" sphere, to the Law. 1
The former part of this statement may reflect Luther's position in so far as
he emphasizes the priority of repentance, but the latter part represents a
thought which is completely foreign to Luther. For in Lather's thought there
is no indication of Law being a corollary of the human. It is true that for
Luther legalism is the natural attitude of man to God.
The Law is a directive of what we are to do, tut the Gospel treats
of that which God wants to give. The first we cannot do, but the
1 Mitt. p. 430. E.T. p. 529
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second we can accept by faith. However, note what men are like:
the first, which they cannot do, they want to do; but the second,
which they should accept, they do not want to believe. 1
let this is something very different from equating the Law with the human.
2
Brunner's contention that "the law is the mark of humanity" is representative
of Luther's thought only in so far as man naturally thinks of his relation to
God legalistically, whereas the free grace of the Gospel is unthinkable. But
Brunner means much more than this In his identification of Law with the sphere
of the human, lie means that Law is really man's possession. Man as an
autonomous being is the possessor of the Law. "The consciousness of autonomy
3
originates in the Law, as the Law is only thinkable through autonomy." It
is here that the divergence between Luther and Brunner, with regard to the
Law, becomes most significant. As ve saw, Brunner divests the material Law,
which it always is in Luther, of all content, and reintroduces it as the
formal imperative. Thus we are not concerned with the Lax/, but with the fact
of law, legality. By this manoeuvre, Brunner can move from the human to the
divine in a setting which is completely foreigi to the way of thought of the
Reformers. For the Law is man's law in so far as man has a sense of obligation;
it is God's Law in so far as man's ultimate obligation is to God.
This formality of Law allows Brunner to equate law with logic, with
morality, and with the demand of God. Thus law represents a human possession
and a divine imperative.
The law is the principle of the crisis in every sense of the word:
as crisis of the critical thinking, i.e. aa principle of the
separation between the given and the non-given, the being and the
ought-to-be, the relative and the absolute; as "crisis", as highest
point of that "sickness unto death", in which man first in his
relation to the absolute will of God comes to the full knowledge of
his needy situation, in that knowledge of "radical evil", as that
"moment" therefore, when the servant of guilt can do nothing isore
1 Luther, ELass, p. 741, sec. 229A*
2 "Gegetg und Offenbarung", p. 291.
3 Ibid. p. 296.
than cry out from the bottom of hie hardened heart and cast himself
on grace; and for that reason also crisis in the original sense of
the word: Judgment.
... Ethics, claim, responsibility, law and crisis are identical
concepts. 1
Obviously this is something very different from the perspective of Luther1 s
contrast between Law and Gospel. The fact is that Brunner's concern is very
different from that of Luther, although he does not seem to be aware of this.
For it is Brunner's concern to claim natural man for God,
Even as an unbeliever, man knows of the Categorical Imperative, of
a spiritual power that limits his own will ... In all the moral
law there is something that limits man, and sets a bound to his
caprice. No one lives wholly without consciousness of responsibility. 2
The concern to distinguish rightly between the Law and the Gospel, which is
Luther's main concern, becomes in Brunner the concern to co-ordinate the
Law-Gospel dialectic with the natural self-understanding of man. The result
is that the dialectic between the two Words of God becomes the dialectic
within man himself. The situation is not helped by Brunner's refusal to call
it psychological.
... knowledge of sin comes first from the law without grace, mere
danand.
The first effect of this law, its supreme achievement - again
in principle, and not from the point of view of psychology - is
the despairing self-knowledge of man: "I died" (Rom. 7:10). ...
In principle this is the last word which lies within the sphere
of man's own possibility. But actually man does not admit his
lostness. That which "in principle" is possible - for our concern,
indeed, is about that which man ought to say to himself if he were
wholly honest - this in fact does not happen. Man is too profoundly
a sinner to be able to admit his sin. 3
That man should know his situation as a sinner, "in principle", is a thought
which is foreign to the Reformation perspective. Luther's insistence on
Law-repentance raises the question as to whether man really can know his
situation as a sinner from the Law. But even this does not presuppose that
1 JfaW p. 312.
2 Dili E.T. p. U9.
3 R&R pp. A2V5.
the sinner should know his situation himself. This is a thought which owes
its origin to the moral idealism which provides the context for Brunner's
polemical presentation of the Christian message. In this setting, Brunner
makes the unfortunate assumption that "if the idea of autonomy is conceived
in a purely formal way as the Idea of the good will, then it is just as
1
Christian as it is Idealistic." This underlying assumption that "in
principle", or "ideally", man stands on his own feet opposite God represents
a thought which is totally foreign to the Reformation perspective. In so
far as this idea prevails in Brunner's theology, his presentation of the
sola gratia principle is distorted. This is particularly important in this
question of repentance. Brunner's doctrine of faith as the crisis of the
moral deviates from the sola gratia principle in so far as the moral is the
sphere of the human, and, on this basis, man is called upon to exercise his
1responsibility'.
Nowhere could it be more evident than at this point that LUTHER
and KANT are so close to each other, and yet so remote from each
other. Ultimately, with his doctrine of the "moral revolution"
KANT is completely Pelagian: "For, so long as the Moral Law
commands 'Thou shalt become a better man', the conclusion is
inevitable 'that thou canst'." In spite of his theory of "radical
evil" Kant completely overlooked - without understanding - Paul' s
and Luther's theory of the "enslaved will". 2
What Brunner overlooks is that it is not only the concept of the "enslaved
will" which distinguishes Luther and Kant, but the fundamental perspectives
from which each is working. Kant's "Moral Law" finds no place in Dither. In
so far as Brunner builds on this "You ought", the formal Categorical Imperative,
he presents an adaptation of Dither's theology to the perspective of moral
idealism.
The result of this combination of Reformation theology and Kantian
1 Mitt. 88n. E.T. p. 112n.
2 GuO p. 571. E.T. p. 590.
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moral theory is a perspective which can only be described as "synergistic".
Sola gratia means "God first".
The relation between God and man is thus always reciprocal, yet
never interchangable, like the relation between left and right.
God is always and inconvert ibly the first, man always and
invonvertibly the second in this relation. 1
Brmmer's central theological position might be summed up in the phrase,
"Divine initiative and human response". The inadequacy of this position can
be presented in Brunner's own words.
... synergism doubtless intends to stress the personal character
of the act of appropriation, but it does not understand the
comprehensive character of grace. It does not understand that
it is due to grace that we can thus respond to God. 2
This recognition of the inadequacy of a doctrine of sola gratia which is
limited to "God first" does not change the fact that it is this formula which
is most appropriate to Brunner's basic position. References to the
comprehensive character of grace are by no means lacking, but this concern is
not integrated into the basic framework which Brunner presents. This is true
not only of his theology, but of his sermons as well, and is most evident in
what is perhaps his most famous sermon, at least in the English speaking
world, "The Great Invitation".
The inviting is God's concern ... But the appropriation of the
message is our concern, the opening of the door, for God does
not deny us the freedom of coming to Him. 3
Dimmer'a concern to emphasise human 'responsibility' triumphs over his
allegiance to the Reformation perspective in that the responsibility he is
concerned about is modelled cm the moral answerability of Kantian moral
theory. It is this question of responsibility which is the chief concern,
and the Achilles' heel, of Brunner's theology.
1 WaB p. 36. E T." p. 89.
2 GuQ p. 587. E.T. p. 608.
3 "The Great Invitation", The Great Invitation, tr. Harold Knight (London,
1955), p. 42.
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b. The Ambiguity of 'Reasons ibllity1
Brucmer deviates from the Reformation perspective in his concern
to emphasize responsibility. His contention that the Christian faith views
man primarily in terms of responsibility neglects a basic element of the
Reformation view. But we have seen that Brenner does not claim to be re¬
affirming the Reformation position, as such. It is his contention that the
Reformers succumbed to a deterministic perspective in their concern for the
sola gratia principle. Thus we cannot charge him with deviating from the
Reformers where he believed them to be wrong. let Brunner also wants to
affirm the sola gratia principle, and it is thi3 conflict which presents
the difficulty in his theology. For whatever inadequacies may be involved
in the basic positions of the Reformers, it cannot be affirmed that Brunner
has provided a more satisfactory formulation of the sola gratia principle.
It is our conclusion that his basic structure is synergistic, and that this
is so because his concern for responsibility is formulated under the influence
of Kantian moral theory.
The term 'responsibility' is Inherently ambiguous. We have
isolated three possible meanings which it seems to have in Brenner'a writings.
First, it may me a purely formal statement of the contention that human life
is essentially responsive. Secondly, it may have a moral meaning In the sense
that man is answerable for his actions. Thirdly, it may refer to man's
ability to respond. In addition to these three senses of the term, there is
a further ambiguity in terms of the context in which the term is used. For
there is a difference between moral and religious responsibility. The basic
problem in Brenner's presentation is that these two senses of the terra are
not clearly distinguished. Beeause of this there is a prevailing tendency
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to move from moral responsibility to religious responsibility, without
acknowledgement of the discrepancy between, the two. It is at this point that
the sola gratia principle is endangered. For moral responsibility refers to
the accountability of a moral agent for an act, or acts, performed. This
responsibility Implies freedom, in that one is held responsible for that
which one has freely chosen. Thus, at least in theory, moral responsibility
demands as its corollary the freedom of the moral agent. Religious
responsibility, however, is more complex. For religious responsibility is
concerned not only with sins, but with sinj and while man is only held
responsible for sin because he has himself freely become sinner, there is
also an element of inevitability here which must be taken into account. This
element of inevitability, which Christian theology has traditionally affirmed
in its doctrine of Original Sin, renders impossible a one to one relationship
between sin and responsibility, such as is at least theoretically predicable
of the moral situation. This implies that religious responsibility is
corporate as well as individual. There is also another side to religious
responsibility which distinguishes it from the sphere of the moral. For the
fact that religious responsibility refers to sin, rather than simply to sins,
implies that it is a total responsibility. Thus religious responsibility is
responsibility for guilt. But the sinner who is imraeshed in the self-willed
alienation from God cannot be expected to recognize his predicament so long
as he remains in it. The fact that sin is only really sin "before God" implies
that man must be restored to his original relation to God before he can
recognize his religious responsibility. But this can happen only through bis
being relieved of this responsibility. It is only through the Gospel message,
in which man learns that Christ has taken his responsibility for sin, that
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man can appreciate what that responsibility means. We have seen that Brenner
presents us with two different lines of thought. On the one hand, there is
an affirmation of the sola gratia principle of the Reformers which demonstrates
a concern for the issues which we have outlined as being distinctive to the
category of religious responsibility. On the other hand, there is a sympathy
with the setting of moral idealism as presented by Kant, a polemical sympathy
'which undermines the sola gratia principle in so far as the latter is pressed
into the mould of this anti-Kantian polemic. We must now observe the basis
of this difficulty in Brenner1 s presentation.
In our consideration of the ambiguity in Brenner's employment of
the term 'responsibility', a basic fact has been implicitly involved which
must now be made explicit. This fact is that the term 'responsibility',
particularly as a religious term, is of relatively recent origin. The
1
original meaning of 'responsible1 seems to have been "correspondent", as in
"The Mouth large, but not responsible to so large a Body." This meaning of
the term in the late seventeenth centruy is far removed from the moral-
religious context in which the term came to be used in the middle of the
nineteenth century, as in "The Great God has treated us as responsible beings."
One modern writer, who is aware of the history of this term, does not regard
the fact itself as particularly significant, except in that it gives us a
new means for articulating depths of meaning previously unarticulated.
This history may mean nothing more, of course, than that men
have found a new sign for a well-known phenomenon and an old
ideaj many writers, indeed, so use it, as their definitions
plainly show. But it is also possible that the word gives us
a new symbol with which to grasp and understand not a really
well-known phenomenon or an old idea but the actuality of that
human existence of which other aspects came into view when we
employed the older symbols of the mores, or of the ethos, or
of what is due, or of being virtuous, that is, being manly.
1 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1962)
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I believe that this is the casej the symbol of responsibility
contains, as it were, hidden references, allusions, and similies
which are in the depths of our mind as we grope for understanding
of ourselves and toward definition of ourselves in action. 1
This evaluation of the significance of the late emergence of the term
•responsibility' presupposes a continuity of thought through the centuries
such as does not, in fact, exist. As it stands, this evaluation may be quite
adequate to the sphere of "the mores" or of "being virtuous", but if it is
extended to the sphere of religion proper in such a statement as "The Great
God has treated us as responsible beings", then we must anticipate difficulties
in enunciating the Christian faith, as it has been traditionally formulated,
with the aid of this category. This difficulty is particularly crucial for
Brunner in his concern to use this term as a basic category of his theology,
and also told to the basic perspective of the Reformers. For the Reformers
did not speak of 'responsibility1. The term 'responsibility' combines
various concerns of the Reformers, the concern for man's response, his
2
obligation, his accountability, and his culpability. Thus whoa Brunner uses
the one term 'responsibility', he can move from moral answerability to
answerability to God in a context which i3 totally foreign to the Reformation
perspective.
The ironical feature of this predicament In which Brunner is involved
is that he appreciates the background to this difficulty so well. No one has
been more insistent than Brunner on the revolutionary significance of the
contrast between the perspective of modern man and that of former ages.
It becomes increasingly plain to us modern men that a profound
gulf separates the "modern world" from the world of the Early
Church and of the Middle ages. ... This division cuts through
the whole of life, and in particular through the foundations;
it separates us at the very point at which the modern man as
such is constituted. ...
1 H. Richard Niebuhr, The Responsible Self (New York, 1963), p. 4B.
2 Holmes Rolston III, The Understanding of Sin and Responsibility in the
Teaching of John Calvin, Unpublished Thesis (Uhiv. of Edinburgh, 1958),
pp. 207?f.
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It does not cut across - as Liberalism used to think - the
point at which the Reformed faith aid Catholicism parted company.
Rather both of them stand on the further side of the gulf, over
against the modern world. In their belief in the Christian
revelation they are at one, in spite of all the differences
between them; they form the one Christian Church. 1
Brunnar goes on to define this distinction in terms of the centrality of the
Christian revelation in the Ancient and Mediaeval Church as opposed to the
assumption of general revelation in modem thought. Elsewhere, he
characterizes modem life in terms of the centrality of the concern for
2
freedom in the sense of autonomy, so that "modem man is, in relation to
3
ancient and mediaeval man a statue in relation to a relief." It is
most curious that Brunner has not applied this recogiitian of the variance
between the perspectives of modem man and his ancient and mediaeval
counterparts to the question of responsibility. For in his failure to do
this, he has combined elements of moral answerability and religious
obligation in a way inappropriate to the perspective of the Reformers. The
result is a concept of man which is very different from that of the Reformers.
For, as another modem theologian, Paul Tillich, has observed, "'Responsibility1
4
presupposes the fully developed ability to respond as a person." The final
result is an infringement of the sola gratia principle in so far as man is
addressed as a 'responsible being' prior to the proclamation of God's gracious
condescension wherein he takes man's 'responsibility' upon Himself.
It is instructive to notice the solution to this problem presented
by this same theologian who has pointed out the implication of the term
•responsibility', Paul Tillich. For his solution has been subject to censure
by Brunner. It is Tillich's contention that Luther's "justification by faith"
does not represent a live option for modem theology.
1~Mitt. pp. 77-?). E.T. p. 102.
2 Das Gmndproblea dor Ethik, p. 7.
3 Ibid. p. 3.
4 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology (London, 1957), II, 48.
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It has been recently maintained ... that Luther's doctrine of
Justification by Faith is no longer relevant for us at the
present day, since our generation does not live under the
burden of legalism, and the fear of the wrath of God; this
statement entirely overlooks the fact that the language alone
has altered; the fact remains. 1
It is curious that the gulf between the Reformation and modern man which
"separates us at the very point at which the modem man as such is
constituted", should become merely a linguistic difference in such questions
as "legalism" and "the fear of the wrath of God". Tillich does not share
Brunner's conviction at this point. He recognises the gulf as extending to
these central questions of Luther's theology, and on this basis rejects
Luther's doctrine of "justification by faith" as a meaningless concept for
modern man. But it is the concept, and not the truth with which it is
concerned, which Tillich rejects. Thus his contention is that the truth which
Luther expressed in his doctrine of "justification by faith" must be expressed
by means of concepts which are meaningful to modem man. The chief concept
which Tillich employs in this connection is "acceptance".
Since it (I.e. justification] is a biblical term it cannot be
rejected in the Christian churches either, but it should be
replaced in the practice of teaching and preaching by the term
"acceptance", in the sense that we are accepted by God although
being unacceptable according to the criterion of the law (our
essential being put against us) and that we are asked to accept
this acceptance. 2
The acceptance of acceptance may be quite intelligible to modem man, but it
is doubtful if this can convey the content of Luther's concept of "justification
by faith". What it means to describe the law as "our essential being put
against us" depends on what our essential being is, and how It could ever be
"put against us". In the end, Tillich really seems to be contending that
theological concepts are reducible to psychological concepts. To accept
1 GuO p. 572. E.T. p. 590.
2 Tillich, Systematic Theology (London, 1964.), Ill* 239
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acceptance is a psychological phenomenon which is very different from
standing in the dialectic of the demand of the Law and the comfort of the
Gospel. It is this reduction of the theological content of "justification
by faith" to the level of a psychological phenomenon which has provoked
Brunner's censure. Yet Tillich's answer to the modern predicament is
instructive for an understanding of Brunner's solution. For Brunner's
contention that the difference between the Reformation position and the
modern perspective is merely a linguistic one with regard to "legalism" and
"the fear of the wrath of God", reveals a basic confidence that a bridge
exists between the psychological orientation, such as Tillich proposes, and
the Reformation outlook. This bridge Brunner finds in the fact of law, the
inherent legality of human life, the Gesetzlichkeitsstruktur of huaan life.
With the aid of Kant's formal Categorical Imperative, Brunner builds a bridge
between modern autonomous man and the man who stands under the Law-Gospel
dialectic as Luther presented it. He is able to do this because of the inherent
ambiguity in the modern concept of responsibility. As pure fact of obligation,
responsibility can refer to ray accountability as a moral agent and to ray
ultimate obligation to God. The result is a concept of man as "responsible
being", a concept which infringes upon the sola gratia principle in that man
is addressed on his own terms, and called to account for himself. The final
result is a synergistic formula of the divine-human relation, wherein God and
man stand face to face.
To be addressed by God means: to be drawn to account by Him. His
claim is the question: Adam where are you? In this claim at the
same time lies the frightful seriousness of Judgment, of being-
accountable, and the valuation of ourselves as persons. This
claim, which makes U3 re-aponsible, establishes us as free, self-
acting, "autonomous" spirit-beings. 1
1 Mxw p. 159
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The contrast with the Reformation position is evident in the fact that for the
Reformers this was the essence of sin, that man took life into his own hands.
Man was not meant to be "responsible", but to live by grace. Of course,
Brunner is not unaware of this. But his loyalty to the Reformation perspective
is weakened by a second strain in his theology, the polemical presentation of
the sola gratia principle in the context of Kantian moral idealism. Thus the
ambiguity inherent in this relatively modern terra, 'responsibility*, both
facilitates the development of Brunner's position and accounts for the major
difficulties which that position involves.
c. Brunner's Contribution
To question the adequacy of the terra 'responsibility' as a concept
for presenting the Christian Gospel in terms of the sola gratia principle is
to question the kernel of Brunner's theology. Thus it would seem that our
evaluation of Brunner's work must be essentially negative. But his failure
to clarify the ambiguity of this terra, and to take this into account In the
development of his theology, does not invalidate Brunner's position as such.
The basic problem is his contention that man can be addressed on the basis of
his responsibility. This implies that man as a moral agent must be challenged
with the 'claim' of the Gospel. The result is a concept of man as an
autonomous being, free to accept or reject grace. But this represents only
one strand of Brunner's presentation, although it is an important strand. His
basic position consists in an affirmation of the sola gratia principle of the
Reformers, wherein man is seen only in the context of grace. Thus it is clear
that whatever Brunner says about 'natural man' is not said because of a concern
for the 'rights of man', but rather because of a truly pastoral concern. "We
3GC
are not trying to save man's 'face' or his honorj here our one concern is
with the question of the preaching of the Gospel, religious instruction, and
the 'cure of souls'.""*" It is in this context that Brunner has devoted himself
to the task of "apologetics", or "eristic theology" as he later called it,
and developed the contested subject of "the point of contact". If in so
doing, he has concentrated on man as a moral agent to the detriment of an
adequate expression of the comprehensive nature of grace, it is, nevertheless,
true that his concern is a legitimate and indispensable one. Consequently
Brunner has made a major contribution to twentieth century theology precisely
in this area. We may mention three particular issues which Brunner has
enphasizod to the edification of modern theology.
First, Brunner has rightly dwelt on the fact that the Gospel must
'strike' man where he is, and that man must be persuaded of his need for the
Gospel. In spite of the fact that man's true need cannot be recognized until
it has been fulfilled through the Gospel, it remains true that Christian
theology must exert every effort to uncover the sham and pretence of man's
'natural' existence. Thus there is "another task of theology" which is not
really another task at all.
We know well that no human skill can create faith, but only the
Spirit of God. But this Spirit of God works, where he works, not
as dark mystical-magical power, but He works in that He speaks.
There is no other faith and no other reception of the Spirit than
that which is accomplished as a "becoming convinced" of the Truth
of the Word. 1
Theology must follow her lord in the condescension into the world of flesh
where men live, that they may be grasped by the power of His resurrection.
In spite of the difficulties in his isolation of man's "sense of responsibility"
as the "point of contact" for the Gospel, there is much in Brenner's reflections
llMp. 413.
2 "Die andere Aufgabe der Theologie"» p. 299«
on the predicament of modern man which is of the utmost importance for
theology.
Secondly, while we have been critical of Brunner's re-interpretation
of Luther in terms of the Kantian setting, it remains true that his task as a
theologian is decidedly different from that of lather. "No theology is ever
final, and the limitations of every age call for the corrections of the next."'*'
Theology, like every other human occupation, is subject to the limitations
and errors of human understanding. But it is not only the humanness of
theology which constitutes the uniqueness of its challenge in every age, but
the challenge of the age itself. "Theology is the struggle of faith with, the
2
powers of the Zeitgeist." In this struggle with the Zeitgeist» Brunner
finds his major role. If it is true that Brunner's theology is unacceptable
in so far as the Zeitgeist influences the central theological message, it
remains true also that Brunner has made an appreciable contribution to the
theological clarification of our age. lie has knowingly risked the dangers of
this struggle with the Zeitgeist.
There is undoubtedly a great danger - proved by the history of
theology in the last century - lest theology, in order to make
itself understood, should adopt the Zeitgeist and secularize
itself by way of escaping from a false sacraliam. But this
danger ought to be no hindrance to the recognition and acceptance
of the task. 3
Brunner is treading the dangerous path of a theologian who is endeavouring to
interpret the Christian faith as it is mediated by the Reformers in the context
of the Zeitgeist of the twentieth century. As such, he is particularly
vulnerable. let this vulnerability is also his strength, in that he has
wrestled with many of the issues which are involved in an appreciation of the
Gospel message in the modern setting.
1 "The Present-Day Task of 'Theology"', Religion in Life, Vll'lV Ho.' 2 (1939)«
p. 182.
2 "Secularism as a Problem for the Church", The International Review of
Missions. XJX (1930), p. 507.
3 Ibid. p. 508.
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Thirdly, in addition to Brunner's contribution to the theological
understanding of modern man, and of the problems involved in presenting the
Gospel in the modem situation, Brunner's more strictly theological concern,
that Christianity be seen first and foremost within the personal dimension,
represents a distinct contribution to modern theology. If his emphasis on
the personal as contrasted to the rational raises questions as to the
significance of the impersonal, it is also true that his concern for the
personal constitutes a sober warning to the intellectualizing tendency in
theology.
Faith is more difficult for none than for the theologian, and
for none is it harder to be a Christian than for the baptized.
The reason is that there is no temptation so great as the
temptation to put a theological system in the place of faith,
and membership of the visible church in place of being a
Christian. 1
If we have had occasion to question Brunner's appreciation for the depth of
the Incarnation, we must be ready to learn from his appreciation for the
breadth of the Incarnation. Itfiatever the deficiencies in Brunner's
theological position, he will not let us rest content with some other
formulation. Be, as a theologian, is not deceived by the theological task.
Consequently he points us ever beyond theology to the Lord we serve, and in
so doing provides a most needed emphasis in an age which puts such a premium
on the intellect.
These brief indications of three of the areas in which Brunner has
made a distinct contribution to modern theology suggest that it would have
been possible to give a much more positive account of Brunner's life-work
than that which we have presented. Undoubtedly this is true. But it has not
been our concern to present Brunner's 'theology' as such, but rather to examine
1 RPh p. 98. E.T. p. 188.
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his understanding of the themes of sin and responsibility, and to do this in
the light of the Reformation principle of sola gratia. In this light, Brunner's
presentation is open to severe criticism. The ambiguity of the term
'responsibility', and the synergistic tendency in Brunner's presentation of
the I-Thou framework, provide an inadequate base for the sola gratia principle.
Yet even in terras of this Reformation standard, Brunner's presentation
represents a thoroughly legitimate and important concern. For it is true that
the human response is important, and that man is "responsible". Brunner
presents this concern most poignantly in a sermon on "Election".
The Word of God does not support those who desire to persuade us
out of our sense of responsibility and the freedom which it
necessarily involves and to say to us "You can do nothing at all".
To what purpose otherwise would the Word of God address us? Why
would God otherwise in the whole history of His self-revelation
be at such pains to win the heart of man? indeed, why would God
have gone to the extreme length of taking humanity upon Himself
and become man to reveal His love and His holiness if in spite of
everything all is as it will be, and if after all, our decision
and our opening of our hearts does not count? In all this self-
revealing action God is speaking with us in order to draw us to
His side. 1
Undoubtedly Brunner is quite right in his concern for the human response, and
in his emphasis an the ultimate significance of this response. Yet the
problem for theology at this point is to emphasize the importance of the
human response while maintaining that this response is only possible within
the context of the prior decision of God. In this situation B^vmner sometimes
suggests that the response involves a choice between two possibilities. Thus
while his concern is a thoroughly legitimate one, his method of implementing
it leaves Mm exposed to the charge of synergism.
We have considered Brunner as a theologian of the Reformation
tradition, for there can be no doubt that this is how he would wish to be
1 "Election", The Great Invitation, p. 46.
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regarded. By this standard his basic position is vulnerable. let it is a
curious feature of Brunner's presentation that he himself is aware of the
difficulties which his fonnulation involves. The fact is that Brunner is a
comprehensive theologian. Nothing essential is lacking in his presentation.
But as a systematic theologian, formulating a distinct theological position,
he neglects important considerations which elsewhere find a place in his
writings. Thus in the final analysis, Brunner is his own best interpreter.
Consequently, if there is any merit in the criticism which is here offered,
it is largely due to insights gleaned from Brunner himself. The most
important consideration in our analysis which does not find a place in
Brunner's theology is the ambiguity in the relatively modern word ' respons-
-ability1. Thus the final comment must be one of puzzlement, and that on
two counts. First, it is striking that Brunner should suppress insights,
which are evident in the broad scope of his writings, when he comes to
develop his systematic formulation of the basic reality of the Christian
faith. Second, it is inexplicable that Brunner should have neglected his
penetrating insights into the chasm which separates the modem perspective
from that of the ancient and mediaeval world whan he concerned himself with
the specifically modem term 'responsibility'.
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